A Bird is Known By its Flight

An exploration of the geostrategic relationship between the United States and Uzbekistan since the War on Terror

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Abstract:

This thesis is a qualitative case study using process tracing to explore how the need for cooperation on the War on Terror in Afghanistan affected US Government criticism of human rights abuses committed by its ally, Uzbekistan. This thesis is a contribution to the foreign policy discourse on the tension between defense and human rights in Central Asia over the past decade. The case study will demonstrate that the US was willing to remain a passive observer of human rights violations in Uzbekistan, provided the Government of Uzbekistan would cooperate with US geopolitical interests in the War on Terror.

The traditional assumption of foreign policy being produced by a unified government acting as a single state has been replaced by a competition of divergent organizations acting upon the interests of their bureaus. During the War on Terror, there was a palpable tension between the different factions of US foreign affairs, and the US Government’s actions were clearly reflective of these diverse interests rather than a unitary actor. Different parts of the US Government jockeyed for influence on foreign policy, with human rights concerns overshadowed by defense interests. The US legislature withheld payments to Uzbekistan in response to concerns over human rights abuses, but the Department of Defense and other senior Bush administration officials continued to seek ways to partner with the Government of Uzbekistan.

The examination of US-Uzbekistan relations since the War on Terror provides a clear picture of what happens when geostrategic military interests come into conflict with human rights. The US Government established military cooperation with Uzbekistan quickly after the September 11th terrorist attacks. However, the relationship stalled out in 2005 at the same time as the Government of Uzbekistan opened fire on its citizens during what appeared to be a peaceful protest in the town of Andijan. Defense cooperation stopped completely, and then the US Government was more vocal about human rights abuses. However, once Uzbekistan was needed again for transit in the War on Terror, such human rights concerns became more muted, and Uzbekistan began receiving military aid again. This thesis uses these three critical junctures to analyze the complex causality of geopolitical interests of the US Government in Uzbekistan, including the extent to which outside pressure related to the Andijan massacre in May 2005 served as a tipping point in US Government – Government of Uzbekistan relations.
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The United States (US) Government is not a monolithic entity, either at home or abroad. Dissenting voices and contradictory opinions are cornerstones of a democratic system and are evident in the leadership of the US Government. Within the sphere of international relations, a complex web of individual branches of the US Government work to amplify their own agendas. There is no absolute as to the hierarchy of interests in the sphere of US foreign relations. Instead, there is a natural jockeying among the various bureaus for a premier position of influence from which to achieve their objectives. Privatization of traditional government functions adds an extra layer of complexity and influence. Each leader chooses which voices to listen to and which ones to ignore. Decisions on international affairs may also be driven by external events and their impact on allies or enemies. This thesis is grounded in the key schools of thought on modern international relations and their applicability to US relations with Central Asia and the former Soviet Union. There is robust debate as to the level of patterns visible in international affairs, and the extent to which patterns predict state behavior. By studying key moments in international relations, insight is gained into trends and priorities that inform future foreign policy decisions.

This thesis is a qualitative case study examining recent US foreign policy towards Uzbekistan to explore the extent to which the need for cooperation on the War on Terror in Afghanistan affected US Government criticism of the human rights abuses of its Central Asian ally. This thesis is a contribution to the foreign policy discourse on the tension between US foreign policy on defense and human rights in Central Asia over the past decade. In doing so, this thesis contributes to the literature on bureaucratic logics in the public sector and the effect of growing defense institutions on the policy-making process of the US Government. It is of interest to human rights organizations or other parties looking to gain insights into Uzbekistan or to political leaders who are interested in the prioritization of military interests over other governmental interests.

This thesis will answer two key research questions: (1) how was US foreign policy towards Uzbekistan affected by its geostrategic interests, and (2) to what extent did the US Government mute its criticisms of the Government of Uzbekistan’s violations of civil and political rights in order to gain support for the war in Afghanistan? The case study will demonstrate that the US was willing to remain a passive observer of human rights violations in Uzbekistan, provided the Government of Uzbekistan would cooperate with US geopolitical interests in the War on Terror.

This thesis will explore the tensions and variables that affect the extent to which the US Government chooses to prioritize human rights concerns as a condition of international relations. Uzbekistan provides a rich case from which to understand this tension. The USA’s relationship to Uzbekistan changed from 2001 – 2012 based on defense priorities for the War on Terror compared to human rights priorities. Different parts of the US Government jockeyed for influence on foreign policy, with human rights concerns overshadowed by defense interests. As such, it provides an interesting case for understanding the relationship between ideals, such as democracy and freedom of religion, and practical realities, such as the defeat of perceived threats to US security. This same tension present in the War on Terror was also prevalent throughout the Cold War.
This case study is not a direct examination of military doctrine, but given the extent to which the War on Terror shaped diplomatic relations with the Central Asian Republics, it is important to understand the trends in defense policy as they have overlapped with the wider foreign policy of the United States. Similarly, one must understand the history of US – USSR relations in order to have context for the international relations between the independent Central Asian Republics and the US.

In a multipolar world, international affairs are not limited to countries with the same methods of rule. Democracy has never been a precondition for diplomatic engagement by the US Government. There are many examples of the US Government partnering with a dictator or non-democracy if such partnership suits US interests including alliance in wider geostrategic matters. Conversely, the US will actively overthrow a dictator, even one it previously supported, if it suits US interests. To the extent that countries vary in their compliance with international agreements on human rights, the US Government has sought engagement rather than isolation as a method to influence the development of human rights protections. Isolation of nations has been largely limited to countries or instances when the US Government perceived a direct and irreconcilable threat to its interests. There are only three nations in the world that currently lack a US diplomatic relationship.

Humanitarian interventions and police actions have been endorsed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and have become a commonly accepted motivation for western states interfering with state sovereignty. This post-Westphalian context of international relations will be examined more fully in the next chapter. Human rights are trumpeted by the US as an ideal that is worth fighting for, but the violation of human rights has never been the sole criterion for US engagement (positive or negative) with a nation. The violation of freedom is used rhetorically by the US as a reason to intervene in a country and enact regime change in nations that pose a military power or material resource threat to the United States. However, the US Government has also chosen to ignore human rights concerns in places that are not of strategic interest to it.

Decisions about the ranking of human rights concerns among other foreign policy priorities are made by a diverse and evolving set of bureaus within the US Government. This thesis will elaborate on the complex dynamics between the various US Government bureaus involved in decision-making on international relations when countries abuse human rights. This thesis will argue that the rise of bureaucratic institutions within the US Government has rendered the unitary rational actor theory that has often dominated international relations theory to be inadequate in explaining or predicting current international affairs. This thesis will examine how the rise in diverse rational actors and bureaucracy in the US Government since WWII impacted international relations. It will

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1 For instance, US relations with the Central Asian Republics, Egypt, Indonesia, China, and Saudi Arabia.
2 Examples of this include US relations with Argentina during the 1974 “dirty war,” support for Manuel Noriega in Panama in the 1980s, the backing of El Salvador in the 1980s, and support for Saddam Hussein in Iraq when the Taliban were rising to power in Afghanistan.
study the competing influences of foreign policy bureaus on each other in order to explain state behavior towards the former Soviet Union and the post-Soviet environment.

It might be naïve, looking as the past behaviors of the US, to think that the US Government would pick human rights over matters of national security. However, this is a false dichotomy as rarely are the two matters mutually exclusive. In most instances of international relations, a combination of military partnership and aid for democracy and good governance has been achieved. The two come into conflict with one another when the US wishes to partner with the military of a nation that is directly violating human rights. US alliances in the War on Terror provide a window through which such dynamics can be seen.

Indeed, the examination of US-Uzbekistan relations since the War on Terror provides a clear picture of what happens when geostrategic military interests come into conflict with human rights. The US Government established military cooperation with Uzbekistan quickly after the September 11th terrorist attacks. However, the relationship stalled out in 2005 at the same time as the Government of Uzbekistan opened fire on its citizens during what appeared to be a peaceful protest in the town of Andijan. Defense cooperation stopped completely, and then the US Government was more vocal about human rights abuses. However, once Uzbekistan was needed again for transit in the War on Terror, such human rights concerns became more muted, and Uzbekistan began receiving military aid again. These critical junctures in international relations will be explored fully in the case chapter of this thesis.

Methodological Approach

This case study addresses the gap in literature on Uzbekistan since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1992, including gaps in contemporary literature on the region since the death of Osama Bin Laden, emergence of threats from Islamic State, and the souring of diplomatic relations between the USA and Pakistan. It explores divergent theories of the historical and present US foreign policy relationship to Central Asia in order to gain an understanding of diplomatic relations since 2001. While there are a few scholars of the Silk Road and Central Asia history, rarely does a researcher examine bilateral politics in depth for any one of the countries in the region. There was a surge of interest in the former Soviet Union at the time of independence, but twenty years later, such interests have waned. A few scholars have maintained interest in the region, and they provide what are in some cases the only verifiable publications of certain facts or analysis pertaining to Central Asia.

A note on sources

This thesis utilizes a range of primary source documents that articulate the US Government position towards the Government of Uzbekistan. Such data includes press releases, official visits and speeches, Congressional testimony and legislation, delegations to the USA from Uzbekistan, policy documents, annual reports, and declassified US Government cables. This case study also includes documentation on changes in Uzbek policy, such as legislation on NGO registration of US organizations, bilateral agreements for US foreign assistance, and agreements on military cooperation.
There is a lack of objective material published in Russian on this subject matter because most local media outlets and academic publishing is owned and controlled by the government. Online media is relatively new to Central Asia, and print media is not archived for public access. Where such subjective material is available and sheds insight into the Government of Uzbekistan’s public message, it is referenced in this thesis. When referencing events in which the international and local media outlets severely differ in their accounting, I have tried to use a balanced mix of Russian and English language reports. Coverage that is unfavorable to the government is rarely published, and if it is published, it gets censored quickly. One of the primary daily independent news sites, uznews.net was shut down on 20 December 2014, a month after its contributors were made public and the editor, Galima Bukharbaeva’s, computer was hacked from her office in Germany. Galima was a journalist in Uzbekistan but had to flee the country after covering the Andijan protests in 2005.

Many journalists were killed or exiled as a result of their coverage of the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan. According to a Human Rights Watch report No One Left to Witness, released at the end of 2011, Beginning in 2004, and increasing rapidly after Andijan, the government forced the closure of numerous organizations, including the Open Society Institute, the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Internews, Freedom House, Counterpart International, the American Bar Association, and many others. None of the organizations that were forced to end their operations have resumed their activities in Uzbekistan.

These closures will be explored more fully in this case study. There are some local journalists who now freelance or contribute to western media outlets, and I have relied on them as sources; however, their work is typically published and available in English. While I have used a few international newspapers extensively, many of those sources cited are of guest articles by foreign policy practitioners. News outlets that maintain journalist connections in the region, such as Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Eurasianet, were cited more extensively, in part because they have more consistent in-depth coverage of Uzbekistan than other news outlets that lack local stringers.

My own interest in this subject matter comes from working for the US Government in Central Asia and then for Amnesty International. I was a US Peace Corps volunteer in Kazakhstan and subsequently served the US Embassies of all the Central Asian Republics from 2011-2014 as the Communications Director for USAID. Working in public affairs afforded me a unique vantage point into the dynamics present in the US Government abroad, but I have not used personal

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7 For her recollection of the Andijan events, see Galima Bukharbaeva, “Remember Andijan?”, *New York Times*, May 9, 2008.
connections or private knowledge in the drafting of this case study. All sources are published and can be independently verified. To avoid potential bias in the collection of data, I chose not to use documents for which I was a signatory in my work representing US Government interests or human rights reporting for Amnesty International. I also chose not to conduct interviews with US Embassy colleagues in order to maximize the replicability of the case study for others who would not have such access.

When using the English spelling of Uzbek words, there are often multiple correct transliterations. For instance, President Karimov’s first name is commonly spelled either Islom or Islam. The K2 airforce base may be spelled Qarshi Qhanabad or Karshi Khanabad, and the town on Andijan may also be spelled Andijon. I have used the most common US Government spellings of words in question throughout this thesis. I have also chosen to capitalize the War on Terror, as it was a formally declared war. However, when discussing the War on Terror as a concept rather than an actual battle, it is common for some researchers to drop the capitalization. Both the US Government and Government of Uzbekistan capitalize the G in government when referring to the governing body, so this is reflected throughout this thesis.

**Definition of human rights**

This research will focus only on first generation negative civil and political rights that the Government of Uzbekistan violated under the justification of combatting terrorism. Civil rights include mental integrity, life and safety; protection from discrimination; and freedom of thought, assembly, and movement. Political rights include rights of the accused; freedom from arbitrary detention; and freedom of association. Such rights are covered by the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1984 Convention Against Torture.

This case will not study second or third generation human rights because these economic, cultural and social rights are reliant on too many external factors to be sufficiently fulfilled or deprived during the period of this case. Third generation rights remain largely untested and unfulfilled; as the least established group of rights, they have too many variables to be able to sufficiently isolate the impact of the war in Afghanistan on criticisms of the absence of these rights. They are also comparative equality rights, which distinguish them from negative first generation rights that may be applied individually. Further, human rights abuses are most likely caused by conflicts or weak or overly powerful states, so in studying the muting by states of criticisms of human rights abuses, it is most germane to study first generation rights.

Human Rights Watch had the longest-standing NGO presence in Uzbekistan, and as such, has the most extensive records of human rights violations. The organization survived the Uzbek purge of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 2005, but was subsequently kicked out of the country. Amnesty International did not have a local permanent office, and Freedom House was only permitted to operate there from 2002 to 2005. Local human rights organizations are largely run by

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one or two key individuals and handle personal grievances and individual cases rather than extensive publishing or widely verifiable research. For these reasons, Human Rights Watch is the most referenced source of third sector research materials in this thesis.

**Research Design**

This case study employs qualitative methods for political science research to conclude the extent to which US Government criticisms of Uzbekistan’s human rights violations were impacted by geopolitical needs for the war in Afghanistan. This thesis uses process tracing to explore the relationship between US geopolitical interests in Uzbekistan and the level of critique of authoritarian governance mechanisms related to civil and political liberties to test the theory that the US Government was complicit in civil liberties abuses in Uzbekistan because it prioritized support for the War on Terror. Process tracing is a method for testing causal mechanisms in case studies through the tracing of causal processes. In process tracing, theories of causality are tested by examining the intervening steps through the charting of initial conditions and their linked outcomes.

Process tracing is used in international relations because it provides primary source data to examine past events in real time in order to understand the cause and effect of foreign policy decisions or relationships. Process tracing allows for the minimizing of third variables by holding them constant and testing internal validity while exploring unique process predictions. This methodology assists with avoiding the common problem of case selection bias in comparative politics. Process tracing allows for an in-depth examination of a single concept or sub-class in international relations to extrapolate conclusions for further research. It is a preferred research method for understanding elements of international relations between the US and the Soviet Union. For example, John Lewis Gaddis used process tracing to understand the five types of containment attempted by the US towards the Soviet Union. Similarly, Deborah Welch Larson explored the role of trust and misperceptions of motivations between world leaders in escalating the Cold War. It has also been used extensively to examine cases of balance of power theory in the Cold War.

Process tracing methodology will be employed in this thesis to show the relationship of competing US foreign policy agencies to each other and their impact on foreign policy towards Uzbekistan. An analysis will be done of various US state actors and their competing foreign policy interests to enhance the narrative on the rise of institutionalism and the extent to which defense overruled other US diplomatic efforts. The thesis analyzes the complex causality of geopolitical interests of the US

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Government in Uzbekistan, including the extent to which outside pressure related to the Andijan massacre in May 2005 served as a tipping point in US Government – Government of Uzbekistan relations and whether multiple conjunctural causation led to the closing of the US military base in 2005.  

The thesis will explore three critical junctures in US – Uzbekistan relations: establishing support for the War on Terror, halting of diplomatic relations, and renewal of support for military interests in Afghanistan. The ending and restarting of bilateral relations between the governments of the US and Uzbekistan provide data for a within-case analysis, as described below. This case begins when the US entered into a bilateral relationship with Uzbekistan in 2002, at which point the US began to make allowances for violations of human rights by the Government of Uzbekistan. There are two key moments (Andijan massacre in 2005 and the opening of the Northern Distribution Network in 2009) that caused variance within this case. The author will conduct a within-case analysis of these two major events.

**Andijan:** When the Government of Uzbekistan opened fire on its own people in Andijan in May 2005, killing up to 745 civilians, pressure from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies forced the US Government to join calls for an independent investigation into this grave abuse of human rights. The US Government sided with NATO in agreeing that the refugees from this massacre deserved asylum. The defiance from Uzbekistan’s key ally caused a complete freezing of the relationship between the USA and the Government of Uzbekistan. Peace Corps programs were not renewed, and the Karshi Khanabad base was closed. Once the US military was not involved in Uzbekistan, diplomatic relations were minimized, and the US Government was united in its criticisms of the Government of Uzbekistan’s human rights record.

The analysis of this variance in the case will explore the complex causality of various external variables that may have impacted the US Government position and Uzbekistan’s response. For example, in 2005, when the Andijan massacre occurred, the US had established alternate routes into the war zones allowing the government to rely less on Uzbekistan, and as such the US was willing to hold Uzbekistan more accountable for its denial of civil and political rights. Other factors include popularity for the war in Iraq, reliance on NATO allies for larger military interests, and the power and influence of other bureaus of the US Government. Variables impacting Uzbekistan’s interest in partnering with the US include material benefits from alliances with China and Russia, internal power feuds over financial gain, fear of regime change inspired by former Soviet states, and resentment of outside criticism of governance choices related to civil and political rights. This case will explore the extent to which the closing of the Kharshi Khanabad air force base in 2005 sent Uzbekistan on a path of strained relations with their former ally.

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Northern Distribution Network: As Pakistan’s relationship with the US soured and access points to Afghanistan tightened, it became apparent that more distribution routes would be required. These three new routes into Afghanistan, started in 2009, had Uzbekistan located in the center of all transit. Since Pakistan cut off its border with Afghanistan in November 2011, the Northern Distribution Network has been the route for 80% of military cargo going into Afghanistan.26

Once Uzbekistan was needed again for the War on Terror, criticisms of its human rights violations became muted. European Union sanctions were lifted in October 2009,27 Uzbekistan got a waiver that no action will be taken as a consequence of their placement on the “countries of particular concern” religious freedom list.28 The US restored military aid to Uzbekistan, despite outrage from human rights groups.29 Victoria Nuland, US Department of State spokesperson, made clear the ranking of human rights and defense needs when she announced the decision to give military aid to Uzbekistan in 2012. “Nobody is shying away from having the tough conversation. That said, we also have other interests and things that we need to protect in our relationship with Uzbekistan.”30

These were three critical junctures in international relations between the US and Uzbek Governments: the beginning of the War on Terror, the Andijan massacre, and the opening of the Northern Distribution Network. The partnership between the US and Uzbekistan was forged primarily for defensive purposes in combatting terrorism. However, the engagement of the two governments was broadened to include economic and social support. This partnership led to some unwelcome criticisms of human rights abuses and did not initially meet the economic interests of the Government of Uzbekistan. These dynamics, outlined above, will be explored fully in the case study in chapter five.

Chapter two of this thesis will provide context for the theories of international relations informing the choices of each government partner. The following chapter, “fragmentation of a unitary actor” will explore the growth of bureaucracy within the US Government during the Cold War and the War on Terror, and how the growth of bureaucracy led to the fragmentation of a unitary actor in US foreign affairs. Chapter four, “Post-Soviet Uzbekistan,” explores geostrategic insights and background on civil and political rights in Uzbekistan since independence. Chapter five is a qualitative case study using process tracing to analyze the extent to which cooperation on the War on Terror impacted US Government priorities for human rights. This thesis concludes with alternate explanations and further areas for research.

CHAPTER TWO: IDEALISM AND REALISM IN US FOREIGN POLICY

Theories on international relations are based on assumptions of states’ interactions with one another, often in hypothetical scenarios. However, as formal diplomatic agreements and international bodies have become a central architecture of bipolar and multipolar relations, contemporary analyses of international relations have evolved to explain how this new international operating environment impacts the outcomes and motivations of state behavior.\(^\text{31}\) This literature review chapter will briefly examine the key schools of thought on historical and contemporary international relations and then apply them to US Cold War foreign policy. The Cold War has provided a rich data set from which to extrapolate conclusions on the relevancy of competing theories of international relations. During the Cold War, the US sought to protect its power and security while also advancing democratic ideology, fearing that a state with different ideology and the same level of military power (the Soviet Union) would threaten its own power and survival. The study of this dynamic also informs the US justification for the War on Terror, during which time the US Government used the preservation of freedom and growth of democracy as the motivations for invading Iraq and Afghanistan in order to keep America safe from terrorists.

Theories of international relations customarily assume that the state acts in its own interest as a unitary rational actor, and the study of international relations centers on the extent to which states seek to engage or avoid actions with or against other states.\(^\text{32}\) Theories of what drives the interactions of states usually fall on a spectrum based on the explanatory weight each theory places on self protection and survival, domestic characteristics, institutional framework, priority of balance of power, or individual relationships.\(^\text{33}\) Reasons for obeying the rules are examined in international relations theory based on the relative power of coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy.\(^\text{34}\)

In US relations since the Second World War, a mix of idealism and realism have dominated the US Government’s public reasoning for its international relations. Richard Holbrooke, a career senior US diplomat, articulated well the balance of various international relations theories by the US Government, arguing that a good foreign policy should “marry idealism and realism, effective American leadership and, if necessary, the use of force.”\(^\text{35}\) Classical realism, as applied to international relations, asserts that the international world is anarchic, and each state will act to protect itself. Classical liberalism is grounded in the faith in rule of law and international bodies being able to protect individual freedom. The motivations of international engagement for a realist would be the protection of power, and the motivations for an idealist would be the advancement of ethics. Idealism is compelled by shared morality, whereas realism is inherently amoral. Contemporary realists believe that managing relations between states is the highest level of


\(^{32}\) The modern definition of a state for the purposes of international relations was set out in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Council on Foreign Relations. “Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.” December 26, 1993.


\(^{34}\) Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.” *International Organization* 53 no. 2 (Spring 1999): 379-408.

interaction possible whereas idealists believe that international actions can shape the nature of states. Nation building and support for the growth of democracy are idealist.36

The theoretical perspective explored in this thesis stretches beyond the simplified notion of the state as a unitary actor and posits that states are a complex web of competing decision-makers that act on their own agendas. The growth of bureaucracy and outsourcing of traditional state functions has rendered the axiomatic notion of a unitary rational actor to be inadequate in explaining the international relations of a state.37 The rhetoric of the US Government may point to a common agenda being implemented by a unitary actor, but when examining the actual decisions and actions of this state, it becomes apparent that foreign policy is made by a diverse and changing organization. The context under which relations occur, and the power of the US within that context, influences which elements of US foreign policy take the lead. The dominant actor may change from decision to decision, and the motivations for a decision may contradict the motivations of other dominant actors within the same state. This position will be explored more fully in the subsequent chapter on bureaucratic logics.

For grounding on theories of state interactions, it is essential to distinguish between international relations and foreign policy. International relations theory is based on the patterns of outcomes of autonomous state interactions and the interpretation of how those past interactions may impact future actions of a state. Foreign policy is an enacting mechanism of international relations. It is based on the present behavior and interests of each individual state and the unique circumstances surrounding the agenda of a state.38 As such, foreign policy is driven by both internal and external factors.39 Traditional international relations theory, by contrast, may treat the domestic system as an irrelevant variable.40

Foreign policy is commonly analyzed in political science traditions using the conceptual tools of comparative politics.41 There is a wide debate on the extent to which foreign policy can be studied in the same theoretical manner as international relations (using general explanations) or whether individual analysis of events is the widest possible application of theory.42 This thesis will process trace one case of events (US engagement with Uzbekistan since 2001) to explore foreign policy decisions on human rights and defense. The analysis of relations between these two states, and their respective relations with similar states, provides insight on the motivations for western states to seek international relations with authoritarian states.

In order to understand the choices of these states during the War on Terror, it is useful to first examine the historical underpinnings of theories of state power and motivation. The territoriality of

42 For the range of this debate, see: Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: the Neorealist – Neoliberal Debate.” International Organization 48 no. 2 (1994): 313-44.
states and the changing geopolitics of post-Soviet states provide necessary grounding in US-Uzbekistan international relations. This next section will briefly review positivist and constructivist epistemologies of international relations, share key examples of their application during the Cold War, and then explore the pairing of idealism and realism as the US justification for fighting the Soviet Union.

**Realism**

Classical realist theory posits that there are no actual rules or enforcement mechanisms for international affairs because the arena outside of any one state is anarchic. As such, conflict and war are persistent threats, as each state seeks to maximize its power or protection against other states. Realists since Thomas Hobbes are thought of as pessimists who believe that humans are inherently sinful.

Realists differ on whether a state seeks to maximize power in relation to others (offensive realism) or whether external threats are rare, in which case polarity better protects a state through the distribution and balance of power among strong forces (defensive realism).

The security dilemma is the concept, introduced in Thucydides’ analysis of the Peloponnesian War, that as one state gains more methods of protection, another state will also seek greater protection to balance against the threats. The inertia of this spiral exists regardless of the expressed desire, likelihood, or frequency of a state attacking another state. The arms race of the Cold War is a popular contemporary example of the security dilemma. Both defensive and offensive realists believe that self-protection is the only driver of external engagement; thus law is created from state behavior and is not a cause of state behavior. Realists assert that the state determines its own scope of authority without the interference of citizens.

Realists are inclined to believe that cooperation is not possible because of the uncertainty of reciprocity. International agreements and governing bodies, such as the World Trade Organization or United Nations, would be of little interest to a realist because each party would act in its self-interest, thus making enforcement of agreement impossible. Even if a state can rationally understand how cooperation would yield benefits, the lack of trust in each other results in a fear of collaboration.

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48 For the debate on the application of security dilemmas to the Cold War, see Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3 no. 1 (Winter 2001): 36-60.
The Founding Fathers of the US Constitution were Hobbesian realists who believed in the inevitability of a war of each against all. They sought to stabilize this through Constitutional regulation of behavior (protecting vice against vice) while maintaining the individual right to property. The federalist tradition, which formed the basis of US governance, was built on the belief that the government exists to protect against a tyranny of the majority. The US Government was established with a primary purpose of balancing competing factions. James Madison feared that the public good “will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.”

Contemporary Theories of Realism
Sovereign states have sought diplomacy as a method of balancing power since the Treaty of Westphalia united Europe in 1648. Individual states emerged from colonial territorialism, and the non-interference of states in the domestic affairs of another state became a prevailing tenet of international relations along with the principle of legal equality between states. The Westphalian System of states is considered to be a contemporary realist interpretation of international relations as it is based on non-interference and self-determination. It is most commonly supported by European nationalists and US conservatives who favor non-intervention in humanitarian or nation-building affairs of other states.

The evolution of classical realism into a theory of foreign policy gained popularity during the Cold War and was explored widely in the 1970’s with the neorealist writings of Kenneth Waltz that apply classical realism to a contemporary multipolar environment. Neorealists acknowledge the role of non-state actors in influencing or engaging in international relations and assert that foreign policy is driven by a cost-benefit calculation of capabilities. Power is simply the extent to which a state can affect others more than others affect them. If a state gains power through cooperation, they may still seek to use that power to dominate their partners.

Relative power emerged as a key theme in explaining the foreign policy choices of major powers. Gideon Rose coined the term “neoclassical realism” to explain how internal variables impact external relations. Neoclassical realism differs from other forms of realism in that it believes the foreign policy of a state may be influenced by the workings of its domestic system and the perceptions of material power by those who make decisions. In neoclassical realist theory, behavior may be influenced by domestic factors acting as intervening variables. Neoclassical realism also considers the role of society in restricting or enhancing the access of decision makers to material resources. Neoclassical realists assert that states respond to the uncertainties of international factors by seeking to shape rather than avoid or obliterate the international environment. More power

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38 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 144-172.
means more international engagement. This forms the realist explanation of multinational economic treaties. Further, according to neoclassical realism, states of the same power will respond the same way to international relations, regardless of their differences domestically. States that share the same domestic traits but different relative power will behave differently based on their international power.

**Constructivism**

International relations theorists who believe in regulation and shared directives may identify with the constructivist epistemology of international relations. Constructivism emerged about 25 years ago in response to the interpretation of rules on state behavior. The constructivist political science tradition asserts that politics and international relations are influenced primarily by social, not material, conditions. Constructivists beginning with Nicholas Onuf argue that rules (formal and informal) regulate conduct, which in turn creates a social arrangement. The structure of the world may be constantly changing, but rules continue to perform their enacting function. International affairs are not based solely on existing material conditions such as economic capacity. Rather, norms and thoughts create a system of relations. Institutions function as agents of their constituency rather than as independent state bodies following material interest. Further, each agent is a unique social being with its own role and status.

Constructivists argue that states create and interpret identities based on actions and reactions. Growing out of this fluid, behavior-based interpretation of political science is the analysis of individual psychology in decision-making. The social identity theory as applied to political science believes that individual leaders can construct an identity that is based on non-systemic sources and might differ greatly from the perception of other leaders. States may follow the same individualist construction of identity and may not uphold the identity that others perceive of them; further, that identity may change based on attitudes and trust. To a social identity theorist, the desire for status and the perception of similar powers may influence the decision-making and behavior of a leader and the desire of that leader to join international organizations.

Both realists and constructivists agree that states are motivated by their own survival and security. This is their primal interest. But, realists believe that states have already constructed their identities

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63 Nicholas Onuf, “Rule and Rules in International Relations.” Remarks at the University of Helsinki, April 24, 2014.

64 For a complete contrast of these two approaches, see Vaughn Shannon and Paul Kowert, eds. *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2012).


and desired outcomes in advance of interaction with other bodies. Social identity theorists believe these identities are shaped by individual affinity and background and may differ from external perceptions. Neoclassical realism falls between constructivism and neorealism because it acknowledges relative power and domestic influence. Constructivists would argue that it is the interaction that drives the identity. Power and interest are derived by ideas and social interaction. To a constructivist, the Cold War was created and fueled by ideological interaction, and it ended because the USA and USSR decided to no longer be enemies. To a political psychologist, it was mistrust and misperceptions between the world leaders that led to their inability to reach agreement.

Realism in Cold War Policy
Realists argue that the prospect of mutual destruction through nuclear weapons was the driver of the conditional peace with the Soviet Union. The spiraling security dilemma reached a point of mutually assured destruction of both states. Alternatively, Russia released the other Soviet Republics so it could focus on the survival of its own nation. Other than isolationism, military engagement was the primary method used to contain the USSR from expanding its ideology and power. The USA chose to bolster its allies in the fight against communism while assuming unilateral defensive power.

Eisenhower believed that a strong military was essential to maintaining peace, but he was worried about creating a military industrial complex. During his administration, the United States became interested in a neorealist policy using allies and collective security that relied more on deterrent power rather than local defensive power, or according to Secretary of State Dulles, a “maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.” The US continued to exert military force abroad, but after a failed war in Vietnam the US engaged in a policy of détente, or easing of strained relations, during which time the US attempted to reach diplomatic agreements to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

After the Vietnam War, US President Nixon connected US interests to other major powers in order to create peace, departing from a sole power approach to international relations. Nixon’s administration held firm to the belief that the US Government should only act in relationship to the degree of linkage to another major world power. He believed that sheer power, as opposed to development or economic policy, should be the driver of engagement with less developed nations. Henry Kissinger, a renowned pragmatic realist who advised many US presidents since WWII, designed this approach to foreign policy.

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69 For this complete argument, see ibid. Larson, *Anatomy*.
Ronald Reagan was elected to the US presidency in 1980 in what was interpreted as the popularity of realist rather than morals-based idealism in foreign policy. Reagan pledged to get tough on the Soviet expansion and to create more domestic stability. He professed optimism in American progress while seeking to bolster free enterprise and minimal government regulation. While Reagan pledged a small and non-obtrusive government, he continued to grow the national debt to over $2 trillion. During Reagan’s presidency, the US went from being the world’s leading creditor to being the world’s leading debtor. Self-interest became the primary driver of US military engagement under President Reagan, who sought to cull the idealistic notion of the US as the leading provider of military support and protection to all nations. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger laid out the path to realism with six new criteria for military engagement. “We cannot assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend their territory - without their strong invitation - when our freedom is not threatened.”

Former CIA chief and Vice President George HW Bush continued this realist vision upon his election as US President. The first war in Iraq is regarded in realist circles as a war of necessity, a last resort in efforts to balance Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait and avoid greater Iraqi dominance in the region. The failure to take action in Yugoslavia and lack of support for Ukrainian independence efforts or nation-building efforts in Iraq were all realist foreign policy actions. In Bush’s address to the Ukrainian legislature, he made many local enemies by remarking, “Freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with local despotism.” Nonetheless, realist approaches during the Bush administration still had a moral component, either overt or reluctant, as evidenced in eventual support for humanitarian aid to Somalia and publicly condemning the Tiananmen Square massacre.

President Clinton, the first president since the Cold War was over, was strongly contrasted as an idealist, advancing a US military intervention in Bosnia, massive aid to Somalia, and nation building in Haiti following the military coup. The post Cold War foreign policy environment was a dynamic time of determining new enemies and priorities, many of which were dominated by non-state actors. “Humanitarian crises, ethnic conflict, the dissolution of states, global economic integration, climate change, and the challenge of non-state actors all defied easy description and prescription.” Such dimensions of international relations will be explored under the framework of liberalist international relations theory.

78 Steven M Walt, “Applying the 8 Questions of the Powell Doctrine to Syria,” Foreign Policy, September 3, 2013.
84 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 the Misunderstood Years, (New York: Public Affairs Publishing, 2008), XIV.

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**Liberalism**

Liberal international relations theory is on the opposite side of the international relations spectrum from realism. Liberal theory is grounded in the belief in rule of law and the moral right to freedom of the individual. John Stewart Mill is widely credited for distinguishing morals-based restrictions of liberty from harm reduction as a reason for state intervention, arguing “That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”\(^{85}\) Liberal theory, like realist theory, assumes each state is a unitary actor but applies theories about individuals to states. Liberalism also accounts for non-state actors, such as international institutions, as relevant unitary actors in international affairs.\(^{86}\) Liberalism maintains that individual states can have unique national characteristics that influence foreign relations. In addition to the primal desire for security, a state may also have other interests, like commerce or ideology, that influence international engagement.\(^{87}\)

Woodrow Wilson popularized the application of individual morals to state behavior and foreign policy. This idealism advocates that states act ethically and in accordance with rule of law on an international level. The League of Nations was established in 1919 based on this premise. Idealism assumes that it is the rational choice of a state to protect the weak and to advance humanity in a way that makes the present better than the past.\(^{88}\) This theory of international relations was discredited widely with the rise of European disagreements leading into WWII. Yet, it remained influential in the establishment and growth of the United Nations. The Marshall Plan, providing aid to rebuild Europe after the war, is an example of liberal engagement by the US. To a liberal, the collective insistence of rights compels us to extend reciprocity to the rights of others. There is a shared benefit in freely exchanging values and participating in international affairs because it advances the rights of participants. Through coming together, mutual understanding creates tolerance, which in turn increases harmony in international relations and reduces the chances of a sustained conflict. Collective security is created through international agreements.\(^{89}\)

Neoliberal institutionalism is the sub-genre of liberalism focused on the study of international organizations. States work together to create enforceable agreements on the regulation of goods and international markets. Rule of law and rule of contract provide clarity that encourages economic exchanges.\(^{90}\) On an international level, neoliberal institutionalists believe that cooperation and agreement is possible because interacting with the same partners within a common institution allows each state to have more incentive to comply with the agreement. Reciprocity is a motivator for fulfilling obligations under international law.\(^{91}\)

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Liberal theorists argue that globalization has rendered the Westphalian doctrines to be inadequate in explaining treaties of global capital and global economic regulating bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The European Union allows for external agents to override the internal affairs of an individual state, thus contrasting the Westphalian notion of domestic sovereignty. International relations theorists have also attacked Westphalian sovereignty in recent years for its lack of consideration for the rights and abilities of citizens to affect the choices of the state where they live. Westphalian realism is criticized for its lack of consideration of engagement with failed states such as Afghanistan and Somalia or non-state sovereign actors like Al Qaeda or Islamic State. Tony Blair famously attacked the Westphalian principles as archaic while laying out the basis for intervention in Kosovo and for greater European support for the United Nations and modernized international bodies.

Idealism as an aspect of liberal theory gained popularity with the “democratic peace” theory first conceived by Immanuel Kant who argued that dictators are more likely to declare war because they are less personally impacted by the calamities of war; whereas in a democratic society, the ruler may be from the citizens and will be accountable to these citizens who will consider the impact of war on themselves. Liberal theorists in the 1980’s widely explored Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” theories and the absence of war between states with elected governments. Many theorists concluded that democratic states may share common respect for individual rights, but it may not translate into peaceful relations with non-liberal societies. Some argue that well-ordered people will behave justly towards one another and apply their sense of justice to international relations in the same manner as they would towards their own community. To a liberal theorist, the Cold War ended because democracy leads to peace and the prevalence of democracies in the world diffused the international conflict. For liberals, this moment in time was proof of international relations moving beyond the balance of military power.

**Ideals as a Justification for Military Action**

In studying the foreign policy choices and justifications of US leaders since WWII, the pairing of liberal theory (individual freedom and rights) and realist engagement (protection of power) emerges as a key theme. US General George Marshall demonstrated this ideals-backed militarism when he declared at the beginning of WWII, “We're determined that before the sun sets on this terrible..."
struggle our flag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand and of overwhelming power on the other.”\textsuperscript{100} International relations of the United States Government since WWII occurred in a diverse and dynamic foreign policy environment, with each Presidential administration making its own decisions on multilateral engagement alongside a changing Congress and shifting American domestic priorities. This section will explore key moments of using preservation and expansion of ideals as the reasoning behind military intervention.

Statements of values drove the public’s perception of the importance of US containment of the Soviet Union. Western democracies embraced a liberal democratic system of economic openness, political reciprocity, and multilateral management. The containment policy, according to G. John Ikenberry, was “based on balance of power, nuclear deterrence, and political and ideological competition.”\textsuperscript{101} This juxtaposition of ideological competition of two states that feared each other’s military power is illustrative of the pragmatic combination of idealism and realism in US foreign policy.

According to the Truman Doctrine defining US foreign policy after WWII, “One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.”\textsuperscript{102} This protection by stronger states of weaker states is liberal international relations, but the motivation is reflective of the realist notion of security through sole hegemony. The practical application of this ideology is also seen in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. President Johnson proclaimed, “We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our freedom be finally secure.”\textsuperscript{103}

The protection and expansion of power drove foreign interventions by the United States throughout the last half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. In the nearly 50 years between WWII and the end of the Soviet Union, the United States joined military conflicts on almost every continent. The US has been involved in over 200 such conflicts in its brief history as a nation.\textsuperscript{104} While only Congress can declare war, the president has claimed that he maintains the authority to use military force at his discretion.\textsuperscript{105} For example, the Vietnam War was initiated by the Congressional Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was not a formal declaration of war and was preceded by military action within Vietnam. The UN Security Council can authorize police actions, which are viewed as defensive or humanitarian operations rather than fully offensive declarations of war.\textsuperscript{106} The Korean War was regarded as a police action.

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\textsuperscript{101} G John Ikenberry “The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos” Foreign Affairs 75 no. 3 (May/June 1996): 81.
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The Vietnam War was framed as both communist containment and the ideological belief that one nation should never conquer another nation, and the US should protect weaker states. This idea of protecting the sovereignty of each state in order to preserve freedom is another reflection of classical liberal theology being used to justify military intervention. However, the American people were not interested in sacrificing soldiers for a war that did not feel like a threat to their own security and whose brutality could be watched in real time on television. The US Senate became less supportive of the war, debating whether the Vietnamese people were interested in assistance and whether corruption in Vietnam made allegiance impossible. Congressional criticisms and attempt for oversight of the executive branch’s actions during the Vietnam War would play out in much of the same way during the War on Terror.

After a failed war, Watergate scandal, and culture of secrecy came to define the Nixon administration, President Carter was elected in 1976 on a platform of strong morals and historical American ideals. Carter introduced a new vision for human rights and democracy, which laid to rest the red scare rhetoric.

Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear…For too many years, we’ve been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs…The Vietnamese war produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life.

President Carter tried to lead on peace through diplomacy with adversaries rather than the drumbeat of war. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in a police action, Carter chose not to engage with an overt military presence. Instead, he pledged nonlethal aid to the Afghan forces, imposed trade embargos with Russia and boycotted the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. President Carter was leading publicly with a diplomatic rather than militaristic solution; however, it was later revealed that the CIA under Carter sent billions of dollars of supplies and weapons to the Mujahidin, in hopes of depleting Soviet resources. During that conflict, the US assisted 35,000 radicals from 43 Islamic countries helping fight for the Mujahidin. This centralization of teaching meant that by the end of the war in 1989, more than 100,000 radicals had direct contact with Pakistan or Afghanistan.

As explored in this chapter, the Cold War provides a window into the use of ideals to justify military intervention. Democracy, freedom, and liberation of small states were key themes trumpeted by US presidents as reasons to fight communism. To what extent rhetoric on freedom...
and ideology alone formed the basis for actual decision-making on foreign policy interventions is the subject of much debate. Henry Kissinger, a staunch realist and foreign policy practitioner in the US executive branch, acknowledged that, “Americans are comfortable with an idealistic tradition that espouses great causes, such as making the world safe for democracy or human rights.”111 Dick Cheney remembered Ronald Reagan as an idealist president despite Reagan’s overtly realist approach to international relations. During Cheney’s remarks at Reagan’s funeral, he asserted that Reagan once said, “There’s no question, I am an idealist,” which Cheney declared, “is another way of saying, ‘I am an American.’”112 The shaping of the popular narrative of America as a hero in an uncertain world was utilized extensively by both presidents Johnson and Reagan, two leaders with radically different views on the role and size of government.113

Paul Wolfowitz, former president of the World Bank and Deputy Secretary of Defense under George HW Bush, summarizes well the tension between idealism and realism in US international relations:

During my time in the U.S. government, I’ve participated in many rounds of this debate. One of them was over whether to preserve the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights. Realists saw it as an annoying creation of Jimmy Carter’s administration; others thought it was more realistic to maintain pressure on an issue of major importance in the competition with the Soviet Union. Similarly, in the 1980s, Reagan’s promotion of democratic reform in the Philippines and South Korea was criticized not only by realists but even by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, more often labeled a neoconservative, who had argued prominently for working with authoritarian regimes. And again, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the realists were generally opposed to NATO membership for the new Eastern European democracies and noticeably reluctant to support the independence movements in Ukraine and other Soviet republics.114

The echoes of morals-backed material imperialism that was so present during the Cold War resounded again throughout the War on Terror. Nadine Strossen of the American Civil Liberties Union captured well the unity through fear rhetoric popularized at the start of this war. "The term 'terrorism' is taking on the same kind of characteristics as the term 'communism' did in the 1950s. It stops people in their tracks, and they're willing to give up their freedoms. People are too quickly panicked. They are too willing to give up their rights and to scapegoat people, especially immigrants and people who criticize the war."115

President George W Bush used idealism as the basis for invading Iraq, going so far as to directly address the Iraqi people during his war deadline speech in 2003. He took a decidedly liberal tone, emphasizing fervent support for the United Nations and its protection of innocence and peace and sharing an idealist vision for the future. “In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture

114 Wolfowitz, “Think Again.”
chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near.” Such goals stood in sharp contrast to the actions of the US military in Iraq.

As this next chapter will demonstrate, a single actor, whether grounded in realism or liberalism, rarely made foreign policy decisions independently. The Cold War led to a swell of foreign policy decision-makers who worked to fulfill the main functions of their bureaus. As these bureaus disagreed or contradicted one another, a conflicting approach to international relations developed within the US Government. This growth of bureaucracy and outsourcing of traditional state functions has rendered the axiomatic notion of a unitary actor to be inadequate in explaining the international relations of a state.

CHAPTER THREE: FRAGMENTATION OF A UNITARY ACTOR

The theory of international relations being decided by a unitary rational actor has been tested by the growth of the public sector in modern democracies. This chapter will demonstrate how the rise of bureaucratic institutions within the US Government has rendered the one rational actor theory to be inadequate in explaining or predicting current international affairs. This chapter will first explore traditional theories on bureaucracy. These theories will then be used to understand how the growth of bureaucracy within the United States Government led to competition in enacting international affairs. This chapter will also provide a brief overview of the rising influence of unit-level and external variables in shaping international affairs during the Cold War. The chapter will conclude with the expansion of US defensive power in fighting the War on Terror.

The growth of public sector bureaucracy in the United States since WWII has resulted in increasing competition among actors of various government agencies that influence decisions based on their respective organizational interests.117 There is no single decision-maker. The traditional assumption of foreign policy being produced by a unified government acting as a single state has been replaced by a competition of divergent organizations acting upon the outcomes of their standard operating procedures and organizational versions of national interest. Graham Allison articulates this rise of bureaucratic politics as such, “Happenings in foreign affairs are understood neither as choices nor as outputs. Instead, what happens is categorized as outcomes of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government.”118

The expansion of US bureaucracy since the Second World War informed relations with the Soviet Union and post-Soviet states. Different bureaus and agencies were established by the US Government to meet the intelligence demands prevalent during the Cold War. The US president divided foreign affairs among the competing members of the National Security Council, some of whom led bureaus with thousands of employees. This council fragmented individual defense functions, such as intelligence, outside of the Department of Defense or US Army. Such subdivisions were then extended into the privatization of security and military functions. The Department of State, which reports to the president but whose leaders are appointed by Congress, was also fragmented by decisions of each embassy and their stateside counterparts (such as the Democracy, Rights, and Labor bureau), whose sub-bureaus were often created by Congressional decree. As this chapter will demonstrate, the president has attempted various levels of centralization of power in order to control the growing defense industry, and Congress has in turn sought to contradict or restrict this presidential authority.

Bureaucratic Logics
Modern theories of bureaucratic institutionalism emerged based on Max Weber’s idea that compliance with operating procedures and internal rules guide the conduct of leaders.119 Rational bureaucratic arrangement assumes that the individual in a position of authority within a system will fulfill the stated job requirements, irrespective of individual personality. Bureaucracy is rational in

that the structure and tasks of an organization leads to its objectives.\textsuperscript{120} As a bureaucracy expands in size, it replicates the elements of the bureaucracy within its sub-bureaus.\textsuperscript{121} But, as a bureau expands, it may need to rely on others to fulfill its obligations; those agents may have different or even opposing interests and goals than the principal that hired them. There is an increased need for control and supervision mechanisms, which in turn generate more rules and procedures.\textsuperscript{122} This is evident in the growth of foreign policy actors in the United States. The National Security Agency and the splitting of the Civil Service and Foreign Service are both examples of the rise of foreign policy implementing mechanisms in the US. The splitting of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Intelligence bureau is another example of expansion driving a need for more leaders in order to retain or expand control.

Modern bureaucratic theorists may consider the impact of external factors on the decision-making or functionality of a bureau. For example, electoral systems, branches of government, political parties and interest groups may all impact how a leader of a specific bureau defines his or her relative power. Government bureaus, congressional committees, and interest groups form alliances (an iron triangle) to preserve their power and agenda. Rather than view the organizational structure of foreign policy enactment as a logical series of units and sub-units, one might instead interpret them as a series of fragmented power centers.\textsuperscript{123} In a democratic system of checks, balances, and competing responsibilities for the foreign policy agenda, it is rare for decisions to be traceable to a single person or single agency acting upon its bureaucratic frameworks. A bureaucratic institutionalist might say that the rise of Department of State solutions to the Cold War finally overpowered the defense strategy, and the legislative branch pushed the executive branch to seek peace.

Individual governmental departments with their own rules and objectives have varying levels of influence on the final decision of any foreign policy. The president and his direct reports may have one overarching foreign policy agenda, but it is enacted by hundreds of bureaucrats with their own priorities. Those agencies may have a more narrow focus that contradicts the goals of a different agency within the same governmental department. For example, the US Agency for International Development may be attempting to expand access to drinking water in the same neighborhoods where the US is blowing up drinking water systems as part of its military attacks. The US committee on religious freedom may be recommending more religious tolerance in a country while a different US department is labeling those same religious groups as terrorists. The Center for Disease Control might be spending millions of dollars giving away free condoms and providing needle exchanges for HIV prevention among prostitutes and drug users while the Drug Enforcement Agency might be trying to round up and prosecute those same people.

The leaders of these bureaus have varying allegiance to elected leaders. Individual departments are often made up of career bureaucrats who are not part of the democratic system. The senior leader of a bureau may be appointed, but he or she is rarely recalled by the same group that made the

\textsuperscript{121} Peter M. Blau and Richard A. Schoenherr, \textit{The Structure of Organizations} (New York: Basic Books 1971), 274.
\textsuperscript{122} Alvin W. Gouldner, \textit{Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy}, (Glencoe, Illinios: The Free Press, 1954), 159-177.
appointment, so once chosen they function with a great degree of autonomy. Often these appointments become the lesser priority of Congress or are used as bargaining leverage against the President, so positions remain unfilled. In the absence of appointed leadership, career bureaucrats fill the positions for months or years. At the start of 2014, there were almost 50 US Ambassadors awaiting Congressional appointment. This means about a quarter of the countries in the world were without their top US official, and senior bureaucrats were filling in.\footnote{Anne Gearan and Ed O’Keefe, “Senate turf fight hurts approval of Obama’s diplomatic nominees” The Washington Post, March 6, 2014.}

The military and defensive interests of the US Government have been led by a host of senior bureaucrats who served multiple presidents in multiple positions. This recycling of key defense leaders served to strengthen the role of defense in shaping foreign policy based on the interests of the Pentagon. This is most evident in examining the senior leaders of the National Security Council. Donald Rumsfeld was appointed as Secretary of Defense under President Ford in the 1970s and again for George W Bush in 2008. Robert Gates served as head of national intelligence under George HW Bush and then as Secretary of Defense for both George W Bush and President Obama. Colin Powell was Reagan’s National Security Advisor before becoming Secretary of State under W Bush. The chart below elaborates on the extent to which senior bureaucrats shifted influential positions. Shaded boxes indicate where a person had previously sat in an unelected position on the National Security Council. This chart only considers the top leader of each of these bureaus. If one were to also look at their deputies and their previous positions in senior leadership outside the NSC, the repetition would be even more striking.


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How expansion of defense fragmented the unitary actor

This next section will trace key moments in the expansion of security bureaus and the resulting fragmentation of foreign affairs since the start of the Cold War.
The foreign affairs bureaus of the US Government have swelled in size over the past fifty years, resulting in the dilution and fragmentation of a unitary actor in US international relations. This splintering was exacerbated by the tension between executive and congressional authority in matters of defense partnerships and actions. As this section will demonstrate, Congress has tried to re-assert authority over international affairs, at times boldly contradicting or restricting the president.

The Pentagon, built in 1943, is a notable symbol of the rise of military bureaucracy and its persistent influence on international affairs. It is one of the largest office buildings in the world at over six million square feet, with over 25 kilometers of corridors, and twice the office space of the Empire State Building. There are enough telephone cables to circle the globe four times, and over 200,000 phone calls a day go out. While other branches of government have expanded as well, none can come close to matching the manpower and influence of the Department of Defense and its affiliates, all of which report to the US President. Further, within such a massive operation, leaders of different branches of defense compete with each other over strategy and territory. There is no consistent ultimate actor within the many defensive bureaus.

Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 to give more power to the president to oversee military operations. President Truman used this new power to establish the National Security Council (NSC) and create the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – the United States’ first-ever peacetime intelligence bureau. The CIA was to be independent of other agencies and report directly to the NSC. Truman also tripled defense spending during his term in office; by 1953 it was 14.2% of the GDP. By creating a security council, decisions on foreign affairs were delegated to a host of high-ranking, unelected officials who may act independently of one another. The president appoints his security council and can centralize policy, but it would be impossible to direct these multiple pillars of security evenly. The Department of State is the only member of the National Security Council not exclusively focused on defense, making it harder for non-military voices to be represented in tactical discussions on national security.

Over three million Americans were employed in the defense industry by the end of Eisenhower’s term in office, and the US spent more on military security than was the net income of all US corporations at that time. This rapid connection between economic growth through military supply and structure became known as the military industrial complex. Eisenhower feared that such expansive military growth could undermine democracy, build a garrison state and ultimately lead to nuclear annihilation. But, he also believed that the moral, economic and military strength of the US would enable weaker governments to be represented with confidence in global disputes.

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131 “President Eisenhower’s Farewell Address to the Nation.” Speech January 17, 1961. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8y06NSBBRfY
A former WWII general to fear the ability of the military to act independently of the US Government shows how quickly the defense industry was becoming its own actor in international relations.

The military industrial complex has grown to include the contracting out of many defense functions, including training and security.\textsuperscript{132} There is robust debate as to whether the privatization of military forces contravenes principles of the just war theory.\textsuperscript{133} Dick Cheney went from being Secretary of Defense to running a private government contractor, Halliburton, which was awarded a billion dollar logistics contract for the conflict in Bosnia. Cheney later left Halliburton to become the Vice President of the USA, but Halliburton continued to receive lucrative military contracts, and there are continuing investigations into the extent that Cheney profited off these contracts.\textsuperscript{134} The most controversial private contractor, Blackwater, received $1.3 billion in contracts from the US Government between 2007 and 2014.\textsuperscript{135} This firm killed 17 Iraqi citizens during a mass shooting at a public shopping center but was able to continue receiving defense contracts by changing the company’s name and creating subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{136}

\textbf{Figure Three: US Defense budget since World War II (in billions)}\textsuperscript{137}

In order to control such a massive bureaucracy, US Presidents have sought varying levels of autonomy and authority in implementing foreign policy.\textsuperscript{138} Arthur Schlesinger coined the term ‘imperial Presidency’ to explain the ways that a combination of doctrines and emotions – belief in the permanent and universal crisis, fear of communism, faith in the duty and the right of the United States to intervene swiftly in every part of the world – had brought about the unprecedented centralization of decisions over war and peace in the Presidency. With this, there came an unprecedented

\textsuperscript{132} For the 25 private companies that profited the most off the War on Terror, see “The 25 most vicious Iraq War profiteers,” \textit{Business Pundit}, July 22, 2006.
\textsuperscript{134} Pratap Chatterjee, “Dick Cheney’s Halliburton: a Corporate Case Study,” \textit{the Guardian}, June 8, 2011.
\textsuperscript{138} For an analysis of internal disagreements on international relations since the end of the Soviet Union, see Jeffrey Goldberg, “Breaking Ranks: What Turned Brent Snowcroft Against the Bush Administration?” \textit{The New Yorker}, October 31, 2005.
exclusion of the rest of the executive branch, of Congress, of the press and of public opinion in general from these decisions.\textsuperscript{139}

The US President retains prodigious power over foreign policy decisions, but he is influenced or undermined by the many competing bureaus acting under his administration. There are currently over seven million federal employees (down from a high of 13 million in 1968), of which about three million report to the executive branch.\textsuperscript{140} In order to control the policy decisions of senior leaders responsible for millions of workers, a great degree of centralization and prioritization is required. US President Richard Nixon is the strongest example of centralization of power within the President’s scope. Under his presidency, he strengthened the NSC, appointed Kissinger as its head, and created a culture of secrecy that ultimately led to his own impeachment.\textsuperscript{141} At one point Kissinger was both the Secretary of State and the head of the National Security Council, until public resentment of the centralization of power led him to drop his position on the NSC.\textsuperscript{142}

\textit{Congressional Actors}

Congress delegated centralization of power to the president to create a national defense strategy. However, the rise in the defense industry quickly overshadowed other elements of foreign policy, causing resentment from elected leaders. This has led to public contradictions between the president and Congress regarding international affairs, furthering the disunity of the US Government. This dynamic is evident throughout US relations with Uzbekistan during the War on Terror, and as such, will be explored in the case study chapter. The most recent example of this discord has been over peace talks with Iran, with the Republican-led Congress inviting the Israeli Prime Minister (a staunch opponent of Iranian negotiations) to address the Senate regarding nuclear weapons talks at the same time as the Department of State was working to reach agreement with Iran. This interference with executive diplomacy reached a new low when 47 Republican senators then sent a letter, openly undermining the goals and tenets of the US position in negotiations, to the Iranian leaders responsible for the negotiations with the US.\textsuperscript{143} In this instance, two branches of the US Government were actively competing against one another as separate but authoritative actors in state affairs.

The Nixon administration was famous for excluding Congress in foreign policy decisions. According to now declassified government cables, Henry Kissinger swept through support for Jorge Videla in Argentina while Congress was out of session because Congress was raising concerns with human rights abuses and was considering sanctions. Kissinger is reported saying to Admiral Guzzetti, “If you can finish before Congress gets back, the better. Whatever freedoms you could


restore would help.”144 US Ambassador to Argentina, Robert Hill, had been delivering a contradictory message, which was undermined by other officials in Washington. Secretary of State Charles Robinson tried to explain the ranking of ideals to US interests. “The problem is that the United States is an idealistic and moral country…There is a tendency to apply our moral standards abroad and Argentina must understand the reaction of Congress.”145 The subsequent impeachment of Nixon shows the power that Congress retained over the president and the ways the Commander-in-Chief was limited by other branches of government.

While Congress had initially given wide security powers to the president, after the Vietnam War, Congress sought to regain control over defense through creating conditions and monitoring bureaus for appropriating funds to the military. Congress also set up appropriations for humanitarian assistance and soft diplomacy in an attempt to prevent developing states from turning to the Soviet Union for assistance. In 1973, Congress amended these foreign aid rules to explicitly say that the US Government cannot provide assistance to countries with a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”146 This was one of the many steps Congress took to wrestle back some power from the president following a botched war in Vietnam. The restriction of aid appropriations is a significant example of the legislative branch effectively regulating the decision-making powers of the executive branch.147 This same regulation would prove to be pivotal to the US relationship to Uzbekistan during the War on Terror.

President Carter was determined to have a different relationship to Congress and to end the culture of secrecy that had come to define the executive branch. He was the first US president to overtly emphasize human rights as a primary consideration for foreign relations.148 Carter began the annual country human rights reports, prepared by the Department of State, to show good faith towards Congress who was upset at the centralization of power that came to define the Nixon administration.149 The annual human rights reports are a cornerstone of the Congressional oversight of executive international actions because they provide a toehold for the legislative branch to restrict financial and military aid to countries that act against human rights. These reports were used to restrict aid to the militaries of Latin American countries throughout the 1980s and helped form the basis for restricting assistance to Uzbekistan during the War on Terror.

Carter also sought to weaken the National Security Council and give more power to career diplomats. He split the Civil Service and the Foreign Service, which paved the way for more career public sector employees to advance with autonomy in foreign policy decision-making positions. The creation of career bureaucrats in diplomacy enabled those positions to function with less allegiance to whoever is in office, thus creating more cracks in the unified actor of foreign affairs.

145 ibid Campbell, “Kissinger.”
This decision also created the structure for domestic-based civil servants who inform foreign policy on a specific region or US ideal, such as the religious freedom bureau. Other examples of this fragmentation of diplomacy include the individual bureaus set up to address niche issues such as trafficking in persons, democracy, AIDS relief, energy and environmental issues, LBGTI rights, arms control, personnel and management issues, and public diplomacy. The US provides over $1 billion in development assistance each year through Foreign Service employees stationed in over 100 countries around the world. This is a small but significant force of person-to-person diplomacy in half the world and provides Congress with a source for information on bilateral relations and priorities of foreign governments.

After President Carter sought soft diplomacy and productive relations with Congress, President Reagan promoted the security-driven imperatives of the Cold War, which put the president back at odds with Congress and other bureaus. Reagan increased defense spending by 35% during his time in office. He believed firmly in achieving peace through strength rather than through the enticement of democracy. The Reagan administration wanted broader military engagement to contain communism in Central America, but Congress was reluctant to grant military aid to countries with dodgy human rights records. Reagan was quick to certify that El Salvador was making progress on human rights, despite objections from Congress. US aid to El Salvador was cut in half in 1991 only after Congressman Moakley uncovered government knowledge of and assistance with the killing of Jesuit priests.

Reagan routinely used his executive authority to assist governments in Central America in much the same way as the Bush administration expanded the role of the US military around the world in a proclaimed effort to fight terrorism. The tension that President Reagan had with the legislative branch is similar to the tension between the two branches over the handling of the War on Terror. The manner in which President Bush defied Congressional attempts to restrict aid to Uzbekistan is an echo of the jockeying between Congress and President Reagan during the “war on drugs” and interventions throughout Latin America in the 1980s.

**Bureaucracy in the War on Terror**


152 Whitehouse, “Reagan.”


156 For a comparison of the rhetoric used in both wars, see Glenn Greenwald, “The Wars on Drugs and Terror: Mirror Images,” *Salon*, October 15, 2010.

The War on Terror provides an interesting snapshot of the expansive power of competing bureaus controlled by the US president. Immediately following the terrorist attacks in 2001, Congress gave extraordinary power to the president to interpret international law and expand the administrative powers of executive institutions.¹⁵⁸ The declaration of war was essentially a blank check to the departments reporting to the president. This broad declaration stretched beyond borders into anyone that “harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.”¹⁵⁹

At the time this war was declared, there was no internationally accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism. Further, terror and terrorism are methods, not entities or state bodies. Unlike a nation, they cannot be a formal party to a conflict, so there can be no war against them.¹⁶⁰ French foreign policy leader Gilles Andreani captures well the problems associated with declaring a “war” on terror.

First, the use of the word ‘war’ gives unwarranted status and legitimacy to the adversary. Second, it exaggerates the role of military operations in fighting global terrorism. Third, the United States bent both its internal judicial rules and international law to accommodate the concept of war on terror. Fourth, the connection drawn by the Americans between the war on terrorism and the concept of preventive war has worried the United States’ partners and undermined the anti-terrorist coalition.¹⁶¹

By declaring war on a concept, the US Government chose a supple opponent that could suit its larger interests, which in this case included pre-emptive military action in places where war had not been formally declared.¹⁶² President Bush outlined this offensive strategy in his West Point address in 2002. “The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”¹⁶³ This represented a new dimension of power for the defensive bureaus of the US Government to pre-emptively act militarily in places where no immediate threat of war had been established.

The brazenness with which the USA adopted a foreign policy of anticipatory self-defense garnered much criticism within the US foreign policy establishment for its departure from the alliance politics of the previous half-century. Even Henry Kissinger, a staunch backer of military inventions during his tenure in the executive branch, argued, “the notion of justified pre-emption runs counter to international law, which sanctions the use of force in self-defense only against actual, not potential threats.” He also made the case that it “is not in the American national interest to establish pre-emption as a universal principle available to every nation.”¹⁶⁴ Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright shared a similar sentiment to Kissinger. “It would be helpful now if the doctrine of pre-emption were to disappear quietly from the US national security lexicon and be returned to

¹⁶² Rashid, *Descent*, xlvii.
reserve status." The warnings of sage foreign policy practitioners did not dissuade the Bush administration in its pursuit of justification for an invasion of Iraq, as evidenced by the repeated assertion, including in a *New York Times* op-ed by Condoleezza Rice that Iraq was lying about its weapons capabilities and hiding weapons of mass destruction.166

The War on Terror provided an opportunity for the defense department to create a new network of secret operations.167 It is estimated that such troops are now active in over 120 countries of the world.168 Less than a week after the attacks on the US, President Bush gave unmatched authority to the CIA to use foreign intelligence agencies and make covert unilateral foreign policy decisions. Approvals for covert operations are given by the president and do not require the approval of a separate branch of government.169 However, the actual implementation of these covert operations may occur without the consent or knowledge of the president or his council. In an effort to preemptively attack potential enemies of the state, President Bush authorized new prisons for terror suspects, opening Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraiib, and a series of secret prisons around the world including within Uzbekistan.171 Up to 100 detainees were held in “ghost prisons” in Iraq, even further outside the registration requirement of US Army laws and the Geneva Conventions.172 These black sites would become a source of major tension during the War on Terror as the American public started questioning the actions of these secret units of defense.

Recently leaked data suggests that the intelligence budget was a staggering $56 billion since 2001, including $900 million for covert operations. However, the overall Department of Defense budget is still 10 times larger than all 16 intelligence agencies combined.173 To provide a sense of scale for this massive bureaucracy, the Department of Homeland Security alone has almost a quarter million employees.174 It is inconceivable for a bureau of 16 different agencies with millions of employees to behave as one actor, much less to act in step with a $620 billion defense enterprise, some of which was contracted out to private actors. Such a scale up of defense happened rapidly; the Department of Defense budget doubled between 2001 and 2008.175 The military budget of the United States during the War on Terror was equal to that of all other nations in the world combined.

While the president retains a degree of control over military operations, the heads of each bureau still retain a great deal of authority. Because of President Obama’s record of voting against military actions, he was unpopular with defense leaders. A huge divide between the Pentagon and the

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165 Madeline Albright, “*Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?*” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003.
173 Dashiell Bennett, “*A Rare Look at the Government’s Black Budget for Spying,*” *the Atlantic*, August 29, 2013.
president plagued the start of his presidency. Robert Gates, who served four presidents and was head of CIA at end of Cold War, was honest about fueling the divide between the president and his military.

My anger and frustration with the White House staff during the process led me to become more protective of the military and a stronger advocate for its position than I should have been…All of us at the senior-most level did not serve the president well in this process. Our ‘team of rivals’ let personal feelings and distrust cloud our perceptions and recommendations.

President Obama sought to reign in the military tactics approved by the previous president. For example, the Bush administration asserted that waterboarding was not torture and served as a reliable way to get information from terrorists. President Obama condemned the practice of waterboarding and claims to have ended it in 2009, saying, “we could have gotten this information in other ways, in ways that were consistent with our values, in ways that were consistent with who we are.”

The first major declassified CIA report on the use of torture provides a glimpse of the US Government operating outside of international law in its treatment of suspected terrorists. The releasing of this report garnered significant criticism from past leaders of the Department of Defense and CIA.

While the Bush administration was responsible for the massive scale up of the intelligence and defense departments, the role of the executive branch in fighting the War on Terror has remained largely the same under the current president, Barack Obama. When he was a Senator, Obama was very critical of the Bush administration’s handling of the war. Obama voted against the war in Iraq, and he campaigned for president under promises to end the war, close Guantanamo Bay, and restore confidence in America’s soft power and ideals. While Obama was running for office, he chastised President Bush for overstepping Congressional authority and using too much executive power. However, as a president himself, Obama has been more aggressive in approving controversial military operations, such as drone strikes, without Congressional approval.

Under the Obama administration, the National Security Council has oversight of a secret panel that decides which US citizens may be captured or killed as perceived terrorists. There are no public records of this panel, no law establishing the panel, nor any public rules governing it. President Obama has maintained that when Congress initially authorized the use of force against militants it included US citizens. The extrajudicial killing of US citizens is being challenged by international organizations that believe it violates basic rule of law principles.

If one were to argue that the defense branch of the US Government is the unitary rational actor in foreign affairs, the fragmentation of defense into many sub-units would contradict this argument. With so many bureaus within the defensive wing of US international affairs, it would be impossible

for all of these agencies (CIA, FBI, Army, Navy, Navy SEALS, Air Force, Homeland Security, CENTCOM, …) to act in alignment. When you add the privatization of security and defense functions, this actor becomes even more fragmented. Security functions of the US Government had been splintered into autonomous bureaus acting upon the immediate commands of their operational unit. Such commands may contradict the commands of another unit within the defense bureaucracy. For example, it has recently been announced that the CIA inadvertently paid $1 million in cash to Al Qaeda via the Government of Afghanistan, at the very same time that the US military was depleting Al Qaeda’s power through extensive drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan.183

As this chapter has demonstrated, different branches of the government have responded differently to international affairs, including war. US presidents have invaded countries and deployed troops around the world without the approval of Congress. A growing Pentagon and National Security Council have led foreign policy decisions, sometimes independently of any elected leaders. Congress gave this power to these bureaus by creating the NSC, Department of Defense, and through the declaration and funding of wars. Congress has since tried to wrest power back from the executive branch through limiting access to funds or creating conditions for providing foreign assistance or other diplomatic engagement. Individual foreign policy groups, such as embassies or civil service bureaus, often work independently of elected branches of government but provide the reporting necessary for Congress to restrict executive power on a country-by-country basis.

The assumption of the unitary rational actor embedded in international relations theory does not accord with the practical reality of the way that foreign policy is decided in a large, powerful democracy such as the US. Even within the defense departments, there is a vast array of power and duties, which is further fragmented by the privatization of military functions. There is a constant struggle between elements of the state apparatus that each perform their enacting functions. Self-protection may be the most primal motivation for international relations, but the method by which such protection is best achieved oscillates between military action and soft or coercive diplomacy.

The diplomatic wing of the US Government was no match for a defense machine more than 50 times its size. The State Department budget, including foreign loans and aid, was paltry by comparison to defense spending. By 2009 the State Department budget had increased to $11.4 billion, or a mere 2% of the defense budget.184 US humanitarian assistance is an even smaller piece of the pie and has remained less than 1% of US Government spending.185 In regions without a large defensive interest on the part of the US, diplomacy has been able to play a more central role in affecting foreign affairs. However, where defensive interests dominate, dissenting voices are less heard.

Immediate strategic military interests have taken precedence over soft diplomacy or human rights foreign policy since the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001. As this case study will show, it was very difficult for foreign policy officials to make credible headway on democracy and human rights while defense officials were violating international law, holding the purse strings, and making deals

with authoritarian leaders. However, there were moments during which human rights were given primary consideration in foreign policy decisions.

The War on Terror provides a lens through which to observe the balancing of foreign policy defensive interests and American ideals. The tension between democracy and defense, often present between Congress and members of the National Security Council, will be explored further in this case study of Uzbekistan’s role in the War on Terror. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian Republic to share borders with all the other countries plus Afghanistan, making it a key stage for the War on Terror. The US President and his administration were publicly very supportive of the authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan, despite concerns from Congress, media outlets, and monitoring bureaus within the Department of State. The executive branch sidelined the ideals of civil and political freedom in order to gain access to Afghanistan. However, through persistent efforts from other branches of government, including Congress, human rights policy was able to shape international relations between the US and Uzbekistan. To understand the motivations for this partnership, it is useful to have some context for the larger geostrategic interests in Central Asia and the human rights situation in these former Soviet Republics. This will be explored in the next chapter, “Post-Soviet Uzbekistan.”
CHAPTER FOUR: POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan is home to roughly half of the total Central Asian population, in addition to diaspora populations throughout the region. Regional geopolitics largely informs the foreign policy choices of Uzbekistan. This chapter will explore the early years of post-Soviet independence, the trajectory of the Central Asian Republics, and the role of regional multilateral organizations in influencing Uzbekistan’s international relations. All the Central Asian Republics started on similar footing at the end of the Soviet Union, but their development has varied noticeably over the past 20 years. According to the academic Kathleen Collins, writing in 2002, the Central Asian Republics are “less stable, politically consolidated, prosperous, and free than they were in 1991… By the time the midpoint of the decade had passed, all five new Central Asian states had settled down to one shade or another of authoritarianism in which informal, clan-based networks dominated political life.”

As evidenced by the GDP graph below, Uzbekistan has struggled to grow the income of its residents. When Uzbekistan gained its independence, it was one of the poorest countries in the developed world, with average monthly wages at only $50. Ten years later, one in five people in Uzbekistan were living on less than $2 a day. This number has barely moved, and the GNI is only $1900 now.

**Figure Four: GDP per capita all Central Asian Republics (in USD)**

As the Republics formed the Commonwealth of Independent States at the end of the Soviet Union, it became apparent that the subsidized relationship and market conditions of the past 70 years were coming to a halt. The new Russian government demanded international market prices for Russian goods and former Soviet domestic prices for goods being imported from the Republics. Russia stopped loans, aid and pricing subsidies and demanded prompt repayment in US dollars. Further, many of the senior political and economic leaders were repatriating to Russia, leaving behind a

vacuum of leadership that would be able to negotiate differently. The resource mix of water and oil has been a source of constant tension between the upstream and downstream countries in Central Asia, at times reaching the threat of war.

It was no surprise, given the difficult market conditions, that the first years of post-Soviet independence were mired in economic instability and recession. Uzbekistan’s inflation reached 1100% in 1993, and the local currency lost two-thirds of its value in the second half of 1994. Trade with Russia and China now account for just over a third of the Central Asia global trade. By contrast, intraregional trade within Central Asia is currently less than 5 per cent, which is very low by global standards. Ten years after the end of the Soviet Union, every economy in Central Asia was smaller than it was in 1990.

Adding to this economic pressure is the disproportionate youth population, comprising up to two-thirds of the total population in the region. Nearly 400,000 new young Uzbek people join the job market each year. Almost a third of the population is between the ages of 10 and 24. Less than 10% of 18-24 year olds are enrolled in tertiary institutions, and one in five children of primary school age are not in school. The connection between surplus youth populations, lack of employment, and the potential for extremism has been well documented by development agencies.

**Foreign Investment in Uzbekistan**

The US government provided $17 million in humanitarian assistance and $13 million in technical assistance during the first two years of Uzbekistan’s independence. Bilateral relations were restricted by the continued human rights violations, and Uzbekistan received less assistance than its neighbors as a result. In 1997, Uzbekistan became eligible for US military articles and services. Overall, the US Government provides the most foreign aid to Uzbekistan, almost one billion US dollars between 1992-2010. That assistance includes financial support for democracy and good governance. However, less than 7% of respondents in an Uzbekistan survey regarded US support for democracy as a valuable form of assistance. In 2002, 85% of Uzbeks had a positive opinion of the USA, and over 90% of those surveyed favored the War on Terror, yet a majority disapproved of the spread of US ideas and customs.

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198 Rashid, *Jihad*, 82.
200 US Army *Kazakhstan*, 460.
During the early days of independence, the international community was eager to assist with economic liberalization across the former Soviet Union. The World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the IMF came together in 1995 to offer $900 million in loan assistance to Uzbekistan over two years. In the first 10 years of independence, net FDI inflows to Uzbekistan were among the lowest of all the Commonwealth of Independent States. Assistance was predicated on Uzbekistan moving closer to western systems of governance and economics. When such progress was not demonstrated, the foreign assistance dried up. The IMF suspended loan agreements, neglected to renew its stabilization package and closed its office shortly after. Small businesses were limited in the amount of Uzbek som they could convert to dollars, impacting their ability to buy products outside of the country. Residents were required to show airplane tickets and travel documents in order to convert currency.

A convertible currency was finally introduced a decade ago, but regulatory barriers still make the process untenable, and there is no private market for remitting foreign funds. The Central Bank controls all hard currency and exchanges, which seriously deters foreign investment. The lack of a convertible currency allowed for stronger control of the black market by wealthy business leaders with connections to the government. The largest unit of currency, the 1000 som bill, is worth about 60 US cents, and ATM or credit card transactions are unavailable outside of a few hotels in Tashkent.

**Corruption and Drug Trafficking**

Corruption, inadequate transport infrastructure, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and faltering respect for contracts have all discouraged major foreign investment in Central Asia. Land travel is the primary method of transport for goods, yet borders are frequently closed in response to conflicts over unrelated foreign policy matters. In a 2008 US Chamber of Commerce survey, 100% of respondents reported “high or very high” levels of border corruption among customs officials in Uzbekistan. Due to informal barriers, the World Bank has labeled the region as the most cumbersome in the world for cross-border trade. In 2013, it took an average of 79 days to import goods across the Uzbekistan border and 95 days for imports, which was the worst ranking of all 189 countries in the annual World Bank Doing Business study.

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209 Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 266.
Uzbekistan consistently ranks in the top 10 most corrupt countries in the world.\textsuperscript{214} In the late 1980s, all of the local Communist party leaders were ousted after it was revealed that they were fixing cotton prices by over $1 billion through a complex scheme of falsified records, kickbacks, and bribes involving thousands of people.\textsuperscript{215} This scandal earned Uzbekistan a reputation as the most corrupt republic within the Soviet Union, and it created the opening that allowed President Karimov to rise to power. For over 20 years, he and his close network of allies have remained in control of Uzbekistan.

The high levels of corruption lend themselves seamlessly to a flourishing drug trade. Corruption is acutely felt in the police force, where organized crime and law enforcement overlap considerably.\textsuperscript{216} According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC),

In 2010 an estimated 25 per cent of the 380 tons of heroin manufactured in Afghanistan — some 90 tons — was trafficked northwards through Central Asia via the Northern route and onward to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, in 2010 between 35 and 40 tons of raw opium were trafficked through northern Afghanistan towards Central Asian markets.\textsuperscript{217}

The UNODC has captured well the larger economic implications of a thriving drug trade: The profits generated from the opiate trade have a serious impact on state and society. UNODC estimates that in 2010 drug traffickers in Central Asia made a net profit of US$1.4 billion from the sale of transiting opiates. At the micro level, poverty in these countries leaves many - including low-paid local officials - with few viable avenues for economic advancement. At the macro level, struggling economies in the region have limited resources to devote to drug control.\textsuperscript{218}


\textsuperscript{215} Cooley, Great Game, 20.

\textsuperscript{216} US Army, Kazakhstan, 467.


\textsuperscript{218} UNODC, “Opiate,” 15.
**Fergana Valley**

Uzbekistan’s eastern border zigzags through the rich, fertile and populous Fergana Valley, which has been at the center of political disputes. In 2004, at least 50 places along the border with Tajikistan or the Kyrgyz Republic were still disputed.¹¹⁹

Unrest in the region in March of 2005 led to a change in presidents in the Kyrgyz Republic.²²⁰ Namangani, the head of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, was born and raised in the Fergana Valley, and in 1999, the IMU planned an attack on Uzbekistan from the Valley. Uzbekistan’s President, Islam Karimov, was acutely aware of the potential power and undermining that was possible in the region. He rose to power in Uzbekistan after government leaders were implicated in a cotton price fixing scandal across the Valley.

The current residents of the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan are limited to state-owned agriculture that they receive little profit from. This region was treated as a plantation for the Soviet Union, and the environmental impacts of draining the Aral Sea for cotton farming has depleted the land of its productivity.²²¹ Unemployment reaches up to 80%.²²² The silk industry, the world’s third largest, is bolstered by unpaid labor, with families across the Fergana Valley being forced by government mandate and local government enforcement to grow silk worms for state profit inside their small homes.²²³ Over 2 million tons of silkworm cocoons are produced each year in the Fergana province of Uzbekistan.²²⁴ The cotton industry yields $1 billion in profit each year,²²⁵ but the labor is provided unpaid by up to one million school children, doctors, teachers and local residents who each need to pick up to 120 pounds of raw cotton daily.²²⁶ Uzbekistan was downgraded to a Tier 3 country in the 2013 annual State Department human trafficking report as a result of six consecutive years of showing a lack of progress on reforms in the cotton industry. The country should have been automatically downgraded in 2011 but received two years of waivers.²²⁷

**Regional Perspective**

Below is a snapshot of the current standing of the Central Asian Republics across a range of recent civil and economic rights indexes, and a brief commentary on the relevance of each Republic to this case study.

**Figure Five: Civil and Political Rights – global rankings**

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Kyrgyz Republic

The Kyrgyz Republic has a similar resource mix and GDP per capita to Uzbekistan. However, it has taken a very different approach from its neighbors in regards to international relations and the role of civil society. The Kyrgyz Republic was the first Central Asian Republic to join the WTO and is making a successful transition to a democratic system of power. There is still much progress to be made, but it has the most vibrant civil society in the region and has tolerated non-violent political demonstrations and other voicing of grievances.

The Kyrgyz Republic hosted a military base (Manas) that was the transit point for all US troops and fuel going to Afghanistan. For that reason, Kyrgyz – US relations could serve as an interesting point of within case analysis. The Kyrgyz Government has been strategic about its benefits from hosting the military base. Each airplane takeoff at Manas cost upwards of $7,000. From 2001-2011, it is estimated that there were over $1.8 billion in fuel contracts for the military base. This money made from partnering with the US Government was crucial to the overall economic stability, as the Kyrgyz Republic consistently ranks in the top 3 most remittance-dependent economies in the world. As such, the Kyrgyz Republic was not in a position to anger the US, as it was dependent on the military base for economic growth.

The people of the Kyrgyz Republic paid close attention to the role of the military base. President Askar Akayev was widely accused of allowing his family and friends to profit off the fueling and

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230 Cooley, Great Game, 163.
servicing contracts from the military base. He was ousted from the presidency in 2005 in the largely nonviolent “tulip revolution” which called for an end to corruption and authoritarianism. This revolution created fear of a ripple effect of instability in Uzbekistan during the same time frame. President Akayev ran away to Russia and was replaced by the opposition leader, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. In 2010, when Bakiyev was accused of not following through on promises to limit Presidential authority and corruption, mass protests ultimately led to his resignation as well. Some reports suggest that President Bakiyev made as much as $8 million each month from the fuel contracts at Manas Air Base.

The Kyrgyz Republic has been plagued by ethnic violence between Uzbek and Kyrgyz citizens in the Fergana Valley. When the region was united under the Soviet Union, land disputes and other territorial matters escalated along ethnic lines. In one of the worst episodes of violence, during riots in 1990, hundreds of farmers were found hung up by meat hooks in the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh. Moscow’s response to this unrest was to reach outside the political elite and appoint a leader who was not entrenched in Uzbek nationalism. They chose an outsider, Islam Karimov, to be the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. This appointment would pave the way for his presidency, which has lasted over 20 years.

As the Kyrgyz Republic sought an increasing Kyrgyz identity after Soviet independence, the 15% Uzbek population has been marginalized. Massive riots in 2010 between Uzbek and Kyrgyz people displaced over 400,000 local residents near the Kyrgyz border with Uzbekistan. Neighborhoods were torn apart, with homes, businesses, and universities burned to the ground. The border is a constant source of tension between the Governments of Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, with periodic episodes of violence and border closings. In Karasu, on the border of Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, nearly 40,000 people cross each day to visit the market on the Kyrgyz side, yet there is no official border crossing station there, making bribery the primary method of access. In 2009, there were attacks on the Kyrgyz border post at Khanabad (a city near the US military base in Uzbekistan) and a suicide bombing at a police station in Andijan, near the border of Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan.

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236 Rashid, Jihad, 50.
237 US Army, Kazakhstan, 399.
For the above reasons, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic have minimal diplomatic ties to one another. When Uzbek residents walked across the border fleeing police violence in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May 2005, the Kyrgyz Government was in a difficult position of determining whether to grant refugee status to those who left or whether to return them to Uzbekistan.\(^\text{244}\) They ultimately sided with the western countries calling for protection of the Uzbek asylum seekers, causing much outrage from the Government of Uzbekistan. This incident will be explored more fully in this case study.

**Kazakhstan**

Kazakhstan mirrors Uzbekistan in its septuagenarian Soviet leadership. But, its independence trajectory is notably different. It does not border Afghanistan, and as such was of less geostrategic interest to the USA for the War on Terror. It has embraced the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has hosted a myriad of international events and has joined a powerful customs union with Russia and Belarus. Kazakhstan liberalized its economy early in its independence and welcomes foreign investment including in its booming energy sector. Kazakhstan was quick to move to private sector banking, housing, and development, and as a result, a middle class is emerging and per capita income has risen to roughly $14,000.\(^\text{245}\) Kazakhstan welcomes visits from the United Nations and similar international bodies and is an attractive hub for multilateral organizations seeking a regional presence. While Kazakhstan has heavily censored local media outlets and does not allow for political opposition, it has tolerated western media, Internet access, non-governmental organizations and other foreign assistance programs.

**Turkmenistan**

Turkmenistan has a similar resource mix as Kazakhstan but is the polar opposite in terms of international engagement. It did not join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and rarely participates in international organizations or rankings. It remained neutral throughout the Taliban’s rule and was unwilling to join larger international efforts to isolate the Government of Afghanistan. Turkmenistan has some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves and growing Caspian Sea mining. As such, it has less incentive to trade basing or access rights in exchange for an economic aid package from the US Government. Turkmenistan’s economy has remained closed and government-owned, but their hydrocarbon resources have led to overall per capita income growth to $8,900.

**Tajikistan**

Tajikistan could offer insights into diplomatic priorities in the region. Many of the key Taliban officials were ethnic Tajiks; the overall population of Afghanistan is close to 30% Tajik.\(^\text{246}\) However, it was too instable to provide any reliable defense stronghold for the US Government. The Tajikistan civil war ended with the establishment of an autonomous region along the border. The high mountain terrain covering 90% of the country and its lack of infrastructure make it an unpalatable geographic link. Tajikistan is the most remittance-dependent country in the world;

\(^{244}\) Marat, “Kyrgyzstan.”


according to World Bank figures, over half of the GDP comes from remittances.\textsuperscript{247} These remittances are predominantly from migrants working in Russia, and as such, Tajikistan would be reticent to do anything that might threaten that relationship. The US Government has pursued economic stability for Tajikistan as a key way of fighting potential terror threats there.

\textit{Regional Influences on Uzbekistan}

Central Asia has been no stranger to its strong neighbors. Russia and China offer a similar style of governance to the Republics and provide growing economic investment in the region. All of the Republics have chosen at times to ignore western advice in favor of Chinese or Russian assistance while maintaining close enough ties to the United States to use them as a buffer against these other powers. In his analysis of the new ‘Great Game,’ Andrew Cooley captures well the current regional political landscape.

The Central Asian states all practice a version of patrimonial politics. Though they vary in their degree of authoritarianism, natural resource endowments, and engagement with the international community, all follow a similar set of local imperatives: they conflate internal and external security threats to further their regime survival, they use state office for private gain; and they act as brokers between their political clients and the international community. These local rules all have their roots in the institutions, practices, and legacies of Soviet times but have been revived and recrafted since independence.\textsuperscript{248}

Russia and China have more complimentary rather than competing interests in the region and have sought to strengthen ties through emphasizing the domestic sovereignty of each country. Both countries have a mutual interest in bolstering the Republics against over reliance on the United States. Russia also seeks to maintain strong relations with its diaspora populations across Central Asia. China is highly motivated by preventing allegiances with the Uighur movement in the Xinjiang region of west China; over one million Uighur people live in the Republics.\textsuperscript{249}

The War on Terror provided both China and Russia with a platform for squashing their own domestic threats. The two countries believed it would be easier to limit civil liberties if such restrictions are couched under perceived improvements in safety from terrorists. Russia was eager to get western backing for its offensive moves in the Caucasus, including the labeling of Chechen separatist groups as terrorists. China has strongly opposed the Uighur ethnic minority group in Xinjiang, framing it as a fight against terrorism. While both countries may use the lexicon of terrorism to strengthen their authoritarian grip, neither nation is interested in seeing the US maintain military bases or any other permanent influence in Central Asia.

Economic statecraft, like international associations, has played an important role in diplomatic relations with the Central Asian Republics. Trade between Russia and Central Asia skyrocketed under Vladimir Putin’s first administration, beginning in 2000, going from $2 billion to $27 billion annually, before the economic downtown in 2009. China’s regional annual trade reached $30

\textsuperscript{247} World Bank, “Remittances.”
\textsuperscript{248} Cooley, \textit{Great Game}, 29.
\textsuperscript{249} Kevin Sheives, “China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy towards Central Asia,” \textit{Pacific Affairs} 79 no. 2 (Summer 2006): 205-224.
In 2013, China was rumored to have negotiated $15 billion in oil, gas, and gold deals with Uzbekistan during a high level visit. Despite trade and investment, there is reticence to engage too fully with China. A poll in 2002 revealed that 40% of people in Uzbekistan say that China cannot be trusted to act responsibly in Central Asia.

Russia’s answer to regional stability has been to lead the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), established with former Soviet partners. The CSTO has been security-focused and Russia-centric since its beginning. Uzbekistan’s presence in the CSTO was short-lived. They joined in 2005 but limited participation in 2009 amidst concerns about stricter customs and border practices, which Uzbekistan feared would bolster the Kyrgyz Republic in its fights in the south. They suspended their membership in 2012 as well once the CSTO gave Russia veto power for any CSTO country allowing foreign military bases.

China established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 under the auspices of fighting perceived regional terror threats and delimiting the borders between the Central Asian nations. The organization was originally established on the basis of non-alignment, and seeks to be more of a partnership than a formal alliance. The trademark of this group, and China’s version of multipolar relations, is the respect for the individual sovereignty of each country. The group operates with a shared decision not to meddle in domestic affairs, or as they have articulated, “We do not impose our own model of development or our own model of democracy on anyone.” This is notably different than most other international organizations that uphold a responsibility to protect against human rights abuses regardless of the jurisdiction of where they might occur.

The SCO operates using consensus, which causes it to limit the membership of states with potentially divergent interests. The original members are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan joined the SCO to counterbalance Russia’s influence in the region, to respond to the growth of Islam, and to maintain its reputation as a leader in the Central Asia region. An anti-terrorist center was established in Tashkent in 2004, likely to counterbalance the US support to Uzbekistan. The common goal of the SCO is repeatedly framed as uniting to fight the “3 evil forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.” This has largely been
interpreted as a method to crackdown on dissent within the authoritarian countries, and it has played out mostly in the form of joint military exercises. Each of the member countries operate using similar methods of graft, and as such, economic contracts and foreign investment are more easily reached within SCO countries than with western agencies who might be less susceptible to suitcases full of cash.

SCO member countries are united in the preservation of regime power as the primary motivation for all state actions. Establishing diplomatic cooperation between authoritarian regimes helps normalize this ruling style and counterbalances democratic norms as the preferred governance method of states seeking international relations. The SCO allows Central Asia and its neighbors to establish authoritarian governance as the accepted principle for ruling in the region while demonstrating that democracy is not necessary for peace between nations.

**Human Rights in Uzbekistan**

The years since the Soviet Union ended have been plagued by the repression of civil society and a disregard for human rights. This section will explore access to fundamental civil and political human rights such as freedom of movement and freedom of religion. It examines how these rights have been restricted under the blanket of national security, and how the Government of Uzbekistan has dealt with security incidents.

**Politics and Civil Society**

President Islam Karimov, and his authoritarian regime that has not changed much since Soviet times, rules Uzbekistan. None of the elections for President have been deemed free or fair, and the few people who have been brave enough to run against the incumbent without his blessing have been imprisoned or exiled. Former Vice President and Prime Minister Shukrulla Mirsaidov went so far to say "We live in a police state that would have made the old Bolsheviks proud…Independence for us has been a cruel joke." Although the Uzbekistan Constitution states that no one can be President for more than two terms, Karimov unilaterally extended the Presidential term of office to seven years from five and was ‘elected’ to a third term in 2007. Presidential elections have been scheduled for the spring of 2015, at which time Karimov will be 77 years old and will have ruled the country for 24 years.

The Birlik (Unity) Party was set up in the late 1980s by writers and intellectuals. Their platform included a return to Uzbek nationalism, greater social and economic equality, and ecological

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restoration through diversification of agriculture. Its rallies drew thousands of people. But its leader, Aburahim Polat, was disqualified from the 1991 presidential election, and the party was formally banned in 1992. Leaders transitioned the party into the NGO the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan. The Erk (Freedom) Party was a spin off from the Birlik party. Key opposition leader Muhammad Solih ran against Karimov in 1991. After losing the election, he quickly fled the country but was sentenced in absentia to treason. He is living in asylum in Norway. His brother, Muhammed Bekjon, also left the country but was then kidnapped by secret security in Ukraine and forcibly returned to Uzbekistan, where he remains imprisoned for his work as the editor of the Erk newspaper. He was scheduled to be released in 2012 but was sentenced to five more years for violations of prison rules, such as peeling carrots incorrectly. His 15 years in prison make him one of the longest imprisoned journalists worldwide. He was recognized with the Reporters Without Borders top honor in 2013.

Access to independent legal counsel is severely restricted in Uzbekistan. In January 2009, the Government of Uzbekistan replaced all independent bar associations with a government-run bar association. All lawyers had to reapply for their license, and every three years they are all required to re-take the bar exam. This concentration of power violates the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. Human Rights Watch describes the chilling effect of these unlawful restrictions as such, “Those that continue to practice since the reforms operate in an increasingly restrictive atmosphere, where taking the ‘wrong case,’ defending a client effectively, speaking publicly about due process violations, or even participating in events organized by foreign embassies risks effective disbarment.”

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have never been welcomed in Uzbekistan. The government is highly suspicious of citizens gathering together for any social purpose; NGOs are viewed as the cause of the color revolutions in Eastern Europe. Many international organizations including Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the American Bar Association, and Counterpart International were denied registration in 2005 based on new laws and were eventually forced to close. The new law in 2005 included tighter restrictions, like reporting all events and publications to the Government of Uzbekistan in advance. International organizations were not allowed to fund local NGOs, and NGOs in human rights or political advocacy were not

271 US Army, Kazakhstan, 450.
272 Rashid, Jihad, 84.
278 Human Rights Watch, “UPR.”
allowed to take foreign donations. Human Rights Watch later reopened but was kicked out by court decree in 2011.\textsuperscript{282} It was the first time in 33 years of operating that Human Rights Watch was expelled by a country.\textsuperscript{283}

There is a new trend towards government-sponsored organizations that address social issues that might otherwise be addressed through NGOs. These “GoNGOs” received significant government funding in 2013 and are expected to grow.\textsuperscript{284} These government-sponsored social welfare organizations are an attempt by Central Asian governments to show they are allowing local organizations to meet community needs in a manner similar to western NGOs. However, organizations outside of the government are still highly restricted. In 2013, the Bukhara staff of the only registered independent human rights group in Uzbekistan, Ezgulik (Compassion), received four-year prison sentences on what were viewed widely as false charges.\textsuperscript{285} The head of the Human Rights Alliance of Uzbekistan and his three sons were imprisoned for slander in May 2013.\textsuperscript{286}

\textit{Freedom of Information}

Information was highly controlled throughout the Soviet Union. In 1994, only 7\% of the population of Uzbekistan had telephone access, including business telephones.\textsuperscript{287} Strides have been made to grow telecom access across the country; mobile phone access is almost universal in Uzbekistan now.\textsuperscript{288} While nearly a third of Uzbekistan’s residents have some form of Internet access, it is highly censored. Internet access via mobile phones remains restricted in the same way as Internet on other devices. The government owns and tightly controls all telecommunications – standard websites such as Google and Yandex are frequently blocked based on current events. YouTube, Facebook, and international news outlets face similar access problems. Whole domains or specific pages are made inaccessible, and the webpages of foreign human rights organizations seem to be blocked indefinitely.\textsuperscript{289}

Shortly after gaining independence, all news outlets were required to register with the Uzbek government, and no independent news outlets were granted registration.\textsuperscript{290} The government regularly provides guidance about the types of stories that are permissible, and media that threatens the “national information space” will be banned under law.\textsuperscript{291} Legal entities with more than 30 percent foreign ownership are barred from establishing media outlets, and public insult to the President is subject to five years imprisonment.\textsuperscript{292} The British Broadcast Service (BBC) withdrew

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{284} International Committee, “NGO Law Monitor.”
\textsuperscript{287} US Army, \textit{Kazakhstan}, 379, 444.
\textsuperscript{290} US Army, \textit{Kazakhstan}, 451.
\textsuperscript{291} Nichol, “Uzbekistan.”
\end{footnotesize}
all its correspondents and closed its office in 2005 citing safety concerns and persistent harassment after its reporting on the Andijan massacre. BBC journalists are routinely denied visas to do reporting. Voice of America and Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL) are similarly blocked within Uzbekistan. Journalists have also been killed or tortured in retaliation for their work. Alisher Saipov was shot in the head in 2007, in what many believe was retaliation for his reporting on Uzbeks in the Kyrgyz Republic. In 2003, journalist Ruslan Sharipov was convicted of homosexual activity and tortured into confessing to crimes. He was later granted asylum to the United States. In 2004, Reporters Without Borders documented similar cases of obstruction, harassment, and imprisonment of journalists.

Freedom of movement is greatly restricted in Uzbekistan. Citizens need resident permits to move to Tashkent, and their registration paperwork in checked at border points between provinces to ensure permission to move internally. An exit visa is required before being permitted to leave the country, and human rights activists are routinely denied the exit visa. Further, for women ages 18-35 to get an exit visa, they are required to have a statement from a male relative that they will not engage in indecent acts abroad.

**Freedom of Religion**

Islam has always been the dominant religion of the region, but it was heavily suppressed during Soviet colonization. The Soviet government tolerated an organized secular version of Islam, with only 65 mosques in Uzbekistan and 3000 religious leaders, all of whom were screened regularly for loyalty to the state. Islam gained traction after independence, but more as a traditional cultural link rather than a religious belief. In a representative survey in 1994, interest in Islam was the weakest among younger generations, and few respondents showed any interest in a form of Islam that would include participation in political issues. Experts concluded that there was no immediate threat of Islam becoming the root of a conflict. As the Soviet Union was ending, new mosques were popping up every day. In 1991, there were over 1,000 new mosques in each Republic, mostly built with foreign investment from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. Across the Fergana Valley in particular, it was a bit of an arms race for new recruits from all sects of Islam.

The strong desire for state control was believed to be incompatible with a new religious order, and the Government of Uzbekistan was quick to clamp down on this growth. In 1998 the Government

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295 US Department of State, “2011 Human Rights.”
of Uzbekistan passed the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which severely restricted religious activity, including the requirement that each religious group have a permanent presence in eight provinces in order to be registered. Unregistered religious activity was criminalized, and minors were banned from religious organizations. The law also required official approval of the content, production and distribution of religious publications and forbid laypeople from wearing religious clothing or symbols in public. The law made clear the divide between religion and politics as well, stating, “The creation and activity of political party and social movement on the basis of religion in the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as creation of affiliates and branches of religious parties outside the Republic is banned.” In a 2012 Pew survey of Muslims in 39 countries, only 30% of Uzbekistan’s respondents said that religion was an important part of their life; among 18-34 year olds, this number was only 25%. Less than 10% of Uzbekistan’s respondents reported visiting a mosque at least weekly. Whether this was due to the strict government barrier to accessing religion is difficult to say, but the evidence suggests that religion is not guiding the decisions of most people in Uzbekistan.

Mass Incarceration
In Uzbekistan, allegations of connection to a religious extremist group are routinely used as a way to imprison someone who may be considered out of step with the regime. The broad-sweeping law against religion in 1998 provided the perfect net to scoop up anyone who was deemed to be a potential threat to the status quo. Mass incarceration of perceived enemies has been a common practice since the beginning of the gulags in the 1920s. During Stalin’s reign, it is estimated that 18 million people passed through prison camps, and six million more were exiled. It should be no surprise then that this tactic has continued in Uzbekistan. Human Rights Watch estimates that Uzbekistan holds more political prisoners than the rest of the former Soviet Union combined. According to human rights groups, over 10,000 political prisoners are believed to be in jail as a result of various ‘enemy of state’ charges. The US Government estimates that over 12,000 Muslims are incarcerated for charges related to religion. According to government of Uzbekistan figures, there are 42,000 total prisoners being held in 58 facilities across the country.

The Jaslyk prison, opened in 1999 in response to an alleged assassination attempt, has been nicknamed the “house of torture” due to the horrid abuses documented by former prisoners. The Nation called it “a vast vault of human misery that has earned its reputation as the country’s worst political prison.” This is the same prison the US Government used for its rendition program. There is estimated to be up to 7,000 people currently detained there, but the Government of

304 Zakon o Svobode Sovesti i Religioznykh Organizatsiya [Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations]. Adopted 14 June 1991 (no. 8, item 186), amended 3 September 1993 (no. 9, item 334) and 1 May 1998 (no. 5-6, item 99).
307 Mansur Mirovalev, “Forced Labor.”
310 US Department of State, “Organization Chart.”
Uzbekistan denies torture allegations.\textsuperscript{312} When Theo van Boven, the UN Rapporteur on Torture, visited in 2002, he reported that the use of torture is systemic. He was denied entry to a few prisons, but his report paints a bleak picture of the criminal justice system.\textsuperscript{313} Human rights groups have documented physical and psychological torture including police officers using lit newspaper to burn the genitals of a suspected spy, pouring boiling water on an activist, beating detainees, hanging them by their wrists and ankles, and subjecting them to rape and asphyxiation.\textsuperscript{314}

Extremist Groups
There have been a few documented attacks on representatives of the Uzbek and foreign governments. These incidents have all been blamed on religious extremists, but in the absence of rule of law, it is impossible to accurately distinguish between accidents, separatist acts, government propaganda, terrorism, or religiously motivated violence. Jury trials are rare, and prosecutors almost never lose a case. In 1999, 128 people were injured and 16 were killed in what would be labeled an assassination attempt on President Islam Karimov. Six bombs exploded outside the Government’s headquarters an hour before Karimov was due to appear there.\textsuperscript{315} No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but Foreign Minister Sadyk Safayev blamed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).\textsuperscript{316} Some scholars believe this attack could have been carried out by major power brokers who had recently lost power and economic stakes in the state’s riches.\textsuperscript{317} As a result of this attack, between 1999 and 2001, the Government of Uzbekistan rounded up over 6,500 young men and incarcerated them as “terrorists.”\textsuperscript{318}

There was a spate of terrorist attacks on police stations and local markets in spring 2004, killing at least 17 people. This included the first known suicide bombings in the country; women committed them.\textsuperscript{319} Other suicide bombings occurred on 30 July 2004 when bombs were exploded at the US Embassy and the Israeli Embassy, at the same time as the trial was taking place for the people accused of the earlier bombings.\textsuperscript{320} In 2009, there were attacks on the Kyrgyz border post at Khanabad (a city near the US military base in Uzbekistan) and a suicide bombing at a police station in Andijan, in the Fergana Valley on the border of Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{321}

The most well-known of the extremist groups in Uzbekistan is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU. The IMU was labeled a “foreign terrorist organization” in September 2000 by

\textsuperscript{313} Eshanova Zamira, “Uzbekistan: UN Rapporteur Says Use of Torture Systemic,” \textit{RFERL}, December 9, 2002
\textsuperscript{317} Collins, \textit{Clans}, 148.
\textsuperscript{320} Wikileaks. “Cablegate.”
the US Department of State. In August 1999, the IMU became known publicly when they brought 800 troops to the Kyrgyz Republic in what is believed to be a threatened invasion of Uzbekistan. The IMU founder, Juma Namangani, was later appointed as the head of the Taliban and foreign forces in Northern Afghanistan. He was killed in an attack on the area in November 2001, but the movement is still active. Their high levels of education have made them prized bomb-makers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IMU is believed to have splintered in recent years into sub-groups more prominent in Pakistan. One splinter group allegedly active in Uzbekistan is the Islamic Jihad Group, or Islamic Jihad Union. This terrorist group was founded in March 2002 as a break off of the IMU based in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In addition to the Embassy bombings, the Islamic Jihad Group claimed responsibility for suicide bombings on police at the end of March 2004 and in 2009.

Hizb ut-Tahrir, or the Islamic Party of Liberation, is a strict sect of Wahhabi Sunni Islam practiced in over 40 countries. It is the dominant religion in Saudi Arabia, a nation that contributed heavily to the building of mosques across Central Asia. In 2000, there were over 800 people in custody in Uzbekistan as a result of accusations of affiliation with this religious movement, but the organization itself estimates the number to be over 10 times that. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir group vehemently denies any terrorism allegations and believes the bombings were a stunt by the Government to gain support for its actions.

The Government of Uzbekistan used fear of extremism as a method of oppression and imprisonment of thousands of people. These prisoners are sentenced in a court system that violates most basic principles of rule of law, and torture is systemic. Religious practice is highly restricted, and public expressions of beliefs are not tolerated. Freedom of speech, association, and assembly are non-existent in Uzbekistan, and western media outlets and NGOs are not tolerated. The country consistently ranks at the bottom of all indexes on civil and political rights. The President has been in power since before the end of the Soviet Union, and no elections have been deemed free or fair.

Despite these grave human rights abuses, the US Government decided to enter into a partnership with the Government of Uzbekistan. This next chapter will explore the motivations for partnering with this authoritarian regime, and how this partnership clashed with US Government ideals. This analysis will include various US state actors and their position on enforcement of US ideals ahead of military interests. The examination of US-Uzbekistan relations since the War on Terror provides a clear example of what happens when geostrategic military interests come into conflict with human rights.

CHAPTER 5: THE WAR ON TERROR AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN UZ

US ideals and values helped shape the War on Terror and the related partnership with Uzbekistan. However, defense interests during the war overshadowed any ideals and took precedence over concerns about civil and political rights. In working with geostrategic partners in the War on Terror, individual departments of the US Government performed their enacting functions in representing their foreign policy interests, whether defense or human rights. The diplomatic branches of the US Government, including Congressional leaders, pressed for civil and political reforms in Uzbekistan. However, the US Department of Defense and its commander-in-chief were unwilling to forgo a partnership with Uzbekistan on account of concerns with its authoritarian ruling methods. But, when military cooperation was no longer a priority, human rights concerns were more influential in deciding the level of engagement the US would have with Uzbekistan. As this case study will show, a combination of genuine concern for human rights, public pressure for greater human rights accountability in the war in Iraq, alliance politics with war allies such as NATO, changes in Uzbekistan’s interest in partnering, and a lack of geostrategic need all aligned to elevate US ideals as a condition of affiliating with Uzbekistan.

The chapter will explore three critical junctures in US – Uzbekistan relations: establishing support for the War on Terror; halting of diplomatic relations in 2005; and renewal of support for military interests in Afghanistan in 2009. These critical junctures will be examined to conclude the extent to which the need for cooperation on the War on Terror in Afghanistan muted US Government criticism of the human rights abuses of its ally, Uzbekistan. The US Government established military cooperation with Uzbekistan quickly after the September 11th terrorist attacks in order to gain access to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s partnership with the US was motivated by prestige, financial gain, and security. The relationship between the two governments stalled out at the same time as the government of Uzbekistan opened fire on its citizens during a public demonstration in 2005. Defense cooperation stopped completely, after which the US Government was more vocal about human rights abuses. However, once Uzbekistan was needed again for transit in the War on Terror, such human rights concerns became more muted.

First, this case will examine the interests and conditions under which the two governments entered into an agreement and whether the partnership agreement was meeting each country’s needs. Then, it will explore the complex factors that caused a material change in the relationship between the two countries. Next, the case study will examine how the renewed need for cooperation in the War on Terror impacted US actions on human rights concerns. This chapter will then offer some conclusions on the effect of defense interests on stated ideals for US international relations.

Critical Juncture One: the Partnership Begins
The terrorist attack on the USA catapulted Central Asia onto the frontlines of US foreign policy and geopolitical interests in the War on Terror. The region went from a small recipient of foreign aid to a key ally on ensuring the stability of Afghanistan. The lack of land access or flyover rights through Iran severely restricted access to Afghanistan, making the Central Asian Republics and Pakistan essential to the war. As Secretary of State Colin Powell declared to the US House of Representatives, “America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind
that we could not have dreamed of before.” Central Asia became linked to the stability of Afghanistan, and the region was viewed as the best hope for longer-term development after the war. As Assistant Secretary for Central Asia Robert Blake testified many times, “Central Asia plays a vital role in our Afghanistan strategy… A stable future for Afghanistan depends on the continued assistance of its Central Asian neighbors, just as a stable, prosperous future for the Central Asian states depends on bringing peace, stability, and prosperity to Afghanistan.”

US military bases were quickly opened and agreements were reached for increased humanitarian and military assistance throughout Central Asia. Pakistan was the favored access point due to its port, stronger infrastructure, and long border with Afghanistan. Economic sanctions that had been in place for over a decade due to Pakistan’s nuclear program development were quickly waived, and Pakistan received billions in US assistance beginning in 2002. Tajikistan provided a small base for the French, but its mountainous location and lack of stability prevented it from playing a larger role. Kazakhstan was supportive of the War on Terror, but it did not border Afghanistan. Turkmenistan wanted to stay out of the war but provided fly over rights and the transit of humanitarian assistance. This left only the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan as the key tactical launch points within Central Asia for the war in Afghanistan. This chapter will explore the different conditions under which these two Republics agreed to host the US Government and how that partnership impacted relations on civil and political rights.

Motivations to partner
Uzbekistan was eager to host the US Government, and it was viewed as a palatable partner by the US as well. Uzbekistan provided a desirable location as it had a border with northern Afghanistan, and the Uzbek military was considered to be the most developed and effective in the region. Uzbekistan had just led a cooperative threat reduction agreement on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which was Secretary Powell’s first bilateral agreement as Secretary of State. The border with Afghanistan was considered a stronghold for the terrorist group, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Mazar-i-sharif, about 30 km from the Uzbekistan border, had been taken over by the Taliban in 1997. The Uzbekistan Government blockaded its bridge to Afghanistan as a result of fear of terrorism at that time and had never reopened it.

Uzbekistan’s partnership with the US was motivated by prestige, financial gain, and security. Winning a partnership with a western country was symbolic of being taken seriously as an

The Government of Uzbekistan also wanted a counterweight to the influence of Russia and China in the region. The War on Terror offered an opportunity to profit. The Uzbek Government was confident that millions of dollars would be coming their way in the form of government assistance and military contracts. The Government of Uzbekistan also had an enlightened self-interest in seeing the War on Terror won. There had been an assassination attempt on Karimov a couple years before, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was believed to be operating out of Northern Afghanistan. Karimov thought the military partnership would result in greater training and equipment for his own military.

In October 2001, following a three hour stop over by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, President Karimov agreed to allow the US Government to use the Karshi – Khanabad air force base. The basing agreement did not have a dollar amount tied to it, but the US Government agreed to provide compensation for the relocation of Uzbek military personnel and equipment as well as compensation for a local guard force. In December of that year, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Uzbekistan and held a joint press conference with President Karimov to celebrate the growing bilateral relationship and to invite Karimov to the White House. This was a major feather in the cap of Uzbekistan’s government and symbolized the growing respect of the west.

Secretary Powell outlined to the press the framework of their relationship, “We look forward to deepening and widening our relationship with Uzbekistan on security issues, on economic issues, issues of political democratization and human rights, and we had a very full exchange of views on all of these matters.” The two leaders deflected a range of more pointed questions from journalists pertaining to the authoritarian rule and lack of previous progress on human rights during the first decade of Uzbekistan’s independence from the Soviet Union. This avoidance of acknowledgment of the level of human rights abuses in the country was common during exchanges between the two governments. Human rights were mentioned early on as an area of possible cooperation. However, discussions on civil and political concerns were framed in the larger context of development aid rather than as a red flag or pre-condition of partnership.

While the initial base agreement did not come with rent, Karimov was correct in his assumption that lucrative government assistance would shortly follow. US funding was quadrupled from 2001 to 2002, going from $48.33 million to $224.14 million. It had never been more than $50 million before this point. $79 million was granted in 2002 for law enforcement and security development, and $37.7 million in international military education and training funds. In total, US Government assistance was $224.14 million in 2002, going from $48.33 million to $224.14 million. It had never been more than $50 million before this point. $79 million was granted in 2002 for law enforcement and security development, and $37.7 million in international military education and training funds.

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341 US Department of State, “Testimony of Colin Powell.”
342 Nicholl, “Uzbekistan.”
aid to Uzbekistan went from $85 million in 2001 to nearly $300 million in 2002.\textsuperscript{344} This new $215 million was certain to enhance the breadth of the Uzbek military and security services. US investments in Uzbekistan acted to bring positive attention from other groups. In May, the World Bank pledged a $1 billion grant over three years, despite external criticism that Uzbekistan still lacked basic reforms to integrate its economy.\textsuperscript{345} Additionally, the German government set up a military base in February, and while the financial commitment was undisclosed, a German Member of Parliament says it was a seven digit amount.\textsuperscript{346} This was the first overseas German military base since WWII.

It is not as though the US Government was unaware of the repression of civil society in Uzbekistan when deciding to house a military base there. This partnership was entered into despite concerns over human rights. In 1998, the Government of Uzbekistan passed the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which severely restricted religious activity and required government approval of the content and distribution of religious publications. The Jaslyk prison or ‘house of torture’ was opened in 1999, and between then and 2001, the Government of Uzbekistan filled it up with thousands of young men labeled as “terrorists” due to their perceived religious affiliation.\textsuperscript{347} These two events were widely documented by and frowned upon by US Government representatives, who reported numerous human rights violations in the 2000 human rights report. Below are some illustrative highlights:

Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights... The police and the NSS [Uzbekistan National Security Services] committed numerous serious human rights abuses...The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and the Government continued to commit numerous serious abuses... Citizens cannot exercise their right to change their government peacefully. The Government has not permitted the existence of an opposition party since 1993... The security forces arbitrarily arrested or detained pious Muslims and other citizens on false charges, frequently planting narcotics, weapons, or forbidden literature on them... The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and the press, and an atmosphere of repression stifles public criticism of the Government.\textsuperscript{348}

In January 2002, shortly after the establishment of the Karshi Khanabad base, Senator Daschle led a bipartisan Congressional delegation to the region. Their findings, published in the congressional record, are a candid testimony of the bleak human rights situation.

The human rights situation in Uzbekistan is abysmal. There is no freedom of association and independent institutions – including the press – are banned... Even the Parliament is largely a rubber stamp for the Karimov government, with little, if any, influence. Civil society in Uzbekistan has also been drastically restricted. NGOS are not allowed to register or function. The few independent groups that do exist are subjected to harassment based on Soviet practices including firing ‘agitators’ from state run jobs, confiscating human rights

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workers’ passports, confiscating equipment of independent NGOs. Human rights leaders and the US State Department also catalogued instances where the government used torture and prolonged detention to deter other civil society activity.\textsuperscript{349}

The War on Terror was being couched as a war for freedom, rights, and a victory for American ideals.\textsuperscript{350} As such, this new partnership with one of the world’s worst authoritarian regimes raised questions about compliance with such American values. Assistant Secretary Beth Jones countered such questions about the ranking of ideals during a visit to Uzbekistan in 2002. “There is a lot of talk about how because we have new military relationships with several of these governments that somehow we’re giving a bye to human rights and democracy. In fact, the opposite is the case.”\textsuperscript{351}

Despite these concerns, the two countries were working together more closely than ever before. There were nine official US delegations to Uzbekistan in the last quarter of 2001, a new record for the two countries. In March of 2002, Karimov visited the US to meet with President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. It is rumored among senior Uzbek officials that when the topic of human rights came up, Bush said simply, “We are not going to teach you.”\textsuperscript{352} Bush gave a special shout out to Uzbekistan during his press conference on the six-month anniversary of the terrorist attacks, saying, “We could not have done our work without critical support from countries, particularly like Pakistan and Uzbekistan.”\textsuperscript{353}

The visit to the White House in March provided the opportunity to sign new bilateral agreements.\textsuperscript{354} The “Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework” agreement, drafted by President Karimov, would provide a guidepost from which to mark progress on human rights. This agreement would later form the basis for restriction of foreign assistance to Uzbekistan. Article 1.2 of the agreement states a joint commitment to:

\begin{itemize}
\item Strengthening the foundation for a state based on the rule of law, a market-based economy and an effective social safety net, and building a strong and open civil society;
\item Further strengthening and developing democratic values in the society, ensuring respect for human rights and freedoms based on the universally recognized principles and norms of international law;
\item Enhancing the role of democratic and political institutions in the life of society; establishing a genuine multi-party system;
\item Further strengthening and developing non-governmental structures, including independent media;
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{350} For an analysis of the rhetoric of the War on Terror, see Douglas Kellner, “Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the War on Terror.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37 no. 4 (Dec 2007): 622-647.


\textsuperscript{352} Daly, et al Anatomy, 21.


Further improving the judicial and legal system..."

It is not clear why Karimov would choose to enter into such an agreement when it was so far from the current practice in his country. Some suggest that he was personally interested in seeing reform and needed outside pressure to enact change. Others believe that Karimov did not expect the agreement to require any enforcement, and he was just providing the lip service needed to get the money he wanted. There is also a theory that such agreements were in vogue with western countries, and Karimov believed that if he could show a partnership with the US it would improve the standing of his country globally.

There were more than 20 high-level US delegations to Uzbekistan in 2002. President Karimov joined twelve members of US Congress on a visit to Tashkent and the Karshi Khanabad air base in June 2002. According to the Congressional record, during this visit, Karimov acknowledged shortcomings in human rights and economic reform, and emphasized a desire for a longer term US presence in the region but also noted, "My advice to the US is that not every place in the world can follow the US model."

Perhaps emboldened by his new partnership with the US, Karimov arbitrarily extended his rule as president for an additional five years via a referendum in January 2002 that Assistant Secretary Jones criticized, "It can't possibly be part of the democratic process because it's extending in position a president who was not elected in a free and fair election...President Karimov's answer to that is we have to keep things under control because the people aren't mature enough to understand how to do this right.” However, she also remarked in response to press questions on the consequence to Uzbekistan for failing to implement reforms, “I can't give you, if they don't do this, this is what happens. I can't do that for you.” This was little reassurance to the advocates for a tougher relationship with Uzbekistan. While individual US officials were acknowledging the shortcomings in Uzbekistan’s human rights record, they were not providing any actual incentive for change. It appeared that violations of human rights may be acknowledged, but they would not deter the partnership between the US and Uzbekistan.

The most vocal advocate for US leadership human rights reform was the head of the State Department bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor, Lorne Craner. His department was established to monitor human rights, so as the leader of that bureau, he was fulfilling the enacting function of his role. During a visit to Uzbekistan in January 2002, he outlined the connection between human rights and regional stability. “I think from the president and the secretary of state you have people that understand that you cannot have a foreign policy without a moral dimension. They also understand that a part of the answer to terrorism is human rights and democracy.” This statement exemplifies the morals-backed militarism that came to define the War on Terror.

356 For an exploration of the various theories of Uzbekistan’s motivation for partnership, see Daly et al, Anatomy, 9-11.
359 US Department of State, “A/S Jones.”
indicates that human rights were part of the US foreign policy agenda in Uzbekistan for the bureaus set up to address human rights. However, outside of this department, the conversation was dramatically different.

Most US officials were professing public admiration for an authoritarian regime that was stifling the freedoms of its people. For example, during a joint press conference with Karimov, when asked about the progress on reforms, Secretary O’Neill said merely, “I expressed to the President our admiration for the leadership that he has provided during the economic transition giving a very high priority to education and the important human needs of the people of Uzbekistan. It's a great pleasure to have an opportunity to spend time with someone with both a very keen intellect and a deep passion about the improvement of the life of the people of this country.”

Given the abysmal starting point for human rights in authoritarian Uzbekistan, it is hard to know how much progress should have been expected in the first year of the partnership with the US. There were some notable victories for human rights after the US and Uzbekistan entered into their bilateral cooperation agreement. The International Committee of the Red Crescent was finally granted access to monitor Uzbekistan’s pre-trial detention centers. Freedom House was registered as an NGO in Uzbekistan and opened an office. In early 2003, the Department of State was permitted to fund a pro-bono human rights clinic, through the American Bar Association, within the Tashkent State Law Institute. The clinic was designed to “provide legal consultations on such areas as the right to freedom of movement, freedom from gender, ethnic and language discrimination, labor rights, as well as an individual's due process rights such as the right to a fair trial and pre-trial detention rights.”

There were some small gains for local human rights development in Uzbekistan. Hundreds of prisoners were freed, and seven police and NSS officers were sentenced in connection to deaths in police custody, and for the first time ever, the court ruled in favor of someone bringing a civil suit against the police. The local Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan was officially registered to operate as well as another local independent human rights organization, Ezgulik. However, the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan remained unregistered, and at least six of their staff were imprisoned. A researcher for the Russian human rights NGO Memorial was also denied entry to Uzbekistan.

Within the first year of the partnership with Uzbekistan, the US Government was providing increased bilateral relations, plenty of press and photo opportunities, a visit to the White House, and other diplomatic opportunities to bolster the legitimacy of the Karimov regime. There was increased military cooperation and millions of dollars in exchange for hosting the air base, and bilateral aid had more than quadrupled. While there was talk of human rights concerns, they were mostly in the advisory tone of “things we’d like to see improved,” rather than an imperative or condition of

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361 “Red Cross Halts ‘Pointless’ Uzbekistan Prison Visits,” BBC, April 12, 2013.
continued partnership. However, not everyone in the US Government was willing to treat progress on human rights as optional, and over the next few years, relations would begin to sour as tensions between human rights and defense would become more acute.

The increased cooperation with international organizations allowed for greater intelligence on the human rights situation in Uzbekistan. After a monitoring visit at the end of 2002, the United Nations issued a bold report in which it declared that torture was systematic in Uzbekistan’s prisons. This report received widespread international news coverage and provided NGOs and activists with outside validation of what they had been saying all along. Uzbekistan took notice as well, and while things did not actually improve, the government issued a series of rebuttals and made claims to be putting safeguards in place. Subsequent requests for visits by the UN Rapporteur on Torture and nine other UN experts were denied as a result.

Uzbekistan’s reputation was wounded by criticisms of its governance methods. The heat on their human rights record reached a literal boiling point in August of 2002 when it came out that the Government of Uzbekistan was killing people by boiling them alive. The case of Muzafar Avazov and Husnidin Alimov, both religious prisoners at Jaslyk Prison, sent shock waves throughout the world and was held up by international media outlets, organizations, and leaders as a symbol of the widespread torture and lack of fair legal processes in the country. To add insult to injury, Mr. Avazov’s 62-year-old mother was subsequently arrested and sentenced to six years in prison for reporting the boiling death of her son.

US Assistant Secretary Jones connected social progress and defense cooperation during a joint press conference with Foreign Minister Safaev in 2003. “As much as we appreciate our ability to use Karshi Khanabad airbase, it is extremely important to the United States as well that we be able to work with Uzbekistan to enhance political and human rights priorities and behavior.” The foreign minister was forced to answer pointed questions regarding Uzbekistan’s human rights record.

The concept of a government representative taking open questions from the press was anathema to the Uzbekistan Government. Western leaders and media outlets were progressively asking the questions that no one internally could bring forward safely, and it was the visits of high-level US officials that provided these opportunities. Individual representatives of the US Government were now making specific links between progress on human rights and partnership in the War on Terror.

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366 Human Rights Watch. “UN Human Rights.”
The most vocal critic of Uzbekistan’s human rights record was UK Ambassador Craig Murray, who made international news with his damming speech during the opening of the Freedom House office. “This country has made very disappointing progress in moving away from the dictatorship of the Soviet period. Uzbekistan is not a functioning democracy, nor does it appear to be moving in the direction of democracy.”

Ambassador Murray went on to be an outspoken critic of western governments’ compliance with the miserable human rights situation in Uzbekistan. His criticisms made him a target of the Uzbek government, and he was subjected to a lengthy investigation of numerous false allegations against him. He was isolated from the other Ambassadors to Uzbekistan, suffered severe health damage, and was eventually released from the diplomatic corps amidst allegations of leaking classified information on the involvement of the UK Special Forces in illegal activities within Uzbekistan.

Congressional Restrictions of the Partnership

NGOs headquartered in the United States were issuing alarming reports of the level of authoritarianism in Uzbekistan, and Congress was raising questions as to the US support for Uzbekistan. Less than a week before Karimov’s visit to the US in 2002, US Representative Cynthia McKinney became a vocal critic of the US partnership with Uzbekistan, telling the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, One glaring example of the Bush administration's willingness to forego human rights concerns altogether in the name of the short-term, tactical support of the ‘war on terrorism’ is Uzbekistan. As the United States expands financial and military aid to the government of Uzbekistan, that country has intensified its severe human rights abuses...Many of us are alarmed that while the State Department report accurately documents the severity of the repression in Uzbekistan, our government has done little to curb the systematic persecution of Muslims and other abuses...The message from our government to the world's human rights abusers must not be you can violate human rights with impunity so long as you do it in the name of combating terrorism.

In its August 2002 and January 2003 appropriations, Congress included a provision that in order for Uzbekistan to receive US assistance, the Secretary of State needed to certify that Uzbekistan made “substantial and continuing progress” on the original framework agreement signed between the two countries. Congress was sending a powerful warning siren to both the US and Uzbek presidents. However, despite the growing evidence of the depth of problems in Uzbekistan, the public relationship between the US and Uzbek Governments continued in the same manner throughout 2003. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to the joint partnership agreement during bilateral

374 A Review Of The State Department’s Human Rights Reports From The Victims’ Perspective: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On International Operations And Human Rights Of The Committee On International Relations, House Of Representatives 107d Cong., 2 (March 6, 2002).
talks in April 2003. Uzbekistan was also quick to endorse the war in Iraq, and President Bush’s letter of appreciation was front-page local news.

Congress continued to take note of the human rights abuses in Uzbekistan, and the Bush Administration continued to gloss over them. Uzbekistan was placed on the lowest ranking in the 2003 Department of State human trafficking report, which was established by Congress to comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. However, President Bush moved Uzbekistan up to Tier 2 later that year. The US Congressional Helsinki Commission wrote a stark press briefing in June of 2003 in which it condemned the recent death of prisoners in Uzbek custody and laid out various sanctions being requested by Congress. Despite the Congressional evidence of human rights abuses, in 2002 and again in 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell certified that progress was being made in compliance with the bilateral agreement, so Uzbekistan could continue to receive money. Such certification garnered significant criticism from human rights groups and monitoring bodies within the US Government.

Foreign appropriations to Uzbekistan slowed down in 2003 and 2004, possibly as a result of the global criticism of the authoritarian ruling style of the Government of Uzbekistan. The total assistance to Uzbekistan went from a budgeted $224 million in 2002, to $90 million in FY 2003. In the spring of 2003, President Karimov wrote a personal letter to President Bush asking for more money. It is possible that Karimov believed Bush could use his authority as president to unilaterally grant more assistance or that Bush would be more receptive to diplomacy directly from one president to another. It is also possible that Karimov thought that the US President should be able to reign in Congress who was demanding more progress than Karimov was prepared to deliver. While no copies of the correspondence have been made available, according to senior officials, the letter was not taken seriously and got a negative response from Bush. This may have caused Karimov to reconsider the role of the US in his country. He entered into the agreement seeking prestige, security, and financial gain. It was looking as though he was not going to receive the financial gains he had hoped, which would in turn impact his prestige. As a result, from late 2003 to mid 2005, there were six redrafts by the Uzbek Government of the Scope of Forces Agreement for the use of Karshi Khanabad air force base. However, the US Government was not interested in bargaining, and none of the redrafts were signed.

While the leaders of both nations were still expressing public support for one another, behind the scenes, trouble was brewing. Karimov expected more financial benefit and was likely facing

376 US Department of State, “Joint press release.”
internal pressure to get more money from the US.\textsuperscript{384} Internal feuds within authoritarian systems are not to be taken lightly. Without the backing of rule of law or democracy, power and money may be shifted easily between those close to the head of state. If Karimov’s powerful friends wanted more money, he needed to find a way to get it or risk competition for his authority. Next door, their rivals in the Kyrgyz Republic were making millions in fueling contracts from the US military.\textsuperscript{385} The son of Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev personally made more than \$100 million in US military contracts.\textsuperscript{386} From 2001-2011, it is estimated that there were over \$1.8 billion in fuel contracts for the Manas military base.\textsuperscript{387} It is little wonder then that Karimov and his cronies would expect to be receiving similar levels of income.

In January 2004, Secretary Powell could no longer certify that Uzbekistan had made the necessary progress on the 2002 bilateral agreement in order to receive US foreign assistance. Despite the overt concerns of the legislative branch and Department of State representatives, President Bush chose to ignore their evidence and overrode the recommendations of Congress and the Secretary of State. He used a national security waiver to continue to provide assistance to the Government of Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{388}

It is conceivable that Congress was using the appropriations process to provide incremental warnings to Uzbekistan and was prepared for the US president to overrule the decision of the Secretary of State. It is similarly possible that the Secretary of State and the President had mutually agreed to the overruling of the Secretary’s recommendations. Such a compromise would allow the US Government to appease NGOs and other vocal critics of the US-Uzbekistan relationship while still continuing to provide financial incentives to the Uzbek Government.\textsuperscript{389} This restriction of Uzbekistan would bolster the credibility of morals-based idealism in the War on Terror while still providing the same tactical support to the military. However, if such an agreement was reached internally, Congress was not pleased. In the second appropriations of 2004, Congress removed the president’s ability to use a national security provision to overrule their appropriations decisions. To add insult to injury, the national security waiver was still included for Uzbekistan’s northern neighbor, Kazakhstan.

President Bush sought to undermine this Congressional restriction, and other branches of the US Government publicly criticized the restrictions.\textsuperscript{390} The Department of Defense issued a press release in which they reiterated that Uzbekistan was an important ally in the War on Terror and said the decision was shortsighted, unproductive, and a bad policy.\textsuperscript{391} There was palpable tension between the legislative branch that wanted to see progress on human rights, and the executive branch that

\textsuperscript{384} Daly, et al \textit{Anatomy}, 33.
\textsuperscript{385} Andrews, “Bustling US.”
\textsuperscript{386} David Cloud, “US contracted Akayev-linked fuel suppliers” \textit{Moscow Times}, November 16, 2005.
\textsuperscript{387} Cooley, \textit{Great Game}, 163.
\textsuperscript{389} Note: Assistant Secretary Lynn Pascoe expressed support for including a Presidential waiver in the decision on military assistance during her testimony, US Department of State, “Uzbekistan: The Key.”
wanted to see unfettered support for the war in Afghanistan. In December of 2004, Bush waived restrictions on non-proliferation aid using the cooperative threat reduction program that was set up with discretionary funds for fighting terrorism. The Department of State criticized this decision privately. Ultimately, $18 million in military assistance was suspended in 2004 as a result of the Congressional decision to withhold aid to Uzbekistan.

The decision to withhold $18 million in aid to Uzbekistan was a blow to the Uzbek Government’s prestige as well as an indication of the lack of financial gain to come. A main Russian media outlet called the decision “extremely painful” and “a public slap in the face to the Uzbek regime.” The news was published in Uzbekistan alongside the encouragement to approach Russia and China to make up for the lost assistance. There was speculation as to how this decision would affect Karimov’s standing among other elites internally, along with admonishment of the hypocritical nature of US criticisms of human rights abroad, and speculation that the US had motivations of regime change similar to that of the Rose revolution.

While Congress sought to minimize the relationship to Uzbekistan, key representatives of the Bush administration were sending a dramatically different message. Assistant Secretary Jones traveled to the region to meet with President Karimov and smooth relations with senior Uzbek officials at the same time as the reduction in funding was being announced. In her address on national TV in Uzbekistan, Jones described the relationship with Uzbekistan as “really very good” and refused to comment on the local political situation in the country, saying, “actually it’s not very appropriate for me to discuss the internal political situation in Uzbekistan.” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was fond of conveying support for President Karimov and his leaders, undermining what the State Department or Congress was telling those same officials. Karimov in turn preferred to deal with defense leaders rather than US diplomats who may raise issues of human rights and democracy. According to an Uzbek diplomat, “Karimov maintained confidence in his personal relationship with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. It is not unusual in private meetings in Central Asia for local leaders to attempt to distinguish between Department of State, for whom they often hold great antipathy, and the Department of Defense, usually a source of largesse and little criticism.”

393 Daly, et al, Anatomy, 92.
396 “Posle Resheniya Gosdepa SSHA Prekratit Pomosh Tashkent Mozhet Obratitsya k Rossii [After the decision of the State Dept to cut aid, Tashkent can turn to Russia].” Tribune UZ, July 15, 2004. https://ca-news.info/2004/07/15/20
399 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, lii.
400 Daly, et al, Anatomy, 30.
Members of the National Security Council continued to profess unified support for Uzbekistan. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited with President Karimov in February 2004, and human rights were notably absent from the conversation. Instead, Rumsfeld chose to convey, “Uzbekistan is a key member of the coalition's global war on terror. And I brought the president the good wishes of President Bush.” When a Senior Defense Official was asked in a press briefing whether the Department of Defense would raise concerns about human rights, he responded, “usually it’s the State Department area.”

When the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Stephen Myers conducted a TV interview with TV Station One in Uzbekistan, Myers expressed, “I wouldn’t be sitting here if I didn’t think that the United States benefited greatly from our partnership and strategic relationship with Uzbekistan.” He previously called the US military funding sanctions against Uzbekistan shortsighted and unproductive.

In addition to access points within Afghanistan, the US military was using Uzbekistan for the rendition of suspected terrorists from all over the world. The rendition program is believed to have been set up as a work around for international laws like the Geneva Conventions. The New York Times, BBC, Der Spiegel, and a United Nations report all document that detainees were being held in secret US prison camps housed within Uzbekistan. According to an expert on the rendition program, “Uzbekistan had become a vital hub in the CIA’s world operations. No other destination east of Jordan had received so many flights from the CIA fleet.” A former member of the Uzbek secret service (SNB) said that American officials personally observed the abuse of prisoners rendered to Uzbekistan. It is conceivable that the US Government was unable to fully condemn the use of torture in Uzbekistan because the CIA was using these same methods as part of its rendition program within Uzbekistan. The Government of Uzbekistan believed it was contradictory of the US to pass judgment on another country’s methods of fighting terrorism while being the driving force behind the War on Terror.

The US establishment of secret prisons came under intense global scrutiny in spring of 2004 with an exposé of pervasive abuse by the US military towards people being held at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The Abu Ghraib scandal set off a series of legislative attempts by Congress to gain more

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403 Garamone, “Myers Meets.”


407 “Intelligence Officer Claims that CIA was Complicit in Torture in UZ.” The Scotland Herald, September 13, 2008.


records on the US detention programs and to end extraordinary renditions. The release of the annual human rights reports were delayed because the US felt it could not be taken seriously at that moment. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was forced to testify to the Senate regarding his knowledge and endorsement of this behavior. Many international news outlets and former Vice President Al Gore called for the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld and other members of the National Security Council. There were lawsuits filed against Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in Germany alleging war crimes. Due to public and Congressional pressure, President Bush found himself having to explain to the world whether the US was violating international law in its treatment of detainees. His assurances, “this country does not believe in torture,” were met with much skepticism, and the Bush administration continued to face loud criticisms for its partnership with authoritarian governments such as Uzbekistan. Human rights were becoming a more central part of the American conversation on the War on Terror. Partnering with an authoritarian regime was becoming a liability internally within the US Government.

US Government officials continued to express public appreciation towards Uzbekistan and to give allowances for human rights abuses. The executive branch and National Security Council continued to partner closely with the Government of Uzbekistan and to find ways to deliver funds despite Congressional restrictions. However, public scrutiny of Uzbekistan’s human rights record was making the partnership more difficult. The US was facing ridicule for its own human rights abuses in the war, and more and more questions were being raised about the US Government’s relationship to Uzbekistan.

As the money from the US was drying up, neighboring China and Russia were more than happy to offer financial incentives to partner together. Restricting civil liberties and imprisoning people under the guise of extremism were widely used by members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization who believed that jihad, terrorism, and peaceful threats to incumbent power were interchangeable. These countries had a similar approach to human rights and ruling authority, and Uzbekistan was being taken seriously throughout the region as the major power broker in the Central Asian Republics. On a 2004 visit to the region Chinese President Hu Jintao offered more than $1 billion in deals. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Karimov in August of 2003 to begin talks of an increased partnership, including the cancellation of debt and the hosting of a regional anti-terrorism center. The two parties also signed a strategic partnership agreement in


June of 2004, and Russia offered $2 billion in oil and gas development. The parties agreed to conduct military exercises together for the first time since independence. Russia was also sympathetic to Uzbekistan’s skepticism of western support for NGOs and was keen to instill a strong message that foreign NGOs were a threat to regime power.

**Evaluation of the Partnership in 2005**

Uzbekistan and the United States entered into a strategic partnership agreement to allow for transit into Afghanistan. Uzbekistan was motivated by prestige, financial gain, and security. After nearly four years of partnering, none of those motivations were being met by the US Government. In reality, the cooperation yielded little financial return from the US and a deluge of international criticisms of the bleak human rights situation. Instead of being viewed as a sovereign nation with an important contribution to international affairs, the Uzbek Government was facing scrutiny from international organizations, US Congress, and press and advocacy groups all of whom were concerned with the lack of progress on economic and social reforms. Uzbekistan’s opportunity for prestige outside of authoritarian countries was being hindered by criticisms of human rights abuses. Uzbekistan was becoming an international pariah instead of peer among the west.

Due to Congressional sanctions, the Government of Uzbekistan was unlikely to see millions of dollars from the US partnership. The military base did not require extensive external services such as fueling or supplies, so there were not lucrative business opportunities as a result of the partnership. In contrast, the Governments of Pakistan and the Kyrgyz Republic were making hundreds of millions in cash from government contracts. The Government of Uzbekistan was not interested in direct humanitarian assistance through government grants especially if such aid would be used to grow civil society and encourage human rights. Russia and China were investing heavily in Uzbekistan and were providing a source of economic stability without any conversations on governance reforms. In refusing to provide lucrative opportunities for President Karimov and his peers, the US was sending an unwelcomed message that they would uphold their agreements for the military base but would not be doing business with the government.

The Government of Uzbekistan also entered into the partnership with the USA to strengthen its own military and protect against internal and external threats to power. However, this security support was proving more tenuous than originally thought. Uzbekistan experienced a rash of domestic attacks and suicide bombings in the spring of 2004. While the US Government issued statements condemning the attacks, it did not send troops or provide any additional military assistance to respond to the threats. Meanwhile, Karimov’s neighbors were showering the country with support through the opening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s regional anti-terrorism center in Tashkent, which served as a symbolic endorsement of Uzbekistan’s handling of perceived threats. Instead of endorsing Uzbekistan’s efforts to combat local extremism, the US Government criticized Uzbekistan for its mass detention of people perceived to be involved in extremist activities. To add

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insult to injury, rather than bolstering the sovereignty of the Government of Uzbekistan, the US Government was funding and encouraging the growth of organizations that were critical of the ruling bodies. Uzbekistan’s restrictions on these local groups in turn garnered more criticism from the west.\textsuperscript{420}

Uzbekistan responded to the lack of tactical and financial support by demanding more money and restricting flights in and out of the Karshi Khanabad air force base. C-17 flights were limited to four per day, allegedly to avoid undue wear and tear on the runway. The US Government agreed to spend $42 million to repair the runway themselves, but Uzbekistan wanted the money, not the construction project. Negotiations were stalling in 2005, and Karimov claimed the US owed $168 million in accordance with the initial terms of the agreement.\textsuperscript{421} While this was a large sum, it was miniscule compared to the money coming to other US partners; Pakistan was making $80 million a month in cash payments through partnering with the US.\textsuperscript{422} Given how much money the US was spending on the war, the refusal to pay more money to Uzbekistan was viewed as a slight to their relationship and symbolic of a lack of respect more so than a purely economic matter.

**Critical Juncture Two: Andijan**

The US Government’s relationship with Uzbekistan was strained by the crackdown on Uzbek civil society organizations. Uzbekistan was paranoid about US organizations fomenting demands for regime change. Conversely, US Congress was concerned about support for authoritarian regimes and complicity in human rights abuses. As Uzbekistan sought to retain control, the US Government continued to interpret these acts as being further from progress on democracy and human rights reforms. The partnership on the War on Terror was becoming a political liability internally for both parties. As this section will demonstrate, the already fragile relationship between the two countries cracked under the pressure to respond to an outbreak of violence in the town of Andijan in May of 2005. Disagreements over the handling of the Andijan massacre and subsequent restrictions of civil liberties across the Fergana Valley led to a complete reversal of the relationship between the US and Uzbekistan. However, the choice of the US to respond strongly to these human rights concerns was also motivated by changing geostrategic needs and domestic priorities related to the War on Terror.

The Government of Uzbekistan was becoming increasingly nervous about the role of international organizations demanding regime change under the auspices of growing democracy.\textsuperscript{423} As Eastern Europe became more democratized, it increased the fear that NGOs and democracy monitors were a threat to the Uzbek regime.\textsuperscript{424} The US Government had provided a total of $685 million in democracy assistance to Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyz Republic, all of which had revolutions that

\textsuperscript{420} For the US Government’s response to this criticism, see Ambassador Jon R Purnell, “US – Uzbek Relations,” Ambassador Review (Fall 2005): 35 – 40.

\textsuperscript{421} Nichol, “Uzbekistan’s Closure,” and Daly, et al, Anatomy, 99.

\textsuperscript{422} Declan Walsh, “Up to 70% of US Aid to Pakistan ‘Misspent’,” The Guardian February 27, 2008.


ousted the former Soviet leaders.\footnote{Tarnoff, “US Assistance.”} In light of the serious investment the US had made in democracy promotion, it was not unreasonable to connect the dots between the teacher and student.

Uzbekistan clamped down on civil society activities seen as promoted by the west. NGOs, human rights movements, and international media outlets and correspondents all faced increasing restrictions or outright evictions.\footnote{Cooley, Great Game, appendix.} Restrictive NGO laws required new fees, accreditation of staff, and mountains of documentation. Many NGOs chose to close instead of re-registering, presumably because they viewed the new requirements as a clear message that their organizations were unwelcome to operate. An additional law restricting the banking of NGOs and the transfer of grants was also passed in an attempt to restrict support to local organizations.\footnote{IRIN. “Uzbekistan: Largest Private Donor Being Forced to Close.” April 19, 2004. Accessed March 30, 2015. http://www.irinnews.org/report/23970/uzbekistan-largest-private-donor-being-forced-to-close and Open Society Foundation “Uzbek Government Forces Closure of Local Soros Foundation.” Accessed April 1, 2015. http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/press-releases/uzbek-government-forces-closure-local-soros-foundation and “Uzbek Government Closes Down Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation in Tashkent,” Eurasianet, April 17, 2004.} Most of the foreign NGOs successfully made it through the rigorous registration process, but the Open Societies Foundation was not allowed to register. It was the largest private donor in Uzbekistan, having given $3.7 million in 2003, mostly to local NGOs.\footnote{Craig Smith, “US helped prepare the way for Kyrgyzstan’s uprising,” New York Times March 30, 2005.} They would be the first of what would soon be many NGOs getting kicked out of the country.

Karimov’s fears reached a fever pitch in March of 2005 when President Askar Akayev was overthrown in a largely nonviolent ‘tulip revolution’ in the Kyrgyz Republic. To see one of his neighboring Soviet colleagues deposed of office was deeply unnerving. The US Government welcomed the new administration in the Kyrgyz Republic and celebrated the transition after 15 years of rule as an important milestone for democracy. The US Government-funded NGO Freedom House had been supporting a printing press that produced 60 opposition journals in the Kyrgyz Republic. The main opposition paper, \textit{Moya Stolitsa - Novosti} (my capital news or MSN), credited with leading the revolution, was given two generators from the US Embassy after the Kyrgyz Government shut off electricity in an attempt to prevent 200,000 issues from getting out.\footnote{“A Tulip Revolution” The Economist, March 24, 2005.} As the ties between opposition leaders and US funding became clearer, it led Karimov and other Central Asian rulers to conclude that the US Government and its NGOs directly sponsored the revolution.\footnote{David Sands, “NGOs Face Hostility Abroad,” The Washington Times, February 28, 2006.} Karimov was determined to make sure nothing similar took place in his own country. By the end of 2005, more than 200 Uzbek NGOs had closed.\footnote{David Sands, “NGOs Face Hostility Abroad,” The Washington Times, February 28, 2006.}

Restrictions on civil and political freedoms were acutely felt in the Fergana Valley, the agricultural hub of Uzbekistan. The region was tightly controlled for any potential unrest, as it had been the location of previous challenges to state power. The people of the Fergana Valley had a number of grievances, and as the most densely populated and profitable region of Uzbekistan, a change in attitudes there could quickly spread elsewhere. Cotton and silk production was managed by state entities, prices for raw export goods were kept way below the market value, labor and land were
uncompensated, and unemployment was rife.\footnote{32} The region experienced a renaissance of Islam after the Soviet Union, but President Karimov believed this to be a potential threat to his power. After passing the religious restrictions law in 1998, only 42 of the 2,200 mosques in the town of Andijan were successfully re-registered, and the central mosque was converted into an art museum.\footnote{33}

Entrepreneurial independence was discouraged in Uzbekistan because business connections and profit were tightly controlled by the ruling powers. The Fergana Valley was home to Akram Yuldashev, an intellectual and business leader who was perceived to be an enemy of the state. Yuldashev created a network of business connections known as “Akramiya,” a diminutive of his first name. This organization of workers was labeled an unauthorized underground organization, and Yuldashev spent a year in prison as a result.\footnote{34} Yuldashev was a schoolmate of one of the alleged leaders of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Due to their connections, and Yuldashev’s practice of Islam, he was suspected to be an opposition leader. He was subsequently imprisoned again in the round up of people following the 1999 bombing in Tashkent.

Akramiya became the Government of Uzbekistan’s focal point for arresting or questioning influential business leaders in the Fergana Valley. Anyone who had befriended, worked for, or been associated with Yuldashev was at risk of being labeled a member of the “extremist” organization. One such influential entrepreneur, Bakhrom Shakirov and his son Shokurjon, set up a beauty salon, bakery, shoe factory, and cafeteria in which he paid over 100 workers a living wage, gave them apartments, and assisted with wedding or medical expenses. They had a collective fund from which they provided charitable donations to social welfare causes and referred to themselves as Birodar, which is the Uzbek word for brotherhood.\footnote{35} Business leaders of this group also had a construction company, pharmacy, medical clinic, and a furniture factory in the Andijan area. Such community support being delivered independently of the Government of Uzbekistan was viewed as a threat to their ruling power and a challenge to their method of governance.

The 23 business owners of the Birodar group were arrested and imprisoned on charges of setting up a criminal organization; undermining the Constitution; participating in religious extremist organizations; and holding documents that threatened public safety. Their arrest polarized the community. Employees and friends began routinely gathering in the town square during their 2005 trial in a show of solidarity for the businessmen.\footnote{36} The imprisonment of these popular community leaders was a lightning rod for local grievances. Bakhrom Shakirov, whose son was one of the imprisoned leaders, was vocal in his criticisms of the government, saying that if things didn’t improve, the government would face a change worse than the recent overthrow of President Akayev in the Kyrgyz Republic.\footnote{37}
On the 13\textsuperscript{th} of May, a couple days after the verdict for the 23 men was due, thousands of people gathered in the square in what was the largest rally in the history of the region. It was described as “calm and well-organized” with protesters dressed in their best clothes and segregated by gender. School was cancelled in some districts, and shops and businesses were closed so people could attend this event. The President of Uzbekistan was believed to be making an appearance to address the group and listen to their grievances. There was a small and infrequent police presence that morning.\textsuperscript{438}

However, as the day wore on, the protests changed dramatically. The night before, armed men had stormed a police post and military base, loaded up on weapons and then attacked the prison that was holding the businessmen, freeing hundreds of prisoners. A few of these armed men joined the demonstrations in the central square, took over the main government building, and held people, including injured protestors, inside.\textsuperscript{439} Thousands of people had come to the square by late afternoon. President Karimov arrived in Andijan to stop the rebellion but did not publicly address the crowd.\textsuperscript{440} People were staying at the demonstration out of a mix of solidarity, fear of leaving the crowd, inability to leave due to large military barricades, and the intrigue of seeing their president in person. Around 6 pm, allegedly without warning, government security forces from all sides of the square began indiscriminately shooting at the protestors. People fled in all directions, the shooting continued throughout the city, and hundreds of people walked together 30 km to the border of the Kyrgyz Republic, where they were taken in as refugees.\textsuperscript{441}

There has been no formal outside investigation into the events in Andijan. International groups have conducted their own research with little cooperation from local authorities. The Government of Uzbekistan reported that fewer than 200 people died,\textsuperscript{442} but the OSCE puts the estimate at closer to 500, and human rights groups believe it was over 700 people. Telephone and Internet connections were restricted, and it was difficult to get a full assessment of the situation. Western and some Russian media coverage were immediately blocked from broadcast in the country.\textsuperscript{443} Karimov was desperate to retain control of the region.\textsuperscript{444} Journalists were barred from entering or exiting the

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\item \textsuperscript{438} Igor Rotar, “Masses Reject Charges of Islamic Extremism in Uzbekistan,” \textit{Eurasia Daily Monitor} 2 no. 94 (May 13, 2005).
\item \textsuperscript{440} “V Andizhane Pogibli 169 Chelovek, Pochti vse oni Terroristy, Zayavil Prokuror Uzbekistana [In Andijan, killing of 169 people, almost all of them terrorists, said the prosecutor of Uzbekistan].” \textit{News.ru} May 18, 2005. http://newsru.com/world/17may2005/uzstatements.html#2
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town, but doctors and eyewitnesses gave testimony of the number of dead bodies they had seen and where the bodies were being kept.\textsuperscript{445} Witnesses who survived the violence told a stark story of innocent people fleeing for their lives amidst indiscriminate and gratuitous use of firearms by military personnel.\textsuperscript{446} A man who led journalists to mass burial sites was stabbed to death the following day.\textsuperscript{447} The full truth of this massacre may never be known, but many reporters, academics, and diplomats have tried to piece together the picture.

\textit{Response to the violence in Andijan}

In his national address immediately following the incident, President Karimov claimed that he personally told troops not to fire, and the organizers of the demonstration were terrorists with connections in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan who premeditated the attacks and opened fire on civilians.\textsuperscript{448} President Karimov refused to allow a formal outside investigation into the events, but the Government of Uzbekistan conducted their own investigation as part of prosecuting the suspected organizers of the demonstration.\textsuperscript{449} They determined that the attacks had been planned since August of the year before by affiliates of Hizb-ut-Tahrir; western-backed journalists had been notified in advance so they could provide favorable coverage; and the terrorists killed two minors and one woman as well as 57 other civilians. According to the Uzbekistan prosecutor’s office, 94 terrorists were also killed in this confrontation.\textsuperscript{450}

Western media outlets offered an opposite accounting of the events in Andijan. Foreign press concluded that hundreds of innocent civilians, including many women and children, were killed through indiscriminate fire.\textsuperscript{451} While access to Andijan was restricted, and people still in the town were reticent to talk, there were hundreds of refugees next door in the Kyrgyz Republic. They provided an accessible focus group to piece together what happened. The reporting of western journalists and human rights organizations strongly informed the response of US and European governments.

\textsuperscript{445}“Andizhanskoye Poboishche [Andijan massacre].” \textit{Vremya} [Time], May 14, 2005. \url{http://vremya.ru/2005/83/5/125162.html}


\textsuperscript{447}“RFERL led to mass grave site in Uzbekistan.” \textit{RFERL}, May 30, 2005.


\textsuperscript{449}“Prezident Uzbekistana ne Ponimayet, Pochemu Zhurnalisty Podnyali ‘Shumikhu’ iz-za Andizhana [President doesn’t understand why journalists raised hype over Andijan].” \textit{News.ru}, May 15, 2005. \url{http://newsru.com/world/14may2005/no.html}


The decision to handle the Andijan matter internally was strongly backed by Russia and China. The unfavorable response from western governments provided the perfect opportunity for Russia and China to reassert their regional dominance. Russian media outlets had long been spreading theories of negative US motives for involvement in Uzbekistan’s development, but this gave them new material to work with. Russia agreed to find any suspected participants in the Andijan events and promptly extradite them to Uzbekistan. Karimov visited China later in May and received a strong welcome. The Chinese Foreign Ministry delivered a clear message of support for Karimov’s handling of Andijan, “About what happened in Uzbekistan recently, we think it's their internal affair, but we strongly support the government crackdown on separatists, terrorists, and extremists.” The president of China led a business delegation to Uzbekistan that July, which resulted in $1.5 billion in trade and investment deals.

Three senior republican US senators traveled to Uzbekistan a few weeks after the demonstration in Andijan. However, no Uzbek officials would meet with them. In their press remarks, they blamed the Uzbek Government for the deaths and issued strong warnings about a continued partnership. We find the recent events to be shocking but not unexpected in a country that does not allow the exercise of human rights and democracy…. [T]he United States must make this government understand that the relationship is very difficult, if not impossible, if a government continues to repress its people.

Echoing his remarks, Senator Sununu stated, This level of political and economic repression is unsustainable. It will only serve to stimulate discontent and unrest among the people in Uzbekistan, prevent them from achieving real economic independence and prosperity, and prevent the United States and Uzbekistan from achieving any type of normal or significant relationship.

President Bush and his administration were more hesitant than Congress to respond to the events in Andijan. US defense officials believed that a strong statement on Andijan would result in a freezing of cooperation with NATO forces, including the use of the Karshi Khanabad air base. Bush was careful to avoid assigning any blame for the violence or contradicting the official statements of the Government of Uzbekistan. When pressed to give a statement at the end of May, Bush said merely, “We’ve called for the International Red Cross to go into the Andijon region to determine what went


455 Grant Podelco, “Uzbekistan: President begins visit to China carrying no baggage from Andijan” RFERL May 25, 2005.


on, and we expect all our friends as well as those who aren't our friends to honor human rights and protect minority rights.”

The White House Press Secretary was forced to answer a number of questions related to Uzbekistan during his June address to the press. He was adamant that the US Government was speaking with one voice in its demands for an international investigation. He also stated that the US defense and democracy objectives were “indivisible,” and the US Government would continue to evaluate the merits of its partnership with Uzbekistan. A few weeks later when pressed by a journalist, President Bush took a harsher tone, linking support for military cooperation with a need to resolve the dispute in Andijan. “We are sending very clear messages that we expect minority rights to be honored, that people ought to be allowed to express themselves in the public square without fear of reprisal from the government.”

There were a number of reasons the US Government chose to be more vocal in its criticisms of this flagrant abuse of human rights. At the time of the Andijan uprising, there was strong pressure within the United States to end the War on Terror. Support for the war was at a record low, and European allies were questioning their decision to engage with the US in combat operations. Given that President Bush was already facing scrutiny about the war, he was not in a place to lose more face by backing the authoritarian Uzbekistan Government while all his allies were speaking out against the actions in Andijan. The US chose to prioritize a message of democracy, possibly to maintain broader support for the war. The events in Andijan provided the US Government with an opportunity to show it hadn’t completely abandoned its moral compass. Ideals of freedom and rights were still a factor in the pursuit of the War on Terror.

Uzbekistan was also less tactically significant to the War on Terror during this time. There were fewer combat operations in Afghanistan in 2005, and most of the focus of the War on Terror had shifted to Iraq. The US military activity in Afghanistan was mostly operating out of the southern region, so connections to Northern Afghanistan were less important. The military base in the Kyrgyz Republic and the ports and bases in Pakistan provided ample access to Afghanistan. As tensions were rising in Uzbekistan, Rumsfeld met with leaders across Central Asia to line up alternative arrangements should they become necessary. As such, the US was less susceptible to the interests of Uzbekistan, who was already restricting use of the base while demanding rent and back pay.

The support of other hegemons enabled the Uzbek Government to be bolder in its actions towards the US. The writing was on the wall that President Karimov was exploring ways to end his partnership with the US. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting two months after

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Andijan, the parties agreed that all military bases in the region should have an exit date. President Karimov returned from that meeting to deliver the message to the US, along with concerns that the US had not fulfilled the original terms of the base agreement.  

If Uzbekistan was hoping its stern message would cause the US to quiet down, it was having the opposite effect. The US Government refused to acknowledge the requests of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, saying that Russia and China were bullies, and its agreements with each Central Asian Republic were bilateral and not a subject for a multilateral organization. The Pentagon started publicly underplaying the importance of the military base, and on a visit to the region in July, Rumsfeld skipped Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan then skipped a joint military exercise scheduled for that month in the US, while the other Central Asian Republics still attended. The military relationship was quickly deteriorating.

The final cut to the relationship between Uzbekistan and the US came when the US Government pushed the Kyrgyz Republic not to return the people who fled Andijan. The Government of Uzbekistan was trying to handle the Andijan matter internally, and the hundreds of asylum seekers who walked to the Kyrgyz Republic were hindering control of the situation. The Government of Uzbekistan was putting intense pressure on the Kyrgyz Republic to return everyone to Uzbekistan to stand trial as terrorists and criminals who organized a violent attempt to overthrow the government. Condoleezza Rice was putting equal pressure on the Kyrgyz Government to hold the refugees and allow them to be processed by UNHCR. In the end, 439 people were relocated to Europe and the United States. To Karimov, these were 439 people who were newly empowered to sabotage the government. The wife of Akram Yuldashev, of Akramiya notoriety, was one of the asylum seekers. She resettled in the United States, which cemented the perception that the US was backing terrorists in an attempt to overthrow the Uzbekistan Government.

The Government of Uzbekistan delivered its notice of eviction from the Karshi Khanabad air base while the refugees were being flown out of the Manas military base in the Kyrgyz Republic. The official reasons for the partnership termination were that it attracted international terrorism; was no longer necessary because the war in Afghanistan has dwindled; the base damaged the environment; and the US had neglected to pay $168 million owed for the military base.

There is no indication that the US would have left the Karshi Khanabad air force base if the Government of Uzbekistan had not evicted them. The US Government was critical of Uzbekistan’s handling of the Andijan demonstration and killings, but the Bush administration never overtly

blamed the Government of Uzbekistan nor did US officials indicate they were considering a withdrawal from the country. By May of 2005, the US and Uzbekistan were not cooperating closely, but the US had no reason to leave. The US Government was comfortable balancing criticisms of human rights with praise for defense cooperation and had been doing so since the partnership began. It is possible that Congress would have continued to reprimand Uzbekistan for its attack on civilians in Andijan, but the legislative branch never went so far as to suggest withdrawal from military operations.

Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns was scheduled to visit Uzbekistan at the time of the eviction notice. He chose not to go, claiming that it would be inappropriate given that human rights would have been at the center of the discussion.\textsuperscript{470} He gave an interview with the BBC in which he was candid about the connection between the US interest in human rights and its eviction from the military base.

I cannot say that the decision to close off the air base was a surprise. We did see an indication that this would occur, we knew it would occur… We have an interest in continued counter-terrorism and military cooperation, but we also have an interest in human rights… We think it’s normal that a country should both press for security interests as well as for interests concerning democracy and human rights… Of course, access to the base was useful to us, but on the other hand, the United States felt it was very important we speak out clearly on behalf of those who were victims of human right abuses, particularly concerning the Andijon episode… We made a clear choice, and that was to stand on the side of human rights.\textsuperscript{471}

The mass killing of civilians in Uzbekistan was a turning point in the relationship of the US and Uzbekistan. The United States Government had been balancing the demands of both defense and democracy, but the killing of innocent people in Andijan forced the US to make a decision of which was more important in their relationship. The extent to which reduced defense needs of the US Government from Uzbekistan or other defense priorities influenced this decision may never be fully known. But, by choosing to push for an international investigation and encouraging the resettlement of Andijan refugees, the US Government alienated their ally, and Uzbekistan responded by cancelling the agreement to house a military base at Karshi Khanabad.

\textit{Ending of Cooperation}

Once the Government of Uzbekistan chose to evict the military base, the US Department of Defense had significantly less interest in the relationship with its former ally. As such, defense priorities were no longer in competition with democracy and human rights priorities. Representatives of the US Government became notably bolder in expressing their concerns. For example, the Department of State issued these comments in response to failed bilateral talks with Uzbekistan in September 2005. “State Department officials say the United States will not make its interest in promoting democracy and human rights in Uzbekistan subservient to regional strategic

interests, and the United States will leave the Karshi-Khanabad K-2 air base in southern Uzbekistan without further discussion.\(^ {472} \)

The base was closed in November 2005 with little fanfare.\(^ {473} \) Congress tried to block the final military base payment to the Government of Uzbekistan. After the Senate passed a resolution to postpone payment, the Pentagon wired the $23 million before the House of Representatives would have the chance to vote on the matter.\(^ {474} \) Senator McCain, in sponsoring the bill on halting repayment, went so far as to call Karimov a dictator, saying, "Paying our bills is important. But more important is America's standing up for itself, avoiding the misimpression that we overlook massacres and avoiding cash transfers to the treasury of a dictator."\(^ {475} \) Senator McCain also introduced legislation to coincide with the one-year anniversary of Andijan that would formalize the munitions ban and freeze the assets of those officials found to be involved in the massacre.\(^ {476} \) The comments and actions were consistent with Congressional opinion throughout the partnership, but unlike before, the executive branch and Department of Defense didn’t seek to neutralize or contradict these opinions publicly.

US diplomatic visits to Uzbekistan ground to a halt. The two official visits in 2005 were both pertaining to the Andijan massacre. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice skipped the country and rebuked them publicly on her October 2005 tour of Central Asia.\(^ {477} \) There was only one official visit by a US Government official in 2006, Assistant Secretary Boucher, and according to his remarks, human rights was at the center of the conversation.\(^ {478} \) There was only one official visit the following year as well. This is a stark contrast to the near constant visits the country was receiving since signing on to the military base agreement.\(^ {479} \) Trade between the two countries followed a similar trajectory, declining 68% from the year before. Deputy Assistant Secretary Feigenbaum described the relationship in 2006 as difficult, seriously disappointing, and deteriorating sharply as a result of Andijan and the general lack of rule of law.\(^ {480} \) Total aid to Uzbekistan dipped to less than $20 million in FY 2007, the lowest it had been since the early 1990s.\(^ {481} \)


\(^ {477} \) Robin Wright, “Rice signals rift with Uzbekistan” \textit{The Washington Post} October 11, 2005


\(^ {479} \) US Embassy Uzbekistan, “Official Visits.”


Uzbekistan was added to the 2006 “countries of particular concern” religious freedom list maintained by the US Congress. There were less than 10 countries in the world with such a low ranking. Many of the reasons for this decision predated 2006, which suggests that the concerns were always present, but the larger partnership with Uzbekistan prevented the country from being placed on the list sooner. Uzbekistan has stayed on this list since 2006, but the impact of their placement has varied based on geostrategic priorities. Uzbekistan was also downgraded to the lowest ranking (Tier 3) in the trafficking in persons reports of 2006 and 2007. Earlier efforts to place Uzbekistan in the lowest ranking had been overturned by the US President and his administration. This ranking later fluctuated again according to renewed geostrategic interests.

The European Union led the push for an independent investigation into the events in Andijan and pressed for punitive sanctions, including a visa ban on 12 senior Uzbek officials and an export ban on munitions. Uzbekistan responded by restricting troop access for most EU countries. However, Germany maintained strong relations with Uzbekistan while the US and other NATO countries were distancing themselves considerably. The Germans were able to keep the base in Termez open, which hosted about 300 troops mostly engaged in aircraft maintenance for forces in Afghanistan. Germany also defied EU sanctions by increasing its annual base payments following the eviction of the US base and allowing one of the 12 people on a visa ban to come to Germany for medical treatment on humanitarian grounds.

The motivations for Germany to continue partnering with Uzbekistan are somewhat unknown, as Germany has not commented widely on the relationship. Germany had a light NGO and media presence in Uzbekistan prior to the Andijan incident, so there was less third sector criticism of human rights violations. Termez was the only overseas German military base, so there could have been a symbolic interest in keeping it open. It is also possible that Germany was worried about diversifying oil and gas access. Germany is the only EU country to have an Embassy in each of the Central Asian Republics. They could have been taking a pragmatic approach to diplomatic relations, believing it better for Europe and NATO to have a door kept open for future international affairs with Central Asia. When Germany took over the chair position of the EU in 2007, it worked to lessen the sanctions against Uzbekistan. The EU came up with a six-year strategy for Uzbekistan, in which engagement and bilateral cooperation were encouraged. Sanctions were lessened, then suspended, and eventually removed all together in 2009, citing dutiful progress on

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484 Rachel Ryan, “Germany aims at improved EU relations with Uzbekistan” DW November 2, 2006, and “German foreign minister calls for reforms in Central Asia,” DW October 31, 2006.
485 “Germany seeks Uzbek base alternatives” DW November 26, 2005.
486 Dierdre Tynan, “Veil is lifted on German payments for Termez base” Eurasianet March 24, 2011 and “The EU isn’t taking sanctions against Uzbekistan seriously, rights groups” Eurasianet February 5, 2007.
487 Richard Rousseau, “Germany’s changing role in Central Asia” The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs February 2012 and Cooley, Great Game, 168-169
human rights such as inviting Red Cross prison monitoring, introducing habeas corpus and ending the death penalty.\textsuperscript{490}

If Uzbekistan missed its former allies, it made no effort to show it. Bilateral relations with Russia and China quickly filled the vacuum left behind. On the same week as the US eviction, Uzbekistan pursued membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Uzbekistan had originally snubbed the invitation to join the CSTO in 2002, instead choosing to use the US as their security ally.\textsuperscript{491} Uzbekistan and Russia conducted their first joint military training exercise in September 2005. The two nations also concluded a series of major trade and energy deals. According to Government of Uzbekistan figures, in 2006, bilateral trade with China was nearly $700 million US dollars and growing.\textsuperscript{492} As a result of closer connections to China, per capita GDP in Uzbekistan more than doubled between 2005 and 2008.\textsuperscript{493}

The crackdown on dissent continued unabated in Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{494} The human rights situation was as bleak as ever, but there were significantly less people left to report on it. More than 100 people were sentenced to prison in conjunction with inciting the demonstration in Andijan.\textsuperscript{495} Uzbekistan continued to pursue the extradition of people suspected of involvement in Andijan.\textsuperscript{496} By the end of 2007, roughly 900 civil society organizations had closed due to government pressure.\textsuperscript{497} Karimov unilaterally extended his presidency for a third seven-year term, despite a two-term limit in the Uzbekistan Constitution. If the US hoped a lack of engagement would cause Uzbekistan to see the error in its ways, the opposite was occurring.

**Critical Juncture Three: Northern Distribution Network**

Relations between Uzbekistan and the US began to warm up again in 2008. The US interest in Uzbekistan was motivated in part by the exit strategy from Afghanistan. The administration had embraced the “new silk road” approach of regional integration between Afghanistan and South and Central Asia. Uzbekistan was a key geographic link to Central Asian and European markets. The US Central Command met with President Karimov in January “to renew dialogue with an important regional player.”\textsuperscript{498} The Government of Uzbekistan then agreed to allow US troops to use Germany’s Termez base, but they avoided commenting publicly on this improved relationship.\textsuperscript{499} There were a few other high level visits between US military officials and President Karimov in


\textsuperscript{491} Vladimir Socor, “Uzbekistan Accedes to CSTO” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 3 no. 124 (June 27, 2006).


\textsuperscript{493} See chart of GDP Growth on page 45 of this thesis.


\textsuperscript{496} “Alleged Akramiya members face trial in Kyrgyzstan” *RFERL* September 26, 2006.


\textsuperscript{499} Maria Golovnina, “Uzbekistan gives US limited use of Termez base” *Reuters*, March 5, 2008.
2008, but there were no press conferences or other opportunities for human rights questions to come up.

President Karimov’s motivations for welcoming US engagement were the same as in 2001: prestige, money, and security. After asserting his power in 2005 and gaining new alliances with China, Uzbekistan was in a stronger bargaining position this time around. Karimov also resented the favored-partner status of northern neighbor Kazakhstan (who was chairing the OSCE) and wished to regain authority as the main power broker in Central Asia. The Government of Uzbekistan had emerged stronger from its unabashed crushing of dissent. Without western media outlets or NGOs to monitor activities or inspire alternative thinking, the Government had fewer threats to its way of operating. The events in Andijan and subsequent mass incarcerations sent a message that the Government would meet any perceived criticism or opposition with brute force. Without western organizations to employ or protect local activists, there was no safety net for individuals seeking reforms.

The crackdown on dissent continued as usual in Uzbekistan, but the US Government was silent on the imprisonment of activists or other civil liberty concerns. Instead, the US was profuse in its praise of Uzbekistan’s decisions that year to allow the Red Cross back into prisons, to establish a human rights monitoring office, and to introduce the concept of habeas corpus. On the four year anniversary of the Andijan massacre, the US helped set up a “free industrial economic zone” to attract foreign investments to the Navoi region of Uzbekistan, outside of the Fergana Valley. The Ambassador’s public celebration of this economic partnership on the same day as the Andijan anniversary was a clear message that economic stability was the priority, and the conversation on human rights was being relegated to the past.

While economic stability was a precursor to avoiding future warfare, the War on Terror and the priorities of the US Government went beyond economic interests or multipolar balancing. The Obama administration was eager to end the war in Afghanistan because 2008 had been the deadliest year for American troops, and the war was growing less popular in America by the day. It cost $1 million per person per year to have military personnel in Afghanistan, a price tag that Americans were tired of paying. In March of 2009, President Obama announced his plan for the War on Terror, including a surge of troops and massive aid for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan was harboring top leaders from factions of the Taliban and was viewed as an unreliable partner in the implementation of military affairs. In order to realize Obama’s ambitions, America would need

greater access to the region. Uzbekistan once again became of geostrategic interest to the US as part of the Northern Distribution Network. Three key transit routes in and out of Afghanistan were established beginning in 2009.

**Figure Six: Map of the Northern Distribution Network**

This Northern Distribution Network (NDN) was an ambitious linking of Central Asia to Europe and to South Asia, with the long-term goal of providing streamlined cross border trade and economic integration for Afghanistan. In the immediate, the NDN was going to help move the 30,000 troops and cargo that Obama had ordered for the “surge” in fighting the War on Terror.

President Karimov was once again meeting with top US officials and acting as a link to the region. The US needed Uzbekistan and was prepared to keep quiet about social concerns in order to regain access to Afghanistan. As part of the re-engagement, the two parties established annual bilateral consultations to maintain productive relations. However, according to cables from the Department of State, the US was careful not to mention human rights in these discussions. In Assistant Secretary Blake’s report back to Congress after his visit to Uzbekistan, defense was the clear priority. “Uzbekistan is a particularly key partner for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. It's providing

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507 White House, “Remarks 2009.”

electricity to keep the lights on in Kabul, it has facilitated transit for essential supplies to coalition forces and it's helped to construct a very important rail line inside Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{509}

President Karimov was correct that this time around, a partnership with the US would prove to be more lucrative. By mid-2009, 30\% of goods delivered to Afghanistan were being transited through the NDN. An Uzbek company was awarded a non-competitive $129 million contract from the Asia Development Bank to build a rail link into Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{510} Rail traffic was considerably easier for the Government of Uzbekistan to control. They could simply sidecar the cargo at the border and demand informal payments or “speed up fees” in order to continue transit.\textsuperscript{511} The Government of Uzbekistan could also impose and inflate tariffs and transit fees, which it chose to do twice in 2010 and again in 2011 without any objections from its allies.\textsuperscript{512} This economic partnership with the west did not hurt Uzbekistan’s trade relations with China either. The two countries were trading over $3 billion a year and reached a new set of agreements in 2012 worth $5.3 billion.\textsuperscript{513}

The Government of Uzbekistan demanded the resumption of US foreign military financing in exchange for access rights to the Northern Distribution Network.\textsuperscript{514} In 2009, Congress restored some military financing, and military training programs resumed in 2010.\textsuperscript{515} In turn, Uzbekistan received a waiver for its placement in the lower rankings of each of the State Department annual human rights reports. Uzbekistan also received a waiver from any punitive actions as a result of being on the religious freedom “countries of particular concern” list in 2009. This garnered significant criticism from the Congressional branch responsible for monitoring religious freedom, but such concerns went unheard.\textsuperscript{516} The authoritarian country was once again getting a pass on human rights abuses.

In the ultimate show of diplomatic cooperation, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Uzbekistan at the end of 2010. Human rights concerns were notably absent from any US Government mentions of her visit, and she did not do press interviews or meet with local human rights groups. She followed a similar pattern in a visit to the country in 2011, choosing to spend time at a General Motors manufacturing plant rather than engaging with human rights leaders or journalists.\textsuperscript{517} However, during a press event in Tajikistan, there were many questions about Uzbekistan, resulting in these remarks from the Secretary,

\textsuperscript{511} Dierdre Tynan, “Documents highlight problems with Uzbek corridor of Afghan supply route” Eurasianet, June 28, 2010.
\textsuperscript{514} Cooley, Great Game, 163.
I can assure you that we have raised all of the human rights issues in Uzbekistan and elsewhere. But we have also learned over the years that after a while, after you’ve made your strong objections, if you have no contact, you have no influence. And other countries will fill that vacuum who do not care about human rights, who do not care about fundamental freedoms. So despite the challenge, I would rather be having meetings raising these uncomfortable issues, pressing for change, than to be totally outside and let others come in that only want commercial, political, and other advantages.  

The increased diplomatic ties frustrated US NGOs who were continuing to report on the appalling human rights conditions within Uzbekistan. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, and close to 20 other international non-profit organizations sent a joint letter to Secretary Clinton in which they outlined the current human rights concerns and urged her to take a stronger stance with Uzbekistan. The US Congressional group responsible for monitoring religious freedom sent a similar message, urging her to raise concerns. If such concerns were actually brought up, they were quiet and non-prescriptive. The US Government was being careful not to upset the Government of Uzbekistan by criticizing its governance choices. For example, despite the un-denied use of forced labor, including child labor, for the annual cotton harvest, Uzbekistan was able to stay on the middle tier of the annual trafficking-in-persons report. In 2012, when the BBC uncovered the practice of forced sterilizations of over 80,000 Uzbek women, the US Government did not respond publicly or adjust its health care partnerships with Uzbekistan. The days of speaking out about human rights concerns were firmly in the past.

Clinton’s visits to Uzbekistan were timed with an increased geostrategic need. Relations with Pakistan had been declining, and the country had closed its access points into Afghanistan in 2011 in retaliation for US air strikes. This made the Northern Distribution Network the only land access point into and out of Afghanistan. With the war in Afghanistan winding down, the US and NATO needed to move troops and cargo back to their home countries. Moving these goods was no small task, as there were more than 600,000 pieces of equipment valued at $28 billion still in Afghanistan in 2013. More than 80% of that was planned to transit Uzbekistan via the Northern Distribution Network. As a result of this premier position, the Government of Uzbekistan was calling the shots in the relationship and even passed a law in 2012 stating they would not house any foreign military bases on their soil. Full US economic assistance was restored that year via a

http://im.state.gov/md175985.htm
522 Natalia Anteleva,”Uzbekistan’s Policy of Secretly Sterilising Women,” BBC, April, 12 2012.
524 David Trilling, “Propagistan,” Foreign Policy, November 22, 2011, and “Northern Distribution Nightmare,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2011.
527 Miles, “Centcom Undertakes.”
waiver from Secretary Clinton, and Uzbekistan was also cleared to receive non-lethal military goods as part of allowing access to the Northern Distribution Network.\textsuperscript{529}

Uzbekistan had successfully gotten from the renewed US partnership what it had failed to get during the first few years. Uzbekistan’s prestige as the key link in Central Asia was undisputed, and its bargaining position with neighboring powers was stronger than ever. There were millions of dollars in business and logistics deals as well as informal payments and tariffs as part of granting military access. US troops were once again training and funding the Uzbek military, and the Government of Uzbekistan was set to inherit leftover hardware. Uzbekistan had successfully silenced the US Government regarding the human rights situation in the country and had rid itself from foreign NGOs and media outlets. In exchange, the US Government got the access points it needed in and out of Afghanistan. The US Government may have been winning the War on Terror, but Uzbekistan had clearly won the war on human rights.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The examination of US-Uzbekistan relations since the War on Terror provides a clear example of what happens when geostrategic military interests come into conflict with human rights. The War on Terror was framed as an ideological fight against the “axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world.” The war was publicized as a crusade for traditional American ideals such as justice, democracy, and freedom. Yet, in the pursuit of those values, the US Government supported authoritarian allies, such as Uzbekistan, who were limiting freedom of speech and other civil liberties and torturing thousands of people under the guise of fighting extremism. The US was willing to overlook Uzbekistan’s human rights record in order to gain military access into Afghanistan.

When the War on Terror started, the US sought a partnership with Uzbekistan that would provide military access into Afghanistan while improving the social and economic condition of the Uzbek people. However, lack of progress on human rights caused dissatisfaction from both parties. Individual bureaus of the US Government were vocal in their criticisms of the partnership with Uzbekistan, but they were initially unable to persuade the National Security Council to prioritize human rights instead of defense interests. There was a palpable tension between the different factions of US foreign affairs, and the US Government’s actions were clearly reflective of these diverse interests rather than a unitary actor. The US Department of State demanded a more conducive operating environment for non-governmental organizations, while President Karimov viewed NGOs as a shell for anti-government activists seeking to rid him of his power. Uzbekistan’s leaders resented the international scrutiny and criticism of their governance practices. The US legislature withheld payments to Uzbekistan in response to concerns over human rights abuses, but the Department of Defense and other senior Bush administration officials continued to seek ways to partner with the Government of Uzbekistan.

The Government of Uzbekistan joined forces with the US for prestige, security, and financial gain. None of those motives were realized by 2005, and this lack of fulfillment led Uzbekistan to demand that the US withdraw from its military base in 2005. Once diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan were not needed for the War on Terror, the US Government was more vocal in its criticisms of human rights abuses in Uzbekistan. The US Government also stopped high level visits to Uzbekistan or other public diplomacy. The country was added to the watch list for trafficking in persons and for religious freedom. Military sanctions continued, and a visa ban was placed on certain high level officials. Such demands had been previously made by Congress or sub-bureaus of the Department of State, but they were overruled by the executive branch, which had been prioritizing alliances for the war. When war interests were no longer in play, the US Government was more direct and unified in defending its ideals of free speech, democracy, and respect for human rights.

As this case has demonstrated, once the US renewed its military interest in Uzbekistan, concerns for human rights were once again side lined. Uzbekistan was in a more powerful negotiating position and was able to gain hundreds of millions of dollars in military contracts and tariffs. Uzbekistan

530 For an analysis of idealism in the State of the Union address, see “George Bush and the Axis of Evil,” The Economist, January 31, 2002.
was cleared to receive military aid again and consequences for its low ranking on global human rights indexes were waived. Demands for a more developed civil society were quieted, and international NGOs were not re-opened. The Government of Uzbekistan was able to get the prestige, security, and financial gain it had originally sought from a partnership with the United States.

The depths of such partnerships with authoritarian countries and compliance with international laws are likely to be revealed as more information about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan becomes unclassified. The US Government recently agreed to donate $350 million worth of excess military vehicles to Uzbekistan’s Department of Defense.\footnote{“Uzbekistan gets 328 military vehicles from the United States,” Asia Plus January 23, 2014.} This is the largest single military donation in Central Asia’s history.\footnote{Kucera, Joshua “No longer under sanctions, Uzbekistan gets 300 armored vehicles from US,” Eurasianet January 22, 2015.} As the war in Afghanistan ends, further study should be conducted into how the US and Uzbekistan’s relationship will evolve once there is no longer a geostrategic military need. The US Government has signaled that there is an interest in maintaining close diplomatic ties beyond military cooperation, but specific programs have not been announced.\footnote{For an indication of this rebalancing of diplomacy, see “Interview with Celeste A Wallander, Special Adviser to President Obama.” VOA News, July 25, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LH9LsHcNjD8&feature=youtu.be}

The partnership between Uzbekistan and the US spanned two different US presidents, representing two political parties, and as such it was not dependent on which party was in charge. The relationship to Uzbekistan changed most significantly first under the Bush administration and then back during the Obama administration. The legislative branch changes every two years, but senior Congressional leaders from both political parties consistently attempted to restrict the US partnership with Uzbekistan. If one were to argue that the Republican Party behaved as a unitary actor in international relations, this argument would be widely discredited by disagreements between President Bush and his republican colleagues in the Senate, most notably John McCain.

If one were to argue that the executive branch, whether under Bush or Obama, was the unitary actor in foreign policy, this argument would not account for the power of Congress to restrict international relations with Uzbekistan. Congress successfully constrained military interests in Uzbekistan because of the lack of progress on first generation human rights. Military funding was cut by legislation, thus negating the argument that the military or defense was the unitary actor in international relations during the War on Terror. Such restrictions were the results of various bureaus within the US Department of State reporting and publicizing human rights abuses in Uzbekistan and pressuring the Government of Uzbekistan to reform. Subsequent research on bureaucratic logic could examine the influence of competing bureaus of US foreign policy in decision-making on a different topic such as economic statecraft and how it compares to this case on human rights. Further research could also include a case comparison to other conflicts in which the legislative branch or other bureaus successfully restricted executive conduct based on human rights. The War in Vietnam and US involvement in South East Asia, as well as US involvement in Central America during the Reagan administration could provide cases for further comparison.\footnote{For case studies of human rights pressure leading to reforms in Latin America, see Sikkink, Kathryn. “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America.” International Organization 47 no. 3 (Summer 1993).} Such explorations are often done from a constitutional standpoint.\footnote{535}
Regarding further research, this case study could be expanded to compare the US relationship with Pakistan to the US relationship with Uzbekistan during the War on Terror. Further research should be conducted on US support for countries near the conflict areas to learn the extent to which the US Government bolstered other repressive governments in order to gain access to war zones. US violations of international human rights law during the War on Terror (for example the 1984 Convention Against Torture) could also be compared to other countries’ violations of the same human rights laws domestically during the same time frame. Insights could be gained from a comparison of the use of torture on suspected terrorists during rendition by the US and torture of civilian prisoners in the same country.

There is an alternate argument that the US prioritized human rights consistently throughout the War on Terror but made a tactical decision to give Uzbekistan room to make changes rather than assuming an adversarial tone, believing this approach to be best for achieving progress on human rights. As the old American saying goes, “you catch more flies with honey.” After all, some progress was made at the start of their partnership: western NGOs were allowed to operate in Uzbekistan, foreign press was tolerated, and UN monitors were granted access. The flaw with this theory is that the Department of State was clear that human rights were still being rampantly violated in spite of the increased engagement. US reporting on human rights still indicated that by all measures the human rights situation in Uzbekistan was still the worst in the world. If positive reinforcement were the method by which the US Government would motivate human rights change in Uzbekistan, than why were their reports and Congressional commentary reflecting the bleak situation? Further, it would be naive to conclude that praise alone would be a sufficient motivator, as Congress demonstrated through the use of appropriations restrictions.

The US Government could have concluded that human rights in Uzbekistan were not improving from 2005-2008 when there was no relationship with the US, and as such, it was better to have a partnership in which they could seek to influence the outcome. Perhaps the US Government re-engaged with Uzbekistan in 2009 because it believed that such engagement would yield the best results for human rights. Or, if the situation was going to be equally bad regardless, then the US might as well partner to get what they want out of the country. This is an oversimplified accounting of the many decisions and actors that affect changes to foreign policy and is wrought with logical fallacies. Affirming the consequent or disjunction are both propositional fallacies. The absence of a condition does not automatically make the presence of a condition the dynamic variable. Further, were this argument to hold true, it would be awfully serendipitous for this timing to coincide so neatly with the defense interests and geostrategic priorities. Because this trajectory matches that of the European Union, further research could include a comparison of EU-Uzbekistan relations to US-Uzbekistan relations during the War on Terror.


A contrasting explanation for the US change in approach to Uzbekistan could be related to defense priorities for the war in Iraq. At the time of the Andijan massacre, the war in Iraq was incredibly unpopular. Around the world the US was facing criticisms for its human rights abuses and lack of respect for international laws. As such, the US could have found the Andijan massacre to be an opportune time to show that it was still upholding the traditional ideals stated at the start of the war. In order to keep western allies together for the war in Iraq, the US needed to isolate a less important ally to show that it was still committed to human rights and basic freedoms. If the US isolated Uzbekistan in order to meet larger military interests, this would imply that defense interests were consistently a higher priority than ideals. To explore this alternate theory, further analysis could be done to find most different case examples where military interests were overruled by human rights concerns or other ideals, or most similar cases where ideals did not take precedent over military interests.

The War on Terror provided massive expansion of executive power, with a mix of constraint and consent from other branches of the US Government. The underbelly of this power included the disappearance and detention of thousands of people without access to charges and the backing of an authoritarian country that systematically abused human rights. The US Department of Defense established a massive footprint abroad, including the use of secret detention facilities in Uzbekistan. This military mark stepped on the ideals of democracy and human rights that had been at the center of international relations since the beginning of the Cold War. In the tension between military realism and diplomatic idealism, freedom and civil rights were traded for access to Afghanistan. These foreign policy decisions were not made by a unitary rational actor. They were the result of diverse and competing interests of the Department of State and its bureaus, the National Security Council, US President and Congress.
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