ABSTRACT

Between 1972 and 2003 there were 168 attempts by terrorists to attack respondents or spectators at major sporting events around the world. A literature review of over 100 research papers outlines the reasons terrorist groups target such high-profile events, one of which, is the presence of the international media. This study considers how well New Zealand hotel managers were prepared for a terrorist attack, in their preparations for the 2011 Rugby World Cup. The senior managers interviewed operated a range of properties from serviced apartments to five-star hotels. The aim of the study was to determine levels of preparedness for an attack, and assess attitudes and approaches to risk management. The study finds that New Zealand hotel managers displayed a somewhat laissez faire approach to security, and it is suggested that Hofstede’s low uncertainty avoidance category may help explain their carefree attitude to security risks during sporting mega events. It is hoped that results of this study will bring attention to the weak security measures, as these were not sufficient to prevent a successful terrorist attack in New Zealand.

KEYWORDS: Terrorism, hotel management, security, safety, sports mega events, New Zealand Aotearoa.

INTRODUCTION

This research was prompted by concern about the preparations for the 2011 Rugby World Cup (RWC2011) in New Zealand. The country had six years between winning the bid and the start of the event, but there was no evidence in the media of preparation for a terrorist attack. Given the considerable literature about the use by extremist groups of international, media-friendly and high-profile events to communicate their messages to a global audience, it seemed logical that the government of New Zealand and security services would work with stakeholders such as the hospitality industry to ensure the RWC2011 could not be ‘hijacked’, instilling fear in those watching (Larobina & Pate, 2009; Bergesen, 2006; Ruby, 2002). Sports events have been disrupted by terrorism 168 times in the last 32 years, an average of five attacks per annum (Taylor & Toohey, 2007). The RWC2011 games were played in eleven cities around New Zealand, with the finals held at Eden Park stadium in Auckland. The New Zealand Prime Minister, John Key, promised during the build-up to the event that it would be played in ‘a stadium of four million’ (www.rwc2011.irb.com, 2012); that is, every New Zealander would be supporting and cheering the event.

Such a mass involvement of a small country’s population would add to the organisers’ challenge of providing a safe and secure environment for the event, which was scheduled across the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in the United States (USA). This, combined with the size of the event, suggested the possibility of terrorist attacks. Data after the RWC2011 show that international guest nights rose 21% in 2011, with the majority of visitors coming from Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Between July and September, 133,200 additional visitors came to New Zealand,
and spending on retail, accommodation and restaurants during the RWC2011 was estimated at $387m (Statistics New Zealand, 2012). This was a significantly sized event for such a small country to host.

LITERATURE REVIEW

As a background to the study, key themes in the literature are over-viewed. These include hospitality and terrorism, sporting events, terrorist attacks, and risk sensitivity.

Hospitality and terrorism

Pizam (2010) points out that terrorist attacks on hotels are not just aimed at causing damage to property, but that hotels are easy targets because they are open and welcoming to all, and therefore provide a low chance of failure. The Mumbai Taj Mahal attack in 2008 was due to the large number of Westerners using the hotel according to Gupta (2008) and Stafford, Yu and Armoo (2002). Although hotels have a responsibility to protect their guests (e.g. Feikert, Verma, Plashka & Dev, 2006; Groenenboom & Jones, 2003; Lashley, 2000; Palmer, 1989) as Lisante (1972, p. 2) explains, they are really just “private property with public areas”, making them easy to attack.

A recent study by Pennington-Gray, Thapa, Kaplanidou, Cahyanto and McLaughlin (2011) found that hospitality organisations in the USA have a high level of preparedness, and Enz (2009) found that larger, more modern hotels, had better security features built into the structure of the building. Brandt and Sandler (2010) note there has been a target hardening where traditional terrorist targets are becoming more fortified. This has resulted in a preference for ‘softer’ targets such as hospitality businesses, which have multiple access points and use temporary staff, especially in the build-up to mega events (Clement, 2011; Frewin, 2004; Cetron, 2004).

Rashid and Robinson (2010) set out to investigate whether the link between terrorism and tourism was reality or myth. They suggest that it is perhaps not surprising that wealthy multinationals with globally-recognised hospitality brands will attract negative attention when they set up their operations in developing countries. For example, political instability has increased the perception of risks at destinations such as Northern Ireland (1970s), South Africa (1980s) and Yugoslavia (2000s), even though the risks of cancer, car accidents and aircraft crashes pose a statistically greater risk than injury in a terrorist attack, and that more Americans are killed in liberal gun law shootings than terrorist attacks.

An analysis of terrorist events involving hospitality properties (Peter, 2011) shows that between 2001 and 2011 there were 50 terrorist incidents leaving 915 people dead and 2095 injured. Hotels are becoming increasingly common targets for terrorism, and perceptions of risk in affected areas are likely to negatively affect tourism in those locations.

Hospitality and the security of guests

Lashley (2000) considers that the ‘sacred duty’ of a host is ‘to protect not only immediate family but also guests’ (2000, p.6), and cites the murder of Duncan by Macbeth in Shakespeare’s play as a particularly abhorrent breach of the host’s responsibility. Telfer (2000) mirrors this, explaining that hospitality was a kind of sanctuary, and the host was thought of as having a solemn obligation to make sure no harm came to his guest while under his roof (Telfer, 2000, p. 39).

Hemmington (2007, p. 753) also agrees, noting that when travellers are in unfamiliar environments they are more susceptible to harm, and ‘see the hotel as a sanctuary’. Similarly, Ritchie (2008) warns that tourists are often unfamiliar with emergency procedures or even the geography of their location.
Hospitality has historically been concerned with security; as Nailon (1981, p. 4) noted in his professorial address at the University of Surrey, ‘the essential components appreciated by the travellers emerge of a welcoming host, attentive staff and security from the elements and evil-doers.’ None-the-less, attacks on hotels are often successful.

O’Gorman (2007; 2009) explains that this duty of care for strangers was known as philoxenos in Ancient Greece, which translates as ‘love of strangers’ and was based on the idea that a stranger might be a deity in human disguise. Logically therefore, the general public might reasonably assume that hoteliers offering accommodation during mega (sporting) events would consider the safety of those in their care for the duration of their visit.

Sporting events, politics and terrorism

Sport is often used to bring people together. It could arguuer that sport facilitates hospitable relations between different regions and peoples as well as acting as a focal point to bring a country together and create a sense of well-being or healing after a traumatic time (Kavetsos & Szymanski, 2010; Reid, 2006; Goldberg, 2000; Branscombe & Wann, 1991). There are economic benefits to be gained from a successful and incident-free event (Barclay, 2009; Brown, 2004; Burgan & Mules, 1992). However, as Czula (1978) has pointed out, politics have often influenced participation in sporting events through boycotts or protests. Wang and Ritchie (2013, p. 82) agree, pointing out “the ironic juxtaposition of tourism (pleasure, leisure, relaxation, enjoyment) and crisis (chaos, destruction, trauma, distress”). A recent example of terrorism at a sporting event, was the shooting of two Taiwanese tourists in New Delhi prior to the Commonwealth Games in 2010. Several New Zealand and Australian athletes withdrew from those games, citing security fears. Terrorists have a wide range of options for the disruption of major sporting events, such as explosives and incendiary devices, bioterrorism, food terrorism, nuclear terrorism, cyber-terrorism, suicide bombings, kidnappings, and hostage takings (Tosini, 2009; Bloom, 2007; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007; Bergesen, 2006). A number of authors have therefore considered the impact of terrorism on tourism and sporting events (Toohey & Taylor, 2008; Taylor & Toohey, 2007; Reisinger & Mavondo, 2005; Clark, 2004; Libby, 2002).

Risk management

The initial intention of this study was to investigate terrorism around mega events and its impact on hospitality accommodation providers. However, interview respondents frequently referred to risk management and crisis planning, prompting a further review of literature on this theme. There is considerable literature on risk management and crisis planning, including some on the hospitality sector (Ritchie, Bentley, Koruth & Wang, 2011). Some of this literature addresses issues surrounding the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in the UK and its impact on the Cheltenham Festival. Various authors warn that much of the complacency was due to a feeling that a repeat of the 1967 FMD outbreak was too unlikely to be worth preparing for, or that such events were out with the control of individual organisations. These attitudes effectively thwarted any efforts to take appropriate preventative measures (Miller & Ritchie, 2003; 2002). Ritchie (2008) also investigated the impact of natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes, bushfires and biosecurity on the tourism industry. Some studies explain the ‘Theory of Planned Behaviour’ (Reid & Ritchie, 2011; Wang & Ritchie, 2010; Wang & Ritchie, 2012; 2013), which suggests that behavioural intention is dependent on an individual’s attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control.

Terrorist attacks and risk sensitivity

Prior to the RWC2011, a number of high-profile activities were undertaken in New Zealand to reassure the public about the level of security surrounding the event, including the recall of SAS troops and Victoria Cross recipient Willie Apiata to New Zealand. The Government appointed a Minister (The Hon. Murray McCully) to oversee the event, including all security. However, there was
a perception that as New Zealand was not actively involved in overseas military interventions, the risk from extremist groups was low, so authorities focussed their attention on how to manage drunk fans (Dudding, 2010; McRoberts, 2010; Vass, 2010). This lower perception of risk for a New Zealand event, is consistent with Hofstede’s (1984) work on uncertainly avoidance, which he describes as ‘the degree to which members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity’ (Hofstede, 1984, p.83). A laissez faire approach to security suggests New Zealanders tend to be comfortable with uncertainty, as Hofstede noted. However believing that the country is not at risk of imminent terrorist attack, is no reason for hotel managers to neglect their responsibilities for the safety and security of guests.

Toohey and Taylor (2008) warn that as there has been a number of terrorist acts at sporting events, it is important to minimise risks through good management. As stadia are becoming increasingly better designed and protected, the weak link in the security shield is surely the visitors’ accommodation. Accordingly, the next section will consider the methodological approach taken to determine the views of hotel managers on security during sporting mega events.

METHODS

As there is remarkably little academic literature addressing hotel security and sporting events, this study takes an exploratory approach. Interpretivism and qualitative research in the form of interviews with hotel managers was considered a useful way to scope out the topic and develop an understanding of management’s perspectives on security (see Altinay & Paraskevas, 2008). Given the sensitivity of information requested (the field work was carried out during the RWC2011), it was decided that a large-scale quantitative survey tool would not produce the desired response rate. A survey would also not allow the researcher to develop an understanding of the thinking that led to the apparent laissez faire approach leading up to the event (see Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Neuman, 1997).

The intention had been to use a sample of six to ten hospitality properties of differing sizes and star ratings. Accordingly, eight managers were interviewed, although as one had responsibility for two hotels, the study covered nine properties ranging from backpackers’ hostels to five star properties. Although it had been planned to interview managers in the teams’ hotels, (perhaps understandably), these managers were reluctant to discuss risk preparedness issues. However, as identified in the literature, any terrorists would be likely to target softer and less well protected groups such as spectators. It was therefore decided to increase the sample to any property with a considerable number of RWC2011-dependent rooms, whether for teams, officials, VIPs, media, volunteers or supporters. As humans were the subject of the research, and given the sensitive nature of the information sought, it was important that the research was conducted according to ethical principles, and without posing risk to the respondents. Ethics approval was sought from and granted by the university’s ethics committee prior to commencement of the fieldwork.

Semi-structured interviews were carried out with eight hotel managers. The data were transcribed and codes (P1 – P8) allocated to respondents to ensure confidentiality, with only the researcher knowing the identity of individual properties and managers. Of total respondents, 60% were male, and their management experience varied from eight months to 18 years. Interviewees’ ages ranged from 26 to 55 years. The number of rooms in individual hotels ranged from 52 to 260, with staffing levels of 9 to 200. Although the sample was relatively small, a wide range of hospitality professionals was included. However, no generalisability is claimed for this study, and a large-scale study would need to follow this exploratory research.

The interviewer consulted the most senior manager in each property. However, it would be interesting to gather the views of other staff and guests, as this would provide a more comprehensive understanding of this important topic.
RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents responses in the key themes that emerged during the analysis. After a brief explanation of each theme, quotes are used to illustrate views, noting any consensus or disagreement where this occurred.

Experience with VIP and high profile guests

It was anticipated that those most experienced in dealing with guests who carried a security risk through their public profile, would approach the hosting of high-profile RWC2011 respondents in a particular way. More than 50% of respondents had considerable experience hosting VIPs, ranging from government ministers to Chief Executive Officers (CEO)s or television celebrities. When asked how often VIP guests used their property, one manager explained:

We have senior judges staying with us - Ministry of Justice personnel - about once or twice a week (P1).

Another said

Every week. As part of the protocol of the hotel, usually a senior manager on duty meets (VIP name)... (P2).

Other respondents explained they had little experience or interest in this market.

No – that is not our market (P8).

No VIP guests. Actually we had someone from the Shortland Street TV programme in our $18 dorm recently (P5).

It became clear that while some had considerable experience hosting what terrorists might regard as high-value targets, others had no experience, nor had given consideration to the issue, as they considered it unlikely they would be hosting such visitors. However, as the literature suggests terrorists search for ‘softer’ targets, which attract publicity with less risk, this area may require further investigation.

Involvement in mega events

All respondents but one had experience of large-scale events in their capacity as hotel managers, with some referring to the Lions Rugby Tour of New Zealand in 2005. Other cited events included the Formula One event in Melbourne, the Sydney Olympic Games 2000, the America’s Cup and the Rugby 7s. The large events mentioned were mostly in Australia, demonstrating the prevalence of managers with an international portfolio of experience in their careers.

Preparation and planning

Interviewees were asked about their preparation in the build up to RWC2011 in terms of trial runs or emergency procedure practices. Some were being pro-active:

We are going to have a test run with the Tri Nations game [All Blacks versus Springboks]. At this stage we are very heavily booked – which is code for over-booked. It is going to be interesting (P1).

We will definitely be having debriefings about different scenarios that may arise (P4).
Many were reliant on (or confident in) their standard emergency procedures:

We will have the fire emergency procedure, which covers any major emergencies (P8).

We know the fire alarm drill. We’ve had meetings about that (P5).

Others had a more laissez faire approach.

We just take it as part of our normal business (P2).

I don’t think I feel the need to actually do any sort of trial run up to the RWC (P3).

While those that regularly had mega event participants as guests seemed confident that their experience would be enough, there seemed little recognition that their staff might lack experience, or they would have casual staff who did not know the hotel or its guests and management at all well. Some assumed that risks were being managed by external groups such as the police.

No. We are not going to have any guards at all. The police and other departments and agencies are covering off security for the city. We’ll adhere to any requirements that we are required to adhere to within reason (P7).

I believe there is meant to be security but we are not doing anything different (P1).

The consensus seemed to be that existing emergency evacuation and a heightened awareness by staff (with some additional private security guards) would be enough. Fire and earthquake evaluation drills were being reviewed following recent severe earthquakes in Christchurch. Other related training (both in-house and off-site) was on the subject of disability awareness. Training topics were targeted at what were perceived as likely situations and incidents, which did not seem to include a terrorist attack.

Security checks on staff and suppliers

Respondents were asked to explain the security clearance procedures for staff and suppliers. Responses for staff were limited to (in some cases) checking references, identification, or work entitlement (i.e. residency or work visas). One manager relied on applicants to indicate any criminal records on their application form. Only one was pro-active:

Yes. There is vetting for everybody and that is one of the requirements for the RWC. As soon as you apply for part-time work, we will send your details to the vetting company (P6).

In another case, the hotel had asked staff for permission to pass their details to the police should the police request these:

We do have them sign off on criminal records and with the situation with the World Cup we have been requested to provide a declaration from each of our staff that allows the police to search their criminal record on the proviso that that will be relinquished after RWC (P7).

Vetting suppliers is important because of the risk of deliberately contaminated food; the Chinese government spent considerable effort auditing the food consumed during the Beijing Olympics. All respondents said they used reputable suppliers that they trusted and had worked with for some years. Two respondents had received information from the authorities on this topic:

We are being audited by RWC and the person from the council that has been assigned to properties.
We have constant audits regarding food quality. I am not a hundred percent sure these suppliers are vetted. We did receive some information from MAF (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries). It is sitting on my table for me to go through (P6).

We have been requested to meet with and comply with Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and police requirements over the food chain. They are coming in to audit that (P7).

Responses suggest that terrorists would find it relatively easy to infiltrate a supply chain and gain access to the food supplied or even the hotel itself as a delivery person. Perhaps more worrying is that a document entitled ‘Food chain safety and security guidance material and checklist’ was issued by MAF to all hospitality businesses in July 2011, yet only three (P4, P6, P7) mentioned this.

When asked if any groups involved with the RWC2011 had requested any special security processes, all replied they had not, although it is recognised that respondents may not have felt able to discuss these. However, none of the properties was intending to restrict or refuse walk-in business (i.e. guests without prior bookings) to increase occupancy during the events, although some did mention that they would remind staff to check Identification Documents (ID). One respondent explained with some embarrassment:

The policy with walk-ins is that we take a photocopy of their photo ID and they pay upfront. Probably doesn’t help if they have ulterior motives on their mind but I’ve found it easier to fall in line or fall in step with the ‘she’ll be right’ attitude. If we did what we did in Melbourne, we’ll be closed off by now (P1).

Another felt that to increase security by excluding guests would impact negatively on business after the RWC2011.

We are not going to stop any person from the public coming into the hotel and having a drink and watching the game on the big TV. [If we did that] Nobody would actually turn up after everyone is gone [i.e. after the RWC2011] (P3).

The opportunity to maximise revenue during a normally quiet New Zealand winter was considered as too good an opportunity to refuse.

External agencies

Respondents were asked if external organisations (New Zealand Police Force, Hospitality Association of New Zealand (HANZ), City Councils, insurance companies, and other hospitality properties) had provided security assistance or support. None of the smaller properties had received any support in preparing for the RWC2011, and a number commented that this had surprised them. Both P6 and P7 had been in contact with the police regarding VIP guests. P7 explained:

It is more about information from us than us requesting information from them. There is a general understanding of how we handle these people anyway. We’ll just be adhering to that. We know the process (P7).

When local councils had been in contact, this had been related to information about street closures, crowd control and food hygiene issues. None of the respondents recalled any security advice from HANZ or from their insurance companies, although one said:

I haven’t heard anything from our insurers. I don’t know whether it’s people thinking it’s New Zealand and it’s too far away – or we are not of strategic importance or... I don’t know if everyone thinks we are one big happy family here (P1).
Even meetings of hoteliers did not appear to have security high on their agenda.

If anything it has been [about] the bad media relating to room charges or it’s been the slowness of ticket sales or the effect of the Christchurch earthquake on RWC and logistics or it’s been about the shortage of skilled staff but nothing about security (P2).

In the final question, all insisted they were prepared for the RWC2011, although some were more convincing than others. A number said the interview had raised questions which were worth following up on, and recognised, on reflection, that they had been rather lax in their preparation. P3 concluded the interview by saying they were confident that the New Zealand government and the team organising the whole thing have done everything to make sure such an act does not occur.

The findings identified a number of key themes in the interviews regarding security preparations for the RWC2011. This section considered the experience of management, the preparation for mega events such as the RWC2011, security checks on staff and suppliers, and the role of external agencies. The final section considers reasons for the laissez faire or ‘she’ll be right’ attitude of hospitality professionals to security in New Zealand.

LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study was initially designed to investigate the attitude of managers to security at a specific mega event (RWC2011). However, as a result of comments from respondents, it was decided that the literature on sporting events and terrorism was not sufficiently broad. The literature on crisis planning and management was therefore consulted, although it was too late to broaden the focus of the interviews to include more general disaster and crisis management questions. This is therefore an obvious area for further research. It would also be interesting to consider the same (RWC) or similar events (football, sailing, cricket, Olympics, etc.) in other countries and cultures. The results of such research could be useful to organisers with responsibility for an event across multiple global locations.

Ritchie et al. (2011) point out that further research is needed on the relationship between security, star rating, branding or nationality of an organisation. Such a study would probably benefit from using a large-scale quantitative survey seeking to identify the strengths of relationships between factors, although Ritchie et al. (2011, p.384) warn that ‘managers’ self-assessment of crisis preparedness may be different from reality’. Finally, Ritchie (2004) suggests a study of how managers use double-loop learning to better prepare their management and staff for future crises and disasters. The authors of this study agree with these recommendations.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This paper started with a review of the literature on hospitality and its relationship with international terrorism incidents because of the global publicity and outrage such an attack can generate (Pizam, 2010; 2002). Cohen (2010) warned that too often research has focused on the consequences of tourism crises rather than on their prevention. While some countries are becoming more prepared (Pennington-Gray et al., 2011; Enz, 2009), others seem to expect that nothing untoward will occur, despite the evidence discussed by Toohey and Taylor (2008). What makes such attacks particularly abhorrent is the fact that victims are visitors and guests, and in most cultures and religions around the world the host is considered responsible for their safety (Feikert et al., 2006; Groenenboom & Jones, 2003; Lashley, 2000). However raising the visibility of security processes appears to have the opposite of the intended effect, in that it instills fear and suspicion in guests rather than reassuring them. Some respondents suggested that New Zealand was not at risk of terrorism because of its physical isolation or the international view of ‘kiwis’ as fun-loving, non-aggressive people whose international involvement is mostly in humanitarian, peace-keeping and rebuilding efforts rather than ‘regime change’. This view would resonate with many kiwis who would describe themselves as having a ‘she’ll be right’ approach to life. Whilst this term is also found in Australia, in New Zealand having an optimistic and ‘can do’ attitude (referred by some as ‘laissez faire’) is regarded with some
pride as a national characteristic. Indeed, in 1955 an Anglican priest, Peter Cape, wrote a song called She’ll be right. One of the verses is very appropriate as it concerns rugby:

When they’ve finished off your forwards, and yer backs are wearin’ thin,
And the second spell’s half over and you’ve forty points to win,
And this hulkin’ wing-three-quarter’s got his teeth stuck in your shin,
Well don’t worry mate, she’ll be right. She’ll be right mate...
You won’t worry who’s the loser when you meet down at the boozer,
So don’t worry mate, she’ll be right.

A more academic perspective of the same phenomenon is evident in Hofstede’s (1984) research, proposing that people of the same country have consistent and discernible characteristics, such as (for example) a high tolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity. Wang and Ritchie (2010) also suggest that inaction with respect to a possible negative event may be caused by the perception that action is someone else’s responsibility, a theme evident in participant responses. While such an approach may be understandable because of geographical, cultural and social factors, the fact remains that the RWC2011 was the largest event ever held in New Zealand, and its success undoubtedly increased New Zealand’s chances of hosting future mega events. Similarly, the recent success of the World Triathlon Championships led to New Zealand’s gaining a permanent place on the triathlon event calendar. However, the French government’s attack on the Rainbow Warrior Greenpeace ship in 1985 demonstrates that New Zealand is not immune to being attacked (Veitch, 2010). Unlike natural disasters, which usually affect a whole area, terrorism targets specific buildings, global brands or individuals. With improved security at airports and high-profile venues elsewhere, it is just a matter of time before terrorist groups move their attention to targets that are open and welcoming to all. Hotels cannot expose their guests to unnecessary risks, and must find a compromise where risks are routinely assessed and mitigated to an acceptable level while still allowing management to provide hospitality.

Some authors have pointed out that times of crisis are also times of opportunity. Taylor and Enz (2002) found that after the 9/11 attacks in the USA, upscale properties used the resulting low occupancy levels to expedite renovation plans more than did economy scale properties. Wang and Ritchie (2010, p. 299) also point out that:

When written in Chinese, the word crisis is composed of two characters: one represents danger and the other represents opportunity.

However, they also note that research tends to focus on industry and government reaction to crises and disasters, rather than on planning, preparation and prevention. The RWC2011 was a resounding success with noisy and fun-loving fans from around the world joining together in a huge festival of sport. More recently, the London Olympics and Paralympics also finished without incident. Three mega events without incident is an encouraging pattern, but should not result in complacency. As one of the respondents noted in an e-mail after his interview,

I trust that the next few weeks will go peacefully and that we will not write a dramatic postscript to the report (P2).

It is hoped this exploratory study prepares the way for further work comparing attitudes at different types and sizes of properties, branded and unbranded properties, or investigating the views of customers, in particular sports fans travelling to mega events. However, more importantly, it is hoped
to bring attention to risks of all kinds, and the need for hotel managers to be vigilant and aware of the responsibility of their roles as hosts.

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