Performance Art and the Prosthetic

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For Martin
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Attestation of Authorship

“I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except whereby explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.”

[Signature]
24.08.2014
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Abbreviation of Heidegger Texts

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td><em>The Question Concerning Technology</em>, 1950</td>
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<td>BT</td>
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<td>BDT</td>
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Abstract

This PhD project explores questions of liveness, site, and locale through a performance and media arts practice belonging to prosthetic technologies. As such, the project investigates performance, and its encounter through video as inextricably bound up with a questioning of the “essence” of the prosthetic. From such a perspective, my project opens up debates about subject/object dichotomies, intentionality, and spectatorship, as a prosthetic life emerges to reveal a liveness that challenges our experience. In other words, prosthetic relations suggest that my existence already belongs with an entirety of world. From this standpoint: liveness can involve being taken by an uncanny revealing through fleeting moments in the constitution of a world that is prosthetics; site is a temporal place of my being; and locale is only locale through something I do that opens up intervals of space.

My art practice engages the prosthetic as a means of vision that resists the instrumental as cause that habitually falls away into forgetfulness. The exegesis employs Martin Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, Being and Time, (and other texts), to explore how technē belongs with poiēsis as a primal bringing-forth of something in itself, and the making of something by means of a relationship to another. What is significant here is not that something is, or is not, a prosthetic (device), but what using it makes me think about the human condition. In short, I employ prosthetic relations (camera rigs, periscopes, projectors, harnesses and so forth), to uncover a time and place that might open our temporal being to a world by questioning a ground of understanding based on cause and effect. In this manner, my project suggests that our prosthetic relations carry a possibility of revealing a belonging with world through ways of questioning how we look and encounter the “essence” of technology.

Four chapters discuss my exploration of prosthetic relations from a diverse body of perspectives: through a “play of forces” brought forth by poiēsis and affect; the modes in which my founding mood or attunement is revealed through temporality; my meetings with self that expose a primordial homelessness belonging to the uncanny; and finally, how my “liveness” is revealed through a belonging to prosthetic relation.
Preface

*Prometheus and Epimetheus*

One day *Zeus* said to *Prometheus*, “the time has come for you, for us gods, to bring into the day the non-immortals.” The non-immortals being animals and men. *Prometheus*, who is put in charge of this task, has a twin brother named *Epimetheus*. *Epimetheus* resembles *Prometheus*; he is his double. But in fact *Epimetheus* is his brother’s opposite. *Epimetheus* is the god of the fault of forgetting. *Prometheus* is a figure of knowledge, of absolute mastery, total memory. *Prometheus* forgets nothing, *Epimetheus* forgets everything. *Epimetheus* says to his brother: “Zeus has given you this task – I want to do it! Me me me! I’ll take care of it.” *Epimetheus* is a rather simple-minded brother, and *Prometheus* is fond of him. He dares not refuse and says, “Ok, you take care of it.”

So *Epimetheus* distributes the qualities. He will give the gazelle its speed, for example. Gazelles run very fast. To the lion he gives force and endurance. To the turtle the shell, *et cetera*. He distributes the qualities in equilibrium. *Epimetheus*’ distribution of the qualities describes the ecological balance of nature. The lion chases and eats the gazelle, but gazelles run fast, so some escape and reproduce. And all the species are in equilibrium. Now, as *Epimetheus* is distributing the qualities, he suddenly notices something … He looks in his basket … There are no qualities left! “I forgot to save a quality for man! The basket is empty. I still have to bring mankind, mortals, into the day.” There was still this species to bring into the day, but there are no qualities left to give him a form.

So *Prometheus* goes to the workshop of the god *Hephaestus*, to steal fire. Fire, which is obviously the symbol of technics, but which is also the symbol of the power of god … *Zeus*. (Barison & Ross, 2004, 0: 22)

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1 Bernard Stiegler recounts the *Prometheus* and *Epimetheus* myth. His portrayal is taken from the prologue originally titled, *The Myth of Prometheus, or the Birth of Technics*, in the documentary film, *The Ister*, (2004). The documentary suggests that the *Ister* comes from *Istros* the Ancient Greek name for the river Danube (Barison & Ross, 2004).
Introduction

We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough. We view action as only cause and effect. The actuality of effect is valued according to its utility. But the essence of action is an accomplishment. To accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this fullness—*producere*. Therefore only what already is can really be accomplished. But what “is” above all is Being. Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. (Martin Heidegger, 1946, p. 217)

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*I am standing on the median strip in the middle of the Dominion Road flyover, Auckland City. I am holding a hand-made periscope device in my hands. There are two small video cameras attached to the device. There is a metal harness attached to my waist. The other end of the harness extends to five meters where it is secured to a wheeled dolly. The dolly supports a tripod with a third camera that faces back toward me. I can hear the sound of traffic. I can feel the wind against my face as motorists’ whiz by me only a matter of feet away. I have placed a restriction on my walk. I may only take a step by using my periscope device coupled with the dolly-harness rig to navigate my movements. At some point, the dolly gets away from me as it veers off the median strip into the path of the oncoming traffic.*

This PhD project explores a question of “liveness,” site, and locale, through performing a series of actions that can only be accessed through prosthetic technologies. Accordingly, this exegesis uses the idea of prosthetic relations to suggest a wide variety of forces that are
inseparable from my sense of being-in-the-world. My prosthetic relations suggest that I am unable to be abstracted or treated as separate from my environment. In this manner, my project opens up debates about subject/object relations, intentionality, and spectatorship. I am interested in how the idea of the prosthetic relates to wider social and political apparatuses of knowledge and power that could be political, juridical, technological, military, and so on. From this perspective, our prosthetic relations action an accomplishment that opens up a world through complex networks that suggest how we understand our relationships with other beings, and situations.

Figure 4. Suzie Gorodi, Dominion Road Series, 2013 (detail) split-screen periscope view.

2 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines “intentionality” as noun [mass noun]; the fact of being deliberate or purposive. In philosophy the quality of mental states which consists of their being directed towards some object or state of affairs (e.g. thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes).
Building upon a low-tech approach, I construct a series of handmade camera rigs, periscopes, dollies and harnesses. My devices are built and put to use as a way of investigating what the essence of the prosthetic might mean at the intersection of live performance and video art practice. This body of work suggests that a prosthetic (camera or otherwise) questions distinctions between the human body and technology.

At its most literal, you cannot experience performance without prosthetics while prosthetics are part and parcel of performance. As I straddle the so-called disciplines of performance, video and installation practices, a notion of the prosthetic extends to encompass, for example, data projection and installation in the gallery. Triple-channel videos are recorded simultaneously and are then projected in-sync as large-scale installations. Three screens occupy the full height of the gallery wall between floor and ceiling. The social paradigm of the art gallery, its protocols and norms, serves the purpose of my project as these conditions bring a particular emphasis on embodied ways of encountering to light vis-à-vis the space and time of spectatorship.3

None of what I consider as prosthetics (the camera, the rigs, the projectors, and so on) are considered as separate entities from my, and others’, performing body/ies, but in the sense of an inherent relation of “technics” that moves my Da-sein between modes of embodiment and dis-embodiment.4 In this manner, my project suggests that our prosthetic relations carry a possibility of revealing a world through exploring how we look and encounter the “essence” of technology. By asking how the prosthetic is related to liveness, site, and locale, I give thought to what the essence of my actions might mean. The idea of the prosthetic articulates a means of vision. What is significant here is not that something is, or is not, a prosthetic (device), but what using it makes me think about the human condition. In short, I employ prosthetic (camera rigs, and so forth), as a way to uncover a time and place that might open our temporal being to a world by questioning a ground of understanding based on cause and effect.

3 Although the influence of the white cube on spectatorship in terms of its political framing is extensive, with reference to how the institution sanctions the so-called artwork that it might display, this is not the consideration I raise for the purpose of this exegesis. Rather I read the gallery as a condition (amongst a heterogeneous play of forces) involving the coming to presence of the artwork.

4 The notion of “embodiment” is a temporal mode of “being” that shifts between “embodied, and dis-embodied ways of being.” These modes are not separate categories, but are of each other.
This project uses the term “essence” to suggest how a prosthetic liveness embodies action as a way to question intentionality—not as something directed toward subjects and objects, but as something related to a different way of constituting a world. In this sense, essence communicates the idea of the essential underlying cause or ground that enables an understanding of how we see our relations with other beings and things. In light of this standpoint, my project asks this question: What has my existence got to do with the essence of a prosthetic liveness? I explore what happens for me as instigator of these performances and, in turn, what happens for the body/ies of the audience.

5 From here on I will use the term “beings” to connote all inner-worldly beings belonging to a diversity of being such as: situations, circumstances, artworks, periscopes, cameras, the Being that is (Da-sein), a way of thinking, et cetera.
At the crux of my project is a desire to explore the essence of action and to question cause and effect relationships; to spend some time thinking about how my practice might let something, as Martin Heidegger writes, “unfold ... into the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this fullness—producer” (1946, p. 217). This has a bearing on how we view “live” performance and its so-called recordings or documentations. If we exist prior to subject/object relations, and are inseparable from the technologies we engage with, then the possibility of seeing different worlds emerges through a question of how we understand the essence of action through prosthetics.

Figure 6. Suzie Gorodi, Plaza Series, 2013 (detail) chin camera view (external plaza).

For Heidegger, the possibility of revealing a world is embedded in how we understand the essence of the human condition (Being). He says, “Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. It does not make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation to
Being solely as something handed over to it from Being” (p. 217). Julian Young interprets Heidegger’s sense of essence when he says it is, “a ‘ground’ that ‘enables’…. The underlying ground, explanation or cause of the phenomenon” (2002, p. 37). This has evolved as a way to explore my practice through a relation of technics as an underlying ground. In this sense, my practice prompted an exploration of Heidegger’s philosophy. It has offered me a way of articulating my experience of performing with cameras and other devices where prosthetic relations are felt as something belonging to a fundamental way of being human.

The exegesis talks largely about performance practice from the perspective of spectatorship in light of Heidegger’s notion of Da-sein (being-there). The term Da-sein suggests existence as a temporal being. Regarding my own practice, and with a view toward the perspective of the spectator, Da-sein is each and every one of us: “Da-sein is a being that does not simply occur amongst other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 10).6 My project engages in a Heideggerian perspective not to exact his thinking, but because it offers fertile ground for examining our relations with media arts as not distinctly separate from Da-sein’s belonging with technology. In this way, my project is underscored by a Heideggerian focus as a way to investigate video encounter as inextricably bound up with a questioning of prosthetic relations.

Technē is the Greek translation for technology or technics. At times, the exegesis uses the phrase “a relation of technē” to signal how we can never get away from the fact that we exist in the world with other beings, and as such we don’t identify ourselves in isolation. In this way, prosthetic devices propose that the way we question and encounter technology is pivotal to how looking7 constitutes our world.

6 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines ontology as the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being. Heidegger suggests that Da-sein is pre-ontological. Da-sein is not a thing “ontically” thought of as separate from other beings, but a being there with all beings in the constitution of world. In his book Being-in-the-world, Hubert L Dreyfus comments in his book Being-in-the-world: Since Descartes, philosophers have been stuck with the epistemological problem of explaining how the ideas of our mind can be true of the external world. Heidegger shows that this subject/object epistemology presupposes a background of everyday practices into which we are socialised but that we do not represent in our minds. Since he calls this more fundamental way of making sense of things our understanding of being, he claims that he is doing ontology, that is, asking about the nature of this understanding of being that we do not know—that is not a representation in the mind corresponding to the world—but that we simply are (1993, p.3)

7 The term looking is used by this exegesis through its associations with spectatorship as the action of encounter, extended through the notion of reading, or seeing, something in a way that informs our understanding of what or how our being is a temporal resonance of all beings in the establishment of a world.
Heidegger’s *The Question Concerning Technology* explores how *technē* belongs with *poiēsis*. In order to understand the essence of technology, he questions the meaning of the instrumental as “cause.” In this sense, my video artworks (as performed iterations) explore what it might mean to question ways of “looking” that reveal different worlds. *Poiēsis* is bringing-forth, which the Greeks understood as *both* the organic, primal, bringing-forth of something in itself, in *physis* (nature), and the making of something by means of a relationship to another through art and manufacture that is *technē* (Heidegger, 1977). My project suggests that *poiēsis* belongs with *technē* because it reveals something concealed within the human condition, through our relations with the prosthetic.

My practice highlights how we access an environment through media arts when watching or making a film. Specifically, “Our understanding always arises out of a specific situation, and...”
always brings with it some attunement or other ... a general unthematazied sense of things as a whole” (Clark, 2002, p. 18). Attunement is a founding mood, it is, “what is most familiar and an everyday kind of thing: mood, being in a mood” (Heidegger, 1996, pp. 126-127). Drawing attention to the temporal modes of attunement and understanding Heidegger writes:

Understanding is primarily grounded in the future; attunement, on the other hand, temporalizes itself primarily in having-been. Mood temporalizes itself, that is, its specific ecstasy belongs to a future and a present, but in such a way that having-been modifies the equiprimordial ecstacies. (1996, p. 313)

While understanding is a way of being toward possibilities for development and interpretation, attunement is relative to a primordial “having-been.” My project utilises the idea of “affect” as something associated with attunements that rise out of our relations with our world. I suggest that if temporality is our factical9 existence usually concealed from our awareness, then affect is a mode of attunement that places emphasis on physically moving us toward the possibility of fleetingly revealing something profoundly connected with disclosing this to ourselves.

Revealing is related to poiēsis. In the context of this exegesis, revealing concerns a Heideggerian approach to “truth” translated from Greek as alētheia. Alētheia is momentarily revealed for Da-sein relative to its factual existence as something already thrown into the world. Heidegger contends that Da-sein is existentially a projected throwness, already delivered over to world. In Being and Time, he discusses how Da-sein is “ontically distinguished” by how it cares for itself. Da-sein is “pre-ontological” and this is what he means by Da-sein’s throwness, in that, we are always already in the manner of an understanding of ourselves. In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger writes, “The beginning already contains the end latent within itself” (1993, p. 201).10 Bearing this capacity to understand and question our existence in mind, we belong to our being-in-the-world with a potential to be brought before ourselves at all times. My project thinks of being brought before one’s self, as an idea integral to how we might move and question the operations of apparatuses through

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8 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the English term “ecstasy” as an overwhelming feeling of great happiness or joyful excitement. From Greek language, ek-stasis means standing outside oneself. Based on ek- “out” + histanai “to place.”
9 The term “factical” suggests how Da-sein understands its own existence as a fact.
10 As cited in David Farrell Krell’s translation of TOWA, in Martin Heidegger. Basic Writings (1993).
examining the essence of the prosthetic. This is how the practice questions the essence of action accessed through media arts (demarcating the digital recording of actions and their exhibition).

Our own throwness is something usually concealed from us, and not something we usually think about. In the light of our throwness, our prosthetic relations emerge as something fundamentally belonging to our own factical disposition. When I encounter, or make a video artwork, my actions vacillate back and forth between inauthentic and authentic Da-sein. As such, spectatorship is a continual movement between in/authentic Da-sein always in a process of flux, either concealing or revealing alētheia (truth). My approach evokes facticity as something associated with live performance and authenticity, not as something related to cause and effect, but as it is constituted through the conditions of existence itself. Along these lines, poiēsis is a bringing-forth associated with a form of self-disclosure, or revealing, orientated by the temporal disposition of our own factical lives in the constitution of a world.

As I have intimated, it has always been my art practice that drives this Heideggerian research. During the course of this PhD project, instances in the practice prompted a sense that there is more than merely what I see before me on screen. Actions appear to physically redirect my thinking in a way that question the site of my own whereabouts in relation to my video installations. In this sense, my liveness can involve being taken by an uncanny dis-embodiment through fleeting moments in the constitution of a world that is prosthetics.

When I cast my eye over my entire body of work, I see similar questions that emerge repeatedly. Questions like: What has action got to do with my existence? How do my actions move me to think? How is such a *kinēsis* of the living\(^\text{11}\) related to the idea of art or me as an artist?

My previous Masters degree study employed a single camera’s movement through space to explore the notion of action with regard to affective embodiment. Using camera rigs and supports, these video works did not feature my own body, but were performed by my body. This practice was aimed at encouraging an affective oscillation between spectators and the media. The notion of movement between spectator and screen makes me think about myself as an artist in relation to my practice. I am neither performer nor video artist. My interdisciplinary being slips easily between categories as I default from one to the other. Accordingly, prosthetic relations have come to signify a resistance, not only to cause and effect ways of relating, but also to disciplinary categorisation.

In short summary, Chapter 1 introduces the notion of the apparatus as “a play of forces” where the essence of modern technology enacts a way of revealing prosthetic relations. Chapter 2 explores a notion of looking as it discusses pro-filmic technics of cinema. These technics enframe our relations with media arts, and question ways of thinking that prioritise subject/object dichotomies. I draw upon concepts of attunement and disclosure to investigate how an encounter with an artwork can reveal temporality as open and dynamic. In this way, my project explores the human condition as a temporal being inseparable from the environment that frames its existence. Enframing here signifies how apparatuses of knowledge and power always place a certain frame of understanding around the human condition. From this perspective, Chapter 3 makes use of the notion of the uncanny. If the anomaly of being *taken* by the uncanny is made possible because we are already a relation of *technē* (we are inseparable from prosthetic technologies), then we *already* belong outside of ourselves. I draw here on Heidegger’s abandonment of the notion of intentionality and of the concept of subject. In this sense, questions of cause and effect, *vis-à-vis* intentional actions and their reception, are fundamentally questioned through the notion of prosthetics.

\(^\text{11}\) *The Oxford Dictionary* defines the Greek term *kinēsis* as movement or motion, to move. A "*kinēsis* of the living" references Aristotelian philosophy as a theory of motion or change in physics that pertains to matter and energy.
Chapter 4 carries on the dominant theme of the exegesis, which is to emphasise that the prosthetic (camera, *et cetera*) is nothing technological. Rather, it reveals a liveness that challenges our experience. In this final chapter, I explore the notion of liveness and ask what constitutes an authentic action or moment. I conclude that a question of authenticity is revealed to me in my own space and time via ongoing attunements that temporally situate my being-in-the-world. Attunements refer here to how we are always already orientated by our environment through our bodies as temporal beings. In this sense, attunement brings meaning to us as a physical body and a temporal existence always moving and changing from a horizon of world.

As a fuller summary, Chapter 1 discusses Giorgio Agamben’s (2009) reading of apparatus. I address the prosthetic as a subset of apparatuses through an embodied way of thinking that reverberates in sympathy with the dynamic relationship between the human body and
technologies. My own analysis of prosthetic relations structures my project through Heidegger’s *QCT*. I introduce Mark Coté’s (2010) discussion of pre-hominoid technics and the human sensorium, in conjunction with Bernard Stiegler’s notion of the memory-support\(^\text{12}\) to consider how technology frames our encounters with other beings. By highlighting the significance of technology, Chapter 1 puts forward the idea that if we disrupt distinctions between the human body and technology, we give ourselves the possibility of seeing this relation in its essence, as a relation that *is* the human condition.

The notion of looking, in the terms of what is at stake for us in our relations with technology, is explored in Chapter 2. I focus on Gary Hill’s video artwork *Blind Spot*, (2003). I discuss how technics are considered in light of the cinematic apparatus as something that often influences

\(^{12}\) The notion of the “memory-support” as discussed by Stiegler in *The Ister*, (Barison & Ross, 2004).
how we see our relations with moving images. I introduce Vivian Sobchack’s (1992) theory of film experience. Her reading incorporates Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) notion of chiasm. Chiasm encapsulates an idea pertaining to how looking involves being seen by the other. This way of looking does not represent a view, but encounters a world of beings in a reciprocal manner.13 My encounter with Blind Spot opens me to a way of questioning what it means “to look” regarding the essence of the prosthetic. In critique of Sobchack’s understanding of film experience with respect to how she reads Heidegger’s notion of the essence of modern technology as “nothing technological,” through engaging with the notion of Ereignis. I refer to my temporal situation as a process driven idea. As Heidegger puts it, “Da-sein is not an instance of being for the representational abstraction of being; rather, it is the site of the understanding of being” (1996, p. 7). Ereignis is an event of self-disclosure, and a moment of vision where my existential situation is revealed to me through a way of looking that sees beings as they are. This becomes a way of articulating how I make artwork and why my artwork remains an unresolved and open-ended iterative process.

Chapter 3 explores how being taken by the uncanny suggests how we already belong outside the physical limits of the human body within prosthetic relations. I discuss Sigmund Freud’s The Uncanny, (1919), in conjunction with Heidegger’s notion of Da-sein’s “throwness” as an uncanny situatedness of never being-at-home. I reference locale and space in conjunction with Heidegger’s Building, Dwelling, Thinking, (1975), as a way to put forward how my triple camera iterations play with temporality as way to provoke and question how Da-sein might be revealed in its own space and time. I discuss Guy Sherwin’s Man with a Mirror, (1976/2006), in relation to the idea of uncanny meetings of self with self. The chapter closes with a look at how stealth and danger inform my own practice in light of Paul Virilio’s War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception, (1989), in conjunction with an analysis of Alex Monteith’s, Passing Manouevre, (2008), and her engagement with camera prosthetics as something that prompts a sense of being looked at in our looking.

13 A notion of reciprocity indicates that in giving something, something is given in return. I use the term “reciprocal” to articulate a way of looking that belongs to both seer and seen. Rather than suggesting that looking is an act separated from our being-in-the-world, reciprocity in this instance reveals how we belong together with other beings and things through a reciprocal way of belonging together.
Chapter 4 considers how our existentially charged bodies enact a technics that question the site of performance as a temporal mode of being. These enactments do not halt the look by moving in a single direction, but are ongoing. In this final chapter, I consider notions of liveness and revealing by raising questions around what constitutes an authentic action or moment. I refer to performance scholars Peggy Phelan, Amelia Jones, Philip Auslander and Matthew Reason, who address themes of live performance and documentation in light of authenticity and disappearance. I propose how Jacques Rancière’s (2007) concept of “the ignorant schoolmaster” suggests new modes of spectatorship pertinent to our discussion of prosthetic relations. In light of these topics, I discuss how a liveness reveals the spectator in their looking through artworks by David Cross, VALIE EXPORT, Rebecca Horn, and Dan Graham.
Chapter 1 – *The Apparatus and the Prosthetic*

When we look to the ambiguous essence of technology, we behold the constellation, the stellar course of the mystery … There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name *technē*. Once the revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearance was also called *technē* … Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious the essence of art becomes. (Martin Heidegger, 1950, pp. 338-341)\(^{14}\)

In Chapter 1 I discuss Martin Heidegger’s *The Question Concerning Technology*, in relation to his idea of technology as something that places a frame around the human condition. I am interested in exploring what the essence of the prosthetic might mean in a response to Heidegger’s notion of technological “enframing.” The concept of apparatus outlined by Giorgio Agamben’s (2009) reading of Michel Foucault’s “dispositive” suggests how our enframing within apparatuses can be understood from the perspective of “a play of forces.” The idea of the essence of the prosthetic brings to light a world that we habitually forget. Veronique Foti’s (2003) reading of Heidegger’s hypothesis of the “world picture” suggests a way of thinking about how we look underscored by a loss of insight. From this perspective, notions of how we look and encounter prompt questions around the meaning of the human condition by means of a performance-based video practice that, in turn, questions the apparatuses that form the networks of their relations.

I build an analysis of prosthetic relations by referring to Mark Coté’s (2010) discussion of pre-hominoid technics and the human sensorium in conjunction with Bernard Stiegler’s theory of the memory-support. I examine the essence of technology by engaging with the prosthetic as a subset of apparatuses that place a frame around our encounters with other beings. In this way, I consider how our relations with technology evoke themes of memory and forgetfulness by exploring Heidegger’s consideration of tools in their use. I am curious to see if the

\(^{14}\) As cited by David Farrell Krell’s translation of *QCT* in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (1993).
apparatus and the prosthetic might reveal Da-sein to itself, through questioning an understanding of technē and poiēsis. By asking how Da-sein forgets itself in terms of an inherently embodied relation with technics as its underlying ground, I am interested in thinking about how technē belongs to poiēsis.

1.1 Technology as a Way of Revealing

From the perspective of moving images and the technologies that produce them, the “essence” of technology is not concerned with camera lenses, projectors, celluloid film, or videotape. Agamben suggests, in his book *Potentialities* that:

For Heidegger, the subject-object relation is less original than the self-transcendence of Being-in-the-world by which Dasein opens itself to the world before all knowledge and subjectivity. Before the constitution of anything like a subject or an object, Dasein—according to one of the central theses of *Being and Time*—is already open to the world. (1999, p. 187)

For Da-sein already open to the world before all knowledge and subjectivity, technology in its essence is a mode of revealing before it is an object or instrument. In its essence, technology as a mode of revealing belongs to an already having-been prior to all subjectivity. Heidegger’s *QCT* suggests that the essence of technology is “nothing technological.” For instance, as we encounter moving images, the action of looking opens up a world. In this manner, a relation of looking is a technē that explores how Da-sein’s world is constituted in space and time through encountering whatever it is up to at any particular moment. Bearing in mind how Da-sein is thrown into the world by a projected leap, this involves a potential for Da-sein to be revealed to itself through technology. “In attunement, Da-sein is already brought before itself, it has always already found itself, not as a perceiving oneself to be there, but as one finds one’s self in attunement” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 128). Through Aristotle, technē is one of the names given to the disclosing of beings in that they are. Heidegger characterises the epoch of modernity, the epoch inaugurated with Cartesian subjectivity, as the epoch of technicity, where the essence of modern technology shows beings—Nature—as a stockpile or “standing-reserve” for production.
A standing-reserve signifies how an apparatus concerning technology can challenge nature’s energy in order to stockpile it for a function. We are included in this mode of production as standing-reserve, in the sense of human resource; we are a labour producing power. The problem for Heidegger (1950) is the indifference to the question of this mode of production. What this relationship reveals is a challenging of Nature’s energy for the purpose of its possible use in production.

Technology as a way of revealing can reveal how Da-sein is already delivered over to it-self within nature and, in this way, we are already set on a path. In this respect, this is how we ourselves are brought to presence through our own enframingment within apparatuses. We are enframed by the apparatus and this is how we may be challenged in the first place. From such a view, we have the capacity to begin to develop a free relation toward our being within this technological cycle of production. My project suggests that the essence of the enframing character of apparatuses is an enabling play of forces that resonates between revealing and concealing.

1.1.2 What is the Apparatus?

We are Da-sein, and Da-sein is evident in the way we question what goes on when we sit down and watch films of ourselves. Accordingly, my project explores what it means to think about the apparatuses that frame Da-sein as a relation of technē. By exploring modes of encounter that investigate performance and video art, my own engagement with the prosthetic as a subset of the apparatus raises a series of problems around how the human condition is placed within the frame of these relations. Giorgio Agamben cites the 1970s’ work of philosopher Michel Foucault on the dispositive—in English—apparatus. Agamben encapsulates these three key points in relation to how Foucault approaches the term:

a. It is a heterogeneous set that includes virtually anything, linguistic and non linguistic, under the same heading: discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, police measures, philosophical propositions, and so on. The apparatus itself is the network that is established between these elements.
b. The apparatus always has a concrete strategic function and is always located in a power relation.

c. As such, it appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of knowledge. (2009, pp. 2-3)

What is decisive here is that apparatuses draw together a variety of beings toward a particular function. Agamben notes the French dictionary defines the apparatus as a, “juridical sense .... A technological meaning .... A military use.” Agamben (2009) makes clear the apparatus itself is the network that is established between these elements as a play of forces. The myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus evokes how we forget that our being-in-the-world is primordially a relation of technē; this situates the key theme of prosthetic relations. This notion of primordiality is the closest and most essential temporal mode of Da-sein. As such, we have the potential to be revealed before ourselves through a play of forces governed by apparatuses involving whatever we do, think, or say in our relations with other beings. David Lines suggests Heidegger’s understanding of “Being and beings is focused on the necessity to view things as they are, as beings in their existence that appear momentarily as truth (aletheia) amidst a conglomeration and contestation of different beings manifest as different shades of revealing” (2005, p. 67). My own practice looks at how technology relates to revealing.

I am interested in how apparatuses bring forth different ways of understanding our relations with technology. Apparatuses have influence, at any given time and under variable circumstances, on how we encounter the other beings we encounter. Our prosthetic relations form a constellation that folds into a discussion pertaining to human beings and technology as a fluid idea in relation to how we see a world. My own project explores how prosthetics suggests a way of looking in our own space and time through opening us to a world.

1.1.3 The Apparatus, Forgetfulness and a Discussion of Handy Things

As human beings, we are utilised for production as standing-reserve, in this manner we are held fast by apparatuses. As such, the apparatuses that enframe us can reveal an elusive indebtedness through our relationship with technology that often eludes us. As will be
discussed shortly, we forget that it is only through pre-hominoid technics that we are already a relation of technē. This relationship questions the existence of human being as distinctly separated from technics through the constitution of its world. Heidegger contends, “Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object” (1950, p. 322). He raises the problem of an instrumental approach toward technology:

Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing. But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, any more than is the realm man traverses every time he as a subject relates to an object.

Within the context of my own practice, I place emphasis on an iterative open-ended process. My encounter with moving images resonates in a temporality that opens the eye of the artist, the camera, and the projector, to all the myriad beings throughout a field of potential for revealing. The artist’s handiwork cannot make revealing in the sense of a bringing-forth happen, but by being opened to Da-sein’s situatedness within this scheme, one begins to establish a free relation toward one’s own enframement as we question the essence of our relations with media arts.

This discussion brings to mind the significance of “a totality of beings” with respect to our entanglement with them. Relevant to how one may develop a free relation toward technology, things at hand, peculiarly, are so most often “there” in their inconspicuousness, in how they tend to fall away into forgetfulness. In this respect, the apparatus may fall away from us. When tools in their use fall into forgetfulness, we no longer engage with these handy things as objects. We engage in the task at hand. Hence, the keyboard that I am tapping on right now is really quite out of focus for me while currently typing. In BT, Heidegger calls this phenomenon “ready-to-handness” and exemplifies it with hammering. We learn to hammer not by looking at the thing and inspecting it, but by picking it up and using it. The way we use handy things signals how Da-sein belongs to a temporal and technical relation that establishes its world. My memory of tools in their use is not a prosthetic addition to the body, but a prosthetic relation that constitutes my world. As living beings, we participate in actions. These acts reveal something about how we are intrinsically bound in our being to the essence of the prosthetic. When we hammer well, the hammer falls into forgetfulness in a kind of looking Heidegger
calls “circumspection.” When we study the thing, weigh the hammer, or look at the keyboard’s mechanism, he calls this “present-at-handness.” Mostly we take the truth of things in their “present-at-handness,” or correctness neglecting that our Da-sein for the most part, exists in the “ready-to-handness” of handy things.

Usually the way one encounters video technologies is not concerned with the materiality or workings of the computer. If the computer stops working, we fall into thinking of it as an object, rather than a way of revealing a world; it stops becoming something concealed from us. There is a continual flux between present-to-hand and ready-to-hand. This shifting motion is guided by the way we are attuned to such other beings and sets of circumstances.

In *Corridor Series, 2013*, I perform my iteration by walking with my prosthetic devices. I employ multiple cameras shooting in-sync with each other as a way to play with notions of ready-to-handness and present-to-handness. Whenever I get lost in performing this task, I am not thinking about the presence of the prosthetic. It recedes from my Da-sein in that my body automatically bears the weight of something on either end of my arms, until it (my body) just kind of gives up. Even though my devices are constructed to perform tasks, the task itself can overtake my rationalisation of it. As the cameras strike the wall, I suddenly become aware of their presence. There is a peculiar self-consciousness, highlighted whenever the hit takes place. This makes me think about how the device falls in and out of forgetfulness for me as I use it. The prosthetic falling away from my being makes me think about how the prosthetic belongs to a relation with my Da-sein.
I take twelve steps forward then a turn, then twelve steps back in the opposite direction. I need to keep the cameras in contact with the walls at all times. The prosthetic arm devices drag cameras left and right across the walls surface. This could be hazardous for the camera lenses. Each time a camera meets its wall head on it strikes its lens on the surface. As they hit they make a noise. They are dragged along by their lenses and scrape up against the internal skin of the corridor.

1.1.4 Prosthetics, (Memory-Support) and Da-sein as a Subset of the Apparatus

Coté’s essay discusses technics and the human sensorium by putting forward this proposition. The fundamental condition that defines our existence is inextricably bound to technics. He suggests how “sensory perception is only ever calibrated in relation to technics” (2010, para
1). This concept is associated with the constitution of world through a transductive relation, as suggested by (Lines, 2005) our technical relations bring forth “different shades of revealing.”

Coté writes that, “The concept of transduction is taken from Gilbert Simondon who used it to emphasize the relation itself over the things related. As such, it facilitates an understanding of complex, constitutive relations marked more by recursivity than by linear causality” (2010, n. 4). Coté’s pre-hominoid reading of Andre Leroi-Gourhan’s bipedal system links to the way that the human body incorporates prosthetics. It highlights possibilities for ways of revealing a way of thinking about the relations between technology and embodiment through the phenomenon of affect. I explore my own relations with prosthetic devices such as handmade rigs, together with the camera, projector, lens, passers-by, and various bodies activated in encounters within the gallery space and so on. From this vantage point, my project investigates the prosthetic as a subset of the apparatus by exploring how video encounter takes place for bodies through a play of forces that involve the sensorium in its transductive relations with technics. In this manner, the apparatus is underpinned by a play of forces pertaining to prosthetics and Da-sein in a relation of technē.

The prosthetic as a subset of the apparatus involves a relation of technē underscored by Stiegler’s archeological perspective. Stiegler in (Barison & Ross, 2004, 21:50) suggests that the notion of the memory-support signals how culture begins with technics through a radical externalisation of a third form of memory. Although two types of memory were in existence, they were unable to communicate with one another, and therefore unable to pass on information from one generation to the next. Type one, a form of genetic memory or DNA, and type two, carried in the nervous system and brain. At some point, pre-hominoid being performs the act of cutting a stone tool. The gesture of cutting is inscribed in the stone. The stone outlives its maker and the next generation is then able to develop technics, since the tool carries the trace of the gesture of cutting in the stone. The gesture inscribed in the tool is passed on from one generation to the next. The tool is now the externalisation of a third form of prosthetic memory-support. At this time, the DNA and the nervous system begin to communicate with each other through the inscription of the gesture in the stone tool. Stiegler’s discussion of the memory-support assists a view of technics as the inception of culture and not the other way around. Since our past-histories are communicated through the

15 The notion of transduction brings to light how my project approaches a notion of liveness this will be discussed in Chapter 4.
externalisation of a third form of memory (technics), this enables information to be passed on from one generation to the next because the DNA and nervous system have started to communicate.

As Stiegler argues in (Barison & Ross, 2004) pre-hominoid tool construction underscores how memory begins to develop by means of the tool and not via the brain. As tools exist beyond their makers, the essence of the tool gazes upon the next generation of makers. This notion of being looked at enables the next generation to “see” itself, evoking Fóti’s reading of the order of the invisible, “in soliciting appearance, it also relinquishes itself to appearance, and to being encountered by the other … [in looking or encountering we] envisage and glance into whatever comes to presence” (2003, p. 82). Along these lines, prosthetics and Da-sein as a relation of technē involves a way to reveal a world through uncovering how we look. Like the apparatus, a memory-support can incorporate any set of instrumental technics brought together to perform a function, from a stone tool to an exegesis, or a piece of masking tape. Stiegler’s notion of the memory-support as a triangulation of memory is interesting for my project as this idea has resonance with how Da-sein may be revealed to itself, through the essence of our prosthetic relations.16

1.1.5 Other Causes

I engage with prosthetics as a way to discuss how we forget what the essence of the prosthetic might reveal in our understanding of the human condition. This exegesis offers an original contribution to an existing body of literature on performance and video art as it contextualises this discussion within a Heideggerian framework. In the QCT Heidegger discusses the instrumental definition of technics through the notion of causality linked to Aristotle’s four causes of occasioning. He uses an example of a silver chalice:

For centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes: (1) the causa materialis, the material, the matter out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; (2) the causa formalis, the form, the

shape into which the material enters; (3) the *causa finalis*, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in relation to which the required chalice is determined as to its form and matter; (4) the *causa efficiens*, which brings about the effect that is finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith.

(1950, pp. 313-314)

Interestingly, Heidegger’s essay questions whether the notion of causality is a sufficient way to address our relations with technology, he asks, “Why there are only four causes?” (p. 314). He suggests that the four causes do not adequately reveal what causality is in its essence; in this manner, the notion of causality linked to the four causes makes us forgetful of what the essence of technology might be. He refers to the essence of the four causes as a kind of co-responsibility:

The four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance. They let it come forth into presencing [*Anwesen*]. They set it free to that place and so start it on its way, namely, into its complete arrival ... It is in this sense of such starting something on its way into arrival that being responsible is an occasioning or an inducing to go forward [*Ver-an-lassen*]. (p. 316)

Coté (2010) suggests that Leroi-Gourhan’s reading of the “bipedalism,” was pivotal to the emergence of tool manufacture that takes place with the liberation of the hands from the ground. In discussing the action of standing on two feet, rather than on four limbs, a change in the body’s position reveals the potential for other causes, amid a proliferation of causes yet to be uncovered. As the bipedal system surfaces, tool manufacture becomes a possibility. Tools merge with the body through the triangulation of memory, absorbed in this relation, like the claws of an animal. The claw is co-responsible with the independence of the hands from the ground to act as a claw and is co-responsible or belongs to the body, as the body belongs to the claw. My own practice explores the idea of an abundance of causes through an unlimited play of forces. As outlined in the Introduction, we are not talking about a causality that makes something happen, but an underlying ground that enables something to be brought forth by being set on a path. As I build a prosthetic video practice, this sets something, “on its way into arrival” (p. 316). Technics urge me to question what I do through modes of seeing and being seen, involving a reciprocal way of looking. A reciprocal way of looking is opened up for us in
attunement and this takes place through the sensorium. As Fóti notes in reference to Heidegger’s essay, *The Age of the World Picture*, (1938):

The emergence of the world picture is the mark of modernity.... The picture at stake here is not visual in any significant sense; rather, what visuality it may possess is schematic or diagrammatic and serves to facilitate human self-orientation with a view to technological, or technologically inspired, productivity and mastery.... The loss of visuality involved is not merely a loss of seeing but also a loss of being looked at and seen. (2003, pp. 81-82)

Since visual mastery represents a certain view of the world, it dominates an understanding of how things appear for us. A form of productivity and visual mastery, evokes the mark of modernity as an enframing mechanism that has influence over how we look through subject/object ways of relating. This mode of viewing travels in a single direction. Within the frame of visual mastery posed by Fóti, the apparatus as “world picture” imposes a loss of insight through the domination of the visible. The order of the visible in this context suggests wo/man as the centre of the universe, who looks at the world as a subject of representation.

Our prosthetic relations move within apparatuses and may be contextualised in relation to Heidegger’s understanding of being-in-the-world. His understanding of world regards the manner in which we “get the picture,” through a play of forces that touches upon our installation within apparatuses at the intersection of relations of power and relations of knowledge. The order of the invisible, on the other hand, entrusts *Da-sein* to a modality of self-orientation that allows us to “see,” but the manner in which we get the picture belongs with how others see us, in order that we might see ourselves. This mode of seeing moves in a circular motion, as it doubles its movement it entrusts itself to being seen by the other. In other words, the invisible involves a reciprocal way of looking. By recognising a complex entirety of beings through our own orientation within apparatuses, my project explores the order of the invisible.

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17 *The Oxford Dictionary of English* defines the term “sensorium” as the sensory apparatus or faculties considered as a whole.

18 The order of the visible that dominates the world as picture can be contextualized in terms of a single point perspective, it is informed by a unidirectional way of looking. See Chapter 2 and a discussion of the synoptic body. For a discussion of space and architecture, psychological aspects, and the paranoid subject of modernity see Anthony Vidler, *Warped Space*; (2000).

19 This action of looking resonates with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of *chiasm* discussed in Chapter 2.
Fóti broaches the notion that the existent may still draw insight from existence through the order of the invisible. Crucially, this notion of the invisible opens to a question of world, not as an object that we form judgments about, but as the space and time revealed to us in attunement. By looking in a certain manner we can get the picture through reconnecting with how seeing involves a falling away from visuality, a forgetfulness, an invisibility, which is suggestive of how vision is an action of being looked at and being seen. This way of understanding how we appropriate our world involves modes of revealing and concealing our Da-sein. This exegesis situates the site of my own video artwork—focussed on the potential for self-disclosure of Da-sein—as a temporal state of encounter within the varied bodies that make possible encounters of the work. Fóti’s ideas are evocative of a receptive attunement to beings in their presencing. She comments in reference to a mode of thinking linked to the Greek goddess alētheia through Parmenidean verse as diamòn and thea:

The Parmenidean verse motivates this train of thought by suggesting that thinking, far from being representation geared to mastery, is a receptive attunement to beings in their presencing, and that such receptive attunement (which Heidegger calls Vernehmen) responds to the very being of beings .... Heidegger links his own meditation on the glance or the look to these two designations. He interprets diamones, or spirits, as those who both envisage and glance into whatever comes to presence, so that their look entrances the uncanniness of presencing into the aspect of familiar presences .... The human glance itself is not an intentionality issuing from a subject; rather, in soliciting appearance, it also relinquishes itself to appearance, and to being encountered by the other. [sic] (p. 82)

Looking is a form of spirit that glances into whatever comes to presence. Fóti conceives a look that captures the uncanniness of our Da-sein20 entranced by a bewitchment that reveals a kind of forgetfulness. Being-in-the-world falls away from its own uncanny situatedness into forgetfulness when seduced by aspects of familiar presences. An apparatus of cause and effect dominates thinking in terms of aspects of familiar presences, as Heidegger reminds us, “The actuality of effect is valued according to its utility. But the essence of action is an accomplishment” (1946, p. 217). Such an accomplishment may unfold with a glance in a relinquishment of human will, so that it is possible to be encountered by the other. This notion of relinquishing control is at the crux of my project’s reading of Heidegger’s perspective on how we question the essence of technology. By this I mean that the notion of

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20 Da-sein’s uncanny disposition as thrown into the world is discussed in Chapter 3.
letting go of control is an inherent paradox constantly at play within the aims of my own practice. This paradoxical feature of my practice concerns an attempt not to impose constraints on spontaneity. By relinquishing control over visual mastery through a series of iterative tasks, my hope is that the practice itself might retain the possibility of being open to revealing in the sense of bring-forth. Since I am continuously performing these actions over and over, my rationale is to generate an emphasis on process rather than outcome. It is a bit like treading water, as I strive for the emergence of a new way of seeing that I don't know how, or if, I can produce.

In *BT* Heidegger suggests how we get to see a world depends upon a paradox of forgetfulness involving concealing and revealing. Stiegler’s reading of the myth of *Prometheus and Epimythus* suggests the notion that whatever is revealed in one’s encounter with one’s environment goes hand in hand with the ongoing development implicit to being-in-the-world in light of a prosthetic relation of *technē*.
Steigler’s viewpoint is of interest to my project as it opens up a dialogue around Da-sein’s belonging to technology. Importantly, this suggests that co-responsibility is a play of forces in the sense of our prosthetically merged relations with technics. Prehistoric technics were not rationalised in terms of prosthetic additions to the body. Our Australanthropian pre-hominoid ancestors fused with technics as part of their physical being. Quoting Stiegler, Coté notes:

At stake, is not just our understanding of our contemporary mediated existence and its political implications, but the provocative claim that ‘we have never been human’; that is, technology will be presented not as a prosthetic supplement to the biological body but as comprising an originary condition, a defining characteristic of the human. (2010, para 2)

Accordingly, a defining characteristic of the human condition is the essential quality lost through Epimetheus’ error of forgetfulness. A sense of this loss of insight can be brought to presence through our relations with technics. That is to say, this is one perspective on how the essence of the prosthetic involves the Da of (being-there) Da-sein, that is us. In this manner, technics (fire) stolen from the god Hephaestus, sets what it is that we forget on its way toward revealing a world.

1.2 The Epistēmē and a Relation of Technē

My thesis project explores revealing in terms of a proliferation of bodies involving a practice or technē. The practice questions the hierarchy between the epistēmē of pure theoretical knowledge, and technē as merely practical knowledge aligned with art and skill by means of technology as a way of revealing what the essence of prosthetics might mean. Stiegler’s notion of the memory-support puts forward the idea that the human condition is a condition based on a relation of technē. A hierarchy between practical knowledge, and art and skill, begins with Plato’s Phaedrus: “the philosophic episteme (such as the Platonic ideal form) has precedence and is valued over that produced via sophistic techne” (Coté, 2010, para 2). Eventually, this situation determines the domination of the order of the visible over the other senses, in terms of the synoptic position of the human body, sight takes precedence over the other senses, in this way, the clarity of the mind is equated with how one “sees” clearly:
It is under such a hierarchy that Plato can condemn knowledge produced and supported by writing (as manifestation of *techne*) as both a contaminant and lesser derivative of the epistemic knowledge or *logos* of critical dialogue. What I propose here is not an inversion of this relation but its implosion. Through a media theory of embodiment, there is both a rearticulation of the human and technics into transductive relations, and a radical repositioning of affect and sensation as both mediated and prefiguring the purported rationality of political thought. In short, this entails a new way to think and feel the political via technics. (2010, para 2)

Coté suggests the implosion of the notion of causality by placing emphasis on technics and embodiment. Since the human condition is inextricably bound up with technics, this prefigures rational thinking to propose how we might be attuned to our being-in-the-world by means of the sensorium. In response to this idea, I ask this question: Would Coté’s mention of affect and sensation as a force that implodes the precedence of mind over body, infer how our being-in-the-world is a relation of *technē* that goes along with us at all times? His rearticulation of our relations with technics appears to affectively reposition being-in-the-world in terms of our transductive\(^{21}\) relations. Stiegler’s ideas around the character of the memory-support, similarly questions a notion of causality that makes us forgetful of the significance of affect and sensation in our everyday lives. It is not only because I look at something and then pick it up and use it that my world is made possible for me. Rather I put forward this possibility, if beings are a *kinēsis* of the living, and all movement constitutes change, and we never stop changing and moving, then, countless phenomena must be taking place at one and the same time. Temporality under these conditions is something dynamic and fluid. From such a perspective a plethora of beings are a play of forces that embody a sense of co-belonging that would draw out the practice of my being-in-the-world as a relation of *techne*. As Timothy Clark notes, a holistic approach pertains to a Heideggerian way of thinking:

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\(^{21}\) As said, the notion of transduction brings to light how my practice performs the media, discussed in Chapter 2. Coté suggests that transduction highlights, “the relation itself over the things related. As such, it facilitates an understanding of complex, constitutive relations marked more by recursivity than by linear causality” (2010, n. 4). Transduction as “a relation itself over the things related” is also in keeping with the way my practice iterates actions as actions in themselves as a way to place emphasis on process over outcome.
Heidegger argues against a whole tendency of Western thought to valorize theoretical understanding as the only true mode of understanding. He homes in on what actually happens in most ordinary everyday experience, demonstrating that our basic forms of knowledge are non-conceptual. Simply by existing a human being has a mode of access to the world that could never be rendered fully explicit in a theory. Such understanding is holistic, i.e. it is given all together or not at all. (2002, p. 24)

By demonstrating how our basic forms of knowledge are not merely limited to concepts of the mind, Heidegger opens up a world for us, through a radical way of thinking with our bodies. Simply by being, we have access to a world—that would be impossible if explicated in terms of causality. This raises the problem of over-theorising my own practice in that it can never be fully defined, finished or resolved. In fact, if I over-literalise the exegesis I could go too far into theory and this would close down the practice. In this respect, I focus on everyday experiences such as myself walking on a road, or down a corridor, with my prosthetic devices in tow, with the hope that this acts as a mode of being always in process; always performed as a series of tests. My tests have no particular outcome or end but, rather, the process itself enframes my performances. This is how the low-tech, clunky, sort of unresolved sensibility of my video installations come into their presence, to presence what it is we forget. Their locale only has significance in that they bring together a practice that explores how one accesses a world. The exegesis theorizes the different variables in my own practice by appreciating Clark's understanding of Heidegger's thinking as holistic. This view supports a relation of technē as a way of revealing that may act as given all together or not at all.

The practice questions the essence of the prosthetic, through an embodied reciprocity that brings something into its being. Coté’s argument suggests how the evolution of a pre-hominoid body is understood through a series of “radical breaks in the modalities through which the world is experienced, from one sensoria to another” (2010, para 15). Just as pre-hominoid tools develop a radical externalisation of a third form of memory that enables the DNA and nervous system to communicate, so our prosthetic condition is revealed through the complexity of our belonging to our prosthetic relations. Heidegger notes that *technē* brings something into being by modes of occasioning that involve a co-responsibility; these are ways of “all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else .... They differ from one another, yet they belong together” (1950, pp. 314-316). Prosthetic relations action a change that opens us up to a way of seeing different worlds through a play of forces or bodies involving: temporality, memory, forgetfulness, and affect.

As Agamben (2009) suggests, apparatuses form where relations of knowledge and power converge. Although my project argues that all beings involve technology, the apparatus involving visual mastery verifies our relationship with technology as an object of representation in the conscious minds of human subjects. This play of forces could be said to value the existence of a distinction between prosthetics and the body. I am not saying that an articulation of consciousness is in opposition to thinking our being as belonging to the body. Rather, I am interested in unpacking the possibility of adding to a discussion around technology and the human condition through practice. My practice entails a series of iterations that look toward a circumstance of self-disclosure in terms of revealing—a mode of revealing, that slips between categories of mind body, body world, subject/object, presence and having-been. Heidegger’s *QCT* looks toward the essence of technology not as something that stands over and against us, but so that in looking we may see ourselves, through a threshold of world that embodies *Da-sein’s* horizon of disclosure, through modes of revealing.

1.3 Revealing and Poiēsis

In terms of disclosure, the *QCT* discusses how *technē* belongs with *poiēsis* bringing-forth. Heidegger’s discussion of handy things alerts us to ways of revealing the primordial
structures by which Da-sein is in its world. When he states that, “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological” (1950, p. 311), he explains it in these terms: “The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already appropriated whenever it calls man forth into modes of revealing allotted to him” (p.324). John Lechte concurs, “The Greeks experienced this call through a sense of wonder in the face of the world” (2003, p. 28). Heidegger calls this call a “destining” that human Da-sein is already ordered into. Fóti suggests a notion of being looked at and being seen, and when Agamben references Foucault, he proposes a play of forces at the intersection of relations of power and relations of knowledge. My own project suggests technē belongs with poiēsis bringing-forth, in the sense of relinquishing a kind of predetermined control over how we understand ourselves, and our belonging to prosthetics.

Whatever is revealed in a relation of technē involves poiēsis. Poiēsis is a creative temporal relation that brings-forth a revealing of being. By exceeding its own bounds poiēsis lets something arrive into its prescencing, whether the bloom of a blossom, or a mode of disclosure in the artist, spectator, or prosthetic relation. The notion of poiēsis is concerned with the disclosure or unconcealing of truth as alētheia. Heidegger writes, “The Greeks have the word alētheia for revealing. The Romans translate this with veritas. We say “truth” and usually understand it as correctness of representation” (1950 p. 318). In BT, alētheia is at the root of how disclosure occurs for being-in-the-world. This understanding of truth is in variance to Truth as verification, or correctness. Heidegger contends:

Not only handicraft manufacture, not only artistic and poietical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth poiēsis. Physis, also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiēsis. Physis is indeed poiēsis in the highest sense .... technē is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Technē belongs to bringing-forth, to poiēsis; it is something poetic. (1950, pp. 317-318)

He describes two modes of bursting open that involve a bringing-forth, poiēsis. On the one hand, “For what presences by means of physis has the irruption belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (en heautōi)” (1950, p. 317). On the other hand, “what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist ... has the irruption belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another (en allōi), in the cratsman or artist” (p. 317). Poiēsis
exceeds an understanding of temporality within the enframing apparatus of metaphysical thinking. David Lines suggests:

Heidegger places questions of art and thinking within a horizon of time. For him, the objectification of what is “present-at-hand”—the way modern science observes and calculates things as objects for human use—is a condition of metaphysical thinking that conceals a horizon of temporality. (2005, p. 68)

From a horizon of temporality, when something is brought together for whatever its function, this lets, “what is not yet present arrive into presencing” (Heidegger, 1950, p. 317). This is what Heidegger means in terms of bringing-forth and presencing. With this context in mind, the notion of temporality in my practice asks questions of Da-sein’s temporal enframing usually concealed from itself. By performing with other beings, such as, the street, the corridor, and the plaza, a play of forces brings something to presence in one’s encounter of video practice, affect performs our Da-sein and opens up the essence of its character as a temporal being to its world. When one questions one’s relationship with the essence of the work, something else arises out of the encounter itself.

My practice asks: How do moments of poiēsis take place? What happens to us in video encounter? How can modes of temporality activate ways “to be” in our own space and time? Poiēsis uncovers the richness of our time as Da-sein. It is something that beholds the truth of Da-sein’s factual existence. Steven Crowell22 writes:

It is not reason, then—the power of combining representations into judgments, the power of subsuming representations under rules, or drawing inferences—that explains how entities show up for us, but rather Dasein’s “transcendence” its “projection of possibilities for being its self” in light of which things can show themselves as what they are. (Crowell & Malpas, 2007, p. 44)

22 Crowell is referring to the philosophy of Emanuel Kant. See Amelia Jones comments on European aesthetics in Performance: Time, Space and Cultural Value:

European aesthetics has, first and foremost, a containing function. Most influentially for modernist art criticism, Kant’s 1970 Critique of Judgment is an elaboration of a method for framing the unknowable aspects of subjects and objects – for explaining how human subjects relate to the objects in the world, how some objects (crudely put) are ‘aesthetic,’ or are ‘art,’ while others are not. (2009, p. 31)
Da-sein’s throwness as a projection of possibilities undermines how we comprehend encounters through reason, enframed by cause and effect relations that fix time in a chronological sequence of events. Moreover, the essence of these encounters may reveal themselves whenever our own space and time moves beyond such a habitual mode of thinking. Rather than drawing inference about our encounters, poiēsis brings forth a play of forces that is my being-in-the-world. Affects may prompt us by shifting our thinking to show us how we often forget. “Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence in the realm where revealing and unconcealmant take place, where alētheia, truth happens” (Heidegger, 1950, p. 319).

1.3.1 Revealing and Affect

The apparatus as a mode of power that would combine representations into judgments does not completely explain how things appear for us, and in their appearing, appear for themselves.
My practice is a play of forces that explores the essence of our prosthetic relations to tease out how events of revealing can happen with reference to a capacity to affect. Where effect is concerned with reason and judgment, it draws inferences about things, affect resonates with beings as they are. Affect lets something be in its own essence whatever it is in its own space and time. In letting something be, affect is a revealing that takes place “where āletheia, truth happens.” In this respect, my project suggests how we are our prosthetic relations; whenever the essence of the prosthetic is revealed for what it is, this is a bringing-forth. In a temporal sense where effect moves within a motion of causality, affect works by belonging within the time of its own presencing.

Figure 18. Suzie Gorodi Quad Series, 2013 developmental tests for Plaza Series, AUT University quad, (detail) dolly-harness, tripod-dolly with four wheel, camera view.23

23 Quad series, 2013 is a series of developmental test works prior to Plaza series, 2013. It does not feature in the final PhD exhibition in 2014.
Brian Massumi theorises affect through the notion of a point of emergence where seemingly opposing levels resonate and coexist. He uses the term “out of phase” in relation to these complexities as he writes, “implicit form cannot be understood as a shape or structure. It’s more a bundle of potential functions localized, as a differentiated region, within a larger field of potential” (2002, p. 34). From this perspective, Heidegger’s reading of Da-sein as a projection of thrown possibilities suggests a field of potential for exploring the essence of our prosthetic relations. When we sit down and watch films of ourselves, one’s encounter resonates between a countless play of forces that may be thought of as “out of phase” in relation to affect. Affect is a phenomenon that encourages a differentiated play of forces that coexist within modes of thinking governed by apparatuses. Since affect embodies a way of thinking, something is brought forth that is out of phase with causal thought. The prosthetic as a subset of the apparatus extends in excess throughout this field of possibility.

*Da-sein’s* affective temporal situatedness is significant in light of affect that can open us to a time when something lets something be in its own essence whatever it is. In this way it can resist a given before and after. Affect is a mode of revealing when it lets something arrive into its own presencing by unconcealing the truth of *Da-sein’s* throwness as temporal being-in-the-world.

J. L. Austin’s notion of the “performative utterance” similarly may be drawn into this notion of affect, as Jon McKenzie comments, “speech acts do something” (2001). Speech acts are actions in themselves when they exceed their own bounds. For example, the “I do” of the wedding ceremony consecrates a marriage; by extending the words “I” and “do” to declare a union, this speech act brings the marriage into being. Krell suggests, with reference to Heidegger’s approach to speech and language, “Through its saying, showing, and pointing, language lets people and things be there for us, allows them to come into their own and radiate in presence” (1993, p. 395). Video encounter moves throughout this larger field of potential. In such a manner, affect can declare a language of technics in *Da-sein’s* own space and time. In light of this approach I ask the question: How can the essence of technology radiate in *Da-sein’s* forgetfulness through our prosthetic relations?
I need to get the device on. Then swing the camera on the dolly around me while I stay pivoting on the spot. Exposed in the courtyard, the metal arms bow under the weight of the swing. The camera shake is frenetic and the pressure on the device is immense. It's noisy as hell. The noise is bouncing around the courtyard. A woman in a pink coat leaves me alone with my performance, as she gets on with her own activity.

1.3.2 Affect and Prosthetic Relations

Julie Clarke in *Art and Performance: Live* suggests, the Greek term prosthesis was originally defined as the prefix to a word. It was not until the eighteenth century that the term became commonly understood as the replacement of a lost limb. Its etymological root derives from, “prostithenai (‘add to’) which was a composite of pros- (‘to’) and tithenai (‘to put in place’)”
(2004, p. 208). As already stated, this project suggests the prosthetic as a subset of the apparatus in order to unravel a notion of how prosthetics belong with the human body as a relation of technē. Coté’s discussion of technics and the human sensorium reveals prosthetic relations as paramount to our survival. In this manner, they are more akin to a temporal situatedness of “place,” rather than the suggestion of putting on something on like a piece of clothing.24

In response to how temporality operates for Heidegger in BT, our technical relations open Da-sein to being-in-the-world. Crowell and Malpas contend that, “In this respect, temporality can be seen as opening up a space—the space within which the structure of equipmentality is itself articulated—and thereby establishing a world” (2007, p. 124). Affect and prosthetic relations emerge through a paradigm shift in praxis.25 The shift we are talking about here comes through a way of thinking about our own space and time in relation to the spatiality one’s Da-sein constructs. The essence of the prosthetic is the underlying ground that questions our enframement within apparatuses underscored by a loss of insight. Affect explores how performance enacts a totality of beings brought into their presencing through finding ourselves in attunement. In this manner, the prosthetic brings to light a world that we habitually forget.

One could posit that prosthetic relations are already put in place via pre-hominoid technics. Through questioning the essence of the prosthetic, my practice encourages the bodies of the audience in modes of self-disclosure in their own space and time. The human sensorium reveals a topology of technics extending through movement (practice) that qualifies the human condition, by revealing something concealed within the order of the visible. Whenever we look at the world as an object of visibility, of objective presence, we fall away from

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24 For a discussion of how the academy often reads the prosthetic in terms of utopian desires. See Vivian Sobchack’s Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image, (2004). Sobchack places emphasis on the notion of the prosthetic in terms of being organically related through practice (in this instance she is discussing her own limb):

My “real” leg and my “prosthetic” leg are not usually lived as two absolutely different and separate things since they function as an ensemble and are each a part of my body participating in the whole movement that gets me from here to there; thus, they are organically related in practice (if not material) and are, to a degree, reversible each with the other (my leg can stand in a part-to-whole synecdochic relationship with my body and vice-versa). (2004, p. 214)

25 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the etymological root of the term “praxis” from its origin in Greek. From Medieval Latin, literally as “doing,” from “prattein,” “do.” A shift in what we do in terms of understanding the spatiality of Da-sein as a temporal establishing of world implodes the notion of causality. Space is not something we enter into, it is something praxis makes room for. See Heidegger’s discussion of the relationship between art and space in “Art and Space,” (1969). Also see “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” (1975).
ourselves into forgetfulness this conceals revealing from our Da-sein. As said, revealing how something is, allows us to let something be, and this is how forgetfulness involves our temporal being-in-the-world. Lines glossing Dreyfus puts forward how Heidegger’s question of Being is often forgotten. He suggests how Heidegger:

Reminds us, that due to their temporal nature, we never quite know what beings really are. Beings are not fixed absolutes but, rather, illusive, fluid and temporal configurations of the moment. Beings can be things, works of art, music, thoughts, emotions, values and humans, in fact, anything that shows up, as something which ‘is.’ (2005, p. 67)

Similarly, for Stiegler the notion of the memory-support suggests the essence of prosthetic is a temporal mode of being. As discussed earlier, the memory-support is the externalisation of a third form of memory. I am interested in questioning how prosthetic relations are likewise memory-supports. Memory emerges through practice. Memory is revealed for an instant through the essence of the memory-support itself. Whether an exegesis, a gust of wind against the cheek, or a loud noise that gives us a jolt, the memory-support is a prosthetic relation in action, and this is something which “shows up, as something that ‘is.’”

The idea of the essence of prosthetics has resonance with Fóti’s suggestion that, as we look we are seen by the world, by “diamones, or spirits, as those who both envisage and glance into whatever comes to presence” (2003, p. 82). Much like Leroi-Gourhan’s prosthetic claw and my own prosthetic devices, prosthetic relations are activated in a specific manner in terms of performance through the essence of technology as a way of revealing. Modes of memory have a potential to be brought forth through a technics that tends to fall away from itself into forgetfulness. This is particularly evident whenever we sit down and watch moving images of ourselves (in this context our encounters are a practice of looking).

A phenomenon of affect connotes how one is within the field of performance. This is a play of forces involving the prosthetic as a subset of the apparatus. In terms of my project, affect brings forth a questioning of the meaning of the human condition by means of a performance-based practice that, in turn, asks questions of the apparatuses that form the networks of their relations. The prosthetic here includes a holistic disclosure of self, world, memory support, forgetfulness, embodiment, projector, camera, performance of the artist, performance of those
that encounter this recorded performance, the gallery space, the street, the plaza, the corridor, passers by, et cetera. Affect is significant as our encounters may be encouraged through the act of spectatorship itself. Prosthetic relations as a subset of the apparatus are so intrinsically entangled within our existentially charged encounters, to the point that this cannot happen without prosthetics. My project contends in the case of my own video practice this is how revealing takes place for Da-sein through the essence of technology.
Figure 20. Suzie Gorodi, *Corridor Series*, 2012, developmental tests (detail) two arm extension devices, taken from tripod-camera front view.

I mark the space of the interior of the corridor with my prosthetic arms in contact with its surface. My body relocates the arms to the ceiling grate. I need to make a turn, I falter, and my ability to control the action is getting away from me. I have to change hands to get my balance. The strain of the weight of the camera becomes progressively more difficult to bear. I am sweating, my arms are fatigued, and I am getting tired.
Chapter 2 – Attunement and Disclosure

What ever appears appears by means of the withdrawal of that which enables its appearance. (Mary Jane Rubenstein, 2011, 39:08)²⁶

Chapter 1 proposed the idea of how we habitually forget to think about the essence of our prosthetic relations. Our relations with technology are explored through a notion of looking in Chapter 2, through a conversation pertaining to video production and its reception. I discuss the pro-filmic technics of cinema. These technics are considered in the light of the cinematic apparatus as something that enframes our relations with moving images. In this way, this chapter draws upon concepts of attunement and disclosure and what might be revealed, by exploring Da-sein in a filmic encounter. Rather than focusing on my own practice, I discuss a close reading of my encounter of Gary Hill’s video artwork Blind Spot, (2003).

I discuss Vivian Sobchack’s (1992) theory of film experience in relation to her discussion of Don Ihde’s account of instrument-mediated perception. Her reading incorporates Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) notion of chiasm. Chiasm signals a notion of affect, in the sense of a gaze that embodies a reciprocal way of seeing and being seen by the other. This way of looking does not represent a view, but encounters a world of beings in a reciprocal manner. Chiasm is a look that has resonance with the concept of separation between the individual and the environment as myth. Sobchack’s phenomenological reading of the film’s body is discussed in relation to the human synoptic body. My encounter with Blind Spot opens me to a way of exploring what it means to look in terms of the essence of prosthetics. I nuance Sobchack’s understanding, with respect to her discussion of film experience in relation to Heidegger’s notion of technology as “nothing technological.” Jeff Malpas adds to our reading of prosthetic relations and film encounter with his interpretation of Heidegger’s notion Ereignis as a mode of appropriation (self-disclosure) that allows Da-sein to apprehend its existential situation.

²⁶ This reference cites Mary Jane Rubenstein’s presentation paper featured in a conference that I watched online, not on youtube but through the URL. Retrieved May14, 2013, from http://mrubenstein.faculty.wesleyan.edu
2.1 Encountering Blind Spot, 2003

*Blind Spot* is a single channel video artwork filmed in Belsunce, near central Marseilles. A man and a woman step out of a doorway on to a side street. A flicker of image and blank screen alternates from frame to frame. It shifts between noisy light-filled action and its silent black counterpart. The hubbub of the accompanying street noise appears to be synchronised with the flicker as it vacillates back and forth. Meanwhile, an apparent evacuation of sound seems to occur as each black frame suggests stillness in time.

![Figure 21. Gary Hill, Blind Spot, 2003, (detail stills) Color, sound; 12:27](image)

*Blind Spot* was originally a smaller component of a larger installation work titled *Accordians (The Belsunce Recordings)*, (2001).

27 I did not experience *Blind Spot* first hand. I encounter this single channel video work as I watch it on my small-scale personal computer screen. With this in mind, see Amelia Jones' essay, “Presence in Absentia.” Apparent distinctions between audiences, who witness a performance in an original setting, are compared with an encounter mediated by its documentation. She writes, “while the experience of viewing a photograph and reading a text is clearly different from that of sitting in a small room watching an artist perform, neither has a privileged relationship to the historical ‘truth’ of the performance” (1997, p. 11). In this respect, Jones highlights a discussion about the reciprocal nature of live performance and documentation in terms of spectatorship as discussed in Chapter 4. This reading suggests that encounters of live performance through documentation nevertheless enact and perform bodies. I approach my reading of *Blind Spot* in a similar vein to Jones.

28 *Blind Spot* was commissioned for the DVD, *Point of View: An Anthology of the Moving Image*, (2003).
The camera’s point of view follows the couple as they walk down the street. The movements of the man are singled out as he turns to face the camera and realises that he is being filmed. The intermittent flickering appears to be getting longer as the actions of the man on screen get shorter. He responds with a definitive gesture by raising his middle finger in noncompliance at the camera. We are aware of this man’s illegal capture by Hill’s lens, as well as our own presence implicated in this exchange. Hill draws out this point in time, extruding a “blink” to twelve minutes of still black action. This situation produces an action that induces a kind of non-time. This play of forces affects Da-sein from the perspective of spectatorship, temporality, and being-in-the-world.

We can think of the constitution of our world as a play of forces that moves within the networks of apparatuses that form at the intersections of power relations and relations of knowledge as discussed in Chapter 1. Attunements accustom us to our temporal situatedness. Although we can never get away from our placement within apparatuses, Heidegger comments on attunement as a mood that assails:

In attunement, Da-sein is always already brought before itself, it has always already found itself, not as perceiving oneself to be there, but as one finds one’s self in attunement … Mood does not disclose in the mode of looking at throwness, but as turning toward or away from it … It comes neither from ‘without’ nor from ‘within,’ but rises from being-in-the-world itself as a mode of that being …. In attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to world out of which things that matter to us can be encountered. (1996, pp. 128-130)

In other words, attunement signals how we are acclimatised in our own space and time as already thrown into a world. My project utilises the idea of affect as something associated with attunements that rise out of our relations with our world. An encounter with Blind Spot confronts bodies with a temporal mood, or affect. Teresa Brennan (2004) talks about the common occurrence of when one suddenly feels entered by an atmosphere:

The transmission of affect, whether it is grief, anxiety, or anger, is social or psychological in origin. But the transmission is also responsible for bodily changes; some are brief changes, as in a whiff of the

30 The presence of the viewer is also implicated by the on-screen action of the man in a kind of voyeuristic double bind. However, for the purpose of this chapter I will not take this discussion any further. See Hill, G. Blind Spot. In Point of View, (2003).
room's atmosphere, some longer lasting. In other words, the transmission of affect, if only for an instant, alters the biochemistry and neurology of the subject. The "atmosphere" or the environment literally gets into the individual. (p. 1)

An understanding of affect from a Heideggerian perspective suggests it is in Da-sein's temporal character always to be in a state of change; ongoing, continuous and without pause. I explore this incessant temporal nature as it becomes evident through the performativity of affect. Within this context, I use the term affect as a mood that assails, in variance to effect. As said, where effects tend toward intellectualisation through opening up questions of causality, affect takes you prior to contemplation through something sensationally embodied. Brennan's theory suggests that fields of affect can alter how we encounter beings and situations. In BT, as Heidegger puts it, we are “ontically distinguished” by how we care for our own Da-sein. As such, we are a projected throwness already delivered over to world. This notion of throwness means that we are always already in the manner of temporally understanding of ourselves. He suggests how attunements acclimatise my Da-sein to its temporal situatedness:

Mood discloses by turning away from and toward one's own Da-sein. Whether authentically revealing or inauthentically concealing, bringing, Da-sein before the That of its own throwness is existentially possible only if the being of Da-sein, by its very meaning is as constantly having-been. Having-been does not first bring one face to face with the thrown being that one is oneself, but the ecstasy of having-been first makes possible finding oneself in the mood of how-I-find-myself. (1996, pp. 312-313)

The term ecstasy derives from the Greek term ekstasis; it literally translates as standing outside oneself. Attunements can bring us before an understanding of our own outside-ness in moments that may reveal the ecstasy of Da-sein's having-been. What is interesting here is whether I experience attunement as something that induces a kind of non-time in my encounter of Blind Spot. How can attunement disclose something of our already having-been to us? Stiegler's notion of the memory-support and the externalisation of a third form of memory resonates with the phenomenon of Da-sein's throwness, as my having-been makes apprehending my existential situatedness possible through the essence of our prosthetic relations.
Extending this analogy to the operations of Hill's lens: How does a split/shift in time seemingly disclose one's being-in-the-world? How is it that temporality as a linear construct can seemingly expand and contract all at once?

### 2.1.1 Effect and the Cinematic Apparatus

When I go to the cinema or watch the television I am not usually required to be aware of my own physiological discomfort. How does Hill's practice compare to my usual experience of, for instance, an orthodox Hollywood film? The pro-filmic,\(^{31}\) tends to employ methods that are geared towards making the cinematic apparatus itself recede into our forgetfulness. In this sense, the cinematic apparatus facilitates effects that work to conceal the mechanisms of the camera, the projector, and the screen. The illusion of movement is directed at supporting a phenomenological and psychological layer of human “consciousness,” thereby imbuing moving images with a fabricated sense of “reality” pertaining to a human perspective (Hamlyn, 2003).

Pro-filmic encounters involve a homogenisation of spectatorship through pro-filmic technique. The cinematic apparatus evokes the technological within the frame of Foucault’s understanding of the apparatus, as an intersection of power and knowledge (Agamben, 2009). A pro-filmic technique forms a hegemony that modifies the reception of spectatorship. Effects have an influence over the terms of spectatorship through making people forgetful of how they are in their own bodies. This illustrates how a play of forces activates power relations and relations of knowledge underscored by the cinematic apparatus. Here the question of a play of forces subjects bodies to receive what is given without question. The effects of the mechanisms of cinema promote technical illusion in a way that sublates the individual.

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\(^{31}\) For more discussion on the pro-filmic technics of cinema see Nicky Hamlyn, *Film Art Phenomena*. (2003). For a discussion on how apparatus theory is linked to psychoanalytic theory in relation to the encounter of the spectator at the cinema see Pamela M. Lee’s commentary in *Your Light and Space: Olafur Eliasson*, (2007), on how: apparatus theory details the ways in which cinema produces what Jean-Louis Baudry calls “an impression of reality” more real than real as if in a dream or Plato’s cave. This otherworldly impression, however, is predetermined by the material conditions and technics of cinema. (2007, p. 46)
By contrast, the juxtaposition of revealing the apparatus with the temporal elongation of Hill’s flicker, affects how my encounter takes place through a kind of doubled unconcealing disclosure. I am agitated and uncomfortable with waiting; I encounter an uneasy mirroring of myself with myself. This happens as the temporal situatedness of my body becomes increasingly acute. The lapse of time between the flicker and the action on screen is interchanged and protracted. I am attuned to my own state of exasperation. *Blind Spot* interferes with my expectation of self as stable and at home in my body. My usual state of ease and comfort is disrupted by a temporal mood.32

> *When a mood gets into me, I don’t get the action the action gets me. Thrust ahead of myself I catch the strangest sensation—of myself passing. This anomaly was not anticipated. The unexpected in the situation prompts an uncomfortable mirroring of oneself with one’s self.*

In this instance, the cinematic apparatus is exposed as an unstable play of forces that governs how one usually expects to encounter a pro-filmic moving image. This event becomes a visual paradox that can simultaneously embody and disembody the spectator in her own space and time. If my usual state of comfort in my body is undermined, my foothold on my world is thrown into doubt. As discussed in Chapter 1, bringing-forth is *poiēsis*. When one’s world is thrown into doubt, this can reveal something to *Da-sein*. Samuel Weber theorizes the close relation between *technē*, and *poiēsis*:

> The knowledge that is technics is not addressed at making or producing particular things but rather at “the unlocking of beings as such”. In this sense, *technē* is a form of *poiēsis* that in turn is closely related to art. (1996, p. 60)

A focus on *technē* and affect, have a potential for bringing-forth *poiēsis* through questioning a rational view of engaging with moving images. For Plato, the embodiment of *technē* is untrustworthy in comparison to the reliability of the *epistēmē* and theories of knowledge produced by the mind. The suggestion here maintains an idea of my body as a stable and fixed entity produced by rational thought. *Blind Spot* opens my *Da-sein* to a mode of being-in-the-

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32 *Blind Spot* was exhibited as part of the exhibition *Voice grounds* at the St Paul Street Gallery, Auckland, in 2009. As an extension of this discussion, and emerging out of a conversation I had with Chris Braddock on October 10, 2013, the volume of the sound track seemed to vibrate the inner ear to the point that experiencing the artwork became extremely uncomfortable. Braddock noted how the work was so confrontational for some people that they could not stay in the gallery because they felt physically nauseous.
world through an unstable play of forces. Coté and Stiegler’s view of being-in-the-world as technical living beings, implodes a distinction between body and mind as having never existed in the first place. When I am thrown into doubt, this somehow attunes me to my own forgetfulness as already thrown. This is how poiēsis is closely related to art; in unlocking my Da-sein, it brings forth a different world.

For Weber, technics embody a particular type of knowledge in terms of poiēsis. The “unlocking of beings” is pivotal when one considers the potency of Da-sein’s forgetfulness. In this sense, Hill makes video work cognisant of the apparatuses that formulate pro-filmic techniques that dictate certain forms of spectatorship and reception. Video artworks such as Blind Spot are important as something profound happens to us. When a technē questions what might bring-forth my Da-sein before its own forgetful throwness, technology and poiēsis perform a belonging to each other, through a synergy of difference between affect and effect. In this manner, my existence as a physical body and temporal being questions something essential and primordial to do with my prosthetic situatedness.

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A temporal variance resonates between anticipation and delay, as Da-sein is brought forth as unreliable, and indeterminate. Hill explains that this point of contact, where glance meets glance, performs like a kind of “magnetic pull and repulsion” in the work, suggesting that in a way this video, “appears almost scripted out ... the time is divided into a slower space where the distance between one and zero, you kept dividing this in half. You’re getting closer but you
are getting further away ... a kind of base division of time” [sic] (2003).33 The moment of recognition between what Hill calls a “personage” and the scopic drive of his practice is elongated in an unstable play of forces. Moreover, this shifting motion activates a doubling over of my own time-space referential, which can reveal unanticipated embodiments for Da-sein:

> When I was a child, I would practice holding my breath underwater. Each time I held on longer I would tend to gasp more desperately at the surface to catch it. When I feel as if I am thrust ahead of myself, as Hill’s black blocks of time extend out, they envelop me. It is like the memory of that instant; just before holding on too long, I would teeter on the edge of the impossibility of my coming back. This memory draws up my past yet resonates deeply with me now. It is not memory as in remembering or forgetting my phone number. This “memory” opens a body to the instant, not as time’s continuity, but as its rupture.

When Brennan’s sense of affect regarding a momentary whiff stretches out beyond my grasp, the memory of it stays with me long after the encounter is over. The duration of this encounter is somehow enabled to continue past the moment of its own passing and, as it were, beyond the moment of this encounter with this video work. Is this unforeseen and existentially charged moment something that suggests Heidegger’s notion of Da-sein’s having-been?

It could be argued that, this schism experienced as a hole in time, might be drawn up in instances of encounter. In a broader sense, this concerns something quite other than the conscious mind of an individual subject. There is something about the way that I am attuned to my encounter with Blind Spot. Not so much about how I understand it, but how it affects me, puts me in a mood that qualifies understanding. My temporally embodied relationship with the film appears to move beyond the expectation of myself as an intentional consciousness, to somehow pose this self and world as temporally modified, as openness to the “there” or locality of its being. The Da of being-there is significant here, as Blind Spot splits and shifts a point in time, I am brought forth, taken by an uncanny disposition, I am not at home in my body. Stranger still, something familiar passes ahead of me and I am taken aback by this situation as I find myself becoming alien to my own place in the world. My sense of place has been thrown into doubt. As I wait for the return of the flick and the noisy light filled frame, I am held in an

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33 Hills comments are taken from an interview conducted by Hans Ulrich Obrist on the DVD, Points of View, 2003.
interstitial zone, twelve minutes of black stillness. I feel like things don’t fit, as the apparent silence becomes almost deafening, my agitated state rises as I am forced to sit with myself. I am taken by an embodied kind of churning, as the memory of the oblivion of my own existence stretches out before me.

2.2 Synoptic Positions and Participatory Exchanges

Sobchack’s, *Address of the Eye*, 1992, reads film experience. Her phenomenological approach, applies a notion of the cinematic apparatus to describe the technological instruments and methods used in film construction, production and projection. She is concerned with different perspectives on how technology is related to the phenomenon of film viewing through embodiment. She formulates her discourse around film experience in relation to Don Ihde’s theory of instrument-mediated perception and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the *chiasm*. For Sobchack, there is a reciprocal correlated structure between, on the one hand, human perception as an embodied relation and, on the other hand, what she terms the body of the film. Ihde’s theory of instrument-mediated perception introduces the notions of “intentionality” and “consciousness” to an embodied way of discussing film encounter.

Intentionality is vital to phenomenology because it alerts us to how consciousness operates through the formulation of human perception. A phenomenological approach suggests a synoptic physiological human body. The human body experiences its world through its senses: two eyes positioned at the front of the head (crucial for an implicit openness to perception that we take as natural and predominantly, almost hegemonically, visual), ears to the sides, nostrils at front, epidermis that can tingle all over and, finally, taste confined to the interior of the mouth. This physiology opens the phenomenality of percepts to perception. The positioning of the eyes enables the human body to experience an engagement with other beings that places emphasis on intentionality and consciousness in relation to how a body sees from an upright position within a horizontal field. Verticality and horizontality are relative to the location of one’s eyes. As intimated earlier, the relationship between how the synoptic body sees from an upright position is also relative to Leroi-Gourhan’s bipedalism and how pre-hominoid life develops as a fundamental relation of *technē*. 
While Sobchack clearly makes a significant contribution to theories about embodied film viewing, my interest here lies with her leaning towards a conscious based subjectivity that could be construed as over-determining our relations with technology by which we reduce being-in-the-world to a type of material objective presence (present-to-handness). Here the question is: How does a theory of instrument-mediated perception align with a Heideggerian understanding of the essence of technē as “nothing technological”? In this context, my own practice endeavors to probe and question what the essence of technology is as a way of revealing. How might technology involve apparatuses that make us forgetful, but at the same time, are that which open us to ourselves? As we are technical living beings, our dependency on technology determines our being-in-the-world. My interest in Heidegger suggests a problem associated with over-determining the instrumentality of technology. This might be an insurmountable problem; however, the nature of my practice-based project attempts to attune my Da-sein to a getting to being before being gets to itself. Which means, in this respect, my performance and video practice tries to loosen something up. It is as if the impossibility of this task as a moment of disclosure rises up and slips away. In terms of embodiment, Sobchack suggests that digitised technologies disembodied spectators when she compares electronic space to a world of cinema:

In an important sense, electronic space dis-embodies. The non-dimensional, fractal-dimensional, two-dimensional, poly-dimensional, and binary superficiality of electronic space transforms what, in the cinema, becomes a world of imaginative and potential bodily habitation. Electronic space at once disorients and liberates the activity of consciousness from the gravitational pull and orientation of its hitherto embodied and grounded existence. This is a space that cannot and could not be inhabited by our bodies as they are. (1992, p. 302)

From the perspective my project suggests, if we are already fundamentally a relation of technē, then do we already embody technology as a way of revealing? This situation includes whatever form of technics our technical living/being may produce. Da-sein is already within our technical relations as they emerge out of a horizon of world. To speak of a lived-body denied entry to the space and time of its own existence, could appear a contradiction in terms. This highlights a problem around over-theorising one’s existence. This is to say that being-in-the-world is blocked by its own forgetfulness, if it equates existence with objective presence. Heidegger points out that since Descartes, and all science since Galileo, an understanding of
technology has been dominated by the instrumentality of human being as subject-who-knows a world of objects to be known:

What mathematics makes accessible in beings constitutes their being ... (Being=constant objective presence) ... The idea of being as constant objective presence ... blocks the possibility of bringing to view attitudes of Da-sein in a way which is ontologically appropriate. But thus the road is completely blocked to seeing the founded character of all sensuous and intellective apprehension, and to understanding them as a possibility of being-in-the-world. (1996, pp. 89-91)

He argues that when science equates Being with objective presence, this blocks the possibility of a richer way of thinking about the fundamental character of being-in-the-world. My project demands that I am in the position of artist and researcher. This throws up a particularly tricky conundrum in light of the necessity of taking on the ambiguous role of researcher and researched.
On one hand, I am *Da-sein* and this is how I gauge my own existence; as such, I am prone to falling away from myself into forgetfulness. On the other hand, my study requires that I develop the ability to both perform in the work—and as my videos are projected at a later stage—I need to be able to learn from my encountering of the work from a fresh perspective. This entails watching myself perform with the memory of being there at the time when the performance was recorded. This gets tricky as I cannot get away from my personal involvement, or the tendency to buy into theoretical paradigms that appear to show some sort of resolution or answer. Accordingly, I attempt to tread lightly in view of my own tendency to fall into instrumental ways of defining my *Da-sein*.

Whenever I think about the practice in relation to cause and effect, this causes a loss of insight. I am interested in thinking about how an over-determination of the instrumental as a play of forces. Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world suggests that a conscious based access to the world causes forgetfulness, and this forms a detour that takes us away from our *Da-sein*. The essence of other beings cannot reveal themselves through the essence of their being, or our being there, since we have a tendency to hold on to explanations that promise meaning through detached and rational thinking. When something makes sense, we feel comfortable and at ease. When something disrupts this pattern, like the rupture in time in my encounter of *Blind Spot*, we tend to get agitated; we feel itchy. This situation presents our anxiety, which drives us on more urgently toward building technics such as: feelings, theories, conversations, or practices, that prompt our falling into what Heidegger calls, “the they,” and various modes of ‘tranquilization.’ It is important to underline for the reader how instrumentality makes us fall into a kind of forgetfulness through these modes of being.

In *BT*, Heidegger argues how everyday *Da-sein* tends to fall prey to “the they.” We are so familiar with this everyday mode of being that we take it for granted. He identifies various modes of everyday *Da-sein* that fall prey to “the they,” as modes of groundless floating such as: idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, that lead to alienation, temptation, and tranquilization:

Idle talk discloses to Da-sein a being toward its world, to others and to itself-a being in which these are understood, but in a mode of groundless floating. Curiosity discloses each and every thing, but in such a way that being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity conceals nothing from the understanding of
As Heidegger points out in *BDT*, our habits make us forgetful, this is why the essence of our *Da-sein* as uncannily situated, “recedes behind the manifold ways in which dwelling is accomplished” (1975, p. 148). Here, falling prey to the various modes of “the they” is an instrumentality that permeates everywhere and nowhere regarding modern technology.

The epoch of modern technology as instrumental science constantly tempts *Da-sein* with an assurance of tranquillization. We fall away from ourselves and into tranquillization, in that once again, we have a rationally reasoned argument for why things are the way they are. Remembering the discussion raised in Chapter 1, the apparatus enframes our technical relations. In the case of my encounter with *Blind Spot*, my enframement pertains to how I encounter temporality with regard to my orientation to moving images. Whenever we fall away from ourselves into modes of tranquillization, we feel at ease in our bodies once again as being slips away from our grasp into forgetfulness. As technical living beings we are locked into a cycle of producing technics that make us forget. If our grasp is lessened a potential for us “to be” in what Heidegger calls a free relation with technology, may be revealed through attunement and disclosure. Not merely when our hold upon explanation is lessened, but through becoming more available to remembering what it is that we forget.

Remembering that technics embody a particular type of knowledge in terms of *poiēsis*, the possibility of bringing-forth can only take place through the ways we find ourselves in attunement. In Brennan’s sense, I am “breached” or taken by affect when encountering *Blind Spot*. As said, affect shifts a view of world in such a way as to encompass a move beyond my expectation of self as an intentional consciousness, through a temporal openness to the “there” or locality of my *Da-sein*. This opening up also suggests a way of revealing found in a kind of self-disclosure. As Malpas notes this involves “the ‘moment of vision,’ *Augenblick*, in which being-there grasps its existential situation” (2006, p. 215). In my own space and time, I am open to the possibility of my situation in a moment of vision. A moment of vision for Sobchack is “seeing as mine.” In the next section, I discuss the notion of seeing as mine as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “chiasm.” Exploring *chiasm* as a way of looking, provides, offers, and questions, the ways in which I engage with moving images, and filmmaking. I ask questions
about what it means to experience a filmic encounter in relation to Sobchack's emphasis on film experience with reference to a centralised conscious subject within a perceptual field of vision.

2.2.1 Chiasm and Seeing as Mine

Merleau-Ponty (1968) outlines his thinking related to human perception in its performative actioning within a world *gestalt*. He contends:

If we can show that flesh is an ultimate notion, that is the compound of two substances, but thinkable by itself, if there is a relationship with the visible of itself that traverses me and constitutes me as a seer, this circle which I do not form, which forms me, this coiling over of the visible upon the invisible, can traverse, animate other bodies as well as my own. (p. 140)

The action of *chiasm* somehow resonates with moments of disclosure with reference to how a totality of beings draws out a relation of *technē*. The action that coils over the visible upon the invisible seems somehow linked to how bodies become animated by other bodies in the process of looking. In relation to questions of what it is to see and encounter, Merleau-Ponty argues for “flesh as an ultimate notion.” He indicates the intertwining action of *chiasm* as the “lived-body” of the “flesh of the world.” His “compound of two substances” suggests how the term *chiasm* activates an in between momentum, an *entre-deux*. Although this may suggest a subject/object binary, neither is one or the other but both of each other at all times. As Catherine Vasseleu has theorised:

Flesh is Merleau-Ponty's term for the prototypical structure of all subject-object relations. In every instance of this relation, flesh defines a position which is both subject (a subjective reality) and object (objectifiable for others), and also simultaneously a subjectivity which is internally divergent with itself. In other words, flesh expresses the inscription of difference within the same ... The body is therefore a hinge; an articulation of the world; an *entre-deux*. Alternatively, it is a fold – never reducible to the difference in which it is created. (1998, pp. 26-27)

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34 *The Oxford Dictionary of English* defines the term “gestalt,” pertaining to psychology, as an organised whole that is perceived as more than the sum of its parts.
Flesh performs an articulation of world. Merleau-Ponty suggests *chiasm* performs by breaking itself open on to a horizon of perception. He uses the term *dehiscence*\textsuperscript{35} to metaphorically signify this continual opening out. When perception is almost realised, it subsequently folds back inside the flesh of the lived body in a perpetually performed act that can be visualised in the terms of a *Möbius* strip. The *Möbius* strip is a mathematical equation that forms a loop with a single twist. If one follows the strip around its circumference it becomes apparent that it is one sided. The *chiasm* is thus implicated as an action of doubling, like being both sides of the same coin, or two hands of the same body touching. The *chiasm* is performed, perpetually moving back and forth between the visible and the invisible (Merleau-Ponty, 1968).

For Merleau-Ponty, visibility is folded back into invisibility, *ad infinitum*, creating a perceptive field (suggestive of a form of consciousness). In addition, the notion of *chiasm* is complex and worthy of research beyond a simple reading as consciousness. It would seem that there is something significant regarding Merleau-Ponty's notion of *chiasm* as a temporal relation that links to how Heidegger suggests *Da-sein* constitutes its world in attunement. These ideas appear to have resonance with each other somewhere around the way *chiasm* performs a play of forces within the apparatus, as it has the power as a relation to let itself and the other be. The notion of *chiasm* raises questions and ideas in relation to the context of prosthetic relations by exploring how film encounter takes place for bodies via the sensorium in its transductive relations with technics. Laura Marks contends that the role of the spectator in an embodied exchange between the body/ies of the audience and the skin of the film screen is evident. She writes:

> If one understands film viewing as an exchange between two bodies—that of the viewer and that of the film—then the characterization of the film viewer as passive, vicarious, or projective must be replaced with a model of a viewer who participates in the production of the cinematic experience. (2000, pp. 149-150)

Sobchack outlines a phenomenological theory of embodied vision that involves a cinematic apparatus relative to Idhe's instrument-mediated perception. If we consider the instruments of cinema as instrumental tools that mediate our perception, my project argues that this idea is

\textsuperscript{35} The *Webster Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*, (1996), defines the term “dehiscence” as a biological term that is described as, the natural bursting open of capsules, fruits, *et cetera*, for the discharge of their contents.
enframed by an apparatus that determines our understanding of looking, in terms of an instrumental emphasis, rather than through a capacity for modalities of affect and bringing forth. Sobchack’s view places emphasis on technology as an enabling instrumental source that resonates with the lived experience of the viewer. She writes:

The film experience calls for a communication model of instrument-mediation—a model that can describe the double perception and the reversible structure of cinematic instrumentality which enable instrument-mediated perception to be communicated to and exist as instrument-mediated expression. This is a technological mediation that is able to reverse itself so that “what is inside is also outside.” (1992, p. 173)

Her suggestion the phenomenon of film experience is an instrument-mediated perception enabled by the projector, “as an extension of the spectator’s being” (1992, p. 177). She outlines how the area of light at the end of the projection becomes the site of haptic affect36 that sees as a distance sense, thereby extending the viewer’s being-in-the-world as it touches and is touched by the body of the film in a chiasmatic exchange:

It is the “flesh,” the lived-body as the original incarnation of my intentionality, that is normative in my evaluation of the paucity or richness of my perceptual experience of phenomena when mediated by machinery and instrumentation. Although I can see through or according to a machine or instrument, I cannot see like or as a machine; I cannot see except against the ground of my human lived-body and I cannot see unintentionally. (1992, pp. 182-183)

When considered through the lens of video encounter, chiasm is in Sobchack’s view a reversible exchange between human beings and technology. Merleau-Ponty suggests: “The look, we said, envelopes, palpatates, espouses the visible things” (1968, p. 133). Sobchack argues being-in-the-world is lived experience chiasmatically encounterable as lived-body and intentional consciousness. She proposes that in film experience there is a “common existential eye” where both filmmaker and camera become an enabling existential source of cinematic perception, asserting: “This enabling subject and eye can be located as such in a reflective and reflexive activity performed both by the film and/or the spectator” (1992, p. 202). This describes the

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36 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the term “haptic” as relating to the sense of touch, in particular relating to the perception and manipulation of objects using the senses of touch and proprioception. For a more in depth discussion of this idea of haptics related to the horizontalisation of the senses in the human body, see synaesthesia in Sobchack, V. Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image. (2004). For a discussion of haptic visuality in film, video and digital art, see Laura U. Marks. Touch, (2002).
reciprocal action involved in film viewing as an embodied relation of both the filmmaker and camera, as well as spectator and projector as: “author of that expression of the film that they together enable and enact in the contingency of their particular conjunction” (p. 203). For Sobchack, film experience involves embodied hermeneutic relations as the perception and the expression of instrument-mediated perception. In this sense, she writes:

It is in imbricated and existential conjunction of these two embodiment relations and two modalities of the viewing-view/viewed-view that hermeneutic relation emerges, and that a dialectic of perception and expression comes into being as the dynamic complexity of the cinematic “text.” (p. 203).

We watch an intended world as another sees it, but at the same time, we have an experience that is our own “unique” way of “seeing as mine.” In the interests of building on Sobchack’s ideas the question arises: How does my encounter with Blind Spot relate to Da-sein with respect to Sobchack’s notion of “seeing as mine”? This question is asked in light of Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis as a unifying and differentiating happening of disclosure, with reference to the way Da-sein is evident when we sit down and watch films of ourselves, since it is through finding ourselves in attunement that we grasp our existential situation as thrown into the world. I will come back to the notion of Ereignis shortly, for now I want to make clear some of the rationale behind why I feel the need to expand upon Sobchack’s valuable contribution to a field of understanding with relevance to filmic experience.

2.2.2 Beneath Synoptic Bodies

Sobchack’s Address of the Eye reads film experience through subject-based consciousness. She highlights a centralised conscious subject within a perceptual field of vision. The participation and production of cinematic experience resides in a viewer as well as in the body of the film

37 The term “Hermeneutics,” from the Greek language translated as interpretation, is often applied to the interpretation of phenomena as it appears to human consciousness. In questioning film encounter through prosthetics, I do not expect to find a single answer. Rather, I produce my practice as a way to keep raising new questions. In comparison, for Heidegger, a hermeneutic way of questioning gains its profundity from an approach that acknowledges Da-sein’s belonging with its being-in-the-world. In this respect a heterogeneous inquiry moves in a circular motion that can question at any given point with an ever-extending circular motion. The questioning circle never closes, but keeps going in order to gain a more fundamental understanding of the essence of our temporal existence as being-in-the-world (Dreyfus, 1993).
itself. As suggested, a *synoptic* position implies an upright human body in relation to a horizontal plane of perception. In addition, this verticality structures a type of sensory “pecking order” within the human body where sight resonates at the highest level, with the remaining senses falling into, or out of place below. *Chiasm* activates sensory perception in a way that levels out this hierarchy. More specifically, when *chiasm* is applied to film encounter, it activates a horizontal exchange between our sense of sight and our sense of touch that implies a haptic affect.

In outlining a number of complex correlative models involving human perception and machines, Sobchack identifies how the filmmaker’s intention for the film, along with the camera and the projector, becomes partially transparent in film experience, previously discussed in the context of the pro-filmic. She stresses that, although the technologies of the cinematic apparatus may appear to disappear for the viewer as if total, this is never actually total. The camera captures what the filmmaker intends by attenuating a world by means of its machinery. The lens has a similar synoptic machinic-physiology to the human body. Yet, it is different to the human body’s visual capabilities. Sobchack suggests when a film is projected on to a screen for a viewer there is always a latent “echo-focus” of the camera. One could argue that, the echo-focus speaks of a ready-to-handness, where the apparatus falls into what appears to be inconspicuousness, as the viewer and film are together focused on the object and content on screen, while the projector often projects the film over an audience from a quasi-invisible position behind them. This evokes the phenomenological positioning of the synoptic body within a horizontal field of perception.

Sobchack augments Idhe’s correlational structure of intentional acts toward their intended objects through the notion of reversibility. As just discussed in terms of a *chiasmatic* exchange, this extends to the other than human embodiment of the film. Here, a “latent echo-focus” that Sobchack’s reading evokes, could be construed in terms of technology as a way of revealing. The term latent suggests a condition of falling into forgetfulness through a kind of sleight of

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38 See Rosalind Krauss’ discussion of Gestalt psychology and the notion of human perception as a type of mirror image reflected back to the perceiver by means of a world Gestalt. She states that, “the Gestalt itself as centrally organized image that is continually mapped onto this perceptual field” (Bois & Krauss, 1997, p. 89).

39 A research pathway not taken in this current project, but a possible avenue for consideration in the future, could be opened up through Maurizio Lazzarato’s (2007) discussion of Henry Bergson’s theory of time in relation to the human body and the camera. Also see the interview: Gilles Deleuze, *Lecture Transcripts on Spinoza’s Concept of Affect* (1978).
hand; it insinuates something is hidden from one’s view. I am a synoptic physiological being. When a film is projected from a position behind me, I understand that the film is transmitted from a position somewhere behind me; I cannot see the projector directly. Only through an attenuated refraction of light usually projected on to a screen over my head in front of me, the projector recedes from me, into forgetfulness as I watch the film it projects. Heidegger’s discussion of handy things in their use reminds us of a different sort of falling into forgetfulness; a forgetfulness that technology itself enables. One might easily arouse the notion of a “latent echo-focus” that retains something of the projector’s being. This is why this project brings the notion of Ereignis into this discussion here—as Coté and Stiegler have demonstrated—attunement and disclosures that can reveal our belonging to technics through Ereignis, precede all subject/object modes of thinking. Accordingly, we become open to the possibility of a memory of being and how, “sensory perception is only ever calibrated in relation to technics .... This entails a new way to think and feel via [one’s own belonging to] technics” (Coté, 2010, para 1-2).

In clarification of these two ways of understanding, a certain type of forgetfulness is decisive here, since the difference rests upon how Sobchack’s reading accentuates our relations with technics through retaining an emphasis on instrumentality. If the possibility of revealing a world takes place through ways of questioning how we look and encounter the “essence” of technology, and how this way of looking questions intentionality, then we are not looking at something in terms of cause and effect. Our looking is instead related to a different way of constituting a world. In this sense, Heidegger’s notion of forgetfulness pertains to how we forget to look toward the essence or essential underlying cause or ground that enables an understanding of how we see our relations with technology. Heidegger argues, “Da-sein is not an instance of being for the representational abstraction of being; rather it is the site of the understanding of being” (1996, p. 7). Technē and poiēsis can involve letting go of our assumptions of a pre-given notion of instrumentality. Sobchack acknowledges the reductive operations of the cinematic apparatus. When she writes: “the interest here is with the function of cinematic technology as, in Heidegger’s sense, ‘nothing technological’” (1992, p. 171).

40 In this sense, the essence of technology is “nothing technological” since it enables a way of seeing that allows us to see a world that we have forgotten. When technology makes us forget the essence of our being as a relation of technē, it does so whenever we fall away from ourselves into forms of representation that always involve some
As discussed, the concern for Heidegger is our indifference that happens as we forget to ask the question of what the essence of technology is. The mark of modernity highlights a loss of insight through the domination of technology that thinks cause and effect. We are technical living beings locked into the production of technologies for our own survival and preservation. Since the question of the essence of technics is glossed over by our forgetfulness, we continue to produce technics driven by our fear of dying. We forget our fear and move away from the question of Being through this technological cycle of production. Our situation as technical living beings raises the possibility of seeing as mine in view of disclosures brought forth through turning toward or away from alētheia, and the truth of our questioning. Through modes of disclosure found in Heidegger’s notion of the Ereignis we can be revealed to ourselves in an openness to the question of the essence of technology.

2.3 Ereignis and Disclosive Belonging

Falling into forgetfulness concerns disclosure; it pivots around a fundamental falling away from being-in-the-world that goes along with us at all times. As we are Da-sein, our habits make us forgetful. The various modes of “the they” and tranquillisation discussed earlier, also tend to veil the way we find ourselves in attunement. In reference to Sobchack’s suggestion of the “latent ech-focus” in film experience, our Da-sein can recede into forgetfulness at any moment through the very technicity that makes our own coming to presence known in the first place. Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis involves the possibility of a disclosive belonging that may reveal our Da-sein by opening us to what we forget. From this perspective, my project introduces Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis within the frame of video encounter through considering a way to explore the notion of the revealing that is poiēsis, as it endeavors to expand upon Sobchack’s work on film experience and embodiment.

While we may have an experience of reacting with film as Sobchack describes, our embodied spectatorship opens up a world, and this involves our attunement. By exploring how spectatorship takes place as and through technology as a way of revealing, poiēsis brings forth form of consciousness. My project suggests that this mode of tranquillisation usually clouds our memory of our relations with technics.
something to do with *Da-sein*’s primordial temporal being-ness through attunement and disclosure. As discussed in Chapter 1, the myth of *Prometheus and Epimetheus* reveals that we are, “technical living beings.” An error of forgetfulness marks our human condition, having no qualities to survive independently from technics, we build technics, and in this manner, we are technical living beings. While I believe Sobchack’s theory of seeing as mine tacitly expresses a Heideggerian reading of the essence of technology, my research expands upon her ideas with a more explicit reading of forgetfulness and *Ereignis*. A modality of revealing does occur with what Sobchack is saying with her reading of Ihde’s theory of instrument-mediated perception and the film’s body; and yet, her reading recedes from it’s own essence in terms of it’s own instrumentality. I want to expand upon Sobchack’s reading of instrument-mediated perception to encompass the profound sense of receding and revealing that can take place within one’s forgetfulness and how this operation can make its appearance known through our *Da-sein*.

### 2.3.1 Forgetfulness, Place and Ereignis

How is Heidgger’s thinking of *Da-sein* crucial to a primordial essence of technology? A language of cause and effect defines technology through a presupposition that says technology is purely instrumental. As a way around an instrumental way of thinking about technology, my own practice attempts to get to being before it gets to itself. Bearing in mind, the site and understanding of being is our *Da-sein*, and in its nearness to us, it is habitually the furthermore from us. Film or video encounter intersects with forgetfulness and our remembrance of our forgetfulness in a complex, yet incredibly simple manner.

In Malpas (2006) "place" takes precedence as a way to articulate Heidegger’s notion of *Ereignis*. He points out that for Henri Birault and Thomas Sheehan, *Ereignis* contains three

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41 In *Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place World*, (2006), Malpas suggests how *Ereignis* is a mode of disclosure that concerns our being-the-world: Heidegger’s thinking begins with the attempt to articulate the structure of a certain “place.” The place at issue is not, however, any mere location in which entities are positioned, but rather the place in which we already find ourselves given over to the world and to our own existence within that world—the place that is, one might say, the place of the happening of being. (p. 211)

Place can be revealed to us as we find ourselves in attunement. Malpas explains how Heidegger’s later thinking builds upon themes raised in *BT* regarding the meaning of being through its temporalisation, which is *Da-sein* situatedness. This thinking develops the ideas raised with *OET* where being-in-the-world, “arises through a simple letting be as such that does not arise on the basis of being-there (where being-there is still understood in terms of the essence of human being), but as that in which being-there is already implicated” (2006, p. 213). Malpas
essential elements. The first relates to Ereignis in English, “event,” or something that takes place as a unity of interactions between elements through a certain type of intrinsic belonging. The second comes through the idea of “enowning,” coupled with the notion of appropriation. As Malpas continues, this is:

In terms of the “happening of belonging” in the sense of gathering or bringing of things into what is their own. The emphasis on “own” here immediately connects “Ereignis” with “Eigenlichkeit,” “ownness,” or “authenticity,” which is such a key notion in Being and Time, but “Ereignis” does not refer to some mode of being that belongs to being-there; instead what is at issue here is a certain sort of unifying of elements in which things are brought into a unity to which they already belong. (p. 215)

This notion of belonging has resonance with Timothy Clark’s take on Heidegger’s thinking as pre-representational and holistic, in addition to modes of thinking that engage in causality. “Simply by existing a human being has a mode of access to the world that could never be rendered fully explicit in a theory. Such understanding is holistic ... given altogether or not at all” (Clark, 2002, p. 24). In this context, the third element of Ereignis translates as disclosedness, or unconcealing. It relates to, “the ‘moment of vision,’ Augenblick, in which being-there grasps its existential situation” (2006, p. 215). These meanings all converge with the term Ereignis:

In “Ereignis”: the idea of event/happening, of gathering/belonging, and of disclosing/revealing. Through all of these three elements there is a persistent theme of unity from the unity of happening, to the unity of belonging, to the unity of disclosedness. Above all, then, “Ereignis” is the name for the particular sort of unifying and differentiating happening by which things come to presence, by which they come to be (p. 216).

suggests that with the TOWA, “the structure of truth that is first elaborated in the 1930 essay is able to be elaborated from within a richer frame” (p. 213). This richer frame concerns how disclosure takes place for Da-sein as an “interplay between two main elements ... the concealing, the sheltering of earth (Erde) and the unconcealing, the clearing of world (Welt)” (p. 213). The themes raised in TOWA will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 3 in relation to locale, space, and place.

The crux of Malpas’ explanation suggests the notion of Ereignis as, “the ‘happening’ of a form of ‘disclosive belonging’” (p. 213). Malpas theorises “place” as a topological characteristic of being-in-the-world. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the term “topology” in mathematics as, the study of geometrical properties and spatial relations unaffected by the continuous change of shape or size of figures. The way in which constituent parts are interrelated or arranged. From the Greek term topos, “place.”

42 Malpas comments, “Ereignis is a matter of topoi-esis—a gathering/opening of/into place. As the manner of mortal being is dwelling, so dwelling is always a being-in-place (and not merely ‘being-in-the-world’)” (Crowell & Malpas, 2007, p. 131).
In exploring the human condition through the essence of the prosthetic, a question of how Da-sein has a potential for self-disclosure is posed within the constitution of a world. A world that could reveal a primordial belonging through a unifying differentiation articulated through the three convergences of meaning as discussed by Malpas as a unity of, happening, belonging, and disclosedness in Ereignis. Malpas’ discussion of Ereignis suggests how the establishing of world involves how we could be opened to seeing the essence of technology, (understood in light of prosthetics for my project). The opening up of a world at the same time, “enables the mortals themselves to come to light ... as beings that die ... death as a mark of radical finitude, of essential uncanniness ... death as the marker of our belonging to the constant ‘sway’ of being” (p. 131). In this sense, my practice raises the problem of how we might, if even only for an instant, be revealed in our forgetfulness of our belonging within the “sway” of being-there. In this manner, we may be “brought into a unity to which we already belong.” The notion of death as the marker of an essential uncanniness will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3. For the time being, Ereignis is an event that questions apparent distinctions between Da-sein and technology, revealed through its own forgetting.

Sobchack argues that Ihde’s model does not fully account for how film experience may “serve as a conduit from one perception to another” (1992, pp. 172-173). In a similar way, one could suggest that Leroi-Gourhan’s bi-pedal system does not fully account for how, “sensory perception is only ever calibrated in relation to technics” (Coté, 2010, para 1). As Stiegler suggests in (Barison & Ross, 2004), Heidegger critics can always accuse one’s ideas of falling into “the they.” Although explanations are useful ways to reveal how things operate, they can be tricky as there is always a tendency to close down possibilities for a field of potential to stay in play where Da-sein’s forgetfulness is concerned.

Apparatuses enframe our experience and are characteristic of instrumentality. Nevertheless, we can still explore how Da-sein may move toward a free relation within its own enframing. By beholding the “sway” of being guided by attunement, we might see how the world sees us and how we are seen by the world through a notion of topos or place. Ereignis has significance regarding “seeing as mine” in this instance. How might we approach Sobchack’s reading of instrument-mediated perception, in terms of disclosure when she mentions Heidegger’s understanding of ek-stasis in relation to Ihde’s use of “terminus” and “seeing as mine”? On this idea, Sobchack writes:
In its use by phenomenologists, *terminus* refers not to a theoretical location of static essence, but rather the lived location of a realized and realizing noesis-noema relation, an intentional correlation that is not static but dynamic and existentially *ecstatic* (in the Greek sense of *ek-stasis* borrowed by both Hiedegger and Merleau-Ponty, and here by Ihde). (1992, p. 176)

For example, the term terminus signals the screen in instrument-mediated perception, as the point of contact with the visible world where Sobchack indicates all precepts and percepts are brought to presence as being-in-the-world. Mary Jane Rubenstein suggests, “*Da-sein* takes place as an *ek-static* standing in” (2011, 40: 41). She puts forward the idea that Heidegger “maps onto being toward death on the one hand ... *ek-stasis*, and care on the other ... *instasis*. Out on the one hand to finitude and singularity, and in on the other to worldliness and relationships” [sic] (2011, 41:00-43:00). Sobchack’s seeing as mine can be related to Heidegger’s notion of care since it is through care for one’s self that one establishes their world. In the context of spectatorship, this is linked to how we care for ourselves in terms of turning toward or away from attunements. As outlined by Rubenstein this relates to “*instasis* involving worldliness and relationships.” She comments that the task of thinking for Heidegger involves dislocating the subject. She explains:

Displaced as *Da-sein* the thinker stands out of herself in the opening of the being that both yields itself and withdraws. Heidegger calls this disposition an “*ecstatic in standing.*” Ecstasy literally means standing outside of oneself, and standing in means remaining within the incalculable. Keeping oneself open to the self concealing event of being, even though precisely because it won’t just present itself. [sic] (2011, 40:00)

Remaining with the incalculable means resisting the urge to seize upon subject/object dichotomies related to an instrumental way of thinking too hastily. Rubenstein comments that for Heidegger, “thinking ... requires a commitment to withstanding the indeterminacy of both thinker and thought .... Heidegger tells us that this withstanding takes place as a double movement” (2011, 41:00). The idea of withstanding in this context, means letting disclosure take place in Malpas’ triple sense of *Ereignis*, “Maintaining itself in this irreducible between out and back, self and world, singularity and multiple” (2011, 43:00). *Ereignis* unifies an incalculable differentiation of happening. I am revealed to myself in my forgetfulness through seeing as mine, and at the same moment, I recede into forgetfulness and I am unable to rationally know what that forgetfulness is through a form of rational thinking. An event of
appropriation takes place, as this doubling over of concealing and revealing; as such, it is incalculable in terms of instrumentally.

2.4. Attunement and Disclosure

If we read my encounter of *Blind Spot* from Sobchack’s approach, it would suggest a complex juncture where the reciprocal looking of Hill’s camera and “personage” are subjected by the film viewer who witnesses this event in a performative glance that occurs in an instant. *Blind Spot* manages to draw out the durationality of the encounter, in that I am taken by and attuned to the strangest sensation of myself passing. My mounting sense of agitation and un-ease attunes me to this peculiar singularity. Disclosure here is determined by a displacement of expectation between self as centrally organised and synoptically bound to my physiological body, and being-in-the-world. If one experiences a rising sense of agitation, it means more than a mere disruption between one’s expectation of return and delay. *Ereignis* prompts a way of disclosure and belonging, *chiasmatically* performing my *Da-sein* between the protraction of the flicker and the reduction of the image. This project contends that this temporal protraction-reduction opens me to my own space and time. I am able to grasp my situatedness through attunement, an attunement that reminds me in my forgetfulness of my place in the world as integrally bound up and belonging with the essence of technology. This happens, not through a distanced judgment based on the logistics of what is going on intellectually, or through a theory of instrument-mediated perception, but, as Rubenstein puts it, Heidegger’s thinking resonates in affect, in this manner, it is “an irreducible between” (2011, 43:00). *Blind Spot* orientates *Da-sein* through a play of forces involving temporal affect. Attunement underscores a potential “to be” within the indeterminacy of *Da-sein’s* disposition of throwness and forgetfulness in an irreducible between.

Seeing as mine could relate to a form of reflection upon my own situation in terms of my *Da-sein’s* concern for itself. This kind of reflexive concern implies a form of distanced conscious reflection. Yet, this situation is always underscored as a play of forces irreducibly moving between *instasis* and *ek-stasis*. *Ereignis* augments Sobchack’s notion of seeing as mine through
an idea of unity and belonging to a differentiating happening that gets to being before it can get to itself. If only for an instant, this reveals my primordial belonging to my being. Ereignis takes place within this frame of withstanding in a differentiating unity. This action resonates with a modality of “the look” that is a moment of vision that expands a notion of chiasmatic exchange, to encompass an essential belonging to technology.

In my encounter with Blind Spot, Ereignis could be said to take place at the “terminus” of seeing as mine. My encounter involves my embodied relation with cinematic technics; however, at the same time, one is enabled or made more available to the memory of something beyond the bounds of cause and effect. The thing beyond the bounds of intellectual conjecture here is contingent with a phenomenon of affect. When something spooks me, it’s as if somebody walks on my grave, but that somebody, is my own existence. This situation suggests something of Da-sein’s throwness that is primordial time, and not the time determined through calculation. Something is disclosed in the manner of Ereignis through temporal affect. Affects produce me as a relation of technē, as a way of revealing my own forgetfulness, in its forgetfulness as being-in-the-world.

Apparatuses enframe a cinematic technics in terms of film encounter, this situation generally influences how my encounters open up a world. How I see my world relates to Heidegger’s notion of the world picture, discussed in Chapter 1. Fóti quoting Parmenides comments:

Beings do not become such because man, to begin with, looks at them—let alone in the sense of representing them in the manner of subjective perception. Rather, man is the one who is looked at by beings, who is gathered into presencing close unto and by that which opens itself. To be looked at by beings and kept within their openness, and thus to be borne by them, to be driven about by their schism: That is the essence [Wesen] of man in the Greek time of history. (Fóti, 2003, p. 82)

As we are looked at by the world, we are brought into our own being. This is the crux of a chiasmatic "looking." Da-sein’s throwness as a projected leap, suggests how this is possible in the first place. Our technical relations bring to mind the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus once again; our Da-sein belongs within a concealing withdrawal. We are brought into the light of day through Epimetheus' error of forgetfulness. Within this mythic context, referring back to Hill’s comments on the protraction of the flicker as his protagonist’s glance meets our own:
This point of contact, where glance meets glance, performs like a kind of magnetic pull and repulsion in the work, suggesting that in a way this video, appears almost scripted out ... the time is divided into a slower space where the distance between one and zero, you kept dividing this in half. You're getting closer but you are getting further away ... a kind of base division of time. [sic] (Hill, 2003)

My encounter with *Blind Spot* involves a temporal mode of disclosure that attunes me in my getting closer, and at the same moment further away. The encounter discloses how *Da-sein*'s throwness projects its possibilities for itself and other “to be.” As Heidegger puts it, “To engage oneself with the disclosedness of beings is not to lose oneself in them; rather, such engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are” (1930, p. 125). *Ereignis* involves this action as a turning toward, and away from that which enables a notion of seeing as mine in disclosure. Forgetfulness is a play of forces that both enables and withdrews in the event of its own enabling. In encountering *Blind Spot*, something gets me, as the essence of technology looks at us; we look and are looked at by a world.

Sobchack suggests that instrument-mediated perception in film experience has an affinity with Heidegger's understanding of technology as “nothing technological.” She notes:

The film’s material existence may be *necessarily* in its immanent celluloid, chemical emulsions, and mechanisms of cinematography and projection, but its material existence is *sufficiently* in its transcendence of its technological origins and dependencies ... not as some objective mechanism ... not experienced and understood as an enabling and extensional prosthetic device like a telephone or microscope. Rather, the film is experienced and understood for what it is: a visible and centered visual activity coming into being in significant relation to the objects, the world, and the others it intentionally takes up and expresses in embodied vision. (1992, p. 171)

In summary, Chapter 2 has explored how the filmic apparatus enframes our relations with moving images through concepts of attunement and disclosure. In addition, this exegesis endeavors to expand upon Sobchack’s view by extending her thinking on embodied vision to include a relation of *technē*. This has been considered via affect and attunement as a way of revealing a forgetfulness; a forgetfulness of *Da-sein’s* throwness disclosed in *Ereignis*. Since our encounters with moving images may bring forth situations that remind us in our forgetfulness through modes of spectatorship, this suggests a kind of uncanny excess takes place in a self-
disclosure that opens us to seeing ourselves in our forgetfulness. On one hand, we see synoptically and chiasmatically as the world sees us, at the same time we slip away, seeing ourselves in our forgetfulness. As we are looked at by the essence of technology, this also brings forth other modes of revealing; this opens us to how we forget that we already belong to a fundamental throwness that means we already ek-sist outside of ourselves as a relation of technē. If we return to Hill’s comments regarding the black interstitial frame, in Blind Spot, essentially, as each black block of time is extended out:

Its almost more of a kind of space which opens up the time of thinking and the time of seeing ... continually always arriving toward some point that never arrives ... moves from almost the idiomatic frame of scene to a kind of photographic point which is adjacent to a non-scene, just a blankness of something that makes you kind of reflective upon the whole process of seeing itself. (Hill, 2003)

My encounter with Hill’s work reveals a mode of ek-static belonging to my prosthetic relations where I am opened to a time of thinking, and the time of seeing and being seen. The affect of encountering Blind Spot, sees, that “retina”-hole-in-time that opens my ek-static temporality to my own Da-sein already there as being-in-the-world. This exegesis contends that, it is just such a turning toward or away from Da-sein’s throwness—as forgetfulness—that is made explicit in terms of Ereignis. Heidegger stresses the importance of not falling prey to the idea of the senses as lived experience, or consciousness, but rather suggests that it is the very fact that all mood is already grounded in attunement that makes mood possible at all. Da-sein already brought before itself is a relation of technē underscored not by perceiving oneself to be there, but through the possibility of moments of vision brought forth through attunement and disclosure.
Chapter 3- Homelessness and the Uncanny

Homelessness is nothing to be lamented. It is rather the pristine ontological mark of humankind ... it is what every work of art bestows on us. Not roots, not domesticity, not the fireside chat, but a sense of our never being at home in the face of the uncanny. (Krell, 1992, p. 44)

Chapter 3 discusses how being taken by the uncanny involves a temporal schism that disrupts a sense of being at home in one’s body. I begin with Sigmund Freud’s account of his own uncanny experience covered in his essay *The Uncanny* (1919). I expand upon some of Freud’s ideas by bringing to light Martin Heidegger’s notion of Da-sein’s throwness as an uncanny situatedness of a primordial homelessness. The notion of an indeterminate Angst underscores our relations with technology, and we are driven to produce technologies through a play of forces involving forgetfulness, and memory. Following this, I discuss the idea of spatiality and locale in relation to my own practice through a reading of Heidegger’s *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* (1975). The notion of dwelling uncovers how Da-sein’s factual disposition in its throwness is an existential situatedness usually concealed from us in our being-there. I consider a key scene from the motion picture *Vampyr* (1932), relevant to being taken by the uncanny through a way of looking that involves meetings of self with self. The theme of doubling of self is extended by a reading of Guy Sherwin’s *Man with a Mirror* (1976/2006), a performance artwork that incorporates themes of reenactments of self. Moving on with the notion of stealth and danger, in terms of Paul Virilio’s reading of the motility of the camera in conjunction with an analysis of Alex Monteith’s, *Passing Manouevre*, (2008). I think about how the notion of being taken by the uncanny can open our engagements with camera prosthetics, through the emergence of a liveness that challenges our experience.
3.1 Freud, Heidegger, and the Unheimlich

Freud (1919) writes about the discomfort associated with an instance of being taken by the uncanny:

I was sitting alone in my wagon-lit compartment when a more than usually violent jolt of the train swung back the door of the adjoining washing-cabinet, and an elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a travelling cap came in. I assumed that in leaving the washing-cabinet, which lay between the two compartments, he had taken the wrong direction and he had come into my compartment by mistake. Jumping up with the intention of putting him right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own reflection in the looking-glass on the open door. I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his appearance. Instead, therefore, of being frightened by our ‘doubles’, both Mach and I simply failed to recognize them as such. Is it not possible, though, that our dislike of them was a vestigial trace of the archaic reaction which feels ‘the'double’ to be something uncanny? (p. 3697)

When Freud encounters his double in the glass, he dislikes it. A simple misrecognition appears to be the crux of Freud’s uncanny encounter with himself. In missing himself, the relations between his physical body and his existence are thrown into doubt. In this manner he is made privy to his own uncanny disposition.

When I am taken by the uncanny, it strikes a chord at the epicentre of how I believe myself to be. The uncanny performs an involuntary shift that fleetingly disrupts my sense of temporality as something linear. As with the rupture, or hole, in time raised through my discussion of Blind Spot in Chapter 2, one is taken from one’s place in the world. This is like a schism experienced as a hole in time that takes you beyond a particular understanding of self to reveal a world temporally modified, as an openness to the “there” or locality of its being. According to Krell (1992), for Heidegger, “homelessness is ... the pristine ontological mark of humankind” (p. 44). The face of the uncanny is something inherent to our encounters with art, and art is a technè that mirrors our human condition. Similarly, for Freud the looking-glass reveals Da-sein’s unhomely disposition to itself. My own iterative practice questions how being taken by the uncanny may open me to the there of my being: If an uncanny homelessness marks the human condition, how does the uncanny operate? If the uncanny is
something that suggests an instance that takes us out of what is most familiar to us, how is Da-sein orientated in a being-not-at-home in the face of its throwness?

Figure 25. Suzie Gorodi, Corridor Series. PhD exhibition 2014 (installation detail). St Paul Street Gallery, AUT University, Auckland.

The phenomenon of the uncanny ruptures a sense of being-at-home in one's body. In terms of how we are attuned to being taken by the uncanny, when this happens, we are estranged from an interpretation of self as mine. The uncanny rises from our being-in-the-world in a way that takes us before we have had time to rationalise what is going on. Heidegger remarks, an uncanny “attunement is so far from being reflected upon that it precisely assails” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 129). In its forgetfulness, Da-sein’s uncanny disposition is an unreflected act in excess of a home-self rationale. This is why reading the uncanny through the eye of our prosthetic relations is such a useful way to analyse how Da-sein may gain access to itself, in light of its own forgetful disposition.
As with Freud’s dislike of the elderly gentleman, a happenstance creates an angled mirror. The compartment is like a Camera obscura. The glass—not unlike the cinema—brings Freud’s doppelgänger into being through mirror reflection. Freud is taken aback when he misses his own reflection as himself. Unwittingly, he has already alienated himself through his own dislike of the intruder. The moment of uncanny vision takes him as he realises that the intruder was in fact his own reflection and he is thrown into uncertainty. This is how a glass window, instead of opening out on to a view of the passing landscape, suddenly becomes a mode of revealing in the sense of bringing-forth. As Freud looks into the mirror, it reflects back a view of how he is seen in his looking by being looked at by the essence of a world. This somehow discloses his existence to him as something beyond the physical boundary of his own body. This situation resonates with how a chiasmatic way of looking (discussed in Chapter 2) appears to be inherent to the medium of video. When I watch films of myself I am exploring how my prosthetic relations embody a temporally “doubled existence” that can be revealed to me through my looking.

43 The camera obscura is an optical device that mimics the human eye. It is comprised of a darkened box or room with a single pinhole on one side. This aperture allows light to come in through the opening. Like an eyeball, light passes through a single hole at the front and projects an external scene on to the back of the retina. The projection is inverted, however, with its colour and perspective still in tact. The camera obscura uses a 45-degree mirror (like the lens of the eyeball), however, the human brain rights the images we see. Jonathan Crary (1996) discusses the socio-political and philosophical implications of historic visual technologies. The mechanics of the camera obscura described an internal body and its relation to the external world that suggested a correlation of Truth between the reflected image and the world. He discusses how scientific investigations into the physiological workings of the human eye eventually led to a major reworking of luminal notions of Truth. This shift can be linked to a break in the ideological dominance of the camera obscura, “from the late 1500’s to the end of the 1700’s, the structural and optical principles of the camera obscura coalesced into a dominant paradigm through which was described the status and possibilities of an observer” (p. 27). This break was an important change in how we viewed the world because we began to understand and interpret vision as something that resides in the observer through “temporality as an inescapable component of observation” (p. 99). See Martin Jay’s discussion of Ancient Greek optics in relation to light in terms of lumen (the essence of illumination), and lux (the actual experience of human sight) in Downcast Eyes, (1993).
I may only navigate by looking into the viewfinder window. Each time I locate a leg I can take a step as long as I keep it in my view. Once the foot is placed on the ground, I may disengage my view and bring my body to an upright position; at the same time, I may slide my other foot along the ground to meet the first foot’s position. The wind is blowing my hair, I can hear traffic coming and going. The leg keeps getting further away from me it is distanced and strange.

Krell brings to light how a notion of Angst and the uncanny may attune our being-in-the-world through a variety of modalities:
Is it only fear of death, this feeling of being ill at ease or uncanny, this unhomely sensation—whatever fine distinctions or sweeping claims Heidegger may try to make? It is more like a pervasive, indeterminate anxiety, a fundamental or founding mood that Heidegger at other times also reads as joy, melancholy, and profound boredom. In the face of what are we anxious, joyous, melancholy, or deeply bored? Everything. Beings as a whole. Nothing. No thing at all. An impersonal yet thoroughgoing alienation marks Heidegger’s thought about who we are. (1992, p. 45)

My prosthetic relations explore how an indeterminate Ängst permeates our sense of being-in-the-world. As said, our fear of death drives us to produce technology without end. The essence of technology reveals what has been forgotten, i.e., discloses the truth of Da-sein’s temporal disposition through showing us our own uncanny situatedness. When the uncanny gets hold of you, it gets into you: it enacts and exposes the existent to a momentary “insight” that opens your Da-sein to a mode of self-disclosure.

3.1.1 The Uncanny and Homelessness

The term uncanny (unheimlich) in German signifies a paradox in that it can mean both homely and unhomely. Rather than placing emphasis on these terms in opposition, when we are taken by an uncanny modality of encounter, this mode of being suggests a “moment of vision,” in Malpas’ words, “in which being-there grasps its existential situation” (2006, p. 215). The paradox of the uncanny as both homely and unhomely suggests a moment when, as discussed in Chapter 2, Da-sein maintains “itself irreducibly between instasis and ek-stasis” (2011, 41:00). The uncanny is something that may be disclosed to us in spite of our tendency to take hold of rational modes of thinking. The German definition of unheimlich undermines a binary logic by placing emphasis on how two seemingly oppositional terms may belong-together. Likewise Da-sein’s throwness suggests how the anomaly of being taken by the uncanny is made possible by our already belonging to this fundamental disposition. This means that we already ek-sist outside of ourselves, thereby we are never at home.
Freud\textsuperscript{44} critiques Jentsch's study on the uncanny, suggesting Jentsch was unable to get past his opposition of the terms \textit{heimlich/un-heimlich}. He writes, "we are tempted to conclude that what is 'uncanny' is frightening precisely because it is not known and familiar" (1919, p. 3676). Krell argues that the second section of Freud's \textit{The Uncanny} posits an alternative reading from two major perspectives; firstly, "the return of materials and complexes repressed during infancy, and [secondly] the reemergence of atavistic beliefs and superstitions that we have (if only in intellectual terms) already overcome" (1992, p. 55). He argues that:

Repression is the very mechanism of anxiety, according to Freud. Any affect or emotion that is repressed returns as anxiety. Further, its return is uncanny—the emergence of something both long familiar and long hidden that ought to have remained in concealment. Heidegger speaks of the concealment and even distortion of beings. Yet it may be that the thought of self-concealing being as enigma, mystery, and secret needs the thought of repression. For when repression is primal, when it is \textit{Ur-Verängung}, it is utterly beyond all thought of subjectivity. The uncanny, unhomelike return of the repressed is a thought of being. (p. 56)

The notion of a primal concealment that is beyond all thought of subjectivity is worth further examination. Krell suggests that Heidegger needs Freud's thought of primal repression in order to substantiate his own theory of \textit{Da-sein}.\textsuperscript{45} Freud evokes a number of possible interpretations of the uncanny: unhomely, native, and familiar. He proposes that common ways of being under uncanny conditions (such as sensations of ambiguity and disembodiment) are evident through memory and repression. Either one is taken by the uncanny as a repressed childhood event, usually traumatic, rises up to grab one from one's subconscious memory banks, or one is taken by the uncanny when primitive superstitions that still lie dormant within us rise up and seize us unexpectedly. This psychoanalytical framework suggests our discomfort or anxiety is associated with a primal fear of death that has been repressed. Our repressed anxiety issues something like dread where "One is curious to know [Freud writes] what this common core is which allows us to distinguish as 'uncanny' certain things which lie within the field of what is frightening" (1919, p. 3673).

\textsuperscript{44} Freud (1919) is referring to an earlier paper by Ernst Jentsch, \textit{On the Psychology of the Unheimlich}, (1906).

\textsuperscript{45} Krell suggests that Heidegger would have had the opportunity to read Freud's \textit{Uncanny} on various occasions leading up to publishing \textit{BT}. See David Farrell Krell \textit{Das Unheimliche: Architectural sections of Heidegger and Freud}, (1992).
The crux of Freud’s essay (and relevance for this project) is not that the uncanny is something frightening vis-à-vis the double, but that the uncanny grabs the spectator who is taken by it: it takes them to another place, another world; performs the unfamiliar that arises out of the old and long familiar that they do not recognise, as such. The avenue of childhood repression and Freud’s uncanny has been discussed at length in numerous studies. However, Freud’s account of the uncanny that manifests a vestigial trace of the archaic reaction which feels “the double” to be something uncanny, is weighty, and worthy of attention. From this perspective, my practice produces a specific reading of a language of prosthetics that is techné. In this way, the essence of the prosthetic is unable to be abstracted or separated from us, since it is us; and our environment, it can not fail to fall into forgetfulness, as this is what we do. One does not recognise that we forget our own unhomeliness because it is closest to us and most familiar. We forget our Da-sein is already in the world as a relation of techné. The essence of our being is a belonging with technology through a world that draws us out in moments of being taken by the uncanny. It takes us out from and back into the “place” of our own belonging, that is the “pristine ontological mark” of humankind.

The problem with talking about the uncanny and an art of process is that, if I talk about the uncanny as a methodology, I lose it; I close down the possibility of exploring it. In other words, if I want to keep the notion of the uncanny in play for the prospect of exploration, this exegesis endeavours to clear a space for thinking about the potential of being taken by the uncanny. This way of thinking is underscored by unraveling an apparent distinction between the intentional character of a self-conscious awareness, and a mood of Da-sein’s throwness as fundamentally uncanny in its being-there.

Freud’s essay touches upon themes of ambiguity, disembodiment, and misrecognition. For Heidegger the uncanny is our primordial homelessness. I am interested in how being taken by a sense of one’s own primordial homelessness relates to locale. In BDT, Heidegger suggests how Da-sein’s dwelling is something related to what we build or do. For instance, when I watch a film of myself, misrecognition often timbres with place in terms of my temporal situatedness. By linking locale to spatiality, Heidegger proposes that locale is not static, but rather something that we do. In this way locale is a play of forces that opens up intervals of space.
3.1.2 Spatiality and Locale a Dwelling that Takes Place

*BDT* explores how the original meaning of the term building belongs to *Da-sein’s* dwelling as being-in-the-world. *Bauen*, or building, in Old English and High German used to mean to dwell. My practice explores the idea of being taken by the uncanny, through momentary moments of vision; it reveals something within our forgetfulness, and this pertains to a homelessness that belongs to how we dwell. *Da-sein’s* throwness is linked to this uncanny disposition. We forget that our throwness is a projected leap, and this is precisely how we might be revealed to ourselves, through dwelling. My practice questions the site of *Da-sein’s* dwelling through prosthetics; by suggesting indeterminacies between self and screen, artist and spectators, through uncanny operations of the lens that complicate how looking takes place.

Heidegger compares the modern term for a building that is the object of one’s home with the notion of dwelling. For instance, while we do build bridges, bus stops, car parks, roads, houses,
or periscope devices, we don’t always dwell in all these built things as our homes (Heidegger, 1975). We are marked by an uncanny homelessness in light of what Heidegger calls, “the domain of our dwelling .... We do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, because we are dwellers” (1975, pp. 145-148). Whilst not wanting to appear illustrative of Heidegger’s thinking, his approach resonates with the Prometheus and Epimetheus myth. Since our survival depends upon the production of technology, or prosthetic devices, building is an activity; likewise dwelling is an activity, it is what we do. As said, my project considers Da-sein’s dwelling in terms of a relation of technē. Our throwness suggests that the domain of dwelling takes place through a reflexive concern for our own existence by means of our prosthetic relations.46

The domain of dwelling is a temporal place in the ongoing constitution of world. What we do is a mode of production that always involves locale. Locale is not a place that I visit, like the Dominion Road flyover, but, the place and understanding of my being-in-the-world. Heidegger writes:

Space is in essence that for which room has been made, that which is let into its bounds .... The spaces through which we go daily are provided for by locations; their nature is grounded in things of the type

46 Da-sein’s throwness is discussed in relation to its capacity for reflexivity in Chapter 4.
of buildings. If we pay heed to these relations between locations and spaces, between spaces and space, we get a clue to help us in thinking of the relations of man and space. (pp. 154-156)

Heidegger suggests that we make room for the essence of space and that space is delivered into its bounds by locale. Locale and space belong-together, from this perspective locale clears a space and time for the possibility of disclosures of Dasein’s throwness.

As already mentioned, Krell suggests that Heidegger’s notion of Da-sein as uncannily situated needs Freud’s thought of repression in terms of an indeterminate anxiety where this “self-concealing being as enigma, mystery, and secret needs the thought of repression” (1992, p. 56). Would this understanding of repression suggest Da-sein’s forgetfulness in its throwness? Krell continues, “For when repression is primal, when it is Ur-Verängung [in English change or movement], it is utterly beyond all thought of subjectivity” (p. 56). A forgetful invisibility as a change of place, with regard to how we are attuned, could suggest being taken by the uncanny as something that reveals itself within Da-sein’s throwness since “The uncanny, unhomelike return of the repressed is a thought of being” (p. 56).

47 For example, in relation to Walter Benjamin’s notion of distraction as he wanders through the city, Anthony Vidler (2000) discusses how the sheer mass of the city is impossible to apprehend from a single perspective. Like the terminus of a video encounter mentioned in Chapter 2, the city is a locale brought into its being by making room for a proliferation of spaces. Benjamin’s walking through the city brings the city as locale into its presencing through his distracted, invisible wandering. Vidler comments on how a certain kind of understanding takes place through the body; “In this sense cities are ‘invisible’ to us, felt rather than seen, moved through rather than visually taken in” (p. 81). Vidler’s comments resonate with how the essence of action questions visual mastery. Here the ‘site’ of the body sees the city, as city by placing emphasis on movement. See Vidler (2000) Warped Space.

From another perspective, we make room for spatiality through performing some action—or producing and using something like a bridge or a periscope—Guy Debord’s notion of the dérive in Thomas F McDonough (1994) suggests the city as locale is: predicated on a model of moving, on “spatializing actions,” known to the Situationists as dérives; rather than presenting the city from a totalizing point of view, it organizes movements metaphorically around psychogeographic hubs … The Naked City makes it clear, in its fragmenting of the conventional, descriptive representation of urban space, that the city is only experienced in time … as a passage from one “unity of atmosphere” to another, not as the object of a totalized perception. (p. 64)

Dérives take place as actions that make room for a grouping of intervals of space. The site of a psycho-geographic and philosophical wandering occurs through these spatialising actions, and through an invisible and yet embodied way of looking as a passage from one unity of atmosphere to another. I do not see the city from a single perspective, but I understand the city as a whole through a series of fragmented and multiplied temporal intervals of space. Akin with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm discussed in Chapter 2, this way of looking involves being seen by the essence of the city in its presencing. The Naked City was the title for a psychogeographically based map of Paris created by ex-Cobra artists and Guy Debord in 1957. See McDonough “Situationist Space,” (1994).
My own musings on the uncanny in this exegesis follow a similar kind of rationale. With respect to locale as a site of being taken by the uncanny, my wandering through a familiar urban landscape (the corridor, the plaza, and the road), make room for the spatiality of Da-sein’s dwelling as a way of revealing. My dwelling takes place, as it ek-sists, in the nearest and yet furthest place from home.

### 3.2 Uncanny Excess and Facticity

This project explores the possibility that it is not the individual artist who creates their work in isolation. Rather, as suggested in Chapter 2, a reciprocal gaze infers that there is an “other than human” happenstance that arises out of being-in-the-world. In terms of the Prometheus and Epimetheus myth, in Stiegler’s discussion of the memory-support, culture begins with technics. The defining moment in pre-hominoid technics, is the act of cutting a stone tool which allowed the “gesture of cutting” to be preserved in the stone as “the trace of individual experience .... In essence: technics is memory-support” (Barison & Ross, 2004, 25:90). The prosthetic is the condition of Da-sein’s facticity as already thrown into the world. In Giorgio Agamben’s Potentialities, the essay, The Passion of Facticity, suggests that:

Heidegger distinguishes Dasein’s Faktizität from Tatsächlichkeit, the simple factuality of intraworldly beings. At the start of his Ideas, Husserl defines the Tatsächlichkeit of the objects of experience. These objects, Husserl writes, appear as things found at determinate points in space and time that possess a certain content of reality but that, considered in their essence, could also be elsewhere and otherwise. Husserl thus insists on contingency (Zufälligkeit) as an essential characteristic of factuality. For Heidegger, by contrast, the proper trait of facticity is not Zufälligkeit but Verfallenheit. Everything is complicated, in Heidegger, by the fact that Dasein is not simply, as in Sartre, thrown into the “there” of a given contingency; instead, Dasein must rather itself be its “there,” be the “there” (Da) of Being. Once again, the difference in modes of Being is decisive here. (1999, pp. 188-189)

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48 As discussed in Chapter 4, a “liveness” emerges through an uncanny excess that reveals facticity, id est. the work of art is the condition for the essence of technē as a way of revealing.
Agamben proposes that Heidegger's account of Da-sein's facticity as forgetfulness is in critique of Husserl's first principles of philosophy. Accordingly, our prosthetic relations are a play of forces that explore a falling into forgetfulness that radically disclose the world of the existent through a dwelling that takes place. What does Agamben (1999) mean when he says the (Da) of being must be its there? Does Heidegger's understanding of "simple factuality and intraworldly beings" expose a pre-existent that critiques Husserl's ideas of things found at determinant points in space and time? By raising this question, I am asking how camera prosthetics—thought of as a relation of technē—offer a way to read Da-sein's facticity in addition to modes of causality and a given contingency.

My practice makes room for an interstitial space between just taking a walk, and taking a walk with a prosthetic extension attached to my body. This complicates relations between the eyes of bodies, and the eyes of camera prosthetics by playing with ambiguity, disembodiment, and misrecognition. My exegetical reading of prosthetic relations suggests, the possibility of being taken by the uncanny, arises from being-in-the-world. It reveals something to do with Da-sein's forgetfulness in its own space and time. In light of this discussion, my project asks questions such as: How can being taken by the uncanny disclose how Da-sein's homeless facticity dwells, when for the most part, the existent, as viable being exists sub rosa to its dwelling place, as part and parcel of its being-in-the-world?

3.2.1 Facticity and Revealing

Agamben (1999) discusses the importance of facticity and factical life (faktisches Leben) in the development of Heidegger's thought. He writes: "The abandonment of the notion of intentionality (and of the concept of subject that was its correlate) was made possible by the establishment of this category. The path taken was the following: intentionality-facticity-Dasein" (p. 188). Agamben stresses how Heidegger applies facticity in relation to Augustine, who wrote, "facticia est anima, 'the human soul is facticia,' in the sense that it was 'made' by God" (p. 189). Made by hand and not by nature—or put another way—fire a symbol of technē stolen from the gods, brings mortal being into the day through presencing our forgetfulness. Agamben stresses how "The term must be understood in all its force, for it is the same
adjective that Augustine uses to designate pagan idols, in a sense that seems to correspond perfectly to our term ‘fetish’: *genus factiorum deorum*, the nature of ‘factual’ gods” (p. 189). The term fetish is significant to an understanding of facticity, its etymological root stems from the French term *fétiche*—something made by art. Whatever is made by hand is a guise or artistry that conceals the ruse of its facticity. My practice probes Da-sein’s throwness in relation to a fundamental forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is a play of forces that performs an infolding of Da-sein’s facticity. This takes place by covering over what we already forget within forgetfulness. Our way of being in technē is covered over by an uncanny doubling of forgetfulness. The guise of Being is the *fétiche* of our existence. We produce technology as a salve that soothes an indeterminate anxiety. Our Angst is quelled by our Da-sein through a veil of forgetfulness. Our facticity plays on a constant ruse as we manufacture technics that promise a relief or cure for a mood that we can’t quite place. My project proposes that we are already a relation of technē, when we are taken by uncanny excess this performs a fissure in time that can make room for the space of the existent in revealing.

In *Dominion Road Series* tests, 2013 the camera on the end of the dolly-harness falls off the median strip, and into the path of the oncoming traffic. The camera’s automatic focus blurs and readjusts itself as it hits the ground. The camera’s point of view reveals my own body upturned and dropped to its side as it looks back at me. There is a moment that gets me as the camera hits the ground. I understand that it is the camera on its side and not me, but I can’t help but somehow miss where my body is placed in this moment in time. This moment discloses something to do with how my Da-sein is a prosthetic relation. In saying this, I mean that I get an embodied sense of my relations with other beings, such as the screen, the road, or the projector, as my temporal situatedness is thrown into uncertainty.

49 Agamben stresses, “What is important here is that for Heidegger, this experience of facticity, of a constitutive non-originarity, is precisely the original experience of philosophy, the only legitimate point of departure for thinking” (1999, p. 189).

50 For a discussion of how the “ruse” is a tactic that infiltrates apparatuses of knowledge and power by undermining them from within, see Michel de Certeau’s, *Making Do*: *Uses and Tactics*, in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, (1984).
Agamben clarifies, “For Heidegger, what remains unexplained in the conception of ... a relation between subject and an object is precisely what is in need of explanation, that is, the relation itself” (1999, p. 187). Stiegler’s notion of the memory-support in (Barison & Ross, 2004) questions the essence of the prosthetic (camera, and otherwise) in terms of a technics that we forget. My temporal being resonates with the double movement of concealing and revealing as a radical self-transcendence in my being-in-the-world. In being taken by an uncanny moment, Da-sein’s throwness is revealed through its factual disposition. My project is a technē that questions the essence of technics in light of a potential to be taken by an

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51 The notion of Da-sein’s self-transcendence is explored in David Carr’s essay, Heidegger on Transcendence, in Transcendental Heidegger, (Crowell & Malpas, 2007). Self-transcendence can be understood as “a ‘break with the way of ideas,’ that is, a break with an understanding of intentionality as something mediated by mental ‘representations’” (p. 3).
uncanny revealing of Da-sein’s enigmatic dwelling. Interestingly, it is not things as objects objectively present that reveal my world to me. Rather, Da-sein’s dwelling reveals itself through its own forgetfulness. This happens as beings in their present/ready to handness, recede into forgetfulness for the sake of whatever my Da-sein needs to be up to in terms of its own preservation and survival. When my being-in-the-world is revealed to me as something unstable what has being taken by the uncanny got to do with how dwelling takes place?

Quoting Heidegger, Agamben notes:

For Heidegger, the subject-object relation is less original than the self-transcendence of Being-in-the-world by which Dasein opens itself to the world before all knowledge and subjectivity. Before the constitution of anything like a subject or an object, Dasein—according to one of the central theses of Being and Time—is already open to the world: “knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world [Schon-Sein-bei-der-Welt].” And only on the basis of this original transcendence can something like intentionality be understood in its own mode of Being. (1999, p. 187)

What is at stake for the work of art as an encounter that makes room for a time of thinking about Da-sein in its own mode of Being? If one is open to a world before all knowledge and subjectivity, one is in this sense, as one is. Clearly, such an argument would result in the following: if one is the relation itself then there is no framework on which to pin causality. From this point of view, my practice explores our prosthetic relations through temporal modes of being that open to the possibility of being taken by the uncanny. This idea suggests that the uncanny is a forgetful dwelling-in that takes “place.” As with the moment just described, when the camera on the dolly-harness falls into the road, I don’t know where my body begins or ends. This is how Da-sein stands outside of itself to exceed its own bounds—the bounds of causal relations within the apparatus—in its own mode of being-in-the-world. Throwness and forgetfulness play with a dynamic construction of spatiality. Technē as a way of revealing explores how an invisibility of the lens exposes a pre-ontological throwness that takes emphasis away from Husserl’s ideas of things found at determinant points in space and time. If Da-sein’s throwness within its forgetfulness implies a possibility for disclosure in

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52 It is important to note for the reader that the theme of the uncanny and performance art practice has the potential to be unpacked from the perspective of Heidegger’s theory of Angst and Care. As said, Angst suggests prosthetics as a survival technics, and care as the care that being always already holds for its own existence. In light of the scope of this exegesis I will leave these as areas of investigation for future work, inasmuch as, opening up these themes to be considered at length at this point would demand a larger project than is possible within the parameters of this PhD research.
terms of either turning toward or away from *alētheia*, disclosure is suggestive of how being-already-alongside-the-world as the *Da* of being-there is already its there, suggestive of an other than human, pre-existent “there.” As discussed in Chapter 2, while the instrumentality of a prosthetic video practice may manifest as present to handness, being taken by the uncanny revolves around a momentary withdrawal, a revealing, and a concealing of one’s already there.

My practice suggests that these instances may be key to drawing near the micro moments in a performative practice that is *technē* as a way of revealing. In this sense, real-time video footage, mirrored and split screens, multiple installation projections, and so on, provoke ambiguity, disembodiment, and misrecognition. This process involves various bodies of spectatorship and an escalation of eyes, which includes: the projector, the camera (prosthesis), passers-by (on foot or in cars), the body/ies of the audience in the gallery, the reader of this exegesis and so forth. Furthermore, in our looking we disseminate a proliferation of refracted points of view. Remembering what the cameras see as I wander down the road with my prosthetic armature in tow, this wandering takes place, not only from a single view, but, through fragmented variations of iterated, iterations and reflected points of view, that throw back a view of my own dismembered body. In addition, at times, the body of the camera looks back at us through its being looked at by us and through us.

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**Figures 31, 32 and 33.** Suzie Gorodi, *Dominion Road Series*, 2012 (detail) periscope with two cameras, tripod-dolly camera, multi-channel projection full view (1).

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53 I use the term “other than human” here, in light of Stiegler’s suggestion raised in Chapter 1, that “we have never been human” (2010, para 2), rather, we are our prosthetic relations or a relation of *technē*. 
A looking glass reveals a severed leg foreshortened and pushed away as I move to capture it within my viewfinder. The body lunges toward the disembodied leg, as it invariably insists on outsmarting the self-conscious intentionality of my awkward activity.

In the article *Corpus Deliti*, (1985), Rosalind Krauss mentions Freud’s essay on the uncanny with reference to his section on E. T. A. Hoffman's short story of *The Sandman*, (1816). She writes with reference to Olympia of an automaton54 in the story and “its extreme effect of uncanniness turns not simply on the doll’s ambiguous presence, but on her dismemberment within the story, a dismemberment through which she is deprived of her eyes” (1985, p. 62). She proposes that a Freudian reading here suggests a fear of castration linked to a loss of the eyes. One could add, that it also suggests a fear of death issued by an inability to determine whether the doll is dead or alive. For film theorist Lesley Stern (1997), a series of indeterminacies involve our encounters with moving images. The uncanny can take you in the form of a self-doubt that can vacillate between life/death, here/there, past/present. In this manner, a dismembered body part tends to throw up a field of indiscernibility.

From this perspective, my studio methods are designed to arouse a sense of throwness as a falling away into everywhere and nowhere. Hence the iterative mirroring of the prosthetic apparatus, in turn captured by the stealth-like camera, in turn projected as split screen large-scale images that coincide with the space of the installation and the space of the recording, yet

54 *The Oxford Dictionary of English* states that an “automaton” is a mechanical device made in the imitation of a human being. See Krauss’ *Passages in Modern Sculpture*, (1981) where she discusses the tradition of the automaton in relation to Surrealist art. She states, “Behind it stands ... a passion to imitate not simply the look of the living creature but to reproduce as well its animation, its discourse with the passage of time” (p. 209).
simultaneously confuse it. In this manner, studio methods aim at underscoring facticity as Verfallenheit (forgetfulness as in falling away from oneself). This exegesis likewise endeavours to provoke a liveness that questions cause and effect relations. The artwork is a locale and, as such, it is the condition for the possibility of being taken by uncanny excess. My own Corridor, Plaza, and Road Series, brings-together the conditions that make room for a space and time of being with the work of art. Technē here does not implicate the objects of technology, but places emphasis on how being there with video installation may orientate bodies as they perform and enact their own being-in-the-world. This is how the essence of the prosthetic opens up moments of vision as a way of revealing uncanny glimpses of self with self.

3.2.2 Meetings with Self and Dreyer’s, Vampyr

Another example of being taken by uncanny excess is captured in the motion picture Vampyr, (1932). Allan Gray, Carl Theodore Dreyer’s main protagonist, bears witness to his own funeral and encounters his own death. The impossibility of meeting oneself in death presences what we forget in this extraordinary situation—we look upon the face of the uncanniness of not being, and this anomaly presences our forgetfulness and our fear of dying.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figures 37, 38 and 39. Vampyr, 1932, Black and white motion picture.55

Gray’s dream body observes his worldly body being carried out of a building in a coffin. There is a small window above his face. As the coffin passes by carried horizontally on its way to the

55 Film stills, screen shots taken from DVD, Vampyr: The Strange Adventure of Allan Gray, (1932).
graveyard, the camera's point of view jumps from Allan Gray watching the coffin, to Allan Gray looking up and out from inside the coffin, to us the bodies of the audience looking back at these proceedings from somewhere else.

Startlingly, one is taken aback by a rift in time where I cannot differentiate between Allan Gray's gaze and my own. Like Freud's reaction to his own reflection, or Brennan's whiff of an atmosphere, this gets into you; it disconcerts you. I do not recognise myself as such. Suddenly, I am seized by uncanny excess alienated from myself by being confronted by myself; I am in excess of my own bounds. Dreyer uses some exquisite camera angles that play on uprooting bodies from themselves, and their contemporaneous encounter of the film. Estranged from one's own being-in-the-world, one moment you watch the film, one moment you are in the film, one moment the film watches you (Gorodi, 2009).

Remembering that we are enmeshed with seizing upon, or neglecting the possibility to be or not to be, through our prosthetic relations. When one is taken by uncanny excess, I propose that Da-sein performs in excess of its own bounds, in excess of a known self. The phenomenon of the uncanny in both Freud and Heidegger suggests this kind of temporal disjuncture within one's understanding of self regarding a disclosing of our belonging\(^\text{56}\) revealed to us in situations involving uncanny excess.

3.2.3 Encountering Guy Sherwin's Man with a Mirror, 1976/2006

Man with Mirror, by the Canadian artist Guy Sherwin, is a performance event that brings-together two performance artworks made at different periods of time into one event.\(^\text{57}\) Here, Sherwin also plays with the notion of meetings with self as somehow split, or fractured, through ambiguity and misrecognition. This complex yet incredibly simple event was created at a retrospective screening in Montreal in 2006. Sherwin projects a historic performance originally recorded in 1976. He re-enacts his own performance by standing in front of the

\(^{56}\) Again being taken by uncanny excess links with Malpas' reading of Ereignis discussed in Chapter 2.

\(^{57}\) I read this encounter as I did with my encounter of Blind Spot, (2003) mediated by a computer screen.
projected film. As he revisits the work, he appears to merge with his own *doppelgänger*. A sense of uncertainty is aroused as the younger Sherwin is brought together at the same time with the older.

![Figure 40. Guy Sherwin, *Man with a Mirror*, 1976-2006. Experimental film Performance (detail) 10mins Colour, Silent, Super 8mm.](http://www.wlv.ac.uk)

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

A live audience is seated in front of the projection area. Sherwin stands in front of the projection with his back to the screen; he is facing the audience and the projector. He holds a flat white panel approximately 1000mm x 900mm in front of his torso. This handheld screen has a mirrored reverse. As he moves, his prosthetic screen can either reflect or capture the projected image omitted from the video projector. In addition, the screen sometimes reflects the audience back to themselves as well as the camera that originally sat on a tripod to film the 1976 performance. Sherwin, 1976, holds a similar panel in front of his body. He is standing in daylight; the sun casts shadows across the face of the panel. As the performance progresses, he begins to turn and flip the piece of board in front of his body. As he turns his body and the board simultaneously from side to side, this reveals the mirrored screen. The reflection multiplies the image and, seemingly, the prosthesis is a magical tool that folds time together. This is something like my encounter with *Vampyr*, although, in this case, one’s look

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58 For a historic perspective on how Performance artworks actively combined the gallery space together with cinema, see Stuart Comer's reference to Expanded Cinema in the 1970s in *Film, Art, Video*, (2009).
is encouraged by different means. Rather than questioning how I am orientated in my encounter, I start to question how the work has been made. How is the image duplicated? Are there a number of mirrors at play? Is there anything behind the projection screen? There is something like misrecognition happening for me as I watch the two performances fold into one another before my eyes. This instance occurs as Sherwin, 2006, appears to meld with his 1976 counterpart. Both the actual performance and the filmed performance begin to morph into something reminiscent of a visual gyroscopic occurrence that intersects and overlaps temporal continuities.

Figure 41. Guy Sherwin, *Man with a mirror*, 1976-2000, (detail) 10mins Colour, Silent, Super 8mm Experimental Film Performance.60

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Dislocated in time, in a sense the two become indiscernible from each other as they merge together as one. As the movements with the mirror become more complex, different points of view are reflected and exposed as the audience makes a kind of audible cooing noise of recognition and delight. The image shifts, inverts, and subverts Sherwin’s body, dissecting and turning legs away from torso. At some point, the mirrored screen captures the audience itself, in its reflection so that one’s spectatorship literally becomes a part of the performance. The audible reaction of the audience alerts me as voyeur—placing me abruptly back into a time of watching the event as something documented. In this sense *Man with a Mirror*, (1976/2006) explores our indeterminacy and our doubt by confronting us with a way of revealing as we look, to suggest the possibility of neither being here nor there. The performance opens us to another *interstice* in time, which ruptures a notion of self as reliable and fixed. This opening to temporality encourages an intricate interplay between audience and video, as it seduces us into experiencing this quasi-magical encounter as both actual and virtual.\(^{61}\) By extension, this temporal merging of self with self across space and time; activates one’s capacity to know where and what one is through another temporal disjuncture. I am not taken by the uncanny here, rather a sense of misrecognition although still an embodied relation, places an emphasis on my conscious cognition, rather than the uncanny excess I encounter with *Vampyr*.

The question arises, does *Man with the Mirror* deal with the uncanny or not? Maybe not purposively or intentionally, and yet, it does appear to lean toward a notion of uncanniness when ambiguity and misrecognition make reference to forgetfulness through disrupting an understanding of the self as fixed in a present time. In comparison to my own project, the possibility of being taken by an uncanny excess with Sherwin’s play on dismembered ambiguity, seems to get overtaken by an instrumentality more geared toward an overt sleight of hand rather than a revealing of *Da-sein’s* throwness. Although a sleight of hand may seduce the spectator by an instrumentally effected sensibility, my practice considers moments of vision in uncanny excess. This is not so much an excess that exposes a trickery or an untruth, but a stealthy tactics of prosthetic relations. The uncanny cannot be manufactured (it is not an

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\(^{61}\) Gregory Flaxman (2000) explains the actual and the virtual are concepts found everywhere in Gilles Deleuze’ work on cinema. The actual is an event of affect that takes place as a virtual occurrence in time, “the virtual is not imaginary but real in the sense in which it is the reservoir on which thought draws in order to bring about the actual” (p. 31). See *The Brain is the Screen* (2000).
object) rather it is a revealing moment, concerned with the disclosure of Da-sein’s throwness in its own space and time.

3.2.4 Stealth and Danger

There is a productive analogy between the phenomena of the uncanny and stealth tactics, that suggests being taken happens seemingly from behind a dissemination of eyes that we don't see coming—the eyes take you by surprise—for an instant, stealth reins.

Paul Virilio (1989) reads the emergence of WWI military prosthetics in the West contemporaneously with developments in early cinema. Photographic cameras were attached to planes for surveillance. In this way, a motility of the lens evolves a technics significant to survival tactics. The images taken from planes form a series of still photographs that build a moving picture of enemy territory. The issues raised by Epimetheus’ error of forgetfulness, vis-à-vis the ongoing character of technical production driven by an indeterminable Angst, could be said to resurface with the paranoia associated with seeing the enemy before the enemy sees you in modern warfare. As survival is directly threatened, the prosthetic camera as a surveillance strategy was clearly connected to concealment and stealth because of the peril of death.

In contextualising my project through dwelling and revealing, there is an element of risk associated with some of the practice (although nothing on a par with war). At times, I do put the life of the camera in danger, along with the possibility of my own safety, liberty, and arrest. In addition, the performances themselves risk closure, as I do not necessarily ask permission to occupy spaces in advance. For example, a security guard closed down the Plaza Series tests since his job description maintained that I was doing something that might be dangerous for passers-by while on University grounds. My reasons for putting myself into these situations are to keep the practice open to modes of spontaneity. Heidegger’s understanding of revealing and disclosure can only happen when the way we look lets something be whatever it is in its own space and time. The most significant moments in the practice seemingly emerge through a way of working on the hoof, through processes of iteration. In re-enacting these tasks, my
iterations appear to have the capacity to disclose something by surprise; much like being taken by uncanny excess, this can only happen when I am not looking for it. This may sound contrary to the essence of “technology as nothing technological,” by suggesting a certain type of instrumentality associated with a production of repetition where supposedly practice makes perfect. In response to this, I am not trying to come up with a perfect answer or outcome, only to reveal something of what it is we forget. At times it works, at others it doesn’t, so my methods place emphasis on the importance of the process itself with regard to a way of looking that involves being seen by the essence of prosthetics.

3.2.5 Encountering Alex Monteith’s, Passing Manouevre, 2008

New Zealand artist Alex Monteith makes video installations that, at times, move beyond the bounds of the law. Her work has often involved speed and danger. Passing Manouevre with two motorcycles and 584 vehicles for two-channel video installation, (2008), is a case in point.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figures 42 and 43. Alex Monteith, Passing Manouevre with two motorcycles and 584 vehicles for two-channel video installation, 2008.62

Her fourteen-minute work comprises of two prosthetic cameras mounted on two separate motorcycles. The two bikes are positioned one in front of the other on Auckland’s Northern Motorway during the morning rush hour. They travel along filming each other in sync; front to back, back to front. They perform an uninterrupted weave, as they move in and out of rows of traffic using an illegal passing manoeuvre that crosses the centre line. This is risky, however my interest in mentioning this work involves how Monteith’s installation evokes a prosthetic lens that involves stealth, and forgetfulness. As Monteith and her counterpart weave across the centre line, her prosthetic lens is an action that causes forgetfulness, not least, forgetfulness of the law pertaining to the road code of New Zealand. Risk and stealth are methods employed in travelling the road in the manner of an illegal act that gets away with going under the radar of the authorities, and without having an accident. I encounter a large-scale installation of the unedited footage projected in the gallery space from floor level to ceiling, and become immersed or absorbed into the work. The motion created by the dual projection can make you nauseous and the noise of the traffic is almost deafening. All these elements combine to reveal a prosthetic lens that presences a forgetfulness, and a fear of death.

Moreover, as I encounter Monteith’s projection, the two-way camera strategy evokes a sense of being looked at as I look. Like Sherwin’s Man with a Mirror, I am not taken by the uncanny as I encounter this projection, but, the artwork is a condition of an ambiguous “coming to presence” of uncanniness through the doubling of a look that cannot quite be placed in either screen, or spectator. There is an oscillation, a sort of doubt raised between body and screen. In this sense, the misrecognition of the whereabouts of one’s self is suggestive of a prosthetic lens.

In Dominion Road Series, my own prosthetic relations take the form of a handmade periscopic device, and through raising the body by half a metre. The added height extends my view. I wear a formal velvet jacket, long black trousers, and riding-type boots in the style of equestrian attire. A body harness is attached to two five-metre lengths of aluminum tube. In turn, the tube is attached to the dolly-cam so that all three cameras shoot contemporaneously with my movements. I am the horse that pushes the carriage along as I walk along the median strip. I am attached to the harness and dolly-cam; the prosthetic device is reminiscent of a horse and trap. The dolly-cam is a small triangular platform supported on three wheels; it
carries one camera. Two other cameras are attached to the periscope. My eye level view is lifted to a height of over six feet by holding the device up to my face.

Figures 44 and 45. Suzie Gorodi, Dominion Road series tests, 2013 (detail) periscope device with two cameras, tripod-camera with three wheels and dolly-harness.

The horse was incorporated into military strategic warfare to give added height and therefore a greater ability to see the enemy at a greater distance. The telescopic lens was employed to extend the military-gaze thereby giving it an advantage over its enemies. Quoting the former United States Under-Secretary of State for Defense, W.J. Perry, Virilio writes, “I’d put it like this: once you can see your target, you can expect to destroy it” (1989, p. 4). Hence, the instigation of a techno-war that raced to extend the military’s visual scope on one hand, coinciding with the adaptation of technical prosthetics for the purpose of concealment from the enemy on the other. As Virilio suggests, stealth weapons extend the military gaze. They are a military prosthetic used as a means of deterrent action. By having the enemy in your sights you protect yourself from annihilation, this is how one deters the enemy. Effectively you become invisible to your enemy by capturing them within your scopic range.63 He suggests, “Weapons are tools not just of destruction but also of perception ... stimulants

63 Virilio (1989) discusses stealth tactics in terms of military deterrent operations. The arms race is a twentieth century standoff born through a prosthetic gaze. Survival in this situation is underscored by the gaining of ground and territory in the form of information. The aberration of war presents our fear of death; for the enemy the spectacle of war produces an image so gruesome that this also works as a form of deterrent. He also sites the notion of the spectacle of war as a military force based upon deception in terms of sympathetic magic. See War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception (1989). For a more in depth discussion on live/performance and installation art through theories of magic and ritual. See Christopher Braddock, Performing Contagious Bodies. (2013).
that make themselves felt through chemical, neurological processes in the sense organs and the central nervous system, affecting human reactions” (p. 8). Such a change of atmosphere takes place through the spatialising action of looking.

As Stiegler’s interpretation of the *Prometheus and Epimetheus* myth reminds us, we have no qualities to cope with existence, the threat of the inevitably of death goes along with us at all times. Our anxiety urges us to produce technics as a way to hold off the inevitable. As we repeatedly attempt to assuage the anxiety created by our fear of death, in turn, we become forgetful that our fear of death produces us in the first place. We carry on and we don’t know why we carry on producing technics—but we do. Integrally bound within a relation of technics, we produce technics without end as such we are driven by an indeterminate anxiety that is always provoking the memory of our fear of dying (Barison & Ross, 2004).
My own practice involves whimsically teasing out a playful absurdity of being. By just popping up and performing from time to time at sites within the urban landscape, these actions may appear overtly absurd within the context of their locale. They don’t happen in a theatre or on stage, but in the city in everyday locations, and by placing these artworks back into the gallery space of the white cube, I produce these actions within a context of performance and video installation art.

In this way, my project reveals situations where the camera appears to take on a life of its own that evokes possibilities for being taken by the uncanny. How might Freud’s “vestigial trace of the archaic reaction” that feels “the double” to be something uncanny, relate to my prosthetics absurd invisibility? For example, when the woman in the pink coat in Quad Series sits as if “nothing” is going on as I noisily perform, I don’t know if she actually sees me, or not. I wonder whether she is purposefully ignoring my performance; maybe she thinks I am bonkers; I will never know what she was thinking. This comment includes passers-by on the street or the road who carry on their business unperturbed by my performances in the proximity of their environment. Are my actions so out of context that for a fraction of time, they go unnoticed? They become a sort of absurdly obvious invisibility, if only for an instant. I am unable to distinguish the answer to this question. In a way, my project suggests that being taken by the uncanny may involve just such an absurd invisibility, as you just don’t see the uncanny coming, and you don’t recognize it as such.

Krell contends that for Heidegger, Da-sein “revolves about a paradox or terrible irony: human being is being in the world and dwelling on the earth—and yet we are never at home in the world, never rooted in the earth” (Krell, 1992, p. 45). For this reason, “When we finally arrive at the ‘there’ of there-being (Da-sein), as Gertrude Stein knew, there isn’t any there there. There there is ash—what Freud knew as traces of ‘the unconscious’” (p. 45).64

The metaphor for the there of being-there as ash is evocative of fire (technics) and its remains.65 Pertinent to this discussion, ash is a residue that arises out of the action of

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64 The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term “unconscious” as, “the part of the mind, which is inaccessible to the conscious mind but which affects behaviour and emotions.” Therefore for Freud, the unconscious mind is related to the Cartesian cogito of the conscious mind and the “I think.”

65 In terms of war and the epitome of instrumentality as technological devastation one could also read the ash of there there—like the residue of Hiroshima—only ash remains.
combustion. The there of being-there is not, “nothing.” Similarly, technology is “nothing technological.” Da-sein is perpetually in a state of motion between concealing and revealing its world to itself in its attunement to other beings. The paradox of being-there outlined by Krell gives us an insight into how Da-sein's fundamental disposition is “never at home in the face of the uncanny,” because the uncanny marks our being we are never there to be seen. What this means is that an invisibility is at play at all times between concealing and revealing. In this way, the paradox of the uncanny is a silent and hidden key to our being-in-the-world.

As with the camera that falls over into the road in Dominion Road Series, exactly whose invisibility we are talking about here becomes unclear. When I am taken by the uncanny, it is as if something other than myself has taken me. Disembodied, one is unsure about where one’s home begins and ends. Like Freud’s dislike of the old gentleman in the glass, when the uncanny grabs you, it is as if a double that you do not recognise is looking back at you from outside of where you expect yourself to be. Lost in a moment, I cannot determine whether I am here or there, in my own space and time, or fluctuating between a strangely distanced sense of place, from somewhere outside of myself, and my own body.

This chapter has explored how a way of looking can involve misrecognition of self and place, underscored by uncanny conditions. Uncanny excess may occur when the eyes we thought we were looking at or through, suddenly look back at us seemingly from an other than human or alternative source, so that I get spooked by my own shadow. A shadow casts a sort of excess that rises up to disrupt one’s Da-sein, as it stealthily captures one within an inexplicable gaze. This prompts me to raise this question, if I am not at home in myself, nowhere to be found, then maybe I am already everywhere and nowhere, and nothing at all?

A liveness looks back at me, away from me, and upon me. A gallows humour somehow focuses in on a temporality of its own making. This making seemingly independent from myself, displaces my world as it is thrown into doubt. Is this occurrence an example of the “archaic reaction which feels the double” (Freud, 1919) —not quite attuned to my Da-sein in its making, but nevertheless attuned to the spectators’ Da-sein upon their encounter.

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66 Gallows humour can be defined as something that makes jokes in the face of the inevitability of death.
I walk down the street dragging the dolly behind me. I am holding the harness arms separately in each hand. The pavement is uneven and I have to navigate the device to allow pedestrians to walk past. Sometimes the dolly-cam falls flat on its face. The camera’s auto focus reveals the texture of the tarmac.
Chapter 4 – Liveness and Revealing

Names carry memory, even if we have never heard them before. (Alexander Garcia Düttmann, 2000, p. 74)

As discussed in Chapter 3, the spectator questions her sense of temporality when taken by the uncanny. The preceding chapters have argued that the prosthetic (camera) is nothing technological, it reveals: a liveness that challenges our encounters with video performance. Yet, it does not do this revealing without our openness to notice its nature as a technology that reveals. In this final chapter, I explore notions of liveness and revealing through momentary openings to the essence of prosthetic relations. Of particular interest is the idea of Da-sein’s facticity in light of questions about the nature of an authentic relationship with world. From this perspective, this chapter addresses a question of authentic liveness with respect to concepts of live performance and its documentation through media arts. I raise questions around the site of performance as a temporal place of my being through fleeting moments in the constitution of a world that is prosthetics. In this manner, my enactment does not halt the look by moving in a single direction, but is ongoing as a prosthetic life emerges to reveal a liveness that challenges our experience through encounters with performance art.

In this context, I refer to performance scholars Peggy Phelan, Amelia Jones, Philip Auslander and Matthew Reason vis-à-vis live performance and documentation relevant to themes of authenticity and disappearance. I also discuss how Jacques Rancière’s (2007) concept of “the ignorant schoolmaster” questions how we look and encounter, by suggesting new modes of spectatorship.

Along the lines of exploring notions of liveness and revealing, Chapter 4 discusses artworks by David Cross, VALIE EXPORT, Rebecca Horn, and Dan Graham. In particular I explore how my own practice makes reference to Horn, and Graham’s artworks.
4.1 Liveness and Performance

As a contribution to thinking about our relations with prosthetic technologies, this PhD thesis situates my own practice as an expression of the "live" at the intersection of performance studies and video installation art. Accordingly, an exegetical reading of performance (through Heidegger’s thinking on *Da-sein’s* facticity) frames my practice from an original perspective. As discussed in Chapter 3, *Da-sein’s* throwness is its factical disposition and homelessness. For the most part this is usually concealed from our *Da-sein*. Situations that undermine our expectations of how we *are* can momentarily reveal our being-not-at-home. In this way, the prosthetic is synonymous with a questioning of the essence of *technē* in that it can expose an uncanny ambiguity in terms of time as a convergence of different, yet contemporaneous, zones of temporality that disseminate the opening up of one’s world throughout a proliferation of bodies.67

My project suggests how a video art practice holds the possibility of a look that is ongoing that *is* the essence of a prosthetic liveness. The *is* is imperative since the *is* raises the notion of a coming to presence in a here and now that involves *Da-sein’s* facticity as thrown. *Da-sein’s* throwness as a projection of possibilities undermines how encounters apparently show up for us through an understanding of time as something linear. *Da-sein’s* throwness means that we are always already in the manner of an understanding of ourselves. As a way of coming to presence, a projection of possibilities is not fixed in time, but a dynamic mode of temporality.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the question of the essence of what *is*, in light of the relevance of one’s own space and time, habitually falls away from *Da-sein*, into “the they.” This set of circumstances brings to light the issue of how one can think about a distinction between live and mediated temporally performed enactment. My project suggests that if all enactment performs *Da-sein* in a relation of *technē*, then our prosthetic relations have utmost relevance to our being-in-the-world. In this way, distinctions between live performance and

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67 This PhD project builds upon the interests touched upon in my Master's project, *Pulse, Pulse, Somersault*, (2009). At that time, my practice did not feature my own body directly. Instead I performed the lens with handheld camera rigs and grips. I do not come from a professional performance background. Yet, through exploring sculpture and bodies I became interested in what it meant to see my body as a performing body in terms of a complex relationship with a camera, a prosthetic, and a video-encounter.
documentation blur and give rise to a way of thinking about the essence of a prosthetic liveness.

4.1.1 Live Performance and Spectatorship

An element of the prosthetic, that we have yet to observe, is the observer. Spectatorship stirs up relationships between live and documented performance. Because performance is ephemeral and transitory, it raises questions about its encounter. The live nature of performance suggests that performance comes “to be” through its disappearance. Peggy Phelan comments:

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes itself through disappearance. (1996, p. 146)

Here Phelan contends that performance’s promise is in the present. Once over, a particular performance event will never take place again. Attempts to preserve performance betray the promise of its existence, since performance transforms into something lesser than the original through re-presentation.

Matthew Reason’s reading of the live archive puts forward the view that “Fears such as these have sparked an academic and social urge to ‘save’ theatre and live performance in general” (2003, p. 82). Phelan insists, “It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation” (1996, p. 148). This state of affairs prompts a number of questions concerning what might constitute the site of performance: Does performance remain in the past, as an event that will never return? If so, is it possible to grasp the already there of one’s own situatedness? What of the memory of those who witnessed the original event? Is their memory (in Phelan’s words) also a betrayal? What about artworks that deal with the subject of re-enactment? What about staged performances such as Vito Acconci’s Photo-Piece, (1969), that may have never had a live audience in the first
How would these ideas relate to Phelan’s notion of a secondary form of performance through its transformation? In terms of questioning the site of performance as an underlying ground, how does live performance and documentation situate the site and understanding of Da-sein in terms of the essence of the prosthetic?

Reason comments that a contradictory thread permeates discussions on performance art in light of a complex association with the notion of disappearance. He states, “Oddly, the idea that live performance must be saved from disappearance is not held as a position incompatible with the valuation of performance as ephemeral” (2003, p. 82). Live performance is ephemeral; its transitory nature underscores its being. At the same time, because live performance is fleeting, it must be saved from disappearance. This highlights the problem of how performance histories are made accessible through documentation, but for Phelan this is a lesser category of the original. She contends that “the economy of reproduction ... betrays and lessons the promise of its own ontology” (1996, p. 146).

Almost in reaction to this idea, Jones, Auslander and Reason suggest performance histories also come to be through disappearance via the notion of trace. Performance involves bodies; these bodies are not neatly self-contained, but leave their residue all over the place; they cannot help but “spill over” across space and time. As Jones (1997) has proposed, neither live performance attendance, nor documentation of live performance, holds a more authentic position in terms of the site of performance in the spectator. As a way of advancing this discussion, I will argue that bodies resist disappearance through already ek-sisting outside of themselves.

From such a perspective, authenticity is a major concept for Heidegger in BT. He reads authenticity from a perspective that suggests that I am not told that something is authentic by

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68 This artwork consists of a grid of images of twelve views of a street scene. A tautological sentence is placed beneath the grid. It reads: “Holding the camera, aimed away from me and ready to shoot, while walking a continuous line down a city street. Try not to blink. Each time I blink: snap a photo” (Acconci, 1969). In other words, Acconci was alone walking down Greenwich Street, NYC, and the twelve still photographs are the only “documentation” of this artwork.
the powers-that-be, but rather, authenticity is revealed to me through the way I am attuned to my own space and time that temporally situates my being-in-the-world.\footnote{For Heidegger, authenticity is not a form of truth as verification or correspondence frozen in time, but concerns truth as relevant to turning toward or away from \textit{alētheia}. This notion of authenticity has a temporal relevance regarding the concealing or revealing of \textit{Da-sein’s} facticity.}

In light of my own project, my focus is a critique of the powers-that-be and a tendency to define the authentic. Authenticity suggests how \textit{Da-sein’s} dwelling\footnote{ Dwelling in terms of \textit{Da-sein’s} factual existence, as discussed in Chapter 3.} is temporality delivered over to it through a concealing revealing action concerned with a notion of liveness and revealing. As suggested in Chapter 1, \textit{Da-sein} is already open to the world before all knowledge and subjectivity. Facticity is the essence of the human condition as it underlies all subjectivity. My project therefore draws upon Heidegger’s more fundamental reading of \textit{Da-sein’s} thowness. \textit{Da-sein’s} thownness highlights the ontological temporality of the spectator by suggesting how \textit{Da-sein} is \textit{always already} in the manner of understanding of itself, this understanding can reveal a temporality of past and present, future and having-been. This understanding of temporality is not limited to time in terms of a seeming chronological order of events, but something more dynamic and fluid.

In reference to Acconci’s \textit{Photo-Piece}, Auslander suggests that since we will never actually know whether Acconci performed the piece or not, passers-by are unimportant to the work. He states, “the presence of that initial audience has no real importance to the performance as an entity whose life is through its documentation” (2006, p. 6). By underscoring authenticity in relation to the performance document and its audience, Auslander does away with the original live performance and its audiences’ ongoing contribution to the work.

My project argues that this emphasis undermines the existence of passers-by at the time of the artworks making, and by doing so, denies them their own space and time. This intention is highlighted when he proposes that the document’s authority is phenomenological rather than ontological.\footnote{In “The Performance of Performance Documentation,” (2006), Auslander discusses performativity and documentation by using phenomenological and ontological frameworks to establish an argument for authenticity, but uses these terms unproductively when taking us back to a notion of performance that resides exclusively in the site of the beholder. He writes:} Is Auslander suggesting that a knowledge of lived experience takes precedence over a knowledge of what already exists?
Let’s say for a moment that relations between performance and document, and performance and audience, are equally important to each other as these relations are not distinctly separate categories, but belong-together, in this sense these bodies are of each other. Following this, my practice underscores the importance of passers-by. If I were to deny or negate the existence of other beings, this would halt our looking and its movement as ongoing. Otherwise said, the site of performance as a temporal mode of Da-sein does not place emphasis on “authenticity” in relation to the phenomenological over the ontological. Rather, my own reading of a prosthetic liveness places a notion of authenticity, if there is one at all, upon moments of vision that open our Da-sein to the possibility of apprehending how it is always already temporally situated in a manner of understanding itself and other beings. Our coming to presence is more than merely fixed at the chronological point in time of my encounter of live performance or its documentation. Rather, as a way of revealing our forgetful situatedness, a prosthetic liveness exposes us to ourselves as “already having-been.”
Standing in the gallery, the noise is almost deafening. The abstract images on the screens either side of me, appear to whizz past; this causes my body to wince, my eyes are twitching.

_Corridor Series_ (2012-2014), is not a direct re-enactment of Rebecca Horn’s early work, my own practice nevertheless draws out a strong libidinal presence. While my practice has a strong kinship with her performance artworks, my task is to evoke _Da-sein’s_ own space and time through an iterative process.72

72 In relation to the notion of a strong libidinal presence, a prosthetic liveness might arouse a kind of tacit haptic feminine body. This reading might reveal the prosthetic as an empowering female sexuality. In _The Artist’s Body_, Tracey Warr and Amelia Jones discuss the legacy of feminist performance artists work of the 70s, these artists performed “self-enactments [that] negotiate Modernism’s repression of the artist’s body by proposing fully embedded and socially relevant feminist bodies that are also specific ‘selves’” (2000, p. 21). I could propose that the action of my taking off and putting on the harness in _Corridor Series_, suggests the hourglass figure. In corsetry
My early tests produced four large-scale screens that surround the bodies of the audience in order to prompt a sense of being absorbed within the body of the installation. A prosthetic liveness in terms of Da-sein’s facticity does not take place without the various bodies concerned in making and projecting my videos (including the gallery space). When encountered as an installation in the gallery, the prosthetic arm extensions in Corridor Series seem to horizontalise the hierarchy of the senses in a synoptic body (as discussed in Chapter 2). Sound, sight and touch appear to resonate with each other on a level plane. How does this leveling action reveal a prosthetic liveness under circumstances that make one more available to understanding how we ek-sist outside of ourselves as a relation of technē?

this both restricts and facilitates a female body in light of the male gaze. However, by making reference to historic feminist performance artworks with my own practice, my concerns do not revolve around a question of gender. That said there are feminine agendas at play in the practice that are implicit to the work, rather than made explicit in this exegesis. Although my practice is indebted to feminist performance artists such as, Horn and VALIE EXPORT (discussed shortly in this chapter), it would be imprudent to try to avoid a feminist reading of the work on some level. One cannot get away from the reading the spectator brings to the work. As a female artist who is featured in the practice, I am mindful of a feminist field of study. While re-enactment in performance art complicates slippery notions of authenticity by bringing the validity of the original into question through ambiguity, parody in a post-modern era arose as a deconstructive style of questioning the terms of spectatorship. Although my performances are not re-enactments per se, I am cognisant of the trope of re-enactment in performance documentation. My own performances do reference historically pertinent artworks more specifically; my iterations perform a kind of re-enactment of themselves through a series of open-ended tests. In this manner, my practice plays with my own socially relevant female body. In extension of this discussion, in terms of my own projects concerns with a prosthetic liveness and spectatorship, Rebecca Schneider raises questions around authenticity pertaining to live performance documentation and spectatorship. She proposes how different ways of remembering take place through witnessing that can "resist a cultural thrill to the ocular – a thrill that would delimit performance as that which cannot remain to be seen” (2001, p. 101). Here, she suggests a way to resist the dominance of visual mastery that regards an authentic artwork as something conventionally associated with an authentic original. From a feminist reading one could suggest that visual mastery predominantly becomes associated with a male gaze. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this project, the question of gender specifics regarding Da-sein, and the essence of the prosthetic, would entail moving beyond the confines of this PhD project. Although this issue could give rise to possibilities for future research, I will leave this discussion here. For a discussion of spectatorship and witnessing in relation to the live archive, see Rebecca Schneider “Archives Performance Remains,” (2001).
My body flinches as a loud noise abruptly disturbs me. This causes the screens on either side of my face to physically scrape my body. Sound scrapes against my skin in a palpable way it is there as it touches me.

By placing emphasis on the corporeity\(^73\) of the body, I question how the scopic might resonate with the haptic. Working with multiple cameras and multiple screens contemporaneously, I endeavour to hasten a sense of touch in looking in the spectator by placing an emphasis on the body’s ability to visually palpate and communicate.\(^74\) What does thinking about attunement reveal to me about my own space and time in my body? What does a look that touches disclose to me about the essence of the prosthetic?

\(^73\) The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the term corporeity as the quality of having a physical body or existence.  
\(^74\) For a way of looking that palpates and communicates, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s *chiasm* discussed in Chapter 2.
I am trying to keep my prosthetic arms in contact with the ceiling. I have to stretch upward extending my arms above my head. At the same time, I have to get up on to the tips of my toes to reach. Sometimes I miss the surface, I have to keep re-aiming to keep in contact. It’s difficult to keep my balance. I need to make a turn 180 degrees. I have to move the arms by taking small upside-down steps. At other moments, I negotiate with my hips in order to rotate my torso within the dolly-harness. I am holding my arm extensions. I can feel the harness around my middle. It feels like I am wearing trousers that have lost the elastic; my hips appear to automatically hitch up the harness as my arms are occupied with bearing the weight of the two cameras. This seems somehow relative to the prosthetic receding. I don’t know when or how this happens, just that, at times these actions arouse a forgetfulness of the prosthetic in its use.

Figure 50. Suzie Gorodi, Corridor Series, 2013 (detail) dolly-harness with two arm extension devices, tripod camera view.
The prosthetic receding makes me think about the way I am *attuned* to the work.

Heidegger writes, “In order to be able to ‘really’ get to work ‘lost’ in the world of tools and to handle them, the self must forget itself” (1996, p. 324). Things have relevance for us, or not, within a self-reflexive context. I forget myself in an embodied way of looking highlighted through a prosthetic relation. Attunement reveals a totality of things at hand. I must look beyond things as objects that form relations, and, instead, look in their place to the relations themselves. I can get lost in using the prosthetic, and as this happens, its relevance as a relation of subject/object thinking recedes, and yet, in forgetting the self and the prosthetic, I am made more available to my own facticity.

These circumstances mark how I am attuned to the prosthetic, not just when I use my devices to make my videos, but also as I use the prosthetic by encountering my videos at
a later stage. This makes me think about the relevance of the prosthetic to a self. In relation to a question of relevance Heidegger writes, “A specific kind of forgetting is essential for the temporality that constitutes being in relevance” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 324). My desire to explore the essence of action by questioning cause and effect relations prompts me to ask; How is it that a self (as temporal being) may be revealed when forgetting the prosthetic?

I walk with my prosthetic devices in-tow. As I question my bodily orientation within the artwork, I get a sense that there is something revealed in the way that the prosthetic recedes for me. Accordingly, I wonder about how my being is part of the prosthetic itself. Is this something to do with my being attuned to my own space and time? Along these lines, Heidegger stresses that situations only have relevance for us through Da-sein’s concern for its own existence. He writes, “Da-sein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its possibility to be itself or not to be itself …. We come to terms with the question of existence always only through existence itself” (1996, p. 10). As the self recedes into forgetfulness, does this signal how our prosthetic relations ek-sist in an embodied liveness with respect to Da-sein’s facticity? From this perspective, a kind of temporal dynamic takes place between artist, spectator, and artwork. Not in the sense of a video work representing or mirroring time, but in the sense of encouraging Da-sein’s own space and time. In this sense, the projector, the gallery, this exegesis, the artist’s body, the prosthetic device, the camera, passers-by, the corridor, bits of tape, or clouds of sound—are not additions to a body, but ek-sist as a different expression of the live. The video encounter itself opens up a world for us that is us—we are a kinesis of the living. Stiegler reminds us: “Technics and man are indissociable. The phenomenon of hominization is the phenomenon of the technicization of the living. Man is nothing other than technical life” [sic] (Barison & Ross, 2004, 4:45). A receding of the prosthetic somehow brings forth, reveals my temporal being, as something to do with my own prosthetic liveness.
Corridor Series questions how the spatiality of a public thoroughfare has a potential for bringing forth the essence of a prosthetic liveness. In contrast to Auslander’s (2006) comments on the irrelevance of passers-by, mentioned earlier, I consider how passers-by affect my walking. The quiet of the corridor is always open to being disrupted by bodies moving in and out of its boundary. Sometimes other bodies are unwittingly absorbed into a performance. These tests are always vulnerable to being unsettled by forces beyond one’s control. Pedestrians and other beings that move, (the cars that rush past me or the motorcycle that performs a wheelie in Dominion Road Series), these moving bodies have the potential to close down, or open up, a performance. These moving bodies are important to my practice since they reveal the corridor, or road, to me as well as to the camera. In this sense with me there, the essence of the corridor or road is also revealed through these moving bodies.
The air is warm and still in the passageway. I carry on with the task at hand. I can feel the dolly-harness slipping down onto my hips. Sometimes, other moving bodies affect my progress. I find myself going along-with, as we quietly, somehow automatically negotiate the corridor as an atmospheric liveness gets into me.

Figure 53. Suzie Gorodi, Corridor Series, 2013 (detail) dolly-harness with two arm extension devices, tripod camera view with passer-by (1).
A couple of workmen are having a conversation. Initially they don’t appear to notice me. The camera captures a reaction. In turn, as discussed in Chapter 3, the gathering together of the artwork is the condition of this locale. It allows the spatiality of the corridor to be opened up. This opening up of space reveals how these incidents draw attention to a prosthetic liveness.

As the camera moves past the doorway a group of people are having a conversation off the corridor. A prosthetic liveness is revealed through the camera, the corridor, the group of people in the room, the projector, and us as we read this exegesis in an occasion that brings the essence of the prosthetic to light. As with my earlier mention of passers-by, a prosthetic liveness itself becomes a passer-by and the group is not separate from what has relevance to the practice. This is how the essence of action makes me question the nature of the relation itself. A prosthetic liveness suggests a way of looking that sees the essence of other beings as they are. My attunement to this artwork is like a blind spot that sees as both my *Da-sein*, and
the being-there of the group in the room see one another as they are. In our being-there we are relevant to each other. Reminding us of the Prometheus and Epimetheus myth, once more, Prometheus’ error of forgetfulness suggests our existence is inextricably bound up with technics (fire). In this manner, my project shows this through exploring the essence of a prosthetic liveness.

4.2.1 Exploring the Essence of a Prosthetic Liveness

The Australian/New Zealand performance artist David Cross creates performance artworks that touch upon themes of spectatorship and participation. *Pump* (2009) is an inflatable
prosthetic viewing device. The device is a box supported on the shoulders incorporating two foot pumps. His performance (created for Performance Studies International, Zagreb, as part of the project Random Entrant curated by Christopher Braddock) plays with the life of the prosthetic. Two “pumpees” become a tripod that facilitates a prosthetic camera. Essentially, the bearer of the device must pump air into the device to keep it inflated in order to see the eye of the artist. Initially, the artist pumps on his own, and as it appears to be difficult for him to keep pumping on his own, he tries to draw passers-by into participating with the artwork. As the Weblog Relational Prosthetics, notes, “Pump is a performance that examines how small-scale sculptural objects might be utilised to draw strangers into a curious dialogue” (“David Cross - Pump, 2009,” 2010). This dialogue plays with a liveness of the prosthetic.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 56. David Cross, Pump, 2009. (detail) screen shot taken from:

75 Cross was born with an unusual eye condition. He has two sets of eyelashes. See David Cross, Some Kind of Beautiful, (2006).
Two participants face each other as they pump. This performance questions the site of performance from the perspective of participation rather than contemplation. A conversation with Chris Braddock alerted me to a more detailed account of what the device entails. Once inside, one’s head is held tightly in place by the inner walls. A shaft runs between pumpees. One does not see one’s pumping counterpart directly. One’s view has been somewhat skewed by whatever the channel is doing. Much like the mirror reflected view captured by the periscope in my own *Dominion Road Series*, one’s line of vision is displaced enough to make one aware of how one is orientated to *Pump*.

In this way of looking through the device makes me think about how liveness can be revealed through action. Like the loud disturbance in *Corridor Series*, a liveness can be revealed to us when our looking is disrupted in some way. In *Pump*, you have to pump, you are inextricably enmeshed with your partner and the device, so much so that you do not know where the prosthetic begins or ends. Our *look* is somehow displaced from its usual expectation of how things are. This displacement alerts us to a kind of liveness about ourselves, and the camera. These anomalies question how an embodied looking reveals something about a prosthetic liveness encouraged within spectators’ encounters as they participate in the performance. We are the performance itself in our participating temporal being. Therefore, the site of performance becomes more than something we look at in the sense of subject/object relations. Rather, the site of performance is a liveness; is looking that embodies and reveals the look itself as it is.

This look is complex as it involves variable actions that move beyond the scope of our cairn. This makes me think about where performance resides in relation to how we access past performance histories through documentation. For Phelan (1996), attempts to preserve performance through documentation betray the promise of its own existence. A derivative imitation of an original is a betrayal in the sense of the authentic original. She suggests how writing about past performance presents a difficult test, because documenting performance histories often has a tendency to fall into the descriptive. Or, as Heidegger (1996) suggests, we have a tendency to fall away from our *Da-sein* into the various forms of “the they.” As said, whenever we are able to rationally explain something, we feel more at ease within ourselves.

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76 A conversation with Chris Braddock in Auckland on 12 December, 2013.
Phelan brings to light how performatives enact themselves through a self-referential reflexivity.\(^{77}\) Reason (2003) suggests that the policies of the live archive unwittingly devalue spectatorship in relation to live collective and individual memory by substituting the memory of the archive for that of the spectator. Nevertheless, he argues for a transformation in the individual memory of spectators as he suggests a new way of reading performance histories documented by the archive “as detritus, not completeness” (p. 82). An emphasis on detritus can be seen to resonate with how we reiterate performance art practice, since this is an opportunity to develop our self-referential reflexivity by means of performative utterance, rather than description.

This transformation in memory takes place in the site of performance as a modality of bringing-forth the individual memory of spectators. This mode of bringing-forth suggests how \textit{technē} belongs with \textit{poiēsis}. In this context the individual memories of spectators are underscored by their own temporal mode of being, bringing-forth moments of vision that question the underlying ground of the site of performance. In this sense, my own video artworks (iterations) explore what it might mean to question ways of looking that reveal a prosthetic liveness. Seemingly, erstwhile live archive policies offering suspect claims to authenticity are disarmed, made inert, brought to bear through a technics of its own undoing. The number of reiterations or distances between the original performance and its subsequent reception become irrelevant. Memory is transformed as it moves away from the frozen archive, to be revealed once more through our individual \textit{Da-sein}.\(^{78}\)

My project uncovers a prosthetic liveness in excess of both live performance and documentation. This excess operates as more than distinctions between: live/document, human/non-human, gallery space/the street and artist/spectator. In this way, prosthetic relations provide a context for reading the essence of technics through \textit{Da-sein’s} factical existence. This is how a radical externalisation of memory \textit{ek-sists} through our prosthetic relations relations involving liveness and revealing. This is not a derivative of an original but

\(^{77}\) Phelan (1996) remarks on J. L. Austin’s sense of action in itself, as mentioned in Chapter 1, when she writes, “Performance’s challenge to writing is to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than … constative utterances … Performative speech acts refer only to themselves, they enact the activity the speech signifies” (p. 149). See Peggy Phelan, \textit{Unmarked}, (1996).

\(^{78}\) The apparatus of the live archive itself can collapse into forgetfulness under these conditions.
an “unconcealing of its already there” in the world, and in this respect, revealing involves a Heideggerian sense of authenticity.

Liveness and revealing, as concepts, question the site of performance put forward by the live archive’s claim to an authentic memory. Cross’ *Pump* is a homage to VALIE EXPORT’S *Touch Cinema*, 1968. EXPORT straps a faux miniature theatre to her chest. She stands topless beneath her appendage as she physically offers her body to a crowd of bystanders who may insert their hands behind the closed curtains of the theatre for a period of twelve seconds. This risky work literally activates the idea of looking through touch.79 Here, contemporary

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79 EXPORT’s oeuvre is often interpreted from a feminist perspective (Widrich, 2011). *Touch Cinema* exposes a gaze that objectifies the female body in its looking. See Mechtild Widrich, “Location and Dislocation,” (2011). In addition, arising from the conversation with Chris Braddock on 12 December, 2013, *Pump* appeared to elicit different responses from men and women. Whilst male participants pumped away exuberantly, the women seemed to take their time pumping in unison with the artist, one female participant keeping in unison with the artist for about twenty minutes.
performance art amplifies problems (augmented in the 1960s) inherent to Da-sein in terms of getting to the essence of technology.

To return to an earlier question of how live performance is evidenced through documentation ephemera (photographs, texts, films, videos, and so forth) and how one views a notion of what constitutes liveness, we must consider where liveness dwells in the first place. This idea raises the problem of how one locates the site of performance histories. Touch Cinema and Pump play with different aspects of spectatorship. Pump reveals a liveness that is part and parcel of the camera itself. We (the participants) are compelled to pump in order to reveal the other participant and to enable the performance itself. For EXPORT, through physically activating the touch that sees, she subverts how we understand the nature of looking itself, as does Cross’ obfuscated view between pumpees.
To recap a key relationship between liveness and the prosthetic, and the essence of technology in these artworks questions a notion of what is revealed through live enactment. This is how the essence of the prosthetic enacts a liveness and revealing that belong-together in our prosthetic relations. My being-there in my own space and time is revealed to me as something embodied through prosthetics. This way of thinking opens my existence, if only for a moment, to my own primordial temporality and situatedness, as a liveness that belongs to my physical body and notion of self, but also to the prosthetic. In turn, I am embodied, in the sense of questioning the way things seem. A moment of vision radically reveals the essence of technology that is my temporal being. This opening to my relations with prosthetics allows me to grasp my “existential situatedness” in its liveness as something that belongs with the essence of technology.

What is decisive here is how my project is driven to question the essence of action through questioning cause and effect relationships. This is what thinking about the essence of a prosthetic makes me question about the nature of looking. This has a bearing on how we view “live” performance and its so-called recordings or documentations. As suggested by Fóti in Chapter 1, if the world as picture is the mark of Modernity and this is what reduces our ability to see, then a look limited to subject/object ways of relating is the underlying ground that enables a loss of insight. Heidegger puts forward the abandonment of the notion of intentionality and of the concept of subject. He proposes that being is ontologically prior to all subjectivity. Taking up the notion of Da-sein’s pre-ontological status, my project suggests that a primordial liveness underscores prosthetic relations only known to me through subject/object dichotomies.

To repeat, the essence of the prosthetic is nothing technological, it reveals: it has a liveness that challenges our experience of video performance whenever “we view action as only cause and effect” (Heidegger, 1946, p. 217). Heidegger suggests that we can rethink the essence of action as cause and effect, and this way of questioning experience is at the nucleus of my project. In questioning the essential underlying ground that enables action as cause, the prosthetic allows our looking to unfold into the fullness of its essence as temporal being. Liveness and revealing enact my time and place in the world as temporal and performative. I question the site of performance, as I question how I look. Who looks at me? Where am I situated within this process of looking? If I am liveness, where does liveness dwell in the first
place? This line of questioning can be expanded upon with regard to how we look and encounter, with Jacques Rancière’s approach to equality in spectatorship.

4.3 Spectatorship and Equality

My project suggests that the possibility of learning something new is brought to bear through modes of spectatorship that question the essence of the prosthetic. How can modes of spectatorship presence worlds differently? Rancière (2007) suggests that we can learn something new about spectatorship from a foundation based on equality. The notion of equality emerges as an opportunity to strengthen an exegetical reading of performance in light of a prosthetic liveness. Rancière cites teaching and learning methods based on an inequality of two intelligences. A master continually reaffirms that the pupil holds less knowledge than the master; this creates a gap between knowledge and ignorance. Rancière’s term for this situation is “stultification.” So it appears that stultification is a result of a reading of the live archive, and not of the archive itself. Its not that the archive is a material collection of ephemera i.e. photographs, texts, or videos, of past performance, but how each spectator’s encounter of these traces enables them to apprehend something of the performance itself. In this manner, my project suggests that the archive is as much a prosthetic viewing device as a telescope or a pair of binoculars. It is not the fact that something is, or is not prosthetic, but what we take from the prosthetic in its use that creates meaning for us. This view challenges a loss of insight that would limit understanding to thinking involving subject-object relations.

Reason (2003) suggests the live archive involves a didactic80 approach to conveying information regarding performance histories. From a certain view, the live archive is a constructed memory. It can also be thought of as a memory-support as discussed in Chapter 1. When viewed as a constructed memory, the live archive holds information for future generations of spectators sanctioned by archive policies. In this way, it controls a flow of information pertaining to performance histories. Like an inequality between master and pupil, this approach closes down the contribution of spectators in their own space and time.

80 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the term “didactic” as something intended to teach, in the manner of a teacher, particularly, to appear patronising.
Rancière (2007) suggests the equality of two intelligences. This creates equality between master and pupil through introducing the “paradox of the ignorant master.” The paradox of the ignorant master is a radical turn around of the terms of spectatorship as it recognises that the pupil will learn what the master does not know and the master acknowledges that s/he is likewise in a process of learning. Rancière’s approach is interesting for my project regarding his sense of equality. The paradox of the ignorant master questions spectatorship as a quiet mode of being with video performance. Rather than standing over and against our encounters with video artworks, this solicits the temporal space, and place, of the individual memory of individual spectators as they are. Our prosthetic relations act as an ignorant schoolmaster by letting oneself and other be.

The rhythmic pumping of two pumpees in Cross’ Pump, (2009) draws out participation between spectator and artist in the terms of equality. This drawing out rhythmically embodies the prosthetic in its temporal being. The action of pumping enacts the prosthetic in its own space and time. The artwork, artist, and audience are equals. In a discussion of video encounter, this clears a space for some sort of presencing to come forth. This happens for both artist and spectator. As with the conversation in Chapter 2 that explored Hill’s employment of temporality as a protracted flicker in Blind Spot, this discussion questions the essence of spectatorship. Likewise, the essence of the prosthetic reorganises spectatorship on its own terms. This is my question: by endeavouring to develop new ways of looking in spectatorship, how can Rancière’s sense of equality presence different worlds? How can different expressions of the live reveal Da-sein’s factual liveness?

4.4 A Live Archive is a Prosthetic

Reason (2003) encapsulates the live archive, as “a desire motivated by an awareness of the inevitable disappearance of live performance” (p. 82). In response to this, and from a Heideggerian perspective, the live archive is a technics that causes forgetfulness through the illusion of an authentic claim to memory; it is driven along by a fear of disappearance. In this
way, an indeterminate urge that produces us as a relation of technē involves how Da-sein is always caught up in its concern for its own survival. Reason states:

Nowhere in the arts can the desire to simply stop things from disappearing, and the feeling that one is able to access the past, be stronger than in the live performance archive. The performing arts archive represents the officially sanctioned collecting, cataloguing, preserving, and consecrating of traces of past performances. (p. 83)

The consecrating of traces of past performance motivates archive policies to proclaim the notion of a genuine and trustworthy memory that allows access to “authentic” past i.e. performance histories. This situation is of concern because a claim of authenticity is often slippery. The preservation of performance histories might put forward the notion of the live archive as an officially sanctioned memory, but this cannot avoid participating in a privileged and unstable ideological framework emerging from the academy, rather than the individual. A potential for new forms of spectatorship and artistic experimentation to emerge may be compromised under these circumstances. The policies of the live archive, albeit with the best of intentions, forego what it is at stake for live performance in its essence as a way of revealing. The live archive brings to mind ideas around authenticity, and memory, in terms of a technics driven by a fear of disappearance. In other words, the live archive is also a kind of revealing.

Reason comments, quoting Eugenio Barba, in relation to a notion of live spectatorship that, “theatrical performance resists time not by being frozen in a recording but by transforming itself” (2003, p. 86). He notes that this sense of transformation, “is found in the individual memories of individual spectators ... if you value performance because of its liveness, then memory must be a more appropriate site for any trace or afterlife than the frozen and unchanging archive” (p. 86). Importantly this is in relation to a resistance of time through a transformation found in the individual memories of individual spectators that ultimately leads to a transformation in the conditions of live spectatorship governed by the live archive itself.

81 In relation to experimentation in the arts, economics limits the boundary of experimentation. See Jean François-Lyotard’s essay, The Post Modern Condition, (1979).
Reading performance through Heidegger’s thinking on *Da-sein’s* facticity, involves a different expression of the live. As the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus evokes, we are susceptible to forgetfulness for as long as we live. *Da-sein* is a relation of *technē* and technology causes forgetfulness driven by our fear of dying. From this perspective, a different expression of the live is located in prosthetic relations. To summarise at this point, the site and understanding of *Da-sein* is its liveness; and the possibility of revealing its facticity through a prosthetic liveness (camera or otherwise). This is how liveness questions the site of performance through questioning the essence of action through *looking*. Indistinguishable from a questioning of the essence of *technē*—the essence of the prosthetic is “nothing technological,” but is a way of revealing. A different expression of the live brings forth *Da-sein’s* situatedness through an embodied revealing that gets *into* the spectator.

The live archive is a prosthetic when viewed through our fear of death in relation to a fear of disappearance. In this case, our fear drives us to produce technics in the first place. In this context: How can a technics that causes a loss of insight, at the same time reveal a liveness?

Tracey Warr and Amelia Jones suggest that Rebecca Horn employs her own performing body in such a way that “prosthetic attachments provide an extension of the body that increases its ability to communicate, thereby creating a new hybrid body beyond the physical limits of the human scale” (Warr & Jones, 2000, p. 178). For me, there can be no extension of the body or hybrid body, in that my project explores how the essence of the prosthetic reveals. If a hybrid suggests a new amalgam, my approach to the concept of the prosthetic suggests something already there. How can the situatedness of *Da-sein’s* facticity as already there reveal a prosthetic liveness? Horn literally extends her physical body across space and time through keeping a distance between herself and her surroundings.
In the performance work *Finger Gloves* (1972), Horn’s prosthetic device both extends and restricts her engagement with the things in her immediate environment.\(^{83}\) Like the novice who wields a set of chopsticks, as one’s body tries to get at a piece of food, the prosthesis pushes it away. Maddeningly, just at the moment the food is about to enter the mouth, it drops off the end of the device. One’s exasperation questions the essence of action as cause. In a similar way, Horn’s *Finger Gloves* perform simultaneously as both the ground that enables the

\(^{82}\) This image is taken from Tracey Warr & Amelia Jones, *The Artists Body*, (2000).

\(^{83}\) Horn began building her prosthetics whilst confined to a sanatorium for lung poisoning where she started fashioning prosthetic body extensions as a way of navigating and making sense of her environment. The toxic materials she had been working with at art school were the catalyst for her illness. Restricted to a hospital bed, “she started to, develop ideas for communicating with people through constructions centered on her body” (Warr & Jones, 2000, p. 183).
prosthetic and its constant barrier. Essentially, Horn’s prosthesis throws up an existential paradox. The enabling force of her prosthesis recedes in the face of its own enablement. This work performs a frustrating oscillation between what appears ready to hand, and present to hand, as discussed in Chapter 1. As I encounter Horn’s live performance through this photograph, I am aware that I, likewise, perform Horn’s actions in my encounter. The finger gloves themselves contemporaneously appear to fall toward and away from memory for user and audience all at once. This encounter makes me think about how a temporal liveness explores the essence of the prosthetic through the condition of my own space and time.

4.4.1 Placing Emphasis on Da-sein’s Facticity in its Own Space and Time (real time)

In my own practice I record my performances in real time and, in so doing, reflect on how Da-sein might apprehend its own situatedness through an understanding of reflexivity. Our reflexivity, understood as the concern Da-sein has for its own existence, does not entail a before or after, but a coming to presence in one’s own space and time. Mindful of these performances and their consequent reprojection at a later stage, I do not perform for a live audience in the traditional sense; however, as already mentioned, my recordings do involve the public, passers-by, moving vehicles, happenstances and occurrences that take place at the time of recording. These bodies embody a collective presencing of the prosthetic (camera and other devices) through establishing a world. This cannot take place without the recorded past performance reprojected at a stage, projected across multiple screens, bodies, projectors, or devices. In this way, these actions challenge apparent temporal appearances of past and present through iterations of performance as a different expression of the live.

I use a low-tech approach, which means that my videos are recorded on small high definition camcorders. These cameras are not employed for the purpose of HD quality. Rather, I use these cameras because their conveniently small size and weight makes it easier for me to perform with all three cameras at once. I avoid using HD in my video’s final projection since this might feed into a kind of visual mastery that I am trying to get away from in the practice. As with my temporal encounter of Blind Spot, and the discussion of a pro-filmic technics of the

84 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the term “real time” as the actual time during which a process or event occurs.
cinematic apparatus in Chapter 2, I do not wish to create a subterfuge for a spectator—I am not looking for perfection.

My camera recordings reveal their own jarring imperfections. Nevertheless, the practice has a potential to open bodies to ruptures in time as a way to bring something of a prosthetic liveness forth. My rationale is that these messy and haphazard projections assist with creating images that urge embodied encounters with these artworks. However, a revealing of spectators to themselves would take place differently for each individual *Da-sein*. Seemingly, some of the most powerful openings to a dynamic sense of my own temporal being become apparent not when the disruption on screen is at its height, but in fleeting micro moments, that take me beyond an expectation of how and where I am. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3 in terms of uncanny excess, as the camera is placed on the ground at the beginning and end of the performance, the third camera’s weight in the neck harness causes its point of view to slowly gravitate toward the floor face down. Something strange takes me as a
spectator, as I start to question where and whom I am in relation to the screen and camera. In this manner, the practice focuses on the possibility of primordial openings to temporality that belong to past, present, future, and having-been, through a series of prerecorded unedited performances that are then projected in video installations in the gallery.

This temporally dynamic suggestion of a prosthetic liveness resonates with Fóti’s notion of insight that solicits and relinquishes the look, “in soliciting appearance, it also relinquishes itself to appearance, and to being encountered by the other” (2003, p. 82). As Phelan writes:

A full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence. (1996, p. 149)
The sense of acknowledgement Phelan expresses describes a reciprocal and reflexive way of looking. As Da-sein’s having-been is a projected throwness into the world, it already eksists outside of itself. This means that Da-sein has a capacity for reflexivity through its essential distance from itself in the world. Our world is inherent in our facticity. In revealing, we grasp our situatedness through a reflexive way of looking that looks back at us in “the look.”

Figure 62. Suzie Gorodi, *Corridor Series*, 2013 (detail) dolly-harness with two arm extension devices, tripod camera view.

*I need to start all the cameras at once and then get into my device. It’s awkward getting the harness on, sometimes the dolly-cam gets stuck against the wall, and since I am stuck in the harness four metres away from the dolly-cam, sometimes I need to take the harness off again.*
in order to sort the dolly-cam out. It’s a bit of a struggle to remember how to take the device off. At times, I get confused so it can get quite messy. At other times, it just happens like my body already knows what to do.

The actions I perform in Corridor Series build upon Horn’s actions in their own way. Where Horn’s video work uses a single channel, my own practice employs three cameras. Of these three different views, two look away from me and one looks at me from a fixed distance. In 2012 my iterations involved an independent camera placed on a tripod. For the later series made in 2013, I fashioned a dolly-harness prosthesis. I wanted all my cameras to record and move in-sync with my actions. The harness created a fixed distance between my body and the camera on the dolly. This appears to complicate a notion of distance involving reflexivity. Do I need an amount of distance from myself? If I am here with myself, how is it possible that I am also there, at a distance, and yet, still here? How does my Da-sein know what to do? How does an embodied knowing implicate a way of revealing how and what or where I am?

As discussed earlier, my own video practice is not performed in front of a live audience as such, but is recorded and replayed at a later stage, across multiple channels. My performance practice is a different expression of either a live enactment of a performance, or the enactment of a body through contact with its documentation. The bodies concerned, in encounters of my own practice, come up against a recording made in real time featuring a live performance in the live space-time of their own motility and encounter with the media. This takes place through liveness and revealing. In this manner, my installations involve a complex enfolding of temporal conditions as the look doubles over itself again, and again. This enfolding action undermines a notion of spectatorship governed by a unidirectional way of looking. Accordingly, Lesley Stern has theorised the indeterminacies pertaining to our encounters of moving images. She comments:

The cinema gives us the experience of time, but in temporalizing it plays all the time on a series of indeterminacies: here/there, appearance/disappearance, life/death, past/future .... The cinema taps our imagination, our unconscious, to produce a sensory affect of dissonance at the very moment of identity. (1997, para 3)
A sensory affect of dissonance reveals our habitual tendency to fall away from ourselves. Something slips away from us, something eludes us. A revealing liveness resonates with Stern’s sense of indeterminacy in a reflexive way of looking that infolds the temporal conditions between Da-sein’s motility, space and time, in our encounters of moving images. This project suggests that this mirroring dissonance reflects how a prosthetic liveness retains the means of relevance to make possible ways of revealing.

4.4.2 Encountering Rebecca Horn’s Two Hands Touching Both walls Simultaneously, 1974

In the single channel video performance, Two Hands Touching Both Walls Simultaneously (1974), Horn uses her finger gloves in a different way to Finger Gloves. This time her finger gloves are white. They appear to be approximately as long as the difference between her outstretched arms and the adjacent walls of the room she endeavors to navigate.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.
The camera’s point of view frames an open doorway from the perspective of the fourth wall, filming from a fixed position just above the floor directed slightly upward. Taking pigeon steps, Horn walks a straight line from the back of the room to the front. Extending her arms out at her sides, her prosthetic fingers hit the walls to omit an excruciating noise. This gives the spectator a sudden jolt. As Stern has suggested, moving images embody a temporalisation that plays on a series of indeterminacies. As with Cross’ obfuscation of a view in Pump, (2009) and Freud’s (1919) uncanny misrecognition of himself discussed in Chapter 3, you are surprised by what you see, but more significantly, this alerts you to how you are taken by an uncertainty that questions you in your looking. Getting a jolt takes you by surprise. My own three handheld cameras disrupt, or surprise, a single point of view through revealing an overlapping of three different views of my moving body, made at the same time across three different screens. On a visceral level, a shock will abruptly absorb you in the moment so that you are unable to distinguish things rationally. The habitually apparent separation between body and world is somehow modified through such jolts. Being taken by a sudden shock to the nervous system reminds us of our primordial situatedness in our own space and time through a disturbance to one’s usual flow of motion.

When Nicolas Bourriaud (1998) asks whether the artwork one comes up against allows one to exist as one encounters it. How would this question relate to how Da-sein is made more available to coming to presence through the coming to presence of the artwork? If the artist is focused on disclosing how one is with the work of art, one is more available to the possibility of being open to a way of revealing. Rather than prompting a didactic understanding of art encounter that would implicate how a work gives up its secrets too readily or literally, I refer to Bourriaud’s point in order to emphasise how the artist gathers-together a work for the possibility of revealing. The notion of Da-sein’s self-disclosure hinges on how attunements enact bodies and media. With respect to how the artist’s intentions feed into the practice, an artist’s intentions do not dictate how the practice is received or interpreted. Arguably, how the artist chooses to make the work invariably has an amount of influence on how the work may affect its audience.

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85 In film theory the fourth wall signifies the position of the audience in relation to the film screen. The position of Horn’s camera is also similar to the ideal position for viewing perspective in relation to Renaissance painting. By activating an existentially charged form of spectatorship she undermines a distanced position of looking at ideal form. One could also suggest Horn uses point of view to subvert a Modernist notion of perspective by disrupting this worldview.
When Horn deliberately drags her fingers across the surface of the walls, her intention is like fingernails on a blackboard; there is a degree of influence on a potential for disclosure with respect to the intentions of the artist in her performance. As Reason (2003) and Rancière (2007) demonstrate, how that performance is placed before its audience is crucial to the participation and enactment of bodies. The enactment of various bodies implicates a kind of excess as Jones writes:

The ‘de-containing’ potential of performance: the way in which it can refuse the boundary-making function of aesthetics and its contemporary corollaries including art criticism, art marketing, curating and the writing of art histories ... performance can work to ‘unframe’ the messy embodiment that constitutes our relationship to spaces and things. (2009, pp. 31-32)

Jones’ perspective of a de-containing potential, in terms of a play of forces encompasses a power of affect. In performance art, this often operates through exposing our embodied relations as unbounded by the influence of apparatuses of power and knowledge. Within this context, the commerce of authenticity proclaimed by the live archive is destabilised and de-contained. My project suggests a radical levelling out of the hierarchy of mind over body, or body and world, is brought to bear with performance as the site and understanding of Da-sein in its prosthetic relations. A de-containment is revealed in a proliferation of bodies relevant to our facticity through a prosthetic liveness.

Horn’s practice raises a challenge to the forgetfulness of Da-sein as unquestioning scopophilia. Where Finger Gloves moves us through the anticipation for the action of the finger’s retrieval of whatever is at hand, this action is consistently denied through the prosthetic itself. There is a rupture in the flow of expectations concerning the act of retrieval. With Two Hands Touching Both Walls Simultaneously, we are physically brought to presence by the essence of the film, not by our anticipation and denial, but through a sense of rupture and surprise in our bodies. This is simultaneously unsettling and uncanny. One is instantly thrown open to one’s own discomfort with an excruciating noise that makes the hairs on the back of the neck stand up. It penetrates one’s body, performing it with an involuntary jolt. This anomaly reframes a way of thinking in terms of embodiment, not through my expectation of what is going to happen, but through a sudden event that involves a “shock.” A shock to the body places emphasis on participation, rather than on a kind of voyeurism that would engage in a distanced view of
something, by means of rational judgment or contemplation. For Jones, such moments are associated with live performance art framed through a play of forces that forms at the intersection of relations of power and relations of knowledge pertaining to the art world. Performance practice can move us beyond this frame in, “moments of unpredictability, extrusions of desire, and/or slivers of affect” (2009, p. 32). In this way, my project suggests that prosthetic enactment attunes us in our encounters with moving images by constituting the poetic spatiality that bodies construct through a temporal capriciousness that says something about the instability of boundaries between bodies framed by the academy and the technics of the live archive.

The apparent separation between the individual and the environment erodes in affect. The omission of a loud noise prompts a kind of primal fear and anxiety, a sense of danger. A cacophony of sound draws out a discordant dis-ease. Brennan (2004) suggests, one gets entered by affect and affects flow from outside in and inside out. If there is a disturbance, a change in the usual atmosphere, this performs the body through revealing memory and forgetfulness. Memory and forgetfulness are triggered in affective exchanges between the individual and the environment. This phenomenon supports this analysis of separation as myth. For Da-sein mood assails, it iterates it’s there before the mind has time to catch up with it. A shock constitutes a change at the level of the physical and biological exchange by unlocking something about being-in-the-world. For instance, the dualism of a mind/body split is challenged by the Ancient Greek notion of extramission.86 Martin Jay theorises:

If Plato argued that the eye and the sun are composed of like substances, and the Greeks believed that the eye transmitted as well as received light rays (the theory of extramission), then there was a certain participatory dimension in the visual process, a potential intertwining of viewer and viewed. (1993, p. 30)

Horn’s performance proposes a visual metonymy of extramission87 via an infolding of the camera lens, the omission of an excruciating noise, and the visual touch of Horn’s extended

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87 Regarding the theory of extramission, Brennan notes:
Sight, as noted earlier, is the sense that renders us discrete, while transmission breaches individual boundaries .... sight also has physical effects. To an extent, this idea is prefigured in the ocular theory of extramission. Extramission, the notion that the eye gave off light and, by this light's merging with the air, “touched” its immediate environs, was not officially disproved until 1704. (2004, p. 17)
fingers. Our technical relations are temporally situated through the motion of our bodies. In turn, our existentially charged bodies are a technics that can reveal the site of performance.88

4.4.3 Encountering Dan Graham’s Roll, 1970

Dan Graham’s Roll, (1970), is a performance work involving technics that arouses questions around the site of performance:

Lying on the floor, the artist rolled around his own axis while holding a camera, at the same time was filmed by a second camera, placed on the ground some distance away, thereby generating two film sequences: in one the fixed camera is filmed by the camera held by Graham, and in the other the artist is trying to keep his gaze and camera directed towards the fixed camera while he rolls. (p. 133)

Graham’s Roll is pertinent to my own project. My practice as a whole makes reference to Graham’s mode of working in general. This performance in particular appears to encapsulate the relations between self and other mediated by a technics that evokes, looking as a look that “envelopes, palpates espouses the visible things” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 133).

88 As discussed in Chapter 1, although apparatuses set our installation within them in place, there is always a potential for the apparatus to fall away from Da-sein. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is made possible whenever we stand in a free relation toward our own technological enfragement. This relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology, as a way of revealing (Heidegger, 1996).
Roll was originally performed in front of a live audience. The image we see above is a re-enactment of the original performance that took place where an audience encounters a single TV monitor system. The audience was seated positioned between a single camera and its monitor. Graham, holding his camera, lies on a platform level with the audience’s line of sight. He faces the stationary monitor and, as he performs, he is in front and behind the audience contemporaneously. Again, this idea produces a different expression of the live. In splitting his performance across distinctions between “so called” live bodies and instruments, he questions the division in the first place. Interestingly, I have not seen the actual footage featured on the monitor by the audience, that is to say, the moving image of Graham’s view. I can only imagine what it must look like. Graham comments on how a staged photograph shows a different perspective to his own eye-view (Mark Francis, Brigit Pelzer, & Beatriz Columbia, 2001):
The glass window, like Renaissance painting, creates a picture plane that places the world at a distance for the viewer on either side. The world, held at a distance, frames a conventional view which is defined by the specific size, shape and direction of orientation of the opening of the window frame. A view from one space into the other space, by what is allowed to be seen, defines one's space's socially (pre-) conceived 'view' of the other. The 'picture-window' appears to be symmetrical in the length of time allowed a person on either side to stare, but actually is not. An employer's view of his employee's work space through one-way glass, as opposed to the employee's view of their employer's office, is asymmetrical, expressing inequalities of power. (p. 121)

Graham's mention of an asymmetrical view that suggests an inequality of power has resonance with Rancière's (2007) notion of equality and spectatorship. As Fóti has inferred, for Heidegger, a look that moves in a single direction involves a loss of insight, where the "look entrances the uncanniness of presencing into the aspect of familiar presences" (Fóti, 2003, p. 82). A unidirectional view of a world covers over the possibility of revealing. As is often the case, the live archive, "solicits appearance [but fails to] relinquish itself to appearance, and to being encountered by the other" (p. 82). Nevertheless, I am able to get this performance from a cross section of remains, contextualised by a transformation in time and memory, "If memory is recreated each time we revisit it, if memory is inherently transformative, then so is the archive's construction of the past recreated each time it is accessed" (Reason, 2003, p. 87). Graham's Roll, (1970) reveals a source of memory at the intersection of concealing and revealing. By looking through the window on to a world mediated by moving images, Roll challenges the authority of an unquestioning scopophilia that supports a unidirectional perspective. More specifically, in the case of Graham performing in front of a live audience, and at the same time, through the body of the equipment, Graham also questions the boundary of the individual to the environment and to his audience.

In the original performance, Graham sets up his view for the audience in a way that encloses them inside the action of his looking as they look; they are the look itself. As he rolls, he attempts to keep the monitor within the frame of his own lens so that what the monitor sees is a rolling landscape that includes a foreshortened view of his own distorted body. The audience can also see Graham himself as he rolls with his TV camera. It is also probable that Graham's lens picks up the audience from time to time as they participate in the performance, in a similar way to Sherwin's Man with a Mirror, (1976/2006) discussed in Chapter 3. As the
camera moves, it picks up the audience so that the audience becomes a part of the work. This situation sets up a kind of view within a view, being viewed. Graham cannot see the world unless he is seen by the world. I try to provoke this kind of engagement with looking through my own practice in *Plaza Series*, (2013). What does swinging cameras around my body make me think about being me?

![Figure 65. Suzie Gorodi, *Plaza Series*, 2013 (detail) multi-channel projection full view, four metre dolly-harness, tripod dolly-cam with four wheels, neck camera with two cameras (internal plaza) AUT University.](image)

*Three cameras views, one looks away from me, a second looks up under my chin, and the third looks back at me. I have to spin the dolly-cam. It is attached to my waist by its harness. I spin holding on to the harness, I rotate in a clockwise movement pivoting on my right foot, I direct the camera on the dolly to spin around my axis. The weight of the dolly-cam resists the spin, until I am able to get some speed behind it. The dolly trundles around me making a terrible clatter it reverberates around the plaza. There are passers-by; some take in what’s happening, others ignore the commotion. The indoor plaza has a glass roof and entrance on one side; the sun is shining down through the glass. I get a bit blinded by the light whenever I turn toward it. Eventually, a security guard approaches, putting a stop to these activities.*

In exploring how a prosthetic liveness can reveal a way of looking that questions distinctions between self and world, live performance and documentation, I complicate the spectators’ encounter. Three different camera points of view target a sense of being looked at by the essence of world. The camera’s actions are inverted in their subsequent projection. The centre screen projects a view of neck and face where the camera that looks up under my chin is
supported by a neck brace device. Here the spectator encounters a monumental head foreshortened as the world turns around the head’s axis. This reveals a kind of motional spinning halo. At times the head is pulled back and forth by the cameras auto focus.

Large-scale projections of light appear to absorb spectators’ more readily, through drawing attention to each individual Da-sein’s own space and time. Projected between floor and ceiling, these screens form a wide horizon with the potential to soak up the audience as they question their own relations to their environment through their own spatio-temporal coming to presence. The screen on the left features the view of the camera on the dolly, revealing a full body view disrupted by extreme quivering, again inverting its own action in projection. Together with this, the camera that spins 360 degrees around the body now appears fixed although dreadfully disturbed. Strangely, the disturbance appears to be situated with the body in view and not the camera itself. The screen on the left reveals the view of the third camera also attached to my neck brace and facing away from my body, it captures the moving camera on the dolly. As the three cameras viewfinders move, they pick up passers-by. Again, although the camera’s point of view appears fixed, the landscape it reveals moves across its viewfinder, complicated by the camera that looks back at it, also featured in its view, supported by the tripod on the dolly. A play of forces vacillates back and forth, between screen and self, body and projector, problematised further by my memory of having iterated the work several times already. As my encounter splits across three screens, my look is dislocated in space and time, not quite in-sync with either screen or self. I am unable to get a definite fix on where I am in relation to where my own look is coming from. This makes me think about what Heidegger means when he writes about accomplishment and essence: “only what already is can really be accomplished” (Heidegger, 1946, p. 217). Surprisingly my split-view feels like something is looking through me, behind me, or back at me all at once. I am moved to question my relationship with myself from somewhere behind my own eyes. What am I? Am I a prosthetic lens and how can this be?

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89 Halo is a circle of light, often connected with a sense of aura.
90 Earlier critiques and an exhibition at the Audio Foundation, Auckland, 2013, provided some helpful analysis arising from the input of spectators at these events. A smaller scale somehow prevented a resonance between viewers and screen. The encounter of spectators’ could be evaluated under these conditions as somewhat compromised by scale.
As such (through performance and its relationship to media arts) I explore a technics that questions a liveness and site of performance. The essence of the prosthetic opens an ongoing look as it reveals different worlds. A question of authenticity can only be revealed to me in my own space and time by means of attunements that temporally situate my being-in-the-world. This highlights how Da-sein’s dwelling is temporality delivered over to it through a concealing revealing action concerned with a notion of liveness and revealing.

Figure 66. Suzie Gorodi, *Plaza series*, 2013 (detail) taken from Neck-cam device.

*I place the neck cam on the ground. The weight of the camera in the brace alters the camera’s position and it closes its lazy eyelid.*
Conclusion

Four chapters have explored the essence of our prosthetic relations in response to a performative media arts practice. Through notions of liveness, site, and locale, my body of artwork suggests that a prosthetic (camera or otherwise) questions apparent distinctions between the human body and technology. Temporal modes of encounter—at the intersection of live performance and video art practice—have investigated the idea of prosthetics through concepts of: (1) a play of forces moving within apparatuses; (2) what it is to touch and look guided by attunement and disclosure; (3) being taken by the uncanny; and (4) notions of authenticity involving liveness and revealing.

My practice has explored a resistance to subject/object dichotomies by challenging instrumental frameworks of looking to reveal temporality as open and dynamic. In this way, a radical reading of prosthetics questions how the operations of cause and effect make us forgetful of our integral relations with technology. From such a perspective, my world is revealed to me through my own forgetful place within technology. Through finding myself in attunement, alētheia shines momentarily for Da-sein relative to its factical existence as something already thrown into the world.

The essence of the prosthetic is a bringing-forth poiēsis associated with a form of self-disclosure, or revealing, orientated by my temporal disposition in attunement. Accordingly, authenticity is revealed to me through the way I am attuned to my own space and time that temporally situates my being-in-the-world. In this way, authenticity suggests how Da-sein may be brought before itself in its dwelling through a concealing/revealing action. Thus, an authentic action or event is not a form of truth as verification or correspondence to a moment frozen in time. Here, a state of “authenticity” is the condition of the artwork as a temporal process that is our being there in our prosthetic relations. In this way, the essence of our prosthetic relations is seen as a “play of forces” that questions the idea of relations between subjects and objects through looking to the relation itself.

Attunement relates to our founding mood at any given moment. Although we can never get away from our placement within apparatuses, mood assails; it takes us in a disclosive
belonging through our being-in-the-world. When taken by the uncanny I am disclosed to myself as already belonging to a world—I grasp my existential situatedness in the event of an insightful understanding of already ek-sisting outside of myself. Moreover, our own throwness is a mode of our authentic being, usually concealed from us, and not something we habitually think about. In light of our uncanny disposition, our prosthetic relations emerge as something fundamentally belonging to a prosthetic liveness. This is why I am interested in how poiēsis belongs with technē, as it reveals something concealed within the human condition.

In Dominion Road Series, as the camera veers off the median strip and falls on to the road, I understand that it is the camera on its side and not me, but I can’t help but miss where my body is placed in this moment in either space or time. This instance discloses something to do with how my Da-sein is a thrown situatedness in a time of uncertainty. Here, uncanniness takes me, to fleetingly reveal something of my prosthetic liveness. As we look with anticipation for the home that houses our self, our expectation is overcome in finding that we were never “there” in the first place. In this moment, the uncanny takes me in the condition of my liveness through locale that is the gathering-together of the artwork, and by an indeterminate site of my temporal being that already understands my being there.

In Plaza Series, I swing the dolly-harness camera around my axis using my own body as pivot. The image is acutely disrupted by the camera’s motion and it negates itself. The instrumentality of my practice cancels out its ends, through its own means. In this manner, the images negation challenges a pro-filmic enframing (technics of cinema) to question modes of thinking that prioritise subject/object ways of relating. In addition, we open momentarily to a memory that belongs with the prosthetic.

In Corridor Series, as the camera moves past an open doorway, some people are having a conversation. The camera reveals a way of looking that is seen by and sees the essence of other beings as they are. In this way, a prosthetic liveness challenges our experience. This PhD thesis has prompted me to think about how I am technologically framed, and how there is no getting away from this situation. Apparatuses of looking are characteristic of instrumentality, and such technics enframe our relations with media arts. My own practice is instrumental, nonetheless; my iterations can reveal a play of forces that say something enigmatic about our
being. Put another way, these events are technologically framed by an instrumental practice as a means to an end, yet, profoundly and essentially, they are nothing technological.
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