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Abstract

With the emergence of a managerial state founded on neoliberal market-oriented values in New Zealand in the late twentieth century, the generally accepted view of education changed: to that of a private good instead of a public one. A contemporary perception is that education of very young children, can also serve the deployment of their parents in the workplace. Early childhood education (ECE) is viewed as the first step on an educational pathway that has a primarily vocational purpose, with outcomes tied to an individual’s potential life-trajectory. The value of ECE, as with education in general, is discussed in terms of cost-benefit investment returns to both the individual and the state. This approach to education derives from the economic theory known as ‘Human capital theory. This thesis uses Michel Foucault’s methodological tool ‘genealogy’ to plot the emergence of Human Capital Theory (HCT). The use of this tool supports a critique of the validity of HCT and the appropriateness of its application to ECE.

Economic evaluations of education reduce it to a performative, technical matter of skill-enhancement where skills are conceived in predominantly employment-related terms. HCT emerged first from the Chicago School of Economics and has influenced the direction of ECE policy and practice since the beginning of the twenty-first century. HCT relies heavily on a use of statistical comparisons of apparently discrete groupings of people together with assumptions about developmental progress and potential earnings over a life-trajectory. Normative expectations are deeply entwined in HCT, and because significant ethnic and socio-economic differences in educational outcomes are posed as a risk to the national economy and social stability, these are of explicit concern to policy-makers. Public policy aims to mitigate the achievement-gap risks because education is seen as vital in attaining both individual and national wealth in a competitive international market environment.
When Māori and Pasifika participation and achievement is compared with the national norm, the disparities of outcomes are particularly acute. Influenced by the supra-national discourse of HCT, educational policy, including ECE policy, aims to ensure that Māori and Pasifika peoples improve their educational outcomes on the basis of strategically placed government support. Policy-makers believe, in accordance with HCT principles, that this investment will improve the educational outcomes of children and thus enhance their job opportunities and life chances.

This thesis is a discursive analysis of the educational policy documents of the Fifth Labour Government (1999–2008), including Pathways to the Future: Nga huarahi arataki. A 10-year Strategic Plan for Early Childhood Education from 2002–2012. A genealogical investigation is conducted that disturbs HCT’s claim to offer solutions for growing the population’s skill-base that are founded on universal verifiable truths identified through neuro-economic science. Doubt is cast on both the efficacy of HCT to support the broader humanistic goals for ECE and the expectation that ECE policies based on the principles of HCT will be able to deliver what is promised, i.e. better educational outcomes with future job opportunities for Māori and Pasifika children. This exposure of the weaknesses of HCT reveals not only its inability to deliver the promised equalised outcomes, but also the extreme short-sightedness of the intensification of an economically driven purpose for education.
Dunedin – a city in the South Island of New Zealand

Aoga Mata – Samoan language ‘nest’ for young children

ECE – early childhood education

ERO – Education Review Office

*ETBM* – Education to be more (Department of Education, 1988)

FLG – Fifth Labour Government

HC – human capital

HCT – human capital theory

*GM - Government Management* (New Zealand Treasury, 1987)

IMF – International Monetary Fund

Māori – the indigenous peoples of New Zealand.

MoE – Ministry of Education

Ngā Kōhanga reo – Māori immersion language ‘nests’ for young children

NPM – New Public Management a catch-all term that includes Public Choice Theory, Agency Theory, Transactional Cost Economics and HCT

OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Pākehā – a Māori term for those who arrived in New Zealand in the nineteenth century; it especially applies to those of British ancestry

Pasifika – a collective name for peoples whose origins are from the Pacific Islands, e.g. the Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, and others

Puna – a parent-led Māori language playgroup


UN – United Nations

UNMDG – United Nations Millennium Development Goals
1 Introduction

This chapter introduces Human Capital Theory (HCT). The concept of education as exchange value—a ‘good’, for both mother and child—is a contemporary rationality to ensure both acquire skills. Such skills, it is believed will enable them to compete effectively in an employment marketplace, either now, or as future workers for the national economy. The chapter introduces concepts derived from the work of Michel Foucault which frames the thesis. They are first, genealogy, a ‘history of the present’, a tool to support a discursive analysis of ECE policy— with attention to the Pathways to the Future: Nga huarahi arataki. A 10-year Strategic Plan for Early Childhood Education from 2002–2012 (SPECE). Genealogy supports exploration of shifts in ideas and societal changes over time. A second Foucauldian concept, biopolitics, concerns the state’s interest in its population; its overview of patterns, shifts and changes, which can be plotted statistically. Such knowledge assists decisions about efficient intervention or targeting of state monies for effective outcomes. Targeting and contracting of monies to groups not participating in ECE is one example. Governmentality is Michel Foucault’s term for the citizen’s internalisation of state regulatory focii and concerns: in the case of HCT, the need for appropriate work dispositions together with the burnishing of skills.

I explore the social and historical contexts of HCT, from its early emergence in 1960s Chicago, to its later adoption in education policy discourse (SPECE, 2002) by the Fifth Labour Government (FLG) in New Zealand. I give some examples of HCT governmentality by the parents or beginning teacher, whereby they evaluate themselves against HCT’s expectations. A new societal perception of early childhood education (ECE) emerged in New Zealand after the 1970s. No longer seen as an adjunct to the maternal environment of home, ECE is now viewed as a social and economic good for both family and state.
In this thesis I examine the marriage of human capital theory (HCT) with ECE in New Zealand. Michel Foucault’s methodological tool ‘genealogy’ allows researchers to position themselves outside of their contemporary confines and the self-evident ‘truths’ of their society. Using this tool I attempt to centre myself from the discipline of ECE that has been my ‘natural’ home for three decades. There are mantras that ECE is ‘good’ for all children; that it is their first step into a world that will be theirs for the rest of their lives; that it is a ‘foundation’ for life-long learning, where youngsters will acquire skills that will stand them in good stead as adults. Intertwined within the discourse of growing skills is a concern about some discrete groups whose skill-base, it is assumed, is less than ideal. Such groups, policy-makers argue, need extra assistance to ensure their skill-base is brought up to that of the accepted norm. Both mother and child should focus on the acquisition of skills, the argument runs, to ensure they can compete equally with others in the employment market. This focus on the educational outcomes of the less skilled is, I argue, a contemporary example of biopolitics, which is Foucault’s term for the management of a state’s population.

The methodological tool of genealogy allows researchers to explore the power/knowledge implicit in a discipline. Genealogy enables one to critique the discipline of ECE and its currently fore-grounded ideas, one of which I suggest is the subject of this investigation, Human Capital theory, which is an historically recent concept. British ECE academic Eva Lloyd (2009), presenting her research on childcare markets in England and the Netherlands, cited an HCT report by Rebecca Kilburn and Lynne Karoly, (2008) who suggest that:

*human capital theory* is ... a useful unifying framework that encompasses many of the disparate threads of current thinking about early childhood policy ... In sum, human capital theory suggests that investments in individuals’ productive capacities have the potential to improve individual outcomes and that these investments might produce the greatest payoffs when made early in individuals’ lives (Kilburn and Karoly, 2008, p. 5, cited in Lloyd, 2009, emphasis in original).
In this work I subject the general context of HCT and its uses to a discursive analysis of policy on ECE. I explore the rupture that occurred in New Zealand in the 1980s when neoliberal economic theories were adopted and ‘New Public Management’ contractual arrangements were introduced. This was a critical point in time, when education became viewed as an individual good, able to be traded in the employment marketplace. I deconstruct policy documents of the Fifth Labour Government (1999–2008), notably including Pathways to the Future: Nga huarahi arataki. A 10-year Strategic Plan for Early Childhood Education from 2002–2012 (SPECE). Despite academics like Eva Lloyd (2009) suggesting that education is a ‘public good’, I argue that in New Zealand such a view of education began to decline in the 1980s. Today, I suggest, the concept of education as a public good is barely evident.

There are presently societal tensions between the roles of paid worker and parent. Many policy-makers in contemporary nation-states, including New Zealand, have sought to manage these tensions with a range of policies that support the employee to give of her best both to her employer and her children. Family-friendly policies include flexible work and the option of childcare for working parents. In this Introduction I set out an overview of the social and political context of ECE before making evident the sites of origin of such ‘disparate threads of current thinking’ (Lloyd, 2009) in New Zealand ECE policy in Chapter 3. While current discourse appears to be very different from that of a century ago, which viewed mothers as responsible for their children’s health rather than their education, I argue in Chapter 4 that both discourses are narratives of biopower. ‘Biopower’ is the name Foucault gave to the state’s interest in the governmentality of its populations; to the management of births, deaths, morbidity, health, hygiene and illness. The prime interest of governmentality is the perceived risks within the state’s population. While a national focus on skill-acquisition may have replaced an earlier concern with hygiene, both are attempts by the state to mitigate risk. Current social discourse emanating both from international agencies and the New Zealand government assumes women work in paid employment for self-
fulfilment, not merely sustenance. *Choice* is a term frequently repeated in this discourse. It is a term that puts the onus on parents for decisions including those made about the timing and spacing of births, as well as the numbers of children. Implicit in this discourse is the assumption that the worker will be capably involved in markets and able to make informed decisions about post-secondary training options, home mortgages, family size and other consumption decisions. International agencies are concerned that fecund workers may choose against having a family (e.g. Ederer, 2007). There is a risk, some demographers assert, that the population will not renew itself, which could affect future economic growth. ‘What is certain is that considerations about the costs of children play a key role in the standard model used by economists to explain childbearing decisions’ (OECD, 2007e).

OECD policy advisers argue that women are presently able to both ‘realise their labour market and family aspirations’ (OECD, 2007b, p. 12). These advisers are part of the network of powerful agencies establishing and endorsing a ‘truth’ about social and economic realities. They are rarely conscious of the underlying epistemologies and ontologies of their discrete disciplines, and the assumptions within which they construct their messages. Politicians value such advice because of the status of the discipline of economics which has credible and critical international status. Such analysis is now interwoven with theories about child development and the societal valuing of ECE for both working women and their children.

1.1 The ‘value’ of policy advice

Policy analysts and advisers are employed to support politicians with advice on efficient and effective government policies on the merits or demerits various solutions to perceived social or economic problems. They usually source their advice from the most recent or most generally supported theory in their field (e.g. Shonkoff & Bales,
Putting theory into action has the effect of supporting the positivity and normalisation of the theory. In Chapter 3 I explore a number of New Zealand Treasury documents, published at the turn of the twenty-first century, which utilised neoliberal and HC theories (e.g. David & Lopez, 2001; NZ Treasury, 1987; 2000 2000a,b, 2004). These theories, I suggest, were critical considerations for the government when formulating SPECE. Policy advisers describe problems, offer a balance of views on the identified problems, and suggest implementations and evaluations of such implementations. Politicians appear to value such advice more particularly when it is generated from economically orientated theories because of the supra-national valorisation of the discipline of economics. The politically attractive theories generated by economists appear to hold a privileged ontological status as ‘truth’. The ‘truth’ under deconstruction in this thesis, HCT, is a micro-economic aspect of neoliberalism. This theory is now interwoven with theories about child development and a narrative about societal valuing of ECE for both women in paid employment and their children (Carneiro & Heckman, 2003; Cunha & Heckman, 2007; Heckman, 1999, 2010, 2011; OECD, 2007b). I explore such HCT writings in detail in Chapter 5.

Intrinsic to the theory of HCT is the idea that the nation-state has a stake in women’s choices because population productivity is its basis for growing the national economy through aggregations of individuals’ wealth. State projections of fertility and population size are central to its long-term planning for job-market supply and growth. Increased parental engagement in paid work, it is argued, ‘delivers many short and long-term benefits to individuals, their children, society and the economy’ (ECE Taskforce, 2011, p. 122). There is political justification for state-support for parental participation in paid employment, for example such as ECE fee subsidies for working parents. The OECD suggests that states can strategically invest in good child development outcomes in its report Doing Better for Children (2009a).

Money invested early in life, HC theorists suggest, can raise the country’s intelligence and social skill base (e.g. Aos, Phipps, Barnoski, & Lieb, 2001; Aos, Miller, &
Mayfield, 2007; Duncan, 2006; Heckman, 2006, 2007, 2011; Heckman et al., 2010). Doing Better for Children (OECD, 2009a, p. 165) suggests states consider a range of in-centre and home-visiting options for families to embed child wellbeing in the policy process. There are debates on how families can attain private goals for both themselves and their children while simultaneously producing ‘public goods’ as workers in the economy (Esping-Andersen, 2007, p. 1).

The risky populations and the ‘problem of the poor’ (Bauman, 2001, p. 117) are managed by states and encouraged by policy to improve. I explore, in Chapter 6 origins of normative assumptions in economics, setting out a genealogy of struggles for rights – civil rights rather than property rights. In Chapters 6 and 7 I outline earlier assumptions about social contracts which have changed over time. Ideas concerning poverty, currently viewed as a risk involving inefficient consumption costs to the civic body, have origins in the eighteenth century concept of political œconomy. The relationship between family wealth, child-wellbeing outcomes and national wealth is central to HCT.¹

Many of the Chicago School of Economics theorists make reference to the economic theories of Robert Malthus (1766–1834), whose idea of the ‘deserving poor’, some maintain, still has some relevance to economics today (e.g. Becker, 1988; Sachs, 2010). Moral principles, I argue in Chapter 7, concerning who is ‘deserving’ of state support remained a tension in political œconomy and economic theory throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Finally, I return to the connection of SPECE to HCT, and set out some thoughts.

Contemporary HCT discourse asserts that there is a correlation of family income with current and future child outcomes (e.g. Carneiro & Heckman, 2003; Heckman, 2006; Carneiro, P., Meghir, C., & Parey, M. (2007). Families are portrayed as altruistically investing in their children. Compared with richer families, however, the

¹ OECD (2009, p. 184) suggests the investment metaphor be extended to thinking of ‘children in terms of portfolio investments of different types’.
poor have limited investment means at their disposal. Some economists (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 2000) suggest that the state offer subsidies as ‘income-transfers’ (OECD, 2009b, p. 171). Others (e.g. Heckman, 2008) argue against any state interference, suggesting that such subsidies fetter market processes. Discussion turns on supply-side tax issues such as whether to offer active employment policies, universal childcare subsidies, or specifically targeted support to those in ‘need’. A prevailing debate concerns how to best manage welfare distributions to sole or teen parents, new immigrants or the unemployed (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 2007; Heckman et al., 2010). Like eighteenth-century political œconomists, many contemporary economic debates utilise the binary of the ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ poor.

1.2 The discourse of human capital theory (HCT)

HCT was developed by economists at the University of Chicago in the 1970s. The theory explains all human action in economic terms. Contributing theorists included Theodore Schultz (1971, 1973), Gary Becker (1975, 1992) and Jacob Mincer (Mincer & Ofek, 1979; Mincer & Polacheck, 1974), all of whose ontological assumptions included the existence of stable entities in the form of atomised individuals, families, firms and nation-states. Becker deemed the essential entity of economics to be a rational, self-interested goal-seeking individual, competing for self-actualisation in economic markets. Such individuals, Becker assumed, possessed the behavioural trait of ‘maximising opportunities’, an assumption entailing ‘stable preferences, and market equilibrium’ (Becker, 1976, p. 5). Examples of these self-actualising behaviours include the economic choices parents make for themselves and for their children. HC, these theorists argued, is a variant of economic capital (not merely linked to cash, land and plant) able to be harnessed in supporting the state’s competitive international advantages: ‘the stock of education in the labor force ... of human capital ... [is] an important key to economic growth’ (Schultz, 1971, p. 41). The state’s interests, the discourse continues, involve
identifying economic possibilities whilst managing economic risk through knowledge of its constituent populations.

I make use of Foucault’s (1984) essay on Nietzsche’s concept of genealogy to provide the essential concepts of my research methods. One of the terms Foucault discusses is *Herkunft*, which describes the numerous small ontologies generated from a range of sites which eventually merge to form a coherent discipline. Such are the stuff of genealogical investigation. HCT emerged from policy discussions about the production of wealth in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Confluent concepts merged into a new discipline, yet retained traces of earlier meanings and usages. Eighteenth-century political œconomy ideas about markets (for example those of Adam Smith (1776) and Malthus (1966, 1973)) merged with mathematical principles devised by nineteenth-century theorists like Carl Menger (Hayek, 1973), and were later adopted as scientific theorems and measures by Austrian economic theorists such as Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek. Institutions as constructed over time, according to the Austrian concept of ‘catallaxy’ (Hayek, 1945; von Mises, 1949), were honed by millions of ‘rational’ trading individuals actively seeking the right market price. Such constructs remain as accepted HCT ontologies.

In order to plot the traceries and emergent ideas which underpin some contemporary economic assumptions on education, I explore the theories of economists from the Chicago School of Economics from 1950 to the present. Econometrics, as exemplified in the work of Becker (1975, 1976, 1981, 1992, 1993 2003, 2005a,b, 2007, 2008; Becker, Murphy, & Wernin, 2005), Mincer (1962, 1974; Mincer & Ofek, 1979; Mincer & Polacheck, 1974) and Barro (2000; Barro & Lee, 2000), is built on a relatively recent ontological emergence – the concept of economics as a positivist science that is mathematically calculable with hypotheses testable for falsification. These theoretical positions – perceived as foundational to twenty-first-century economics – emerged in the twentieth century. I explore Menger’s *methodenstreit* dispute with Gustav Schmoller over divergent economic concepts in Chapters 8 and 9. The influence of
Menger’s disciples on twentieth century economics is explored in their historical and social contexts. The ideas of Menger, Lionel Robbins, Karl Popper and Milton Friedman, together with the use of economic modelling for prediction, allowed Chicago School economists to claim HCT as a robust science capable of advising public policy. Economically orientated public policy as adopted by liberal Western states in the late twentieth century sought to harness concepts of education and skill-training investment as allies in the production of individual, familial, corporate and state wealth.

HCT accumulated power/knowledge in the 1980s as its proponents developed political strategies to spread its messages that were valorised as a new ‘truth’. Austrian ideas gathered support in Anglo-American contexts with the appointment of Friedman as President Ronald Reagan’s economic adviser, and the establishment of think-tanks offering (ostensibly economically neutral) advice to politicians. International agencies disseminated HCT policy ideas to member countries of supra-national agencies: the OECD, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, for example, commissioned and published studies on HCT in the 1970s (see e.g. Marginson, 1993, 1997; Georgiadis, 2007). Such studies were used by member countries to critique their comparative economic strengths. Neoliberal economics underpinned policy of a number of governments, for example those headed by Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and, in New Zealand, Lange and Douglas (Department of Education, 1988 a, b; Schultz, 1973). By the turn of the twenty-first century, HCT had become naturalised as an explanation of, and guide to, human decision-making: a meta-narrative which included all citizens in its discursive normativity. It has become the accepted discourse of governments in relation to the wellbeing of the population and the management of the economy, being cited in documents from supra-national agencies (e.g. OECD 2007a,b, 2009; World Bank, 2005) and in state and national policy papers (MoE, 2002; Duncan, 2007; ECE Taskforce, 2010, 2011, April & June).

The naturalised use of HCT can be seen in the twenty-first-century speeches and practices of politicians (e.g. Maharey, 2000; Horomia, 2005; Clark, 2007). Public
servants, social policy analysts, institutions and individuals are now using HCT concepts in ‘taken for granted’ ways. To the extent that this has been achieved, it is reasonable to refer to the theory in practice as a discourse, a system of rules and practices melded as representations of ‘truth’. Such a discourse is both conceptual and material with an influential effect on citizens. It is now possible to speak of an ‘HCT discourse’ – something we are unable to stand outside of – where the institutions which impose its ritual forms ‘surround them with a circle of silent attention’ (Foucault, 1971, p. 7).

The integration of the discourse we know as HCT in the wider discussions of peer-reviewed economic journals, and international bodies (OECD, IMF, UN, World Bank) is explored in Chapter 9. HCT can be found in the articulations of specialists in social policy from areas of education, neuro-development and health. Specialists are increasingly citing this discourse as offering ‘scientific’ explanations for familial and derivative concepts in research within their disciplines. An example of an influential newly emergent concept is the privileging of technology skills and a policy of investing in the ‘Knowledge Economy’ to promote growth, a growth believed by many politicians and government advisers to be unlimited (e.g. Skilling, 2001; David & Lopez, 2001; OECD 2007b; for a critique of this see Peters, 2003, 2004). This growth becomes self-fulfilling as investment and political attention ‘talks the concept into being’ (Meuret, 1988). Political statements that assume the efficacy of this discourse, such as Prime Minister Helen Clark’s ‘Speech from the Throne’ (2005), and policy documents strengthen HCT’s power. HCT has entered the lexicon of the management of education. Educational institutions are increasingly framed in business terms, governments as investors (owners), principals as chief executive officers (CEO), and students as customers. HCT concepts are found and used as jargon in day-to-day memos and conversations, as in the use of terms such as choice, price, efficiency, educational investment, and educational loans. For instance, the 2010 Budget suggested that changes to student loans will ‘give taxpayers a better return on their investment in the education of our tertiary students’ (MoE, 2010). The words ‘investment’ and ‘choice’ occur often in
Education Review Office reports. Such terminology can also be found in the non-compulsory sectors. ‘We need’, said Mark Flowers, CEO of a tertiary educational institute, ‘more people with skills ... It’s just a good investment’ (cited in Migone, 2011).

The widespread acceptance of a naturalised discourse in which market-related terminology predominates has the effect of constructing human beings in aspirational and positivist (scientific) norms. Under such a managerial discourse, there is a normalisation of neoliberal economic ideas, for example, that the state as principal (in this case the Ministry of Education) will contract for paid outcomes, to agencies that can support children’s increased participation in ECE. States view certain discrete bodies of their population as being in need of short-term targeted assistance to equalise their skill-bases. To achieve this would be a good governments’ economical management of educational monies. Although education is viewed in the neo-liberal understanding, as a ‘private good’, pertaining to the individual, some sectors of the population need state support. Government intervention to ameliorate risk to the skill of the wider public is presented within the discourse of principal-agency contracting for services. The state is keen to ensure a minimum skill-level for all the population, because in HCT theory, individual skills are aggregated to the skill-base of the national population. Investment in education is assumed to have unidirectional causality: that it will grow the wealth of the population and the nation. Therefore governments support individuals and ‘firms’, including educational sites such as ECE centres, to plan wealth-producing, long-term investments. Concepts such as Public Choice Theory, Agency Theory, Transactional Cost Economics, and HCT are neo-liberal economic models of New Public Management (see e.g. Boston, J., 2000; Devine, N., 2000, p. 7; 13; Olssen et al, 2004, pp 153 ff). Since the 1980s, there has been a New Public Management (NPM) understanding among policy makers and within state agencies, that the state will be removed from daily oversight of education. Instead, educational entities deliver services, partly funded by government,
in the tertiary and ECE sectors, in partnership with individuals. The role of the government is merely to regulate, while the daily role of educational ‘firms’ is to deliver curriculum as a service to clients who have chosen them as a preferred educational provider.

Such ‘truths’ promulgated through the discourse of education and other state institutions such as the health system are instructively considered as ‘language games’ by Lakoff and Johnson (1984), games in which we are all players as we daily speak such truths into being. This daily intercourse contributes to the accumulating power/knowledge of HCT discourse. The working parent learns to care for herself, to examine herself against societal expectations of a balanced parent-employee. By examining her ability to balance loyalty to her employer and responsibility for her children’s future, she learns to regulate herself under the gaze of state agents and to become self-managing – ‘empowered’ to meet normative expectations of the state and her community:

Empowerment, with all its emphasis on strengthening the capacity of the individual to play the role of the actor in ... her own life, has come to encompass a range of interventions to transmit under tutelage, certain professionally ratified mental, ethical and practical techniques for active self-management (Miller & Rose, 2008, pp. 106–107).

If the worker is a sole parent who is required by the state welfare agency to find paid employment but who is nevertheless concerned for the wellbeing of her young children, her Department of Work and Income New Zealand (WINZ) caseworker will reassure her by citing research demonstrating that children are not damaged if they are enrolled in ‘quality centres’ (Bennett, 2008; Mitchell et al., 2008). Longitudinal research, the caseworker could add, demonstrates that being in such settings increases children’s reasoning and problem-solving skills (e.g. Mitchell et al., 2008). The Ministry of

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2 ECE centres have been bulk-funded since 1990 on a per child-funded hour basis, up to a limit of 30 hours per week.
Education’s (MoE) belief in education and skill-training as an investment is such that they fund over 20 teen-parent units across the country, where parents attend school and their children adjoining ECE centres (e.g. MoE, N.D. a,b).

Should the mother be Māori or Pasifika, she will be reassured by the choice of culturally appropriate ECE services. The Ministry of Education’s (MoE) contracts with Iwi Māori and Pacific peoples aim to support increased participation of their children in ECE. The mother will be able to choose from a continuum of services, from teacher-led kindergartens, Pacific Island Education and Care Centres, or Māori language ECE immersion services through parent-led Puna, Aoga Mata or Kōhanga Reo (OECD, 2007, table 4.1), or a home-visiting parent-education option. If she is considering a career in ECE, she will discover that TeachNZ Scholarships can fund her choices. Iwi and hapū offer scholarships while WINZ training subsidies are available for work-ready parents. The mother can access a student loan and will be reassured that she will be able to repay it as there is a solid career path in ECE awaiting her. She will wonder if the side-supply tax subsidies presently offered under the ‘Working for Families’ tax-abatement scheme will continue in the near future (English, Bennett & Dunne, 2011).

While training to be an ECE teacher, she (or, occasionally, he) will learn about the international and national history of ECE. She will learn about the local models offered by Playcentre, and Ngā Kōhanga Reo which are specific to this country, local options, emerging to meet local needs (Walker, R., March 7, 2012, personal communication). She will learn that the national ECE curriculum Te Whāriki Matauranga mō ngā Mokopuna o Aotearoa, (MoE, 1996), offers options for diverse individual and community needs. She may muse about tensions between some agentic readings of the child, in this curriculum document, of bicultural options (e.g. Ritchie, 2002, 2003; Williams, Broadley, Te Aho, 2012), and other, more instrumental portrayals (e.g. Duhn, 2006, 2008). However, she will adapt and conform to the daily messages sent from myriads of sites about the need for life-long learning, and skill enhancement as the preparation of a career-ready and focused opportunistic individual. She will assume
tensions between HCT and liberal education perspectives may resolve themselves as she reflects more deeply, learns more.

Individuals learn to govern themselves according to the discourse of their times. Had we been born in mediaeval times in the Western world, we would attend church, learn certain prayers and rituals; baptise our newborns and prepare for a better life in the next world. Today, we internalise the need to obtain credentials, gain marketable skills: we now seek salvation through education. Should we not be trained to our employer’s satisfaction, ECE centres will support us to plot enhanced professional development and knowledge of key educational elements such as assessment of children’s learnings. As the earlier subject of the sovereign’s realm trusted in the trinity of subject-king-god; we now believe (and in turn govern ourselves) within the HCT trinity of skills-training-wealth. The twin axes of governmentality (the state and the individual) become intertwined within the dominant discourse, which in turn, becomes self-fulfilling in its purposes.

Foucault calls this form of power – that of the embodied discourse – ‘governmentality’, a concept closely tied to discipline and professionalisation. The beginning teacher will join a discipline that draws its competencies from knowledge of child development developed by Arnold Gesell, Louise Ilg and Frances Ames (Rose, 1990, pp. 146–148). The graduating teacher undertakes a cycle of self-improvement and reflection, a care of the self which, it is theorised, will support the teacher to better govern her charges and to implement the national curriculum. Reflective journaling will discipline her to critique her philosophy of teaching and practice in a search for improvement of self-knowledge through ‘memory, mediation and method’ (Foucault, 2001a, p. 460). She is unlikely to be made aware of the historical construction of these pedagogical ontologies. The power of the discourse will be embodied and enhanced through her engagement with it. Governmentality brings everything into its ambience, where all the population’s permutations can be counted, measured and described; where the citizens can be ‘known’ by the state. It is a type of governmental rationality
that manages social spaces, practices and forms, and thus its population. James Scheurich (1994) makes the point that the regularities of any discipline are not intentional, nor created consciously by any one group. This does not mean, however, that particular groups may not benefit from the power/knowledge constructions. Most social agents operating within a discipline are unaware of the ‘social regularities shaping their subjectivities and their practices’ (p. 303).

This then, is the work of this thesis: an investigation of biopower, including the significance of HCT to the prevailing discourse of education and economic policy, with its links to employment responsibilities that are now naturalised as ‘common sense’.
2 Theoretical bases

This chapter sets out the research tools of archaeology and genealogy used in this thesis and outlines Human Capital Theory (HCT). Foucault’s (1984c) work *Nietzsche, History, Genealogy*, supported the unpacking of ideas presently seen as ‘naturally true’; a progression to the pinnacle of the present. In exploring discursively, the social and historical contexts of the discipline of economics, theorems, facts and ideas can be seen as socially constructed. Citizens are constructed by state education discourse, through normative expectations and images. Genealogy as a tool does not offer solutions, merely sites for local and specific struggles to the dominance of any discourse.

In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality...[T]ypes of prohibition ... intersect, reinforce or compensate for each other, forming a complex grid which changes constantly ... the regions where the grid is tightest ... are those of sexuality and politics (Foucault, 1971, pp. 210–211).

Society’s view of humankind and the shared environment is socially constructed as discourse gives a view of the world both as it is and as it should be. Where one authoritative account exists, other perspectives will also exist as all ‘realities’ are developed by fallible people (Foucault, 1970, 1978, 1984c, 1984g; Said, 1993a). Social norms differ over time and space, and can be researched for the residual traces of previous human perspectives. The theoretical framework of my research into the influence of human capital theory (HCT) on early childhood education (ECE) follows the thoughts and works of Michel Foucault who, as noted in the Introduction, has given researchers tools to look outside and beyond the present structures that confine their thinking. Foucault is particularly useful for the study of human capital within the field of economics, because his theory allows for longer-term perspectives of historical change,
through a critique of the ‘natural’ assumptions of a discipline. The interweaving of historical and discursive aspects supports researchers’ deconstruction of the elements that make up contemporary power/knowledge structures. Foucault’s *Birth of Biopolitics* (2008) included aspects of the topic of HCT in the context of French liberalism in the 1980s. In applying this theory to ECE in New Zealand in the twenty-first century, I both build on and diverge from Foucault’s genealogy.

Foucault used the metaphor of construction, and wrote about seeking ‘to construct myself [in contrast to the group who called themselves] “structuralists” but weren’t’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 250). Post-structuralists\(^3\) believe language confines our thinking – that the lexical, semantic, grammatical concepts construct us in the confines of our lingual field with both historical and social rules. A group of French theorists that included Louis Althusser and Jean-Paul Sartre together with Michel Foucault called for ‘reevaluation of the theory of the subject’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 251), in moving beyond the semiotic analyses of structuralist theorists like Ferdinand de Saussure (Foucault, 1984i, p.115).

Foucault’s theory gives an opportunity to look outside the accepted way of perceiving things as generally accepted ‘givens’ or ‘truths’; to go beyond the idea of there being ‘an historical a priori of human “nature”’(Foucault, 1971, 1970, p. 172; 1978). Using the metaphor of de-constructing, Foucault developed a ‘toolbox’ for discursive analysis in order to reveal the taken-for-granted assumptions of a specific society.\(^4\) His theories of archaeology and genealogy allow researchers to adopt a long

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\(^{3}\)Foucault himself avoided any label, or indeed questioned the authority of ‘the author’ (Rabinow, 1984, p. 23).

\(^{4}\)Foucault used the metaphor of toolbox: ‘I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area ... I would like [my work] to be useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector. I don’t write for an audience, I write for users, not readers’ v (1974) ‘Prisons et asiles dans le mécanisme du pouvoir’ in Dits et Ecrits, II. Paris: Gallimard, 1994, pp. 523-

He talked of ‘scaffolding’ his thought as his works form links between ideas in ways that are ‘instrumental and tentative’ (1978, p. 240)
and deep analytical perspective of change. It is from these two Foucauldian theories that I take my foci.

Archaeology is a ‘method specific to the analysis of local discursivities’ (Foucault, 1994d, pp10-11). In this thesis I trace the changing perceptions of societal understandings of the ‘care of the child’ over the past century, as the focus shifts from a mainly private focus, to a societal belief that such care is a public issue. An archeological slicing across time would show ECE as initially familial care co-existing with philanthropic care for some (risky population). The philanthropic discourse of hygiene was part of this co-existence as an emphasis on children’s skills emerged. The discourse of hygiene, including ECE, was extended to all families, and was subsumed into HCT later in the twentieth century. Society now believes that children who do not attend an ECE centre are at risk of not learning certain required skills. Genealogy, Scheurich and McKenzie (2005, pp. 10–11) suggest, is the tactic, which once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them’. There small emergences of ECE from private concerns, linked to philanthropic anxieties about the poor, to appear as a public good after World War II. There are withering of concerns about the poor, as an egalitarian ethos emerges, then descends again. The rupture in the accepted discourse occurred in the 1980s, as first NZ Treasury, then politicians, then government education discourses adopted terms from the Chicago School. SPECE continued the discourse, but set out statistical representations of perceived risks to the body politic posed by discrete groupings of the population. A genealogical approach can explore how normative expectations concerning the acquisition of skills became an educational salvational and alchemic concern.

‘Governmentality’ is a concept of prime importance to this work. Governmentality, argued Foucault, operates on two axes: the rationality of the subject is positioned at one pole, and the rationality of the state at the other. The mechanisms, procedures, *technes*, of these two concepts, shift over time. A subsidiary Foucauldian
concept, linked to the second pole, is that of biopower. Biopower is a practice that allows the state to gain information about its own population and assume to know it. By employing techniques involving the gathering and analysing of statistical and demographic data, the state identifies areas for intervention and areas of perceived risk or concern to the body politic. Policy is the state’s response to any perceived problems concerning economical management of populations based on evaluation of demographic data. Policy documents setting out solutions to such problems are a focus of this research.

This thesis is a discursive analysis of the educational policy documents of the Fifth Labour Government (FLG) (1999–2008), especially the *Pathways to the Future: Ngā huarahi arataki. A 10-year Strategic Plan for Early Childhood Education from 2002–2012* (*SPECE*). Such documents provide policy solutions to a ‘problem’: how to engage populations in the state’s aspirational goal of growing national wealth through the skill-base of today’s parents and their children as future workers. In the past three decades, there has been increased state policy interest in young children. I aim to unpack the universals presented in the policy discourse portrayed as ‘truth’, specifically that the preschool age-group is an optimal site for state investment to promote future wealth creation. I offer a contextual introduction to Foucault’s theories in the body of educational thought, internationally, nationally and within the sub-category of ECE. The three sections of this chapter present an overview of genealogy, and its discursive analysis uses. Firstly, I attend to the construction of the ethical being; secondly to the power/knowledge of discourse that normalises choice as a freedom essential to education; and thirdly to the subject of this thesis, HCT, in relation to policy on ECE.

Foucault held the Chair of the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France from 1971 until 1984. His theory about systems of thought allowed researchers to look analytically at the configuration of human ideas over epochs. He wished to ‘establish domains in which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent’ (Foucault, 1980 p. 79). All human societies have rules about the way of
doing things and thus produce discourses that justify both the rules and the limits of possibilities. These are the social regularities which are constituted by discourse, whose power is not readily apparent. However, Foucault offers strategies to make the power-constructions visible so that they can become sites for deconstruction. There is no neutral observer of social processes, he suggests, we as human beings are all enmeshed and intertwined in the capillaries of power; our values are central to our perceptions.

Foucault advises that researchers should perceive power/knowledge structures as socially constructed rather than ‘natural’, so that they can be examined for the underlying epistemologies and ontologies. A prime site of such power analysis is discourse, which is both texts and the social contexts that support their articulation. He suggests that there are two differentiated elements in discourse: connaissance and savoir. Connaissance includes only formal bodies of knowledge – those that support a ‘discipline’. It is savoir that Foucault believes gives new insights, fertile areas for exploration of the grids that constitute the accepted social regularities. Savoir includes texts, but moves beyond these to look at the situational context that produces such texts. It is not only the analysis of texts and institutions that produce such savoir, but also the individuals operating as experts within institutions, as their disciples. Savoir involves ‘three fundamental elements of any experience ... a game of truth, relations of power and forms of relations to oneself and others’ (Foucault, 1984b). Savoir is a body of discourse supported by institutional power, where researchers can clearly differentiate the rationalities of rules over the epochs, which will vary across time and space. I seek to explore, through savoir, the social rationalities that constitute HCT.

Foucault’s concepts of archaeology and genealogy enable researchers to explore the body of discourse that is supported by institutional power (Foucault 1976, 1994, p. 116). These two methodologies challenge researchers to view the positioning of mankind and society very differently from that of the historian. No longer will the researcher be able to write monumental histories – viewed by Foucault as parodies, as ‘spectacles’ (Foucault, 1984d). Conventional historians take ‘unusual pains to erase the
elements in their work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and place’ (Foucault, 1984d). Humankind is now decentred, a situation which challenges human beings’ place at the centre of the known world, positioning this view as culturally and historically specific to the European Enlightenment⁵ (Foucault, 1984i, 1984j). Foucault believed that we must not forget that the Enlightenment – the period positioned by many as the beginning of modernity – is located at a very specific point in the development of European societal thought (Foucault, 1991). If we look beyond humanity as pivotal to teleological progress, we can see other forces at work, thereby decentring and collapsing the subject-as-colossus (1984c).⁶ In this way, the power of discourse to define and construct us becomes the object of research. Foucault engaged with this concept of power/knowledge to argue that discourse is never neutral, but exists within complex systems. Discourse does not identify objects or subjects, but constitutes them in normative ways, making some groups ‘problematic’ and in need of curative intervention. Yet in framing it’s ‘truths’, discourse conceals their social construction. Research, such as Foucauldian archaeology or genealogy, can locate an emergence of concepts specific to a time and place. Deconstructing concepts viewed as ‘universal’ across time, history and culture assists in dissecting their power.

In the next two sections of this chapter I give more detail about archaeology before extensively discussing the methodology of this thesis – genealogy. Archaeology offers researchers a chance to distance themselves from their contemporary societal positions. A detailed overview of the theory of genealogy, my chosen methodology, forms the bulk of the chapter.

Foucault explored his concept of archaeology in two major pieces of work: "Archaeology of Knowledge" (1969; ET 1972) and "The Order of Things: An Archaeology of

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⁵ The Enlightenment, or the Age of Reason, can be defined as that movement that began in the eighteenth century, with writers and thinkers such as John Locke, Isaac Newton and others who privilege humankind’s rational ability. Many believe we are still enthralled by such ideas. Mankind’s ‘historical mode of being’, argued Foucault; the ‘constitution of the self as an autonomous subject — is rooted in the Enlightenment’ (Foucault, 1984j, p. 42).

⁶ The idea of heroic man, pitting himself against natural or human forces.
the Human Sciences (1966; ET 1970). In these works he set out a basic distrust of the building monuments to history; there is, he argued, there is no teleology, no essential progress. ‘[T]he history of thought, of knowledge, of philosophy, of literature seems to be seeking, and discovering, more and more discontinuities, whereas history itself appears to be abandoning the irruption of events in favour of stable structures’ (1972, p. 6). Researching the discontinuities of history gives very different understandings of humanity and human environments to the conventional picture of perpetual improvement posited in the modernist version of ‘development’. In The Order of Things, Foucault set the examination of classifications as a tool for archaeology. Each epoch, he argues, has a ‘table’ – a grid of similarities and analogies that are accepted as coherent. However, the coherence of one epoch becomes the myth of a later age. Foucault uses an example from mediaeval China of classifications of animals that challenge modern European distinctions between the ‘same’ and the ‘other’. This Chinese ordering used 14 categories of animals, including those that were fabulous, belonged to the Emperor, were sirens, or could be seen from a distance; as well as those that had ‘just broken the water pitcher’ (1970, p. xvi). To us, Foucault suggests, such fields of ordering are disturbing, laughable and create anxieties. Nevertheless, such orderings can be researched empirically for a ‘system of elements’ (p. xxi). Order is that which is given as an inner law, and at the same time has no existence, except in the grid, created by ‘a glance, and examination, a language ... [l]t is only in the blank spaces of this grid, that order manifests itself in depth as though there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression’ (p. xxiii). Order examines the mode of being and the regulation that divided things into categories. Examples of such categorical divisions given by Foucault are taxonomy, grammar, and wealth. These three are a part of the human sciences that construct mankind and his or her ways of understanding and valuing things in the world. The terms, nomenclature, positing in speech; together with material things that are valued are indicators of the social constructs of society: societal discourse indicates the values of its people.
Foucault’s notion of archaeology allows researchers to seek the limits and forms of what is sayable. The object of research is discourse, the movement of the *savoir*. Foucault’s definition of discourse is that it is the body of truth which arises and exists in different ways in varying social environs. It has a condition of existence, and a practical field in which it is deployed (Foucault, 1991). Using archaeology, the researcher can seek out the surface impressions of change over time. The rules for what is able to be said differ over epochs and can be exposed and questioned. The researcher may then follow the multiple constructions and allied rule formations for the intersecting truths using a second method: genealogy.

A critical piece of work that underpins this research is Foucault’s *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History* (1977), which Scheurich and McKenzie (2005) suggest was a theoretical bridge between his two theories: published after his work on archaeology, and before his first genealogical work (p. 842). Foucault’s conceptual tools of *connaissance* and *savoir* are archaeological, as is that of ‘the ponderous power’ of discourse – its positivity. Genealogy will attend, Scheurich and McKenzie suggest, to society’s articulation of the history-imprinted body, within social systems of dominations. A genealogical investigation allows researchers to write an ‘effective history’ that questions any discourse of power.

Both the methods of archaeology and genealogy as proposed by Foucault support new understandings of ‘a problem’. Researchers can seek archaeologically the origins and explanations to a ‘problem of the present’. Such research is not confined to any single disciplinary study, but can examine a redrawing of frontiers that can collapse or parody the power of the discipline. Such research will ignore the apparent discreteness of objects to seek their unconscious linkings and connections in sense-making. ‘This unconscious is always the negative side of science – that, which resists it, deflects it or disturbs it’ (Foucault 1970, p. x). Archaeology calls into question the schema of things, as it delineates shifts in the episteme of Western history. It is able to seek evidence of both deep structural phenomena and surface phenomena that occur at
the ‘level of daily human micro-practices’ (Scheurich, 1994, p. 303). In 1983 at the Berkley History Department, an audience member asked Foucault if he ever stopped doing archaeology? Foucault replied ‘No. And I never stopped doing genealogy. Genealogy defined the target and aim of the work. Archaeology indicates the field in order to do genealogy’ (Foucault, 1983, p. 3).

2.1 Genealogy: the methodology

Genealogy is ‘a critical set of tools’ that can be used in ‘any set or grouping’, unlike archaeology, which is dependent on highly structured and interrelated sets of constructs (Scheurich & McKenzie, p. 857). Foucault (2003) distinguished between the two in the following way: ‘[a]rchaeology is the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities and genealogy is the tactic, which once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them’ (pp. 10–11).

Genealogy, understood as a method of enquiry, can attempt to challenge the strength of power at every intersection. It is

[f]irst a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents (Foucault, 1984a, p. 351).

Genealogy, Foucault suggests, interrogates the power of science. It is anti-science in the sense that it seeks to deconstruct the grids that construct science’s ‘ponderous materiality’ (Foucault, 1981, p. 216). Genealogy also helps the researcher to understand the way structures are socially defined; how ‘problems’ may have had different portrayals in another epoch. The researcher can seek out ruptures and submerged
knowledge or the perspectives made illegitimate at one time that may yet emerge as legitimate in another discourse. In this research, the object of study is the differing perceptions of ‘capital’, ‘wealth’ and ‘economy’ in various epochs. Economic practices have been understood as ‘precepts ... ultimately as morality, [which] have sought since the sixteenth century to ground themselves ... in a theory of wealth and production’ (Foucault, 1971, p. 213). The research will seek out the co-options by a dominant discourse of science as well as the resistances to the power of the science. Examples of co-option could include changed emphases or new meanings that pertain to capital, riches and the acquisition of wealth. At the centre of this study is a fascination with the power/knowledge of policy to construct, align with, appropriate or suppress resistance to the ‘will to truth’. Discourse is the contemporary evidence of a genealogy, the part that is currently apparent and draws on the concepts and assumptions of the genealogy. The task of genealogy, argued Foucault, ‘is to expose a body totally imprinted by history’ (Foucault 1984d, p. 83). The state’s uses of the body-as-parent are many: through training, discipline as a worker as self-seeking career planner. The co-option of parental aspirations for their children by the discourse of the state insists there is but one view of quality parenting: parents’ desire to increase intellectual and societal wealth for themselves and their families. Such discourse attempts to encourage familial discipline and prudence.

Discourse is always transparent, with no hidden meanings, but it is a role of the genealogist to ask, ‘whom does [a] discourse serve?’ (Foucault, 1980a, p. 115). One can ask about the mechanism of power that asserts there is merely one truth. To seek for evidence of any suppressed truths and sites for struggle that may open new possibilities, unseen options.

[C]riticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making
metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological ... in the sense it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge ... but to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say and do as so many historical events (Foucault, 1984a, p. 46).

Foucault noted that such critique allows us psychological distance from the ‘truths’ of the present. The critique would

be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are, what it is impossible to do and to know, but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do or think. (1984a, p. 46)

‘Genealogy’, wrote Foucault, is ‘gray, meticulous and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times ‘as it seeks out the singularity of events in the most unpromising places’ (Foucault, 1984d, p. 76). In genealogy, Foucault seeks traceries; small branchings that may shrivel between one period and another, or shift to ally with another vein. His foci are the customs of an earlier epoch, which may have become illegitimate in the later ages. Contemporary concepts may have replaced or merged with earlier customs. However, the period which follows is not an improvement on the earlier period; it merely uses different constructs as new disciplines emerge. In his first genealogical study, Discipline and Punish (1975, ET 1995). Foucault set out examples of two discourses on state governance of its citizens. In this work he postulated that there are two discontinuities in the episteme of Western culture. The first was between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries when the discourse on discipline changed: no longer did the sovereign discipline the population using display. A second discourse supported individuals to become responsible for their self-discipline.
Foucault used Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon\(^7\) to illustrate the changed discourse of this second epoch, arguing that these two perspectives on discipline, the display, and the gaze, illustrate differing epochal *savoir*.

Foucault derived much of his theory from Nietzsche, Heidegger and Canguilhem (Foucault, 1975, 1999, p. 49; 1978, p. 255; Scheurich & McKenzie, 2005, pp. 253–254). Like Nietzsche, he seeks the ensembles of discourse together with their associated discontinuities (Foucault, 1991, p. 55). In *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, Foucault examines Nietzsche’s challenges to the pursuit of origins; to the view of history as a tale of this ‘truth’ (Foucault, 1984d). Using a range of Nietzsche’s works, Foucault unpacks Nietzsche’s use of the terms *Ursprung*, *Entstehung* and *Herkunft* and their changes in meaning. While all the terms have similar meanings, Foucault differentiates their crucial semantic significance.

*Ursprung* in the pursuit of origins attempts to capture the exact essence of things – that Platonic idea that we can find an embryonic root at a historical point of time, something Foucault argued, is impossible. In his investigation of the concept of instabilities, he seeks out the meaning of the latter two terms, which he sees as more exact than *Ursprung*, and thus useful to a genealogical investigation. While all can be translated as meaning ‘origin’, *Herkunft* is ‘the equivalent of stock or descent ... [as pertaining] to a group’ (Foucault, 1984d, p. 80, emphasis in original). There are myriads of numberless beginnings, which form a network that is impossible to unravel, thus no examination of minute details by the researcher is productive. We can track through documents for numerous events to see the accidents, the dead-end lanes of possibilities that were contenders, but never followed. We can seek the ‘errors, the false appraisals and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us’ (p. 81). This means that researches will view documents, within their

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\(^7\) Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* (1977) drew on the model Jeremy Bentham (1791) had constructed of a backlit cell that faced a jailer’s tower as an example of a modality of power. Prisoners were constantly visible, under the gaze of the jailer (Foucault, 1984k, p.206 ff)
social contexts, as sites where pouvoir/savoir can be sought. Moreover texts are interrelated, they cross-reference and draw on other, previous ideas, are built on other, inter-textual references. No text will exist in isolation, but must be positioned in ‘the true’ (Foucault, 2001b). By taking an approach (that differs from that of the historian) of a critical suspicion of any power-position, the researcher can peel back the veneer of truth, to demonstrate the social and subjective matter of texts.

Every origin of morality, Foucault maintains, has value as a critique the moment it stops being pious, and is positioned by others as the undisputed ‘truth’. For example, there is an uncritical acceptance by most economists of the Adam Smith economic model of economics. Such a model, with its individualistic positioning, when applied to HCT is believed to offer an option which can save individuals from poverty.

When researching a discourse which concerns the body of the subject, researchers can seek out changing emphases imposed by such discourse. The body is the site of all inscriptions, as the dominant discourse moulds us in its image. For example, the discourse of individualism, which underpins HCT, can be researched. The researcher seeks out points, small traceries, which join in a confluence, in of the stream of HCT power. If society requires us to be individuals, the process of formation of the individual can be traced in many ways e.g. the baby is ejected from the maternal bed, to a cot, then a bed, and to an individual room. Each individual can be counted, scrutinised, their career path plotted, documented, and assessed. The body, and everything that touches it, is the domain of the Herkunft, and traces, stigmata, of social experiences are inscribed (Foucault, 1984d p. 83). This concept applies to both the individual and the collective body of the state. Ruth Irwin (2001, p. 46) compares the concept of Herkunft to the Maori genealogical understanding of whakapapa, where certain lines are privileged over others, while some remain almost invisible, or wither.

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8 Knowledge/power (in the French ‘pouvoir/savoir’) was Foucault’s definition of the constructions of discourse. Truth is merely an accepted power/knowledge construction (Foucault, 1984g, p.51 ff).
Entstehung, Nietzsche’s second term, has connotations of emergence, which ‘is always produced through a particular stage of forces’ (1984d, p. 84). The researcher can follow the emergences, seeking out nodes where there have been struggles for dominance among discourses. Struggle, strength and sites for confrontation are alluded to with Entstehung: what Foucault describes as ‘the endlessly repeated play of dominations’ (p. 85). There are always violences, which are installed in a system of rules that cloaks this domination (Foucault, 1997; 2004a). Truth/power games are analysed; the play of forces sought because struggles ‘always occur in the interstice’ as one discourse gains the ascent (p. 85). The strategies of ascent are through the constructions of ‘higher moralities’. However, no one is responsible for an Entstehung – the wider social milieu; the specific historical moments create the conditions for this. These two terms – descent and emergence – are central to the examination of discourse as ‘dangerous’ as we question its will-to-truth.

Foucault did not see genealogy as superior to archaeology, but as one of several tools. My discussion in the following paragraphs is indebted to James Scheurich and Kathryn McKenzie (2005), who summarise ‘four general rules’ for genealogical study, drawn from Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. They state researchers should look for ‘possible positive effects. By positive ... he does not mean something we might like or approve of; he means something produced rather than repressed or excluded’ (1995, p. 854, emphasis in original). The second rule is the construction of policy. How policies are analysed is critical, according to Scheurich and McKenzie. Traditionally, social scientists saw actions related to government as the function of social agents. For Foucault, acts, procedures or disciplines have “specificity within” the more general field of other ways of exercising power’ (p. 855). Despite the intentions of individual agents, power multiplies across a social field. Power circulates, not on a broad public face, but in capillary fashion, behind and through small micro-tubes.

Scheurich and McKenzie see their third rule as a critically important one. The researcher can see the knowledge of man and his institutions as emerging from ‘some
common matrix’. Technologies of power may multiply across fields and disciplines, linking systems and sciences. This multiplication, they argue, is likely to be ‘both intentional and unintentional, both rational and not rational’ (p. 855). They use the example of public education – its practices, procedures and policies. Some of these may arise from other matrices – or from the same matrix manifesting in another form.

Schurich and McKenzie’s fourth rule is to discover the entry of the soul as an object of disciplinary investigation. ‘By his use of the word “soul”, Foucault means that the focus of [the system being investigated – in his example, penal systems] ... not only on what they ... do but also on what they are, will be, may be’ (1995 p. X, emphasis in original). In this example of disciplinary practices, Foucault sets out two axes: the body of the criminal, as the object of discipline; and the body politic, which seeks to reduce risk by engaging with the soul of the criminal.

Foucault developed the concept of ‘governmentality’, from the merging of gouverner (governing) and mentalité (modes of thought) (Lemke, 2001, p. 2). He took the body as the basis for critical resistance (Hoy, 2005) and used the ancient Greek view of the body to establish that what has been constructed as humanly universal is in fact not so (Hoy, 2005, pp. 63–64). What counts as a person has differed over time, culture and space. The state, with the panoptical gaze encourages individuals to conduct themselves as though they are visible at all times. The father would govern himself ethically, and his family economically, to ensure prudent, compliant, disciplined offspring. We, as children of such fathers, learn that we will not do something because ‘they’ are watching.

Foucault sets out the two axes: ‘the body–organism–discipline–institution series and the population–biological processes–regulatory mechanisms–State’ (2003 p. 250). He defines governmentality as:

the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow this very specific, albeit complex form of
power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. (Foucault, 1991, pp. 102–103)

It is the governmentality of the population as a whole, which forms the subject of interest for government policy. Policy and police share semantic roots, and both support the regulation of individuals and groups within the state.

Statistics, for Foucault, is the science of the state. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the state was keen to ‘know’ its population, and statistics allowed it to do so (1994; 2000, p. 212). The state, with the technology that allowed it to count, categorise, number and set in hierarchies, was now able to form policy, and thus to regulate bodies of the population. In the nineteenth century the specific concern of the state was the health of its population: the morbidity, the diet, the interest in sanitation, the medicalisation of risk in certain areas such as urban slums. These were the initial interests of what Foucault calls biopower. The security of the body politic was a concern, however, political œconomy\(^9\) would allow the state to enhance its wealth and secure its strength over its neighbours. Hoy notes that the terms biopower and biopolitics are almost interchangeable in Foucault’s writing. Both are examples of “‘power-to” and “power-over’” (Hoy, 2005, p. 78).

The reduction of risk as connaissance relied on the definition of a norm. The normalising judgement of society pushes the ‘other’ to the periphery. By its very positivity, the norm makes any alternative illegitimate. Resistance, though, is always allied with the dominant discourse, is ‘found in the social ontology from the start ... Power depends on points of resistance to spread itself through the social networks’ (Hoy, 2005, p. 78). Critical resistances and paradoxes can be located by the researcher

\(^9\) ‘Political œconomy’, or an economical management of policies relating to population, was the eighteenth century term. It was superseded by the more common term ‘economy’ in the late nineteenth century. Foucault, (2008) notes that in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century the term had two meanings. Firstly it involved production and circulation of wealth, while it also referred to ‘any method of government that can procure the nation’s prosperity’ (p.13).
at the point where the two poles (body /organism; and population/ biological processes) reach their limits (Foucault, 2003, p. 253). It is the existence of desubjugated knowledges that allow for new possibilities. Power is never absolute and it is at the periphery, at the nodes of these illegitimate spaces that sites for struggle may be located, identified. A sceptical rejection of the dominance of any norm is a first action for a researcher seeking other histories.

David Couzens, Hoy suggests, genealogy need not assert any specific doctrines. It is a tool to allow the researcher to momentarily dismantle the structures that presently confine us. It will not dismantle a ‘truth’ to replace it with another.

[B]ut in the sense of being heuristically feasible ... [genealogy] itself becomes a way to do nonmetaphysical philosophy ... [a] thorough-going genealogist could avoid metaphilosophy altogether by suggesting that the only way to challenge the results of one genealogical analysis would be to produce another genealogical analysis either of the original phenomenon or of the initial genealogical account itself ... Even with strong motivation ... the second-order genealogy will not necessarily succeed. If it does succeed, then we will be concerned with the substance of its concrete findings, and the metaphilosophical justification will be unnecessary (Schact, 1994, pp. 252–253 & 258, quoted in Devine, 2000, p. 30).

Thus genealogy supports multiple perspectives, multiple uncertainties, and makes visible the fact that ‘everything is dangerous’ (Foucault, 1985, p. 343).

The fact that Foucault did not offer solutions to identified problems has been an issue for some. His objective instead was to identify nodes in the nexus of power where there were possible sites for struggle, for ‘conditions in which particular subject groups ... can express themselves and act’ (Smart, 1986, p. 167). Struggles are not the same as solutions, however. Foucault’s toolbox did not privilege any one resolution. There is some agreement among the critics, however, that Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism

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10 What Foucault saw as relations between the one, and the many: omnes et singulatim (1994a p.307).

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has use, even if he can be located as a ‘theorist of Fordism’ (Fraser, 2003). Foucault is arguing, not that past practices were ‘more rational ... but that all practices are less rational’ (1981, p. 162, emphasis in original), but this is unintelligible unless seen within the tabular contextual grid of a particular epoch.

Foucault’s theory has been criticised as being bleak, as being Eurocentric, and offering no reconstructive possibilities once the discourse has been deconstructed. Indeed, one critic has referred to his style as an ‘obscure, arrogant, sensationalist, and opaque form of discourse, which by his own admission is a “labyrinth into which I can venture ... [and] in which I can lose myself”’ (Midelfort, 1980, p. 249; see too Stone, 1983). Others have challenged his historical accuracy and political outcomes. According to Smart, critics ask if researchers can deconstruct, but not reassemble a new truth (1986, p. 166). Often, the issue of discussion is a local occurrence that has been accepted as a universal truth. For example, in this work I plot American studies that are seen as empirical, therefore applicable in other settings, far from the site of the research. Such universalities, Smart continues, constructed as “true” discourses ... have provided reasons, principles and justifications for objectifying and subjectifying practices through which people have been classified, examined, trained “divided from others”, and formed as subjects ... with a “self” respectively’ (p. 167).

Edward Said, who set out to deconstruct norms in literature, is both one of Foucault’s greatest disciples and severest critics. In Travelling Theory (Said, 1983b), he considered the theory of Foucault. Foucault’s toolbox offered resistances to theory ignored by other, formalistic theory. He was ‘rightly considered to be an ... opponent of ahistorical, asocial formalism’ (p. 175). His analysis of power/knowledge was powerful, but when he moved from particular examples, to wider society, the ‘methodological breakthrough becomes the theoretical trap’ (p. 176). This is particularly an issue when Foucault’s methodologies are transported from France to other regions. We should not accept that the same pouvoir/savoir is everywhere. Such a simplistic view has been accepted partly because Foucaldians have been at pains to avoid Marxist structures.
Foucault, Said continues, ‘obliterate[s] the role of classes, the role of economics, the role of insurgency in the society he discusses’ (p. 177). His very brilliance, Said maintains, encourages his followers to overlook the role of struggle. In this, he differs from Noam Chomsky who envisaged a just future society, whereas Foucault explored the nature of power in our present societies. The debate between Chomsky and Foucault focused on their differing views of human nature (Chomsky & Foucault, 1971). With no vision for change, Said argues, ‘Foucault’s theory of power is a form of theoretical overtotalization’ (1983a, p. 179). Such theory, he argues, can become academic cultural dogma.

Foucault sometimes went head to head with his critics in debate, such as the 1971 bilingual debate between him and Chomsky. Are we, he asked, ‘the product of all kinds of external factors’ of which discourse is an ‘epistemological indicator’, or of a central entity – human-nature?’ (Chomsky & Foucault, 1971). Theory is ‘always local and related to a limited field ... No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall’ (Foucault & Deleuze, 1972). But theories do travel, as Said suggests, and when Foucauldian theories meet the liberal air of America, or Australasia, they transubstantiate into new beliefs (1983a).

This then is an answer to such criticism: here, in the antipodean Pacific Ocean, we are constructed by the very discourse that arose in Europe two centuries ago. It is especially relevant in that New Zealand is considered an ‘experiment’ in neoliberal economics (Floresta & Cooper, 1997; Kelsey, 1995, 1997; O’Rourke, 2002). Here, writers of the body of critical theory who use Foucault include Michael Peters, Tina Besley, Patrick and Peter Fitzsimmons, Mark Olssen, James Marshall, and Nesta Devine. It is Pākehā theorists on the education scene in this country who, seeking clarification of the totality of neoliberal discourse, have used Foucault and who have found his tools useful in the New Zealand social and political context. In addition, Australasian theorists have different points of interest from the American and British Foucauldian schools, whose focus has often been on the image of the child or curricula in education (Cannella, 1997,
Said took Foucault’s theory into the world of struggle against imperialism and the effects of colonization, using the field of the word, the text and their effects on the world as his tools of analysis. In New Zealand, a similar critique has been undertaken by Linda Tuhiwai Smith. She suggests that the issues of rights and representation are crucial to discourse. Who represents the ‘other’? she asks, citing Said’s questioning of the written word: ‘Who writes? For whom is the writing being done? In what circumstances?’ (Said, 1983, p. 7, cited in Smith, 1999, p. 36). Following the Foucauldian dictum that ‘everything is dangerous’ (Foucault, 1985b, p. 256), Smith expands on Patricia Grace’s argument that books (and for the purposes of this thesis, texts and policy documents) are dangerous. For Grace, books are dangerous for indigenous readers because: ‘1) they do not reinforce our values, actions, customs culture and identity; 2) when they tell us only about others they are saying we do not exist; 3) they may be writing about us, but are writing things that are untrue; and 4) they are writing about us but are saying negative and insensitive things which tell us we are not good’ (Grace, 1985, cited in Smith, 1999, p. 35). To indigenous peoples, oral texts moved and were re-constructed at each telling to meet the needs of each new audience and context. Oral story-telling was the norm: there did not exist any ‘ponderous power’ of written texts. So we return again to the issue of texts, the fact that they are ‘dangerous’ in their power to construct the ‘natural’, and that they have ‘materiality’ and align with institutional power to hide the intents of paternalistic judgements.

11 Other indigenous peoples similarly trouble and confront our certainty about the primacy of English. It has been criticised as a nexus of the logocentric colonising presence (Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, 1972, p. 439). How the oral tradition fits alongside the written texts of the Western world, such writers ask. The inclusion of the oral tradition in the sites of education is an important aspect of the challenge.

12 Grace, P., 1987, p. 59

13 This is especially relevant to this thesis, as she shared a platform at the 1987 Early Childhood Convention in Wellington, with David Weikart, whose views have become tools of early childhood educational imperialism.
2.2 Human capital theory: a ‘problem of the present’

People believe in the truth of HCT because it is so pervasive in everyday government and educational discourse. Power is allied to our aspirations, the things we seek (Foucault, 1984g, p. 119). It is productive, interconnected. Power is capillary-like in its effects, Foucault says or, as Edward Said has noted, like a spider-web sans spider. Power is never hegemonic, but inveigles us all in its discourse, but it is never total. However, resistance is always allied to power, ever-present. There are multiple sites of possible resistances. Resistance is interlinked to power, which is never absolute. It is at the nodes, the interlinkings that power is most evident, and it is here there are sites for possible struggle by activists seeking change. Because truth/power is everywhere, it is ‘dangerous’ and there is always something to do.

The most ‘dangerous’ contemporary discourses of power are concerning sex and politics, both of which are central to HCT. HCT is concerned with the individual, with fecundity, where the risk-averse mother will consider having children, yet not too many. Sex is located at the intersection of the body and the entire population (Foucault, 1994f, p.125). The discourse of discipline concerns labour to increase one’s personal wealth through marketing one’s skills for employment, suggesting mothers early consider moving out of the ‘home’ into paid work and seeking care for her child.

Contemporary views of ‘dangerous’ bodies in many Western liberal countries who have adopted neo-liberal economic theories, including HCT, portray the mother, who does not conform to the norm of the working mother —the poor, the immigrant, the black and unmarried mother as problematic. To avoid risk to the country, to reduce welfare benefit payments, there is the assumption that both she and her child need discipline. The body politic seeks management of these risky bodies of population, through behavioural policy strategies to conform to middle-class norms.
The body of truth, that which is commonly accepted, constructs the subjects of education as agents in their own govern-mentality. Parents as present employees in the workforce, and their children as future workers, as constructed by the anonymous authors of *SPECE*, are a contemporary biopolitical discourse. So inured are early childhood teachers and managers to the dominant HCT discourse that they do not question policy that sees their prime role as releasing parents to the requirements of the workforce while caring for their children’s dispositions and skills. Foucault (2008, p. 36) suggests that when science begins to ‘tell the truth’ researchers should be prepared to reveal the ‘regime of verification’ that ensures compliance with the power/knowledge discourse of the time. By deconstructing the context of ontologies, it may appear that things masquerading as truths are not truths at all.

Foucault visited the hermeneutics of the subject – the study of the self in relation to a set of practices – noting that one is always involved in constructing one’s self in the *savoir* (2001; 2005).

> When I use the word knowledge (*savoir*), I do so in order to distinguish it from a knowledge (*connaissance*). The former is the process through which the subject finds himself modified by what he knows, or rather by the labor [sic] performed in order to know. It is what permits the modification of the subject and the construction of the object. *Connaissance*, however, is the process which permits the multiplication of knowable objects, the development of their intelligibility, the understanding of their rationality, while the subject doing the investigation always remains the same (Foucault, 1991).

HCT is a suitable field for genealogical study as it operates in three domains. Firstly, it constitutes New Zealanders, educators, families, mothers and young children as objects of state knowledge, creating effects of power that shape our perceptions. Secondly it alters our relationships with ourselves, and thirdly, with others. This study does not undertake a history of HCT but seeks out the constitution of the theory as a mode of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 2000). It is the construction of truth and the regular effects
of power in the form of HCT which are the objects of this study (Foucault, 1980b, p. 131).

Foucault, in his ‘17 March 1976’ lecture, linked racism with biopower. With the waning of the power of the sovereign in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a new technology of power emerged: evolutionism. The state was concerned with the constitution of the body politic (Elden, 2002), so sought to control groups within the total body of the population. Biopower applied to ‘man-as-species’, a ‘multiplicity of man’. The knowing of populations became important at the mass level – through forecasts, statistical estimates and measurement of the health of the population. Pathology became a focus for both the power/knowledge of the body and of the population, applicable to both the individual and the general populace (p. 255). The state’s gaze shifted in the twentieth century as risk became a more general term applied across domains (Beck-Gernsheim, 1996; Beck, 1992, 2003). Biopolitics is the state’s concern with the mass of the population, ‘its volume, its density, with the territory it covers’ (p221). The state’s techniques for managing the population comes from the model of pastoral care, of the shepherd and his flock, of noting the movements, changes and clusters of populations. State interest in biopower concerns the body of the population – of so many heads they ‘can’t be counted’ (Foucault, 2004b, p. 245). The concern of governmentality is to ‘know’ this population – its morbidity, its fecundity, the risks, to use the science of the state (statistics) to better manage such risks, and discipline its citizens. In his lecture Security, Territory and Population (1994, pp. 67 ff) Foucault set out a genealogy of this concern with populations and associated risks. He plotted shifts from the model of the shepherd, to that of the father governing children, to issues of government including self-governance, and to the ‘reason of state’ (p. 68). He set out the technologies, including alliances for concerns outside the territory, such as treaties; and of state police— able to govern the forces within the state.

In his essay Governmentality (1997, pp 200 ff), Foucault sets out his definition within the broader foci of Security, Territory and Population (p. 219). There is a triangle
of concern, Foucault suggested sovereignty, discipline, government, the primary target of which is population and the apparatuses of security, which becomes in contemporary societies, a field of intervention. There were three interlinked discourses in the eighteenth century that remain with us – ‘government, population, political economy’ (p.219).

At much the same time as Foucault was discussing biopower in Paris, the Second Early Childhood Convention in Christchurch was hearing reports of the Multi-Disciplinary Child Development Study’s findings. Papers had titles like ‘Children at risk’ and ‘The health of mothers and its relationship to child development’. University of Canterbury Economics lecturer Brian Easton’s paper, ‘The economics of children in a welfare state’, suggested integrating ‘activities associated with childrearing into a wider model of economic behaviour’ (Easton, 1979, p. 1). Easton questioned the ‘implicit morality’ of a state that did not address poverty which could lead to ‘lower opportunities for the children’ (p. 9). He suggested viewing the family as a ‘production unit’ to enhance state knowledge; ‘improving … understanding of parental responsibilities and activities’ (pp. 11–12) could identify risks such as ex-nuptial and teenage births. Economists, Easton concluded, needed a theory of family to support policy development. Easton’s paper is an early example of the co-option of early childhood personnel into the micro-practices of HCT.

In the period between 1979 and 2000 the state’s role in the use of a welfare-net came under question, including its support of education. In 2000 Education Minister Trevor Mallard noted that ‘human capital’ investment ensured ‘the best use of each education dollar to … raise achievement and reduce disparities… [Here the] early years are important’ (Mallard, 2000). It had become a ‘truth’ that the policy of investing in HC was a major way of reducing intergenerational poverty through individual effort, including HC transmission (OECD, 2008). There had been increased devolution of responsibility from the state to the family and community and questioning of who
should pay for education. In what ways, some have asked, could the costs be shifted from government to users of education? (e.g. NZ Treasury, 2010).

In this thesis I attempt, by accepting that ‘everything is dangerous’ (see the previous section), to open up the rationality of neoliberal discourse for critique. Genealogy can make us aware of the underlying processes of socialisation that we have learned, but may wish to re-examine in the light of a genealogical analysis (Hoy & McCarthy, 1994, p. 194). In undertaking such an examination, I join the ranks of others who have used Foucault’s methodologies to explore education and the rationalities of the state. Early childhood theorists who have used Foucault to analyse the construction of the child include Gail Cannella (1997, 2000), Peter Moss and Gunilla Dahlberg (2005; Dahlberg, Moss, & Pence, 1999), Glenda McNaughton (2005; Hughes & MacNaughton, 2000) and Linda Graham (2005, 2006). Although many use Foucault’s theory as a strategy to seek justice, he was uncertain about the concept of justice. He stated that ‘[i]n a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice’ (Chomsky & Foucault, 1971, p. 31). The concept does give insights, however, into present sites of power. Critics of Foucault’s tools argue that deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsible; however, deconstruction is a necessary first step.

In Foucault’s toolbox the ‘relations of forces’ were more explicit than those of justice. Such forces were analogous to the model of war and battle (Foucault, 1980a, pp. 114 & 163–114; 1997; 2004b). The strategies and tactics that engender the power/knowledge of political discourse will leave traceries at the intersecting nodes. The specifics may change over time; however, the genealogist can decipher the grids, which offer sites for struggle. Foucault posited the ‘specific intellectual’ as having a role in this ‘battle’. The battle may be for advocacy for children, for the differánd of the dyad, be it Boy/girl, Pākehā/māori or Adult/child. The intellectual can be co-opted by those seeking new visions in the ‘battle for truth’ (Foucault, 1980; 2004, p. 132). In

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14 Jacques Derrida (1996) coined the term *Differance*, in his attempt to unpack and displace the subject, to unsettle the frozen meaning of terms and untie the signifier from the referent.
seeking out the genealogy of the problem constructed around class and ethnicity in policy documents, new constitutions of the child and her family as productions of truth can be sought.

Plural possibilities are what the Foucauldian toolbox offers. Neoliberal thought centres humankind as the knower of all reality; however, we are increasingly insecure in all kinds of knowledge. We cannot seek comfort in ideas from a different context. ‘[Y]ou can’t find a solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people’ (Foucault, 1985, p. 343). If everything is ‘dangerous’, then we ‘always have something to do ... [which] leads not to apathy but to a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (p. 343). Plural possibilities, their normative edges softened, give new images space to come forwards. Such plural images are evident in the New Zealand national early childhood curriculum document Te Whāriki Mātauranga mō ngā Mokopuna o Aotearoa. Dahlberg, Moss and Pence challenge the privileged model of ‘best practice’ and ‘quality’, suggesting that there is potential in ‘not-knowing’ (p. 170). By seeking its genealogy, the social rationality of the construction becomes evident and makes its articulation of power/knowledge stutter. It may also make space for local, specific alternatives.
3 ‘Third way’ solutions to socio-economic problems

In this chapter I use FLG’s (1999-2008) policy document SPEECE as an example of 3rd way interests: a social face to economics. I plot a rupture in the 1980s of the accepted view of education as a ‘general good’ (of use-value, in economic terms). In the mid-1980s, education became re-defined as a ‘private good’, whose value could be exchanged by the entrepreneurial individual in the employment marketplace. Such concepts remain with us today, and underpinned FLG’s ECE policy. I set out 1999-2008 examples of SPEECE micro-practices as evident in three conference presentations.

I argue that education in New Zealand has always been a governmental tool of biopower. I challenge the statement that education is a ‘good’ for all children, despite having begun as a welfare rationale to provide care and education ‘for disadvantaged children’ (MoE, 1996, p. 17). I maintain that the early intents remain embedded in the discipline. Well-meaning humanitarians, such as philanthropists and elders of the church, had earlier viewed early education as a technique by which to bring poor children and their parents up to a desired norm of educational conformity. Since the 1990s, a number of governments, including the Fifth Labour Government (FLG) of 1999–2008, have adopted discourse about the cost-benefits of education. I use that government’s SPEECE (MoE, 2002b) as an example of the way in which ‘third way’ governments have utilised HCT in education policy. Policy discourse, I suggest, is used to groom the way we view people and their relationships in modern liberal societies. Policy seeks to attain certain societal outcomes, for example ameliorating civil risk by ‘closing the gaps’ between sections of the community. Policy writers use HCT to encourage parents to believe that they can manage the risk of future poverty and unemployment by growing their children’s skills. Such skills, it is believed, are an
investment which will enhance the children’s potential employment marketability, and thus alleviate the danger of poverty.

The dominant Western liberal discourse of education portrays individuals as rational, self-motivated entrepreneurs, keen to manage their life-chances. This was not always the educational model. Clarence Beeby, who was New Zealand’s Director of Education from 1940 to 1960, viewed education in the Keynesian\textsuperscript{15} tradition as being of general use to the state, accessible to all. Gerald Grace, a Wellington Professor of Education, argued in 1988 that education was a ‘public good’ because ‘it places a high priority upon social justice, equity and the attempt to establish a fair society’ (1988, p. 13). Such egalitarian ideas about the purposes of education were soon to change.

In the mid-1980s, there was a shift in this perception of education; in Foucauldian terms, there was a sudden rupture. Education was seen no longer as having ‘use-value’ but as a private good, of no interest to the state. New Public Management (NPM) concepts were promulgated by economists in institutions like the Chicago School of Economics. The Fourth Labour Government’s adoption of these ideas was to effect change on the education scene (see Olssen, et al., 2004, p. 153 ff.; Tooley, 1997; Tooley & Guthrie, 2003).

3.1 A rupture in the perception of education: the Fourth Labour Government

Treasury officials in the mid-1980s wrote a briefing for the incoming government, called Government Management (GM) (NZ Treasury, 1987), which set out the ideas of the Chicago School economists. Gerald Grace (1989, p. 209) argued that rather than the impartial advice ‘expected of a non political administration’, that GM was an ideological

\textsuperscript{15} J M Keynes was the economist whose ideas were accepted at the turn of the twentieth century. These ideas remained dominant until after World War 2.
document. ¹⁶ Many of the ideas set out in GM still affect the perception of government today. The major change was the re-framing of education from being of general value to the country, to a private responsibility and investment. According to GM, Education should not be seen a ‘public good’ (NZ Treasury, 1987, p. 271). Rather, the entrepreneurial individual trading in the education marketplace (p. 14) gained a ‘private good’ – a property right to be husbanded and managed efficiently (p. 135 ff.).

These ideas on education found favour with some members of the Fourth Labour Government, such as the ministers Roger Douglas and Richard Prebble (Lange, 1996). These individuals were to influence Prime Minister David Lange’s cabinet in their implementation of education and state services reforms. Lange oversaw the development of policy documents on reform and retained the education portfolio (Lange, 1999). There had been a perception by some that the Department of Education, because of its excessive bureaucracy, was slow in its service response.¹⁷ Lange’s government, seeking new options, commissioned a number of education reports. Working Groups reported on post-compulsory education training and education in the 1987 Probine-Fargher Report and 1988 Hawke Report, Learning for Life. Reports on the compulsory education sector including Tomorrow’s Schools: Administering for Excellence (the Picot Report); Education to be More and Before Five,¹⁸ were early childhood subtexts (Department of Education, 1988; Lange, 1988a,b; Taskforce to Review Education Administration, 1988). These reports were largely accepted by the government, and were to underpin the Education Act 1989. The reforms were wide-ranging and the effect of the Act was to usher in a regime of contestability across a number of portfolios (Scott & Gorringle, 1989, pp. 85–87).

¹⁶ Grace (1991, p.33) suggested it was a small section, including Metro Magazine and other media interests, the Business Roundtable and Ruth Richardson who were concerned about such bureaucracy. He argued that at this time, ECE, unlike the post-compulsory education sector, was able to escape the very radical new right changes (p. 37).
¹⁷ Grace (1991, p. 31), suggests it was a small section, including Metro Magazine and other media interests, the Business Roundtable and Ruth Richardson who were concerned about such bureaucracy. He suggests that at this time, ECE was able to escape the very radical new right changes, unlike the post-compulsory education sector (p. 37).
¹⁸ Lange as Minister of Education adopted the investment terminology of ‘Improvements in this sector are an investment in the future. Our children are our future. They need a good start in life’ (Lange, 1988, p. iii, cited in Te One, 2005, p. 30).
Under the 1989 Education Act parents were defined as clients, education services as an industry; and education advice and policy functions were separated. Early childhood services were viewed as self-managing firms (as defined by Marshall, 1891; Robbins, 1928; Coase, 1937a, b) within regulatory and curricula parameters set by central government. The manager of an early childhood centre was viewed as its chief executive officer (Education Review Office, 1994), charged with a duty of care to govern and manage frugally and efficiently.

Centres were conceptualised as competing in an educational market. Some early childhood centres were able to thrive. Privately owned centres operating for profit, grew in numbers, particularly in well-to-do areas. However, poor communities, many with high Māori populations, lacked skilled people able to govern and manage centres (Education Review Office, 1997). The effects of the education reforms were, after only a year or two, beginning to hurt the poor. However, a 1991 National government continued with the ‘New Right’ agenda of enhanced competition in the education ‘marketplace’ (Gordon, 1992; Kelsey, 1995, 1997, 1999; Ballard, 2004).

The 1991 National government, keen to compete internationally, took advice from Harvard University Strategic Planner Michael Porter on ways the country could hone its competitive advantage. To avoid economic ‘arrested development’ (Crocombe, Ewright & Porter, 1991 p. 149), Porter suggested greater government investment in skill training. Governments should not be involved in day-to-day management, but rather should focus on long-term entrepreneurial plans, he argued (1991, p. 177).

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19 The MoE bulk-funded all centres equally on a per-child-funded space per hour to a maximum of 30 hours a week. Other overheads were covered by parental fees or subsidies for approved beneficiaries.
20 Porter’s five-force model looked at competitive advantage in a tight market with few firms, versus a market where many firms competed. New firms are more motivated to compete when breaking into the market. The successful strategist will assess the market against the position of rivals and suppliers to maximise their firm’s position.
Porter’s ideas influenced both the government of the day and later the FLG. They also influenced educational models of governance and management.

Giving funding directly to individuals was seen as a way of increasing competition in the education marketplace. As skill training was an individual investment, a ‘private good’, the argument went, so individuals’ projected future earnings could be borrowed against. National briefly toyed with Milton Friedman’s voucher system for the tertiary education sector in their 1997 White Paper (Education Forum, 1998; MoE, 1997; Walsh, 1997). After a wide range of submissions, however, the government backed away from the voucher proposal (Armstrong, 1997; Education Forum, 1998; Gerritsen, 1997; Gould, 1997; Rivers, 1997a,b; Walsh, 1997). However, vouchers continue to be suggested by some as a tool to increase individual responsibility for education (e.g. Report of the Inter-Party Working Group for School Choice, 2009; Roy & Douglas, 2009). Student loans, on the other hand, became an accepted way for individuals to fund their tertiary education. The theoretical underpinnings of the Education Act 1989 were to affect both parents and their preschool children in the decades ahead.

3.2 The ‘third way’ in New Zealand: the Fifth Labour Government (1999–2008)

In 1999 a Labour-led minority coalition government came to power after the party re-evaluated its earlier unpopular policies and the Fifth Labour Government (FLG) remained in office until 2008. Members of the new cabinet were advocates of ‘third way’ politics, which offered apparently robust economic policies with a social veneer. These had been used to good effect by other Western, liberal, left-leaning

21 Porter was a speaker the FLG’s 2001 Knowledge Wave conference.
22 However, an earlier leaked copy of the draft White Paper suggested more explicitly the use of Friedman-type vouchers. The final paper was less extreme in its monetarist views (Olssen, 2001, p. 29).
23 This may be the intent in the funding proposal of the 2011 ECE Taskforce.

The ‘third way’ differed from the earlier neoliberal policies of the 1980s in that it aimed to provide ‘economic efficiency and social justice’ (Maharey, 2001b) with a ‘realignment of economic and social policy’ (Blair cited in Maharey, 2003b). The FLG, dependent on Māori and liberal voter-support, was at pains to ensure that their policies appeared both equitable and economical. Nevertheless, government departments

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24 ‘It’s the economy, Stupid’ was the 1992 slogan Bill Clinton used to marshal his supporters in the electoral campaign against George Bush, Snr.

25 Maharey, early in the first term of the FLG, met with ‘third way’ ministers from Finland, Norway, Canada, Ireland, and the Netherlands. He also met with Anthony Giddens (Maharey, 2000). Maharey’s (2003) definitions of the ‘third way’ include: new technologies (the Knowledge Economy), transforming education, addressing inequalities, reshaping the public sector and government, and renewing democracy (Cheyne, O’Brien, & Belgrave, 2005, p. 75).
continued to use principle-agency strategies and other NPM models (Boston, 2000; Boston, Martin, & Pallor, 1996; Shaw, 1999). The FLG was keen to 'close the gaps'; to reduce the tail of statistics of disadvantage and poverty (e.g. Clark, 2000; NZ Treasury, 2000; Turia, 2000). Yet, iwi or community partnerships could find their contracts terminated if they failed to deliver on purchased outcomes. Policies to break the cycle of disadvantage included NPM techniques such as community partnerships (Maharey, 2001; Mallard, 2000a, 2001a,b,c, 2002c, 2002e); targeted funding to low-socio-economic areas (Mallard, December 2004); and Māori ‘capacity-building’ (Turia, 2000).

3.3 \textit{SPECE}: ‘third way’ construction of bodies

A few months after attending the United Nations 2000 Millennium Summit, Helen Clark summed up her vision for a fair society:

... New Zealand would be made up of a series of global villages attracting and nurturing talent. More than a decade ago Michael Porter wrote of the potential for clusters in the New Zealand economy. We need to draw together our public sector investments in education, research and infrastructure with private sector investments (Clark, 2000).

Education Minister Trevor Mallard, meanwhile, appointed a working party to consult on a strategic plan for ECE (MoE, 2000, 2001). Its terms of reference were that it would support ‘government policy goals ... [of] education, labour market, health, welfare and Closing the Gaps’ (MoE, 2000). \textit{Pathways to the Future: Nga huarahi arataki. A 10-year Strategic Plan for Early Childhood Education from 2002–2012 (SPECE)} was one of several FLG policies aimed at growing citizens’ knowledge and skills (e.g. Clark, 2000, 2002; Clark & Maharey, 2001; Horomia, 2000; Mallard, 2000a). \textsuperscript{26} I argue that \textit{SPECE} is an example

\textsuperscript{26} This was the first time that a Minister of Education had retained the portfolio of ECE. His National Party predecessors had devolved the responsibility to an associate minister. The ministerial nominee for chairperson of the
of ‘third way’ policy that constructed parents, children and their communities in a neoliberal economic mould similar to that described above by Clark. The NZ Treasury published a document titled *An Inclusive Economy*— one of four key priority areas. It presented a framework for considering broad policy options in terms of their potential for positive and mutually reinforcing linkages between a productive economy and various characteristics of society, with the ultimate objective of improving the wellbeing of all New Zealanders (NZ Treasury, 2002, p. 13). HCT was also evident in policy documents: ‘Early childhood education is the first stepping-stone on the path to lifelong learning. Access to high quality early childhood education that parents can afford, is the firm footing children need to thrive at school and beyond’ (Early Childhood Policy, 2005). Tax-breaks were introduced by the FLG in April 2005. ‘Working for Families’ was a subsidy for parents involved in full-time employment.  

The FLG, being politically very risk-averse, found the concept of HCT seductive; Cabinet members often used the term ‘human capital’ (Clark, 2005; Beehive Bulletin, 2005).  

Working Group was Dr Anne Meade, who had ties with the Fourth Labour government, which had published the 1988 report *Education to be More* (Bushouse, 2008; Meade, 1988).  

27 In the FLG, education and economic growth were increasingly linked. The 2002 Speech from the Throne noted that ‘[i]ncreasing the quality and quantity of our human capital is the highest priority ... the early childhood and compulsory education sectors lay the broad base for [this]’ (Governor General, 2002). The NZ Treasury published a document titled *An Inclusive Economy*, which it said was one of four key priority areas for 2000/01. It presented a framework for considering broad policy options in terms of their potential for positive and mutually reinforcing linkages between a productive economy and various characteristics of society, with the ultimate objective of improving the wellbeing of all New Zealanders (NZ Treasury, 2002, p. 13). HCT was also evident in policy documents: ‘Early childhood education is the first stepping-stone on the path to lifelong learning. Access to high quality early childhood education that parents can afford, is the firm footing children need to thrive at school and beyond’ (Early Childhood Policy, 2005). Tax-breaks were introduced by the FLG in April 2005. ‘Working for Families’ was a subsidy for parents involved in full-time employment.  

28 Very early in the first term of the FLG, the phrase ‘closing the gaps’ became a political liability. Opposition members suggested it was a racist term, and permitted race-base funding to groups seen as unfortunate (NZPA, 2004).  

29 Meetings, such as the Hui Taumata (Durie, 2001; Helen Clark, 2005, Feb. 1; Mallard, 2001, Nov. 11), and focus groups were a favourite technique of the ‘third way’ Clark government.  

There was a growth in education and care centres offering full-day enrolments, as the push to get people into work meant parental workers needed care for their preschool children. The government had come to power offering to support community-owned centres such as Kindergartens and Playcentres, but this proved to be at odds with the perceived economic need to grow the workforce. To grow the economy, parents needed to work, and education centres released parents from care responsibilities. In the run-up to the 2002 elections, privately-owned ECE centres successfully lobbied to overturn the government’s policy intention to differentially fund not-for-profit services (Thomson & Kong, 2005; Mallard, 2004). When there were tensions between the wish to privilege the not-for-profit sector and the need to support working parents, the latter proved to be a higher political priority (Dye, 2004, May 28).

Part of the attraction of HCT in this view of the world was that government bore little responsibility for poverty; rather, the individual was the active agent, able to independently decide her future and wealth. It was expected that people would maximise their self-interest, although for some, it appeared, poverty appeared to be a conscious choice. Language was to play a crucial part in the state’s strategy of devolved authority. The ‘third way’, Nikolas Rose suggested, was a rationality for visualising political problems (2000a, p. 1395). The FLG needed a social construct to overcome voter resistance to the extremities of the New Right policies of its predecessor. ‘Communities’ in this sense is a newly minted biopower technique: they are collectivities which look after and actively invest in the health and welfare of their own. Individuals increasingly identified with, and were identified by, their community as sites for macro- and micro-interventions (Rose, 2000c, pp. 135 & 136). No longer was it politically

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31 Internationally, Marginson (1997, p. 93) noted, there was a growth in publications on HCT, from small beginnings – 800 in the 1960s – to 2,000 a decade later. In New Zealand, politicians increasingly used the term in their framing of educational issues.

32 Initially in 2002, the Minister and MoE privileged not-for-profit community groups over profit organisations.
acceptable to suggest that ‘[t]here is no such thing as society’ (Thatcher, 1987). The
construction of the social – the discourse of the nineteenth century – was replaced, for
policy purposes, with the discourse of community. Here, as in Britain, the term
community became identified as a territory between the ‘authority of the state ... the
exchange of the market, and the liberty of the rights-bearing individual’ (Rose, 2000a, p.
1400). Citizens, in such ‘third way’ constructions are given a stake through a ‘dimension
of ethics’ (p. 1398) (see Table 1). Devolved community responsibility ensures each
docile individual purchases the very best educational product the market can provide.
The FLG had a number of strategies to ameliorate risk and consolidate social cohesion.
Many were borrowed directly from the Blair models in Britain.
Table 1: Some examples of New Zealand’s ‘third way’ strategies set against Rose’s description of British models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rose’s definition of 3rd Way <em>technes</em></th>
<th>Labour Coalition: New Zealand Examples</th>
<th>Examples from SPECE and associated documents</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating, enabling state as populations set free to find own destiny, yet responsible for this destiny as well as that of the state. (p.1400)</td>
<td><em>Review of Centre</em> effected better public management (Cullen, M., 2003)</td>
<td>‘ECE raises the potential of children by developing strong foundations for learning and later life. It also enables a parent to enter and remain in the workforce... The government can assist... by providing funding, setting laws and regulation, providing information... providing advice and support to services...’ (Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community ‘governance’ with devolved responsibility to local and institutional hubs. The community is a space between the market and the state - a ‘transactional reality’ (p.1401) (Stakeholders)</td>
<td>‘I see my role... is very much a ‘human capital’ approach... we are doing things which keep you active and involved and engaged in your community... the principle of mutuality’ (Maharey, S., 1999)”</td>
<td>‘Collaboration with the local community has had the spin-off some of the parents have undertaken training in early childhood teacher education... [and] become important role models for their families and communities’ (Maharey, S., 2006c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Joined up services’, focus groups, partnerships of all types between public, political and profit-making</td>
<td>Partnerships are a key technology in supporting local communities to seek local solutions. (Larner, W., 2004; McIntosh, T., 2003).</td>
<td>‘The coming together of children and families in E.C.E. services provides greater opportunities for addressing health and social issues. Building stronger links between ECE services, ante-natal programmes, parents and whānau, parenting programmes, schools, and health and social services can also improve a child’s educational achievement...’</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

33 All page numbers in this column refer to Rose (2000a).
<table>
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<tr>
<th>institutions.</th>
<th>communities which strengthens partnerships with community groups (Dyson, R., 22.5.2008) Māori and Pacific communities the practical support they need to get local solutions working in areas such as health, education, housing, employment and economic development. It is only through working with the communities themselves that the gaps that have divided this country can be closed. Joined-up solutions’ (Maharey, S., 15.09.2000)</th>
<th>... strong relationships [ensure smooth transitions] ‘ (Ministry of Education, 2002 p. 21) “Building collaborative relationships is critical to realising government’s vision for ECE” (Maharey, S.2006c)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Move to a fusion of ‘culture and commerce’ (p.1402) with a move from the image of the ‘melting pot’ to the metaphor of the ‘rainbow’ (2000a). These presuppose a changed emphasis from morality to ethics. Self-steering communities.</td>
<td>‘Investing in the future of Maori to “progress their economic aspirations … to realise their full potential … now and in the future’(Horomia, P., 2006) ‘ … investing in the … potential of our Pacific communities … [so they can] contribute to, and share in the future success of New Zealand’ (Laban, W., 22.5.2008) ‘The government is acknowledging that Māori and Pacific peoples fared worse as the rich-poor gap widened, by funding capacity-building programmes’(Mallard, T., 2001c).</td>
<td>‘Involving diverse communities: … increased participation in ECE by all children from different cultural, social and economic backgrounds’ (Maharey, S.,2006c)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Volunteering &amp; NGOs as citizenship activity, &amp; reattachment &amp; mutual care have a key role in civic revival yet increased</td>
<td>‘ … begin to look at the Third Sector as an employer” … a ‘welfare society’ rather than a Welfare State’ (Maharey, 2006)</td>
<td>Social services = best outcomes &amp; community groups will have more certainty with grant funding and more time focusing on outcomes for e.g. Barnardos and FamilyWorks (Dyson, 12 February 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility in “new technologies of welfare”.</td>
<td>S., Jobsletter, 1999) ‘volunteers the heart of the community’ (Maharey, S., 2000b)</td>
<td>‘The indicators are relevant to current and future social wellbeing. Participation in early childhood education contributes significantly to a child’s later development. Going to a kindergarten, kōhanga reo or some other early childhood service prepares children for further learning, helps equip them to cope socially at school and develops their bodies and minds to better prepare them for adult life. Quality early childhood programmes can help narrow the achievement gap between children from low-income families and children from more advantaged families.’ (<a href="http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/documents/sr08-knowledge-skills.pdf">http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/documents/sr08-knowledge-skills.pdf</a>) ‘we are...committed to...having regular and transparent indicators of children’s health and social wellbeing’ (Dyson, 2008b)</td>
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<td>Statistics, changes to date, and give projections for forward planning as “automatic pilots” of decision making (2000d p.205), transform the objects and offer “translatability” across sectors as the object and its subject become standardised,(2000d, pp. 206-207)</td>
<td>‘[The] long tail of teenage underachievement in education ... limits the potential of our economy and our society’ (Clark, H., 2008). ‘One-quarter of all 16- and 17- year-olds and one-third of that age Maori are not in education or employment. Such a high percentage of school-leavers receiving little or no skills improvement is alarming.’ Maharey (2000 c)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Values of ‘pro-business and pro-enterprise” while supporting the ‘natural constraints of globalisation’ (Bensaïd, December 1998)</td>
<td>‘Our aim ... [is] to harness the power or (sic) both markets and community ... to creat[e] and spread knowledge ... The expansion of early childhood ... education ... to create opportunities for life-long learning are essential’ (Maharey, S. 2003a).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizenship = conditional on conduct (p.1407). Exclusion codes of problematic persons – practices targeted at the excluded themselves.- reattachment</td>
<td>‘Several challenges remain ... [including] ... elimination of poverty through raising incomes and more early intervention in dysfunctional families’ (Maharey 25.9.2008). Māori who belong to gangs and are guilty of murder should be denied the option of a tangi (Flavell, T. U 2009).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ECE independent businesses competing in the market place for client, with many owned by corporate. (Maharey, S.2006c). ‘ ... the government continues to invest in early childhood education ... to help services meet increased costs, reducing the needs for these to be passed on to parents’ (Carter, C., 2009)</td>
<td>‘Health explained the rationale for the B4 school check came from a strengths based approach. It is considered preferable to check children as close to 4-years-old as possible ... the checks start in 2008. ... ECAC ... suggested a one day measure would not be as comprehensive as a teacher’s knowledge of the child . The evidence ... for the 3-8 year -old the “Incredible years” programme made the most difference. Invoke three parts; parenting programme, teacher strategies and a social skills programme ... [which will be made] available for all children ... with antisocial behaviour’ (Ministry of Education, 2006b)</td>
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</table>
Prime Minister Clark in 2005 was describing education in explicitly economic terms.

In education, investments are rolling out across the sector. We have big programmes in early childhood education ... to overcome the neglect of the 1990s and improve quality ... Making it possible for every individual to fulfil their potential through education is our dream, and it’s the dream every family has for their children ... Everything this government does in education reinforces the vision we have for taking New Zealand ahead – and becoming more innovative, more skilled, more productive, more prosperous, and lifting overall well being ... [T]housands more families have got help with their childcare costs. That helps more women return to work ... (Clark, 2005, p. 2).

Clark next turned to those about which there was political concern. Community must, through the governmentality of education, support those whose behaviour appears to be of risk to the country. The Hui Taumata, under the authority of paramount chief Arikinui Hepi Te Heuheu, had been instigated as a technique to bring Māori entrepreneurs, planners, and government officials together. The hui, Clark said, sees Māori picking up the challenge of development, and planning how to accelerate it. This matters to all of us. Māori children ... are projected to comprise 28 per cent by 2021. Ensuring that they can stand tall and make a big contribution to New Zealand’s development and well being is critical to our future (Clark, 2005, p. 4).

The ‘best interests of the child’ were co-opted to support an aspirational norm. Child-rearing intervention measures in the home had intensified under SPECE. The modern family has, for at least two centuries, been the site of moral exhortation and expert intervention, Rose (1990) suggests. Messages about the need to improve parenting emanated from supra-national agencies such as the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Good parenting would produce compliant children, who will become industrious workers. Parenting initiatives introduced or continued by the FLG included Strengthening Families; Parent Support; Whanau Toko Ora; Home Instruction
Programme for Preschool Youngsters; and Parents as First Teachers. Other initiatives included Supporting Parent and Child Education (centre-based parent support) and Promoting Participation Contracts (parental intervention at centre level), together with television and website initiatives such as Team Up.

A 2004 OECD report published by the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, Babies and Bosses, suggested the outcome for New Zealand women could be improved. New Zealand women’s fecundity, when compared with others in the study, was higher. As more children were born, more women spent more time out of the workforce. Others were portrayed as a risk, with ‘[t]eenage motherhood high among the Māori population ... [where] one in four children in New Zealand live in a one-parent household [or grow] up in jobless families’ (OECD, 2004, p. 13 ). The authors, in an argument reminiscent of the Wisconsin Works Programme (Rogers, 1997), suggested case-management of beneficiaries would better support women into work. Having children affected the mother’s HC. The role of ECE was increasingly seen as one of releasing women to work, rather than as a general educational good for children.

Public servants in a small country are very reliant on the statistics and information from supra-national agencies to underpin their policy advice. When predicting trends, patterns and areas of concerns, it is often assumed that international patterns can be applied here. Comparisons are collected and used by statisticians and policy-makers when developing regulatory mechanisms to support the effective and efficient uses of state resources. State knowledge of the skill-level of the population supports capacity-building intervention. Statistics are bases for inter-group and inter-country statistical comparisons of HC and wealth (see e.g. Ball, 1999). International agencies present poverty and under-achievement as issues solvable by improved governance practices (Garcia, Pence, & Evans, 2007; Gusenbauer, 2002; Hanna, 2010;

34 Mothers in the 20–39 age brackets suffered a 10% penalty in their HC possibilities (OECD, 2004, p.76) – what the authors call the ‘mummy track’ (p. 195, para. 12).
Menashy, 2007; Offord, 2008; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000 World Bank, 2000; World Bank Staff & IMF Staff, 1999). Implicit in any state discourse of biopolitics are norms acting as indicators of the mean; the ideal; and the tail of statistical failure. These cohere to offer a powerful narrative, equating to the deep structural phenomenon underpinning daily human micro-practices (Schurich, 1994, p. 303).

The next section sets out three conferences which are examples of micro-practices where intrusions by the state into the conduct of the family are advocated in a discourse legitimising such intrusion. Although the examples interweave, each considers the supra-national economic influence on early childhood in New Zealand in different ways. In these examples tensions are evident between fertility, mortality and population-change in groups whose fecundity, it is perceived, are a risk to the nation (see Wrigley, 2002).

3.3.1 ‘The Big Picture’35

Education, Minister Trevor Mallard said, laid foundations for later educational achievement. There were MoE plans to reduce ethnic and rural disparities through increased collaboration between government agencies (Mallard, 2001a,b,c, 2002a,b,c,d,e). An ECE conference titled The Big Picture took place at Auckland University, two years after the introduction of equity funding, and targeted scholarships for Māori and Pasifika teachers. Here, Jilly Tyler, Northern Regional Manager, Early Childhood, MoE, gave a presentation on the government’s successes to date. Wealth and competitive international advantage was being put at risk by a

![Figure 6: OECD quadrant demonstrating equity distribution across ranked member countries](image)

Source: Tyler (MoE,2004, slide, 2).

35 The title of J Tyler’s 2004 conference presentation.
percentage of the population who were failing to govern their families adequately (see Figure 1). New Zealand’s progress towards quality ECE compared unfavourably against other OECD countries.

Pākehā children, Tyler noted, were most likely to attend ECE, while Māori were ranked second, and Pasifika children brought up the statistical tail. By encouraging increased attendance at preschool by such children, society could both mitigate future social risk and enhance present prospects of parental employment. Firstly, the MoE’s Increasing Participation Contracts used community agencies to encourage under-achieving groups into early childhood (Tyler, 2004, slide 9). Secondly, there was an expectation that ECE teachers would support multi-agency early intervention (slide 18). Collaborative intervention between agents such as teachers and social workers could, Tyler argued, improve outcomes for children.

Children with some-degree of Māori identity or heritage are, for statistical purposes, counted as Māori as a default measure. The MoE uses figures as a comparison, for example recording the increased participation of groups of children, and their hours of attendance, at ECE centres. Such comparisons are used as indicators of the current and
future social wellbeing of population groupings. Statistics showing participation of Māori and Pasifika children become ‘automatic pilots’ (Rose, 2000c, p. 205) for MoE strategies. Numbers give the appearance of objectivity, yet ‘transform the thing being measured’ (p. 205), as inscriptions of a certain reality. Numbers are integral to the constructions of any modern ‘problem’ as categories in policy become standardised and come to ‘constitute the domains they represent’ (p. 198). They are also integral to policy forecasts.

I next look in some detail at one such ‘problem’. In her presentation, Tyler attempted to put a human face on statistical data. This is the inverse of usual statistical depictions for policy purposes, where numeric representation gives figures an appearance of objectivity. Fifty children formed the basis of Tyler’s forecasts; off these 8% percentage would need extra government resourcing in school. By school-age, ‘1–2 will be truanting; 5 will report being seriously bullied; [while] 4 will need special education assistance’ (Tyler, 2004, slide 4). Of this group of risky children there was a high likelihood that some would experience teen pregnancy; others would have a drug

![Diagram](image-url)

Figure 8: Fixed, rather than fluid entities. The MoE’s Logic Model (2003) supports the tracking of improvement, using feedback loops. Source: Tyler (2004, slide 13).
or substance abuse problem, commit criminal offences, or have ‘lower lifetime earnings’ (slide 6). Tyler predicted that ‘10 will leave school without any school qualification’ and ‘5 will have completed a tertiary qualification by the time they reach 24’ (slide 5). Investment now will pay future dividends, was her message.

Tyler used a Logic Model (MoE, 2003) intended as a tool to monitor SPECE for cost-effectiveness using feedback loops. The five key areas for intervention were visually discrete. This was an example of Rose’s ‘ethico-politics’ – of community responsibility for its members. Colour-coded blocks represented the entities used in SPECE: ‘Māori communities, families and services; [and] Pasifika communities’ (MoE, 2003). The state aimed to work in partnership to ‘increase … community capacity’. The Logic Model entities showed strong similarities to Michael Porter’s ‘clusters’, where each is a part of the ‘value-chain’ of ‘causality’ (Porter, 1985). Aggregations of numbers become fixed statistical representations of entities of interest to the FLG; all fluid human identities are removed for purposes of statistical analysis. Logic was held up as one tool to combat the biopolitical risk of under-achieving populations. Categories constitute and re-present the ‘truth’ of ‘demand conditions’ where ‘networks of individuals and institutions … interact’ (Porter, 2000). Statistical monitoring of changes in types of communities, or numbers of teachers, for example, becomes possible when they are viewed as stable entities. The complexity and fluidity of society is reduced for statistical, measurement and evaluative purposes.

In the next section I examine partnerships: joined-up services, focus groups, and partnerships of all types between public and profit-making institutions are favoured ‘third way’ techniques.

36 This is a representation of a circuit board with assumptions of flows and movement, including ‘feed-back loops; a mechanical model’. It differs from the ‘liquid modernity’ of Bauman.
3.3.2 ‘Getting People Together in Early Childhood Education’

Attendees at the Children’s Issues Centre National Seminar, *Getting People Together in Early Childhood Education: Implementing the Collaborative Goal of ‘Pathways to the Future/Ngā Huarahi Arataki’*, which was held on June 18–19, 2006, heard about collaborations such as the ‘foundation of the Early Childhood Strategic Plan’? The conference was an example of ‘third way’ interest in joined-up services, where services could be devolved by the state to communities – to groups with motivation to address educational challenges among their members. The coming together of children and families ‘in E.C.E. services provides greater opportunities for addressing health and social issues’, SPECE had suggested (p. 18). ‘Building stronger links between ECE services, ante-natal programmes, parents and whanau, parenting programmes, schools and health services can also improve a child’s educational achievement ... [where] strong relationships [ensure strong transitions] (MoE, 2002, p. 21). Keynote speakers gave examples, both national and international, of targeting funding to low socio-economic areas. This, together with ‘wrap-around’ services, ‘lifted the capacity’ of parents and children it was asserted. International examples were offered as solutions to local problems.

In Britain, Children’s Centres had been described by Tony Blair as the ‘new frontier of the welfare state and the education system’ (Whalley, 2006b, p. 8)\(^{37}\) – the ‘jewel in the crown’ (p. 8) of policies to combat poverty (see Penn, 2007, p. 196).\(^{38}\) Margy Whalley had played a pivotal role in the establishment of these centres (Whalley, 2001a,b, 2003, 2006a,b). They differed from the Nursery Schools, in that they were viewed as a ‘wrap-around welfare model’. They were set up in ‘at risk’ areas like Corby

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\(^{37}\) The label for such communities had shifted, and were now known as ‘Super Output Areas’(p.8)

\(^{38}\) In 2007, there were approximately 3,500 Children’s Centres in Britain, providing targeted education and care for the poorest regions (Moss, in Ministry of Education, 2007).
or Hull (Whalley, 2003)\textsuperscript{39} and were designed to provide spaces for courses to improve parenting and change attitudes to unemployment. The Children’s Centre in Corby provided a model, Whalley wrote, for the national ‘regeneration’ of community (2006b, p. 9), where ‘[e]thical entrepreneurs’ (2006a, p. 9) provided leadership to their community.

Judith Duncan, another keynote speaker at \textit{Getting People Together in Early Childhood Education}, reported research on families in three low-socio-economic areas.\textsuperscript{40} The families reported feeling shame about being reliant on welfare benefits (Duncan, 2006, p. 16). Such families were, however, with the support of early childhood staff, able to ‘build upon their social capital and foster family resilience’ (p. 19). The research found ECE centres were a vital nexus of the community. Using language harking back to a simpler past, Duncan suggested such centres were ‘the heart of their community’ analogous to ‘micro-community building [at the] village well’ (Scott, 2000, cited in Duncan, p. 19).

\textsuperscript{39} Unlike New Zealand’s one-regulatory environment, that of Britain’s differs, with a range of options being funded by local authorities, rather than central government. Penn suggests that the policy plans were vague, and the outcomes of the Centres very uncertain (p.196).

\textsuperscript{40} This study investigated collaboration between ECE centres and community agencies in lower socio-economic areas of Dunedin, Wellington and Gisborne (Duncan, Bowden, & Smith, 2005). It made extensive use of the three terms, from differing lexical genealogies of HC, social capital, and cultural capital, as below in the table from that study.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{HUMAN CAPITAL} & \textbf{SOCIAL CAPITAL} & \textbf{CULTURAL CAPITAL} \\
\hline
Education & Access to social and personal support & Cultural heritage \\
\hline
Positive attitudes & Access to financial support & Cultural identity and values \\
\hline
Coping strategies & Access to external resources (for health, welfare, work, parenting) & Religious and spiritual beliefs \\
\hline
Family cohesion & Community support & \\
\hline
Personal goals & Quality family time & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table from the Duncan, Bowden, & Smith, 2005 study. Terms such as HC, social capital, and cultural capital are set out as discrete social and economic categories. Source: Duncan et al. (2005, p. 60).}
\end{table}
Jacqueline Hayden, from the ‘third way’ environment of New South Wales (see e.g. Goodfellow, 2005; Melville, 2008; Pierson & Castles, 2002) used Putnam’s theory 41 to argue that collaboration supported improved social capital. 42 Health professionals valued ‘child care services as entry points’ in their work to address the ‘statistical tail’ of disadvantage (Getting People Together in Early Childhood Education Flyer). Partnerships [for the socially alienated] protect ‘against … psychosocial, mental and biomedical health problems. Early childhood services serve a vital role in a society’, Hayden concluded (2006, p. 25).

The conference was an example of governance through the social, where the aim was to ‘re-activate self-motivation, self-responsibility and self-governance’ (Rose, 2000c, p. 249). Wrap-around services could ensure support from educational and health professionals close to the community of need, in the name of ‘public good’ (p. 171). Leaders in the Māori and Pasifika 43 communities were constructed as role models, and monitors of their own community. They represent Rose’s ‘rainbow’ self-steering communities who are ethically responsible for their own and bound through emotional relationships. Such communities can be viewed as ‘intersubjective zones’, where geographic or ethnic space is ‘reconfigured in the name of security’ (p. 247). Identities are both relational and collective – Rose adopts Wendy Brown’s phrase, ‘wars of subjectivity’ (Brown, 1995, cited in Rose, 2000c, p. 46) to describe one’s obligations to both self and others. Elements of security, of mitigating risk, were also evident in my third example, which is discussed in the next section.

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41 See below, Chapter 5
42 Robert Putnam (1995) claims social connectedness and civil engagement is diminishing because of the movement of women into the labour force, increased mobility, and the transformation of leisure, particularly electronic individuation.
43 A keynote speaker was Mini McKenzie, sharing the community model of Kōhanga Reo (immersion). There were Pasifika and Māori research projects reported on at the conference.
3.3.3 ‘Travelling Pathways to the Future’

Attendees at the government’s ECE Symposium, *Travelling Pathways to the Future: Ngā Huarahi Arataki*, which was held on May 2–3, 2007, were mobilised into ‘making political reason operational and material ... as the theatre ... from which to view the... evolving drama of government’s understanding of governing ... into “state reason”’ (Doherty, 2007, p. 199). Rich countries differ in how they provide ECE, said keynote speaker Peter Moss. He set out a broad-brush picture of similarities, before examining the British context in some detail, including their government’s economic positioning and valuing of ECE. The Anglo countries share a liberal approach, where the majority of such education is seen as ‘childcare’ – a provision for working parents. The British government, he continued, has a ‘hands off’ approach to such matters, seeing it as parental purchase of private education for their children: a market concern. Unlike New Zealand there is only a small government-financed section offering targeted services to the children of the poor, Moss stated (MoE, 2007). He compared differing investment rates and tax side-supply subsidy regimes in Sweden, the US and the UK. Parental leave, in most countries, is also seen as a private matter: a contract between the employer and employee, not a matter for government, nor one of policy integration. He noted that all English-speaking countries have poor child-poverty figures, and shared a simplistic belief that ECE is a cure for such poverty. Split-funding regimes, such as central supply monies, together with side-supply tax credits and parental fees were not, in Moss’s view, to be recommended. Policy-makers should consider the holistic picture of

44 Peter Moss situated New Zealand ECE services among the ‘liberal welfare regimes’ where the private provision, market logic and targeted provision for lower-income families are evident (MoE, 2007, May 2–3, p. 28). A range of international research demonstrates the ongoing influence of ECE on children’s learning (MoE, 2008, Mar.). Research from NZCER researcher Cathy Wylie is cited by many MoE publications. Her longitudinal research (2001 onwards) shows correlations with Weikart’s HighScope/Ypsilanti findings – that ECE can ameliorate the effects of poverty and deprivation. The Fourth National Government played with the concept behind *No Child Left Behind*, with Bob Simcock, MP for Hamilton West 1996–1999, suggesting that the US model be investigated. The Act was signed off by G. W. Bush in January, 2002. It involved ‘mandatory testing and increased reporting of educational outcomes to parents’ (QPEC factfile, n.d.).
education and parental leave for the very young. He cited economist Gosta Esping-Andersen’s argument that someone (whether parents or tax-payers) has to pay. ‘What varies is who shoulders the burden [of taxes] not the total weight on the burden’ (1999, cited in MoE, 2007). Moss concluded with questions for conference attendees, one of which was about this country’s goal for reducing child poverty and the implications of this for ECE services.

Lesley Haines, from the Department of Labour, offered a solution to Moss’s query about child poverty: ECE centres’ support of working parents to grow their wealth. Haines spoke about the government policy Choices for Living, Caring and Working: A Ten-year Plan to Improve Caring and Employment Choices Available to Parents and Carers. ‘It is a vision’, she said, ‘that gives parents ... real choices ... more mothers are participating in paid work’ (p. 22, emphasis added). It was not, Haines was at pains to note, ‘about forcing people to work at the expense of their children; ... [nor] encouraging children into long hours of care’ (p. 26). When emphasising ‘choice’, Haines may have been aware of public

45 Shonkoff & Bales (2011, p.23) make an argument: that we ‘can pay now or we will pay later for societies’ failure to promote healthy development in the earliest years of life’. Their argument is the inverse of Esping-Andersen’s, being an early investment rationale, rather than a public/private one

46 There have been several reports issued since then showing that child poverty in the population continues to grow, as the gap between the poor and others continues to increase under several governments (e.g. CPAG, 2011; CSHM, 2011).
reaction when Helen Clark had described the policy explicitly as ‘help[ing] more women return to work’ (Clark, cited in Coney 2005; Laugesen, 2005). 47

There were a number of sector and community representatives invited to evaluate SPECE at the mid-way point. Other speakers included Anne Meade, chair of the 2000 SPECE Working Group, and MoE officials. Education Minister Steve Maharey expressed concern about the numbers of Māori children beginning school without ‘cultural capital’ (video, 2–3 May). The order of proceedings included MoE background briefing papers and progress reports on SPECE.

The preceding three examples reveal the micro-practices evident in the second and third terms of the FLG. The discourse of HCT, utilising the very aspirations of staff and parents for their young charges, changed their perceptions of themselves and their task in very specific HCT ways. Since the 1980s governments have sought to manage risk to the body politic efficiently, utilising HCT to promote enhanced work dispositions in both parents and children. Underpinning the contemporary economic constructions of ECE there remains a social remediation function that is individualised, morally judgmental and, when Māori and Pasifika become proxies in policy for those in poverty: essentially a racist discourse about the poor. The deliberate objectives of economic rationalisation are evident in this country as well as internationally.

Policy, Robert Doherty suggests, is purposeful and directed towards a problem, need or aspiration to support actions that will achieve goals. It is also essentially conflictual (Doherty, 2007 p. 198). Governmentality as understood by any specific community, takes on a kind or order. Firstly, it has connotations of the moral plane, of the local, the familiar, the context of interest and relationships. Secondly, although

47 The range of reactions is summarised by Sandra Coney: ‘I wouldn’t like society to shift to a position where you got social censure if you weren’t doing your duty and getting back into the workforce, children or not. Gareth Morgan ... ‘Helen Clark’s view on the value of motherhood simply reinforces an influence that the monetarised economy has been exerting for a few decades now’. Vernon Small, Dominion Post, ‘Ms. Clark’s heavy emphasis on the economic advantages for the nation has triggered a backlash from many women’ (The Jobs Letter, 2005, Feb. 17).
there is provision for some governance at local, rather than central, level, devolved autonomisation remains tightly controlled by regulation. With the state adopting the role of providing ‘expert administration’ (Rose, 2000c p. 111), it shapes the practices of self-regulation of groups. As both Rose (2000b) and Zygmunt Bauman (2001) have noted, community vitality is sought to support government aims. All are co-opted into the battle against degeneracy. Parents who prefer welfare benefits to honest work, who do not contribute to the economy, are of concern to the state in its competitive struggle against fitter, wealthier nations. Those who ‘choose’ not to belong are at risk of expulsion from their community. There is an increased belief in the power of human development to support each individual to ‘boot-strap’ themselves out of unfortunate circumstances, with the alchemy of ECE. The nineteenth century had seen the transformation of the home into a machine for health, with the ‘education and solicitation of mothers as ancillary workers in the health care of their children’ (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. 15). The twenty-first-century use of HCT co-opts parents as a means of individual and national salvation and wealth acquisition through skill-training.
4 Changing constructions of child, mother and teacher over the twentieth century

In this chapter, I set out changing societal constructions over the twentieth century of the child, her mother and teacher. In the early part of the century there was a state interest and penetration into the previously private domain of the home. The two-pronged approach was tied firstly to the issue of public hygiene. The state and other agencies used normative images as models of appropriate behaviour, with the aim of addressing the risk to the health of the nation. ECE was allied to philanthropic interests, with education of the children of the poor seen as a second way of ameliorating societal risks. After World War II, ECE was presented as a ‘public good’, funded by the state in the national interest. In the 1970s there was, I argue, an emergence of ‘others’ in ECE policy documents, among these were Māori and Pasifika groupings. Another discourse became evident in the 1990s, when the ECE teacher was portrayed in policy as societal saviour. Teachers involved in compensatory education were seen as laying down the foundational skill-base of children. Their role in offering care which released the parent into the work-force, added to an economic discourse of education as salvation of individual and national wealth.

Everything looks bright when you start in married life. But it’s when you have a swarm of children round you ... you feel that ... every sixpence that comes in ought to buy a shilling ... then you know what getting married means. And if there’s no work ... and illness ... what then? (Lamb, 1889, p. 14).

With societal interest in the ‘private’ aspects of the family as sites of risk, and social health, there was a co-option into the state’s *Polizeiwissenschat*; the state’s interest in disciplining and regulating (in this case) the family at the turn of the twentieth century. There may never have been rigid boundaries between the public and the private, but in the early 1900s, a range of agencies turned their gaze to the family home. Medical and public health authorities’ attention to the bodies of mother and child was a part of a wider interest in the health of the nation. Associated with an interest in hygiene was an interest in the education of children of the poor. There was a widespread belief in human development; that by using their
faculties, all rational human creatures could improve their lot. Interwoven in the emergence of educational and child development theory were societal norms involving racist and classist epistemologies, and a civilisational understanding of knowledge (Scheurich & Young, 2002). There was general belief across the Western world that science could improve the conditions of life. Evolution, closely tied to human development, demonstrated the ability of mankind to move to higher planes of wellbeing. Early developmental scientists believed in Lamarckian ‘biogenetic laws’ which viewed the child as ‘a rehearser ... not only a specific embodiment of the future adult; he is a genetic embodiment of the venerable past of the human race’ (Gesell & Ilg, 1943 p. 14, cited in Marchese, 1995). The theory of recapitulation, the demonstration of phylogenetic evolutionary principles in social development, was popular among doctors and scientists. Biometricians Francis Galton and Karl Pearson held the Chair of Eugenics at London University (Galton, 1887a,b, 1909; Marchese, 1995; Pearson, 1903). Pearson and G. S. Hall drew on the theories of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer to develop twentieth century notions of health and educational science. Traces of these within the disciplines of medicine, psychology and education continue today, seen in normative definitions of gender, race, and evolutionary development (Scheurich & Young, 2002).

The production of normative images is a techne of governmentality. It is an attempt to ensure compliant behaviours of the state’s populations through uses of hedonistic techniques. We human beings conform, and learn to govern our bodies as we compare them against our society’s ideals. Intertwined with pleasurable images are those illegitimate images on which society frowns. The societal

Figure 10: An early twentieth century normative image – Mother and Child by Frances Hodgkins. Dunedin Museum collection: source prints.co.nz.

48 A hierarchy of being, such as illustrated in Edward Cope’s On the Origin of Genera (1869), portrayed the non-white races as a lower form of human life (Marchese, 1995). At the pinnacle of such a hierarchy were the middle- and upper-class European men.
evocation of ideals is called into play to enhance self-governance of the ‘risky’ populations and to encourage enhanced conformity from such bodies.

I begin by using Dunedin as an example of governmentality for several reasons. Firstly, it was the largest centre of population in New Zealand at the beginning of the twentieth century. The city had several bodies of ‘risky’ population: newly arrived immigrants, Irish, Chinese, Lebanese and others who had sought their fortune in the Otago goldfields (Caversham Project; Otago University & FORST Funding). The country controlled the arrival of aliens with, for instance, the Chinese Immigration Act of 1881 and the Immigration Restriction Act of 1899 (Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, 2009). A substantial wealthy middle-class managed these perceived moral and social risks, utilising the sciences of health and education. A daughter of the wealthy bourgeoisie, Frances Hodgkins in 1912 painted an image of mother and child which reflects the ideals of the time: working- and itinerant-class women were encouraged to aspire to middle-class norms. Firstly, for instance, serials such as the 1889 Girl’s Own Annual (Lamb article) quoted above, articulated Malthusian expectations of moral and medical hygiene through management of the household. A second technique was the co-option of women as hygienists. Iconic images of the woman-and-infant dyad appeared on societal logos, such as those of the Plunket Society. These examples of the ‘re-modelling’ by philanthropists and hygienists of the families of the poor through moralisation and normalisation are what Nikolas Rose calls the ‘familialisation’ of the dangerous bodies of population (Rose, 1990, pp. 126–128).

Medical experts at Dunedin’s medical school researched city neighbourhoods, such as one nicknamed the ‘Swamp’, where there were densely packed working-class neighbourhoods – a ‘mixed population of the unskilled living in high-density housing’ (Brookes, 2003, p. 299). Many homes had inadequate sanitation: water was brought by pail from a nearby tank and thus bathing was often irregular. The day-to-day financial survival of Dunedin families depended

49 Thomas Robert Malthus, 1776 -1834 is discussed in the chapter 7 below. His moral strictures were offered as solutions to the poverty of his time.
50 The Lamb (1889) story suggested that the best method of birth control for the working classes was a long celibate engagement, during which the couple should save frugally and hone housekeeping skills to prudently support their future family.
greatly on the health of the male breadwinner. There was a moral imperative that ‘the wage earned by a husband ought to be sufficient to support his family, without his wife and young children having to work’ (Olssen, 2003, p. 60). If the breadwinner was injured, the family income stopped (Brookes, 2003). Benevolent societies, the only welfare option, had strong moral expectations of appropriate familial behaviour. In cases where the father died, his family might be broken up and the children put in care. Badly policed baby-minding facilities were options most mothers of illegitimate babies wished to avoid after the infamous Minnie Dean court-case. Good health often made the difference between taking advantage of employment opportunities and sinking into poverty or reliance on charitable aid.

Mothers were seen as responsible for the health and vigour of their husband and children. Women were expected to work as a hygienist in the home – either their own, or that of a middle-class employer. ‘Ladies’, from the wealthy middle classes, however, could aspire to the nurturing roles of nurse, doctor or teacher. In adopting the role of moral police the middle classes were able to philanthropically improve their lower-class sisters’ standards of living and police the bodies of their families. The working classes were expected to aspire to middle class norms.

Despite progress being seen as a demonstration of societal vigour, deeper anxieties about the pathologies of population and concerns about sources of contamination were evident. Hygiene was an issue of increasing importance after an outbreak of plague in the colony in 1900. Malthus’ theory of older societies lacking vigour, with new settlements such as New Zealand having healthy vitality, was accepted as a ‘truth’ of population strength. However, statistics demonstrated there was high infant mortality from prematurity, diarrhoea, and infectious diseases – 2,000 of every 25,000 babies died in their first year (Snowden, p. 10). Premier Richard John Seddon issued a memorandum in 1904, where he urged the national ‘preservation [of] babies as the best immigrants’, stating that ‘if increased from British stock the

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51 Olssen notes that when the Hillside railway workshop’s whistle blew, ‘the only males left at home were the sick, the disabled and those too young’ (2003, p. 53).

52 Minnie Dean, a ‘baby farmer’ or minder of unwanted children, was convicted in 1895 of murder of several of her charges, and hanged.
self-governing colonies will further buttress and strengthen our great Empire ... [rather than the colonies being] populated by the inferior surplus of people of older and alien countries’ (Bryder, 2003, p. 1). A state-funded hospital, named after Seddon’s birthplace, St Helen’s, opened in Wellington in 1905 to support wives of men with little means. A member of the Legislative Council in 1908 described population as indispensable to national safety and progress: ‘We must have soldiers and workers or our prosperity will be imperilled and our industry will decay’ (cited in Bryder, 2003, p. 2).

Not all adult national stock was healthy. During the Boer Wars there was concern about the physical health of military recruits (Bryder, 2003, p. 1) and during the World War I the poor condition of New Zealand troops challenged the perception of the superiority of the British soldier. A Dunedin doctor, Frederic Truby King, noted the poor physical health of both men and women, including shallow chests, poor posture and crippled feet (King, 1913). The state of military recruits became part of a wider discourse of eugenics. Dr Elizabeth Gunn set up Health Camps, run on military lines, where the children of poor Europeans were sent to learn about disciplined hygiene practices. A number of fitness associations were established across the Empire, for example the Young Men’s Christian Association and the Boy Scouts movement. The government appointed Public Health Officers in Schools and instituted military cadet training.

Women were co-opted at the frontline to educate their sisters, and thus concerns about child-rearing moved out of the home into the public arena. King wrote, ‘[t]he safety of nations [depends not only on] the man behind the gun ... he is mainly the resultant of the grit and self-sacrifice of his mother. If we lack noble mothers we lack the first element of racial success’ (King, 1913, p. 153).

I use King in this thesis as an example of an emerging governmental intrusion into the child and into the health of the wider population. As superintendent of Seacliff Mental Hospital, King was able to carry out animal husbandry experiments on the hospital farm. Growth comparisons, and systems developed at Seacliff, were to later be generalised into

53 A similar view had been voiced by economist Alfred Marshall, cited in Cunha et al. (2005, p. 700).
systems of infant growth and development (Deem cited in Snowden, 1951, p. 9). The rearing of young children was a methodical science: ‘I have no hesitation whatever in saying that law obtains just as much in the feeding of babies as in the feeding of pigs or calves’ (King, 1914, p. 9, emphasis in original).

The science of hygiene, King believed, could reduce infant mortality and strengthen the colony’s breeding stock. King discovered, while on sabbatical in Japan, that Japanese women breastfed until their child was 18 months old. These babies were strong and wiry, in contrast to the New Zealand infants. Such sights challenged his accepted ideas about the superiority of British stock (Cooper, Olssen, Thomlinson, & Law, 2003, p. 36). In New Zealand, only lower-class women breastfed; if middle-class women did so, it was for only a few weeks. As fresh cow’s milk was not always available, and few people boiled milk, illness was common. King was convinced that ‘natural’ infant breastfeeding prevented risks such as the development of ‘idiots, imbeciles and epileptics’ (Bryder, 2003, p. 4).

Experts focused on women’s health to ensure their babies were healthy, offering scientific information to support improved maternal practices. Scientific measurement and statistics were central to this new science. Measurement included the charting of food and drink intakes. Residue milk bottles were weighed and deducted against the recommended daily food allowance for each child. Babies were weighed before and after feeding and their growth charted. King licensed his seaside home at Karitane as a ‘school for mothers’. It also served as a site for the teaching of paediatrics. Mothers would stay with their newborn infants, then after training in hygiene, return home.

The regulated body was seen as a central factor in preventing any degeneracy of the race, with Karitane staff refusing to accept ‘defectives’ or babies suffering from infectious...
diseases, such as tuberculosis or syphilis. The destiny of the race, King believed, was in the hands of its mothers. What was best for the child was ‘best for the mother and best for the race’ (Snowden, 1951, p. 69).

4.1 ‘The Race marches forward on the feet of Little Children’

A philanthropic ‘Society for the Promotion of Health for Women and Children’, known as the Plunket Society (after the wife of then New Zealand Governor), was established by King in Dunedin on 14 May 1907. The ‘Aims of the Society’ included:

1) To uphold the Sacredness of the body and of Health; [and encourage] the duty of every mother to fit herself for the perfect fulfillment of the natural calls of mother-hood … and … promote the breast-feeding of infants

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57 What King, (1914, p. 10) called ‘practical eugenics’; an attempt to rear a ‘strong and healthy race’, which he continued, was not to eliminate the ‘unfit, but to prevent their production by aiding in the full development of the healthy … for the sake of the Dominion and the honour of the Empire’ (p.11).

58 King (1917, cited in Bryder, 2003).
2) To **acquire** accurate information... on matters affecting the Health of Women and children...

3) To train ... qualified nurses ... to give ... advice, and assistance ... with a view to conserving the health and strength of the rising generation and rendering both mother and offspring hardy, healthy and resistive to disease. (Truby King, 1913, p. 3, emphasis in original).

Proper motherhood involved absolute focus on the needs of the family, with nothing, for example strenuous physical exercise, deflecting from such aims. Medical experts suggested that mother’s milk was the ‘birthright of the baby’ (Snowden, p.47). Infants and their mothers, King wrote, were to be introduced to nutritious foods which provided ‘the foundations of strong healthy minds in sound enduring bodies for those who survive to be our future men and women’ (King, 1913, pp. 15–16). Provision of fresh air and good diet, together with bodily and household hygiene, was allied to the regimen of the military (Snowden, 1951, p. 50). Disciplined children became disciplined citizens of the Empire, with hygiene as a first site of such training. In governing themselves, children could learn skills that would support them to govern others. Individuals were expected to be in control of all bodily functions. Bad habits, such as poor hygiene habits learned in childhood, led to undisciplined adults. Such poor habits were viewed as examples of undisciplined parenting. The clock, rather than the baby, should rule the household, with feeding prescribed on a four-hourly basis, rather than on demand, and baby’s bowels evacuated by 10am (King, 1913, p. 62).
Expected norms on mental, physical and moral health were proselytised through newspaper columns, books and serials. King published a regular newspaper column under the pseudonym ‘Hygenia’. King’s *Feeding and Care of Baby* (1913) was designed to give information on ‘practical eugenics’ between the home visits of nurses (King, 1913). Women’s clothes were an important aspect of hygiene: the ‘corset is the greatest and most serious menace to the health of the female sex’, King stated (p. 5). The discourse of good hygiene increasingly penetrated the body of the mother.

The Plunket Society’s ideas became the national standard in community health and hygiene practices in the period between the World Wars. The exemplar of hygiene was the middle-class home, with air, light, warmth and running water. There had been a wide discussion on concerns about the working people in Europe, where hygiene had been closely linked to improved housing such as the Cadbury model housing estate in Britain.

The Plunket Society attracted a number of wealthy and influential people. Church people and moral benefactors sought to organise the relations of the poor in the ‘form of the domesticated family’ – a ‘prophylactic mode of action’ (Rose, 1990, p. 127). Financial aid was conditional, tied to the future moral conduct of the recipients. Rose argues that the institution of philanthropy – those initiatives that allowed the state to intervene at ‘a certain distance from the organs of political power’ – were partially a response to the perceived threats to the wealthy by the dangerous classes (Rose, 1990 p. 126). Such ideas are illustrated in the hygienic medicalisation of Dunedin’s working classes.
Societal focus next shifted to the field of education, with philanthropists Reverend Rutherford Waddell and Bishop Andrew Suter supporting kindergartens in Dunedin for the education of the children of the poor. The state’s interest in the body of the child continued through the practices of education.

4.2 Philanthropy as governmentality: the establishment of kindergartens

In New Zealand, the churches and the wealthy middle classes led the call for kindergartens. Like the Plunket Society, the kindergartens’ focus was on instilling in children patriotic sympathies to Mother Albion. Wellington kindergarten teacher Ted Scott recalled that in 1915 children stood before the Union Jack and sang ‘God Save the King’, concluding ‘I give my hands, my head and my heart to my country’ (NZCER, 1975, p. 9).

The first kindergartens were established in Dunedin in 1889 and these were followed by others in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch (Downer, H., 1964). The Free Kindergarten Union was formed in 1926, with Lady Sidey and Miss Alexander of Dunedin as office-holders. By 1928 there were 28 kindergartens in the South Island. Between the World Wars voluntary, philanthropic partnerships supported the provision, training and payment for kindergarten teachers (Downer, H., 1964)

The teachers’ role (which involved visiting homes to enrol students, or check on student attendance) was effectively that of social police. Teachers had ‘the door slammed in [their] face. The poorer people didn’t like interference. Someone knocking at the door usually meant

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59 One kindergarten in London was attended by 48 children who were there all day. The parents paid when they could, and the meals were subsidised: ‘children sleep at the kindergartens on little beds, with the windows open, and everything is most hygienic’ (Discussion post-paper presentation, King, 1914, p. 20).
trouble’ (NZCER, 1975, p. 12). Some children had ‘lice in their hair. Some of the children were sewn into their clothes for the winter. Others were overclad’ (NZCER, 1975, p. 12). Children attending Taranaki Street Kindergarten in Wellington in 1935 had decayed teeth, impetigo, poor nutrition, enlarged tonsils, and signs of early goitre (p. 15). The role of hygienic health care remained a central aspect of education.

4.2.1 Normative maternal expectations

Developmental screening tools were designed by early measurement proponents like Francis Galton, Arnold Gesell and Alfred Binet. Charts (similar to those used by King) measured children’s mental progress against their age-cohorts. The ‘professional’ was a scientist like Arnold Gesell, who observed objectively, dispassionately and from a distance (Rose, 1990, pp. 144–147). Scientific observers, using numerical information graphs and measurements of skill development, named new ways of knowing childhood. Gesell, like King, had made a career of defining normality (Marchese, 1995).

Links between health and education were strong, one example being a philanthropic joint project in Dunedin – a Pre-School Educational Centre administered by the Free Kindergarten Association and Plunket Society as a centre for observation and training for kindergarten teachers and Plunket nurses (Bryder, 2010). Professionals such as nurses, doctors, psychologists and teachers were able to articulate developmental ‘truths’. These professionals named, categorised, and described the bodies inspected in observation rooms in hospitals and teacher-training institutions. Keen observation was an expected professional skill of the health and education disciplines (Foucault, 1983a, b). Norms became techniques for visualising and inscribing individual differences, justifying intervention upon children whose behaviours were difficult. There were a number of eugenic assumptions embedded in the New Zealand social and epistemological educational discourse. Tales like The Waterbabies and Robinson Crusoe encouraged working-class children to accept their lot within the British Empire. Civilisational racism,

60 These were noted in 23 of the 140 children.
61 Gesell was an American psychologist who worked in the early twentieth century on the normative approach to child studies.
underpinning the ‘science’ of development with its normative expectations, supports the
classism and racism normatively embedded in the disciplines of psychological and
educational assessment.

Over the period of the mid-twentieth century the utilisation of normative comparisons
consolidated into a system of administration, technical, and increasing juridical knowledge
Motherhood itself emerged and ‘materialized through the constant reiteration and assertion of
regulatory norms’ (Shaw, 1999). Educational techniques intervened at the level of both the
body and the mind; the disciplines of hygiene and education, working in tandem, instigated
regimes of supervision of the working classes by those trained in developmental science.
Experts constructed images of how mothers and children should be. Parents could be educated
in human development, enabling the judging of the quality of their parenting against a
normative standard set by professionals.

4.3 The ‘truth’ of experts

The 1947 Report of the Consultative Committee on Pre-school Educational Services
(hereafter ‘the Bailey Report’) drew on experts such as Gesell to suggest educational support
for families. Parents needed to know about child development and ‘be given opportunities to
observe children in the kindergarten [and] to study typical behaviour’ (Bailey, 1947, p. 44).
Although international psychologists John Bowlby and Harry Harlow had suggested that the
‘natural’ place for the child was in the maternal home, Susan Isaac had recommended short-
term mental-health respite for both mother and child (p. 8).\(^{63}\) Although after World War II the
maternal home was privileged, preschool education, the report suggested, could bridge gaps
between home and school.

\(^{62}\) Foucault (1994g) saw juridicial knowledge as one societal pole, which was increasing focused on regulating the rights and
wrongs in society.
\(^{63}\) The committee included educationalists and the Director General of Health, Dr H. B. Turbott.
A generation later, the 1971 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Pre-school Education (hereafter ‘the Hill Report’) was published. This report disputed the fact ‘that most homes are adequate for fostering the development’ of the child because the mother cannot ‘possess … all the knowledge and skills to create the optimum learning environment. [Rather, parents need] guidance’ (Hill, 1971, p. 27). Research, furthermore, demonstrated increased educational gains by children who attended a preschool. Now the calibre of the parental home had come under the gaze of the state, and been found wanting; better for children to be under the gaze of trained teachers.

In the 25 years between the Bailey and Hill reports, New Zealand had become a more diverse society. The discourse of feminism suggested mothers, particularly educated women, would be happier in the workforce; that parenting was not a calling for all women. Public servant and economist Bill Sutch advocated for equal pay for equal work and for care for preschool children (Sutch, 1974). He was critical of the Hill report, arguing that by naturalising the role of the mother the state was shying away from a robust preschool policy. Social and economic pressures encouraged many rural Māori families to move to town, where they became more visible than in previous generations. The authors of the Hill report were not unanimous as to whether there was a ‘Māori Problem’ (p.31), mainly because a very assertive woman, Iritana Tawhiwhirangi, had set herself against the Pākehā committee members. Like Māori, Pasifika peoples were brought to urban areas by the government and employers to fill employment gaps. In many cases, the terms ‘Māori’ and ‘Pacific’ replaced the earlier category of ‘working class’ in social policy documents.

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64 Mason Durie, writing to Dr Turbott in 1959, queried the two stranded policies of Plunket for Pākehā families and Department of Health nurses visiting Māori (Bryder, 2001, p.65).

65 Mrs Taiwhiwhirangi was later central in Te Tino Rangatiratanga Unit of the Kōhanga Reo National Trust.
In the 1970s international publications that included constructions of parents-as-workers began to emerge. The Early Childhood Care and Education report (OECD, 1977) examined provision for children from birth to school-age across nine countries. Although ‘stability and continuity of [parental] relationships’ was important, the state needed to consider the issue of ‘supply and demand’ (p. 9). More ‘mothers from [middle-class] homes decide to re-enter or continue in full employment’ (quote includes a citation referring to an OECD 1974 ‘Care of Working Parents’ paper, p. 10). No longer was preschool viewed as maternal respite; now self-actualising parents sought freedom through work. New Zealand had recently joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an international agency fostering economic development for its members and so the use of the term ‘supply and demand’ may not have been coincidental.\textsuperscript{66} It was implicit in Brian Easton’s 1979 paper given at the Early Childhood Convention, which was discussed in Chapter 2 (Easton, 1979). A decade later the term would become central to Government Management (GM) (NZ Treasury, 1987).

4.3.1 Who should get to preschool?

A new discourse of economic rationalism ascended in the 1970s. Three intersecting themes became apparent at this time: (1) the right for women to work for self-actualisation; (2) the provision of both care and education to ensure child development outcomes; and (3) the professionalisation of teachers to enable them to teach children effectively.

In the 1970s societal roles were debated on a number of fronts. The issues of extra-marital births and children’s rights were spoken of openly; adoption of illegitimate children was no longer a preferred option, as many parents could choose to keep them.\textsuperscript{67} From 1973 the state provided a Domestic Purposes Benefit for sole-parents. A parliamentary Select Committee on Women’s Rights was held in June 1975, where the right to paid work was

\textsuperscript{66} In 1975 and 1976 OECD data showed negative growth in productivity New Zealand. Members of the OECD tend to be among the world’s wealthier countries.

\textsuperscript{67} In SET no 2 (1974) a pamphlet was jointly published by New Zealand Educational Research and the Family Planning Association, ‘Too great a risk’, giving birth-control advice in cartoon format. This was an indication of changing social attitudes.
discussed. However, little had changed for lower socio-economic parents, including Māori and Pasifika parents, where parents worked for financial reasons 40 or more hours a week (Julian, 1977, p. 56) and used informal caring arrangements for their children.

There was enhanced interest in young children as research subjects. International studies had noted that the most significant variable was the child's home, with parental attitudes to educational attainment being central to school performance (Rose, 1990 p. 184). Following a 1958 British model, Otago University began a longitudinal study of children born in the early 1970s that was headed by Philip de Silva (see papers, ECE Convention, 1979). Other publications, such as the American study by James Coleman (1966, 1972) research which analysed the groups making up the ‘tail’ of statistical achievement, added to this interest. Compensatory education programmes – such as Head Start under Urie Bronfenbrenner and HighScope/Ypsilanti under David Weikart – were introduced for the poor black children of America (Bronfenbrenner, 1974; Weikart, 1987). Psychologist Jane Ritchie set up Te Kōhanga Preschool at Waikato University. Modelled on the Head Start programme, this facility aimed to get Māori children ready for school so they could begin on an ‘equal’ footing with their non-Māori peers (Ritchie, 1978).

In 1973, Geraldine McDonald drew on statistical data provided by government departments. Māori Mothers and Pre-school Education was the first published national research into the Māori preschool population (McDonald, 1973). Her experiences of being mistaken for a missionary, a nurse, or a debt

68 Jane Ritchie and her husband, Professor James Ritchie, also wrote books and articles on parenting. Their 1970 book Child rearing patterns in New Zealand had a chapter entitled ‘The Maori child-reading pattern’.
69 The introductory foreword by Merimeri Penfold noted the paucity of research, firstly on ECE, secondly on Māori preschooling. Education at the turn of the twentieth century was not always accessible by indigenous children. Binney (2009)
collector were similar to that of earlier home-visitors: those defined as ‘problem populations’ continued to distrust the motives of well-intentioned people bearing intervention strategies.

Psychologists in New Zealand were increasingly given educational power to define and assess children. In 1975, psychologist David Barney conducted a literature review and data analysis of who attended preschool. He included tabulated data on ethnicity and attendance numbers, including those for Māori and ‘handicapped children’. The statistical data showed that some groups were better off than others. Should young children be allowed to miss out ‘because of their parents’ lack of interest?’ Barney asked (1975, p. 282). There was, he noted, increasing interest in improving ‘the conditions of the underprivileged sector of society’ (p. 3). It was ‘essential for some solo mothers under present financial arrangements to go to work’ (p. 282). Barney posited this as a necessity, rather than a choice.

Participants at the 1979 Early Childhood Convention in Christchurch heard economist Brian Easton (1979) suggest economic forecasts should include children as part of a ‘human capital’. Policy from the mid-1970s became increasingly interested in children. Some academics were suggesting compensatory early education as a solution to disadvantage. Dorothy Butler, a New Zealand children’s author, had demonstrated that within her own family a child diagnosed as being behind developmentally had ‘caught up’ with her peers after intensive work by her family. New Zealand children’s television followed the lead of American programmes such as Sesame Street, offering daily diets of cognitive concepts for children on the assumption some would not have preschooling opportunities. Although disadvantage had, in Western thought, been viewed in the light of class, rather than race, the two elements increasingly merged: in America as well as New Zealand in the 1970s the disadvantaged were depicted as children of colour.

With the concept of early intervention as a management technique for a diverse population of risks, the privileging of trained teachers as preferred carers of young children sets out the difficulties experienced by Tūhoe hapū at the turn of the twentieth century in getting schools built and funded by government. Waikato-Tainui at the same time boycotted the government’s attempts to introduce schooling (Burden, 1955, p. 179).

70 The Department of Education, established in 1964, had a psychological service.
began to emerge in public discussion. Russell Marshall, Education Minister in the second term of the Fourth Labour Government, raised this point at the 1987 Early Childhood Convention (Marshall 1987, p. 7). Although parents were an important influence on children’s experiences before school, quality ECE could best be provided by ‘caring, well-trained adults’ who complement the work of the family (p. 7). David Weikart, from the Perry Preschool in Ypsilanti, was a keynote speaker.71 ‘Do you know’, Weikart asked conference attendees ‘that the person sitting the other side of you is more effective as a crime fighter than anyone else in the country? ... If you could peek under the collar of her shirt you would see a red T-shirt...it would say “crime fighter” and “superwoman”’ (Weikart, 1987, p. 15, emphasis added). International agencies such as the World Bank, Weikart continued, were advocating for early intervention, while the ‘Mayor of Minneapolis [has said we must use] early childhood education to reduce adult unemployment’ (p. 19). Traditionally New Zealand had drawn its pedagogical ideas from Europe and Britain. Now the state’s interest in young children’s cognitive development began to look towards America for educational ideas.72

4.3.2 The positivity of educational duty

In the 1987 GM, Treasury had offered the middle-class home as the norm against which others were to be compared:

In some homes, the child’s whole environment will be arranged with an educational intent – educational toys, educational posters on the bedroom walls, books ... Such provision will vary enormously across social classes...[Some children] particularly from poor backgrounds are [disadvantaged] – the child’s cultural capital does not have currency in the formal educational system (NZ Treasury 1987, p. 48).

71 This was the year after the publication of Economic Analysis of the Ypsilanti Perry Preschool Project (Weber, Foster, & Weikart, 1978).
72 The section in EBM (1988a, p. 14) sets out range of references to USA studies, including the Weikart 1982 article on the cost effectiveness of ECE.
ECE was able to compensate for neglectful homes – mothers, especially sole parents, such discourse inferred, were not to be trusted with the care and education of their children. In SPECE (MoE, 2002) the home was no longer viewed as central to learning because ‘children from disadvantaged backgrounds ... may not be exposed to high quality early learning experiences in the home’ (p. 10), and thus needed ECE as a stable environment. The child-as-future-citizen was to be provided with education by the state as a prophylactic technique, in support of the country’s future wealth and wellbeing.

Policy documents portray paid work as a solution to building the skill-base of the country. ECE was also constructed as a panacea for working families needing childcare, as well as a solution for dysfunctional families (MoE, 2002, p. 10). The families of concern to both Susan Isaacs in the 1930s and 40s and to the NZ Treasury in the 1980s were now able to be supported by trained staff, offering quality curricula activities. An OECD 2004 publication, Babies and Bosses, portrayed flexible parents able to work in the global economy while their children received ‘quality care’ in ECE centres.

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73 A 2002 Treasury publication, The Inclusive Economy, has a section on HC.
In *Babies and Bosses* (OECD, 2004a) an aspirational image portrays the male child-as-manager, surrounded by images of power—an office, a desk, and the computer as icon of the Knowledge Economy.

Figures 14 and 15: OECD images HCT—these children are not from disadvantaged or risky groups.

A second image foregrounds a girl surrounded by HCT icons: desk, laptop computer and office. The pen in her mouth both draws attention to her oral infant stage and cues the reader to her focus on the task at hand. Her parents look on fondly. Perhaps they themselves are successfully achieving a work-life balance.

As the state seeks to avoid day-to-day management of these populations, devolved responsibility has increased. Policy is about efficiency, best-value for state investment, and a reduced bureaucracy. On one axis of governmentality, education is mainly understood as labour market policy which positions accruing wealth as central to education (Marginson, 1993, p. 56). On the other axis, families’ dreams and hopes for their offspring are viewed as material and narrowly focused on employment. The internalisation of the models of ‘good’ parenting meets the state’s need for families to maximise educational opportunities. Such discourse has ‘responsibilised’ the family (Rose, 1999, 2000c).
5 Micro-econometrics: a twenty-first-century intrusion into the soul of the family

In this chapter I suggest that economics increasingly intruded into the ‘soul’ of the family. There is an economic interest in ECE as an investment that, based on US longitudinal data, is presented as a long-term cost-effective state investment. Some microeconomists maintain that ECE—targeted to poor populations that are at risk of under-achieving; of not contributing to the workforce—will pay future dividends to the national wealth. The child is viewed as a saviour of herself, her family, her community, and the national interest.

I use James J. Heckman as an example of a new type of econometrician, a micro-econometrician, who is interested in economic minutiae and complex data. Surveying Heckman’s work, I plot the heightened economic interest in policy relating to working mothers, and to their children as future employees. The use of such data has economically bound the mother to the child, focusing on what are described by one theorist as ‘nonseparable preferences of females and child-care costs on female and life-cycle fertility and labor supply behaviour’ (Gayle, 2003, abstract). Micro-econometricians link economic models for individuals to data on individual behaviour (Heckman, 2001). They have paid increasing attention to the cost-benefit advantages of state investment in ECE programmes (see Levitt, 2000). This economic discourse uses an instrumental portrayal of the mother-and-child dyad. Heckman maintains that an ‘investment made while a person is young pays repeated benefits over a lifetime’ and such investment is, some believe, ‘the most important common feature in effective public policies to build human capital’ (Harms, 2004). As the state seeks to grow wealth and manage biopolitical security, there is a growing community co-option into the discourse of worker skill-enhancement (Rose, 2000a, c, 2009, 2010). Increasingly the communities of the new immigrants; the peoples of colour; and the ‘hard to manage’ are expected to support their members towards improvement. The interest of micro-econometricians and policy-makers in families that do not fit the perceived norm is, I suggest, a contemporary example of economic imperialism.
Heckman has had an econometric interest in ECE for over 30 years, and has examined educational data, including that gathered from natural or randomised experiments (Levitt, 2000, p. 37). His aggregation of data from a variety of fields including medicine and education has assisted the move of economics into the field of ECE. Heckman’s colleague Steven Levitt has likened the impact of such research to that of the impetus Milton Friedman’s methodological shift gave to the discipline (Levitt, 2000, p. 36, fn. 2). Heckman’s writings encompass a more diverse range of topics than earlier micro-economists’. Like Gary Becker, Heckman has generalised human behaviours from animal experiments (Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron & Shonkoff, 2006). While the family remains a central construct, Heckman locates the child and family within the community.

The ontological assumptions made by Heckman are the same as the earlier HC theorists: that education is a private good and responsibility and that there are minimal risks to the state of investing in returns on education (Heckman, 2000a). Society has become more complex in the last 40 years so Heckman’s interest has shifted from examining childcare to support working parents (1973), to plotting life-trajectories investments as a means of determining the most efficient and effective ways of investing education public funds (see e.g. Blundell, Dearden, & Sianesi, 2005; Blundell & Meghir, 1986; Blundell & Stoker, 2005; Cunha & Heckman, 2007; Heckman 2010; 2011; Heckman, Moon et al, 2010). Predictions of life-cycle fertility and labour supply could be supported by dynamic models: hypotheses concerning time on the job, which can affect future earnings for women, against the counter-utility of time raising children (Gayle, 2003). For example, a parent will seek a balance of cost to satisfaction when making hedonic economic decisions about the quality of life for herself and her child. The roles of taxes and welfare benefits in determining the labour supply of sole parents in such arguments are closely related. Tax breaks can influence decision-making, for instance decreasing sole parents’ dependence by setting time-limits on benefits to encourage them to seek jobs (Blundell, Duncan, & Meghir, 1992).

74 See below for detail on Friedman’s 1953 publication.
75 Knudsen et al. (2006, p. 22) refer to ‘low-grooming’ and ‘high-grooming’ behaviour in paternal rat experiments.
76 Witness the heterogeneity of data, including aggregated micro-data, cross-sectional and panel data and information from control and randomised studies to inform government policy.
People are diverse, Heckman stated in his 2000 Nobel Prize in Economics acceptance speech (see Heckman, 1997, 2000, 2005). Diversity and heterogeneity data implications had previously been under-estimated in econometrics. By synthesising both micro- and macro-economic data, micro-econometrics could provide a ‘rigorous empirical and theoretical foundation for evaluating large scale social programmes like educational subsidies that alter prices’ (Heckman, 2000, p. 307). Heckman criticised the earlier HCT models (those of Becker’s generation) which he said created a halo effect. It was not useful to assume for policy purposes that there is an ‘average or “representative” agent’ because such assumptions did not support targeting to the populations of concern (2005, p. 18). Evaluating policies that apply universally within an economy ‘is not helpful ... [unless useful data on] the different interventions and the economies are segregated from each other’ (p. 16). While targeting was not a new technique, the recent adoption of increasingly specific targeted policies to populations of risk supported a deeper intervention by the state into the social body. Blended heterogeneous data-sets give information that support the state’s increasing penetration into the bodies of mother and child: into ‘[f]ailed families [that] produce low ability, poorly motivated students who do not succeed in school’ (Heckman, 1999, p. 5). Micro-econometrics offered new strategies, for example, of supporting state attempts to move sections of the population off dependency on welfare benefits (e.g. Heckman & Borjas, 1980). ‘Policies that seek to remedy deficits incurred in early years are much more costly than early investments wisely made’ (Heckman, 1999, p. 5).

Economic-neuroscience alliances, in a series of ‘borderland’ cross-fertilisations (Wrigley, 2002, p. 50), have recently suggested developmental windows of opportunity for early intervention initiatives.

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77 An example was the research into the schooling of Southern blacks in the first half of the twentieth century (Donohue, Heckman, & Todd, 2002). Northern philanthropists built schools on a ‘carefully targeted’ plan of investment with limited or no investment from the state.
5.1 Heckman: Invest + Develop + Sustain = Gain

While remaining focused on price theory, the object of Heckman’s investigations has shifted over the past four decades, to his focus on the long-term effects of state investments in the child-as-future-worker. In a chapter in T. W. Schultz’s Economics of the Family, Heckman researched the efficiency of price for educational service (Heckman, 1973). When President Nixon’s voucher model was proposed, Heckman had investigated the value of women’s time and its effect on their choice of childcare. Heckman’s arguments now suggest that improved social skills learned at ECE are traits that will make for efficient and effective future workers. Social rather than academic skills are essential workers’ traits, Heckman suggests. Early targeted investments build the attitudes and dispositions required by compliant workers in the twenty-first century (Heckman, 2000b, 2008; Heckman & Masterov, 2006). In a 2004 study co-authored with Alan Krueger, Inequality in America: What Role for Human Capital Policies? Heckman suggests that the state should re-evaluate its earlier investment in preschooling from an intellectual to a social one (Harms, 2004; Sundstrom, N.D.). Despite large educational investment in programmes such as Head Start and Abecedarian Preschools in the 1970s, the efficiency of these investments was later questioned. Twenty-first-century research focuses, instead, on the best time in students’ life trajectory for efficacy of investment (e.g. Bils & Klenow, 2000; Garces, Thomas, & Currie, 2002; Steuerle, 1996). Investment in adolescents paid poor returns (Duncan, Ludwig, & Magnuson, 2007a; Nores, Belfield, Barnett, & Schweinhart, 2005); a more effective investment was to target funding towards preschool children’s education. Economic estimates are that returns to the state may be $8 for every $1 invested at preschool level (Duncan, Ludwig, & Magnuson, 2007b, p. 143). Thus early intervention

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78 Heckman,(N.D.) pamphlet
79 The Abecederian Project started under the Frank Porter Graham Centre at the University of North Carolina and the Infant Health and Development Programme worked with children aged from birth to 3 years for deprived African-American children. For further details see Bruer (1999, p. 144ff.).
80 Chapters in this book were contributed by well-known HCT theorists, such as George Borjas and Eric Hanushek. Hanushek’s ideas, among others, on teacher quality have been influential on recent initiatives in New Zealand such as the recent debates on teacher performance and standards e.g. O’Reilly (2005) ‘Teacher performance pay good for education’ and NZ Listener, February 13, 2010 editorial, By anybody’s standards.
spending makes good economic sense, as ‘early investment produces the greatest return in human capital’ (Heckman, N.D., p. 3).

5.1.1 Tools of economic imperialism: the ‘promise’ of micro-econometrics

Such interpretation of the data utilised by contemporary econometricians has supported increased intrusion into the family and social community. Heckman’s uses of cross-sectional data, discussed below, suggests that intergenerational poverty cycles can be interrupted, and incarceration figures reduced, as educated individuals better maximise their H&C (e.g. Carneiro & Heckman, 2003; Sundstrom N.D., 2005; Knudsen et al., 2006; Doyle, Harmon, Heckman, & Tremblay, 2009). People, in this argument, should actively seek employment wherever possible. Individuals who prefer to live on welfare are encouraged by state taxation and benefit strategies to aspire to the middle-class norms of tertiary education, mortgaged homes and employment in a contestable marketplace. States can actively manage behaviours of risky populations, such arguments suggest, by targeted tax and welfare measures.

Heckman and his colleagues have developed methods of parameter estimates in a range of contexts which are now considered by the discipline to be empirical, such as information from randomised trials. Heckman examined data – seen by him, and some educational researchers as the empirical ‘gold standard’ of research – collected over 30 years from the Perry/Ypsilanti study (Carneiro & Heckman, 2003; Heckman, 2007; Heckman & Cunha, 2007; Heckman, et al, 2010). In the 1970s David Weikart and his Ypsilanti colleagues, when researching preschooling outcomes, randomly assigned children to either a treatment or a control group (Nores et al., 2005). Quantitative raw data from several American intervention programmes, particularly Weikart’s, have been revisited by researchers interested in preschooling’s economic effects (Duncan et al., 2007a). The Perry/Ypsilanti data, Heckman and

81 Commenting, for instance, on the use of ‘control’ and ‘treatment’ to support findings in investigations, Heckman said that researchers assumed the outcomes for the control group would be as they would have been in the absence of any intervention. When scientific modelling left the laboratory, the control and experimental groups would ensure veracity of data in a social-sciences laboratory.
colleagues argued, can demonstrate the long-term value of educational outcomes for state investments. Improved student performance will over time ensure employment options, which in turn will reduce poverty and crime (Carneiro, Meghir, & Parey, 2007).

Heckman’s writing has assumed a decidedly Malthusian veneer: he utilised large databases containing much information about sections of society and developing countries’ populations. Should society ‘respect the sanctity of the family in regard to certain dysfunctional groups?’, he and his colleagues asked (Carneiro & Heckman, 2003, p. 75). Poor neighbourhoods have contributed to ‘stagnation in schooling participation’ (Carneiro & Heckman, 2003, p. 77), particularly where there are ‘harmful consequences of bad family environments’, teen pregnancies, and sole parents (p. 77). Despite a greater state investment in education in the 1980s, the record among welfare communities with ‘increased intergenerational persistence of income inequality’ continued to be poor (Sundstrom, 2005). Micro-econometricians such as Scharf (2010) and those at the Waterford Institute suggest childcare offers a dual solution to social risk: releasing the mother to become a full-time worker in the economy, whilst supporting her child to build foundational skills (Gormley, 1991; Gormley & Gayer, 2005; Kearney, 2008). Targeted educational investment in preschool children, they argue, can support both mother and child over time to raise their stock of HC (Belfield, Nores, Barnett, & Schweinhart, 2006). If unmarried mothers are in need of state support to improve their HC (Knudsen et al., 2006; Duncan et al., 2007b; Kearney, 2008), perhaps their children would be better with teachers in ECE, it was suggested. The poor dysfunctional mother is increasingly viewed as ‘dangerous’; a risk to herself and to her children. Poverty is constructed in such discourse as a choice, which prudent parents with aspirations for their children can avoid with support from the state to change their ways. ‘Paternalistic interventions into the lives of severely deprived children in disadvantaged environments may be warranted’, Heckman suggests (2000b, p. 22).

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82 Lifetime Effects: The HighScope Perry -Preschool Study through Age 40 (2005) was the title of a recent longitudinal study.
Heckman and colleagues are ambivalent about the role of ‘teachers’. They advocate ‘invest[ing] in the environments of disadvantaged children during the early childhood years’ (Knudsen et al., 2006, abstract). Heckman (2011) addresses environments, but seems uncertain about teachers. ‘Schools and communities recognise good teachers’, he states, ‘in a new right “choice” argument’. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) reject suggestions of lowering the teacher-to-child ratio. They reiterate New Right lexical concepts such as ‘parental sovereignty’ (p. 43) and ‘choice, competition and local incentives’ (p. 43). ‘Teachers matter’, Carneiro and Heckman conclude (p. 66), but need firm management.

So enthralled are many by the promise of early childhood as a social solution that they use religious images, such as the term ‘miracle’ to convey the importance of micro-economic studies. David Kirp, Professor of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, became a publicist of missionary zeal for the new micro-econometric truths in his book *The Sandbox Investment: The Preschool Movement and Kids-First Politics* (Kirp, 2004, 2008, Feb. 25).

Adulatory language, too, is evident in Kirp’s review of a publication by Diane Ravitch (Kirp, 2010). Ravitch herself is quoted describing her change of heart. She was no longer a supporter of the ‘No Child Left Behind’ policies: ‘I too had fallen for the latest panaceas and miracle cures;
I too had drunk deeply of the elixir that promised a quick fix to intractable problems.’ Ravitch here used metaphors drawn from pagan religious imagery to critically describe her earlier captivation by the policy (see also Ravitch, N.D.). The president of the Bank of Minneapolis, Art Rolnick, has also utilised the evangelic lexicon (Grunewald & Rolnick, 2007; Rolnick, 2007), arguing that ‘[o]n both sides of the political aisle there’s an understanding of the latest research on early childhood education’ (Rolnick, 2010, my italics). Authors of a report advocating for increased investment in preschooling describe their attitude to the delivery of state funding as ‘agnostic’ (Duncan et al., 2007b, p. 150), but argue that preschool education contains ‘promises’. At a Minnesota conference on economic interventions, children benefitting from such strategies have been described as ‘Little Miracles’ (Gormley, 2007). In one paper William T. Gormley and colleagues reported on a research cohort of 4-year-old children in Tulsa, Arizona, which gave good cost-benefit results. Heckman, himself, has portrayed childcare as a ‘miracle’ which supports ‘cost-benefit investments by paying long-term dividends’ (Hanford, E., 2010, p. 30). Such investments, George Borjas (2001), maintains, can open the doors to Heaven for migrant populations new to America.

The promise of miraculous ‘powerful forces’, of cost-effective education of mother and child is exhilarating (Rolnick, 2010). As science revealed the possibilities of good early intervention, such investment became positioned as the new ‘truth’. Recently neuro-econometricians have suggested a range of interventions to make the body politic healthier and purer, in a reinvigorated metaphor of the state-as-constitution (see Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. 9). Paul Zak of the Centre for Neuroeconomic Studies has suggested that rewards and punishments, measured as neural activity, can be used to discover why ‘individuals may not want to trade off a given amount of theft for less police protection and lower taxes’ (Zak, 2004, p. 1746). This was a behaviourist interpretation of small-government, individual-responsibility balance.
5.2 Multi-disciplinary data supports early intervention

Malthusian concerns for managing difficult groups of society were beginning to emerge in other scientific sites early in the twenty-first century. According to Jack Shonkoff, dean of the Heller School for Social Policy and Management, Brandeis University, ‘there are some clear areas of agreement between market economists and child development researchers. The time has come to invest in young children and there are substantial gains to be made from these investments if they are made wisely’ (Friedman, D., 2004). Shonkoff, with Heckman and others, wrote *Economic, neurobiological, and behavioral perspectives on building America’s future workforce* which synthesised brain development, child behaviour and economics in a new discourse (Knudsen et al., 2006). Despite some dissenting voices (see e.g. Bruer, 1999, 2006), who caution against the current enthusiasm for quality ECE as a social solution, early economic intervention has become an accepted truth. Heckman’s ideas have been widely publicised by journalists and international agencies such as the World Bank and the OECD (e.g. OECD, 2006, n.d.). Recently instigated studies include an American pilot study called *Nurse-Family Partnership*, which was subsequently introduced to Britain and Europe, and a childhood intervention programme has begun in Ireland (Doyle et al., 2009, p. 5).

It is because the United States has invested more generously in studies of social policy, than other countries, that American data has been presented as the norm (Howell, 2006). In the last two decades of the twentieth century the United States was the source of most data on

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83 Shonhoff & Bales (2011) talk about the process of lobbying politicians to accept child development as a public issue that should be invested in. To overcome the deeply embedded idea that child-rearing is a private matter, the National Scientific Council on the Developing Child and the Frameworks Institute have spent time working on good science communication strategies to ensure their messages are heard.

84 In *From Neurons to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early Childhood Development* (2000), Shonkoff sets out factors that put infants at risk and the impact of these factors on early brain development.

85 Heckman has travelled to South American states and advice on growing the national wealth has been offered to such states. Researchers have used his data-analysing methods to plot these countries’ forecast wealth (e.g. Behrman, Cheng, & Todd, 2004).


87 Research funding in the USA often requires ‘translational’ effects in that it can demonstrate direct social, medical or other outcomes e.g. Shonhoff & Bales, 2011).
the benefits of ECE as a buffer against social deprivation. Indicators in these American studies include long-run data on adult unemployment, welfare benefit and incarceration figures. Heckman has discussed his antipathy to ‘social welfare’ programmes (see Heckman, 2008; Heckman, LaLonde, & Smith, 1999) as high ‘levels of taxation, protection and generosity of benefits erode the dynamism of a society’ (Heckman, 2008, p. 23). Instead there should be rewards for entrepreneurial innovation and creativity, with ‘incentives to seek jobs when economic conditions favor reallocations’ (p. 23).

Heckman and his micro-econometrician colleagues have written into being a contemporary example of biopower. Individuals are, I argue, increasingly required to govern their own lives with the support of the facilitating state-at-a-distance in the ongoing battle against social degeneracy. There is, now, an increasing penetration of economics into the sphere of the social. This is a twenty-first century form of governmentality.

5.3 ‘It takes a village to raise a child’

The recent interweaving of science, sociology, child development, social capital theory and HCT into a new truth of community responsibility has suggested poor neighbourhoods can have adverse effects on the growing child’s brain development (Shonkoff & Miesels, 2000; Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000). Shonkoff and Heckman are now suggesting the value of community relationships in supporting children and their parents to become skilled workers. The social has been rediscovered as a ‘good’ in economics. Capital is now embodied in the nation’s citizens, rather than its soil (see e.g. Barro, 2000; Barro & Lee, 2000; Heckman, 2000b; Khan & Luintel, 2006).

88 Sachs (2006) has refuted Heckman’s thesis that Nordic countries are less dynamic than the US. He states ‘highly ideological claims made against the social welfare states of Scandinavia are simply off the mark’ and may have more to do with the benefits of resource endowments (p. 19). Howell (2006) argues that on performance, Nordic countries outpace the OECD PISA scores in educational comparisons. Employment rates for women with children, he adds, are higher in European welfare models than in Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire markets.

89 Hillary Clinton (1996).

90 Singapore has defined the economic foci of interest as “knowledge” capital, ‘imagination’ capital, ‘emotional’ capital and ‘social’ capital’ as elements for a dynamic growth economy’ (Keeley, OECD, 2007, p. 13ff.).
In a number of Western liberal countries, there is debate about the role of the state in managing risky populations. Disquiet about the role of the state focuses on strategies which seek to ‘inscribe the norms of self-control more deeply into the soul of each citizen’ than all earlier governmentalities (Rose, 2000a, p. 1409). The ‘moral wage’ is the concept that, individuals’ acquisition of ‘soft skills’ like honesty and self-reliance is more valuable to the community than mere money (p. 1406). In the 1990s politicians discussed civic responsibility, shared values, norms and affect-laden relationships in a number of ‘third way’ countries. The waged worker, it was assumed by politicians and policy analysts, will learn strong moral and prudential values from earning a wage. There is therefore both an autonomisation and a responsibilisation of members of the contemporary community (Rose, 2000c, p. 174). In 1991, in the United States, Governor Bill Clinton explained the need to ‘inspire responsibility throughout our society and restore a sense of community to stop the cycle of dependence on welfare’ (Clinton, 1991). Building economic strength was a defining element of America’s national security, he argued. Five years later, as President, Clinton signed off the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, Public Law 104-193, which restricted welfare to alien immigrants, ensured consistency across states in paternity payments for dependent children, and set limits to welfare beneficiaries. In 1997, Tony Blair’s reform of the welfare system, he said, would be a ‘platform of opportunity, not a recipe for dependency’ (Blair, 1995). No longer were people individual economic actors, as his predecessor Margaret Thatcher had constructed them. They were now ‘social beings nurtured in families and communities and human only because we develop the moral power of personal responsibility for ourselves and others’ (Blair 1996, cited in Rose, 2000b, p. 1404).

Rose has noted the flowering of ‘third way’ technologies (2000c, p. 167), including the role of morals in creating a reattachment of individuals to the community. Society needed, in this newly-minted political framework, a sense of belonging, of duty to one’s community (Rose, 2000a, c). This was a moral space, with shared values, norms and affect-laden relationships.

91 Heckman’s (2011) term.
92 A ‘third way’ strategy was the establishment of the Social Care Institute of Excellence, founded in 2000 for the interdisciplinary sharing of information (see OECD, 2007, p. 99).
The role of the state was increasingly that of a facilitator, a partner with not-for-profit and profit groups, in welfare, health care and education (Rose, 2000b, p. 1405). The lexicon of capital has recently shifted its focus from ‘Human’ to ‘Social’ to ‘Ethnic’ in a strategic alliance of forces (Rose, 2000c, pp. 130, 173ff.). 93 ‘Third way’ governments, keen to regain the heartland of their voting public, turned to policies that melded nostalgia for a mythical community, with stringent economic policies based on individual responsibility. The recreation of civic engagement was designed to devolve responsibility and autonomy to communities (Rose, 2000a). Yet the individualism of HCT remained unquestioned.

In New Zealand both major political parties have adopted belief in the potency of the Knowledge Economy to grow wealth (Peters & May, 2004). In 1993 Lockwood Smith, a minister in the National government, stated

This country can look forward to more rapid adoption of new technology; to expansion of output in goods and services ... to improvement in the quality of what we produce. A better system of skills development will help us enhance our international competitiveness. This is a vital step in improving economic performance, providing more jobs at good wages, and hence a better standard of living for everyone (Smith, p. 31, cited in Devine, 2000, p. 208).

Steve Maharey, Minister of Education in the FLG from 2005 to 2008, expressed similar ideas (Maharey, 2006). Policy-makers have demonstrated an uncritical acceptance of this new and seductive concept.

Information and communication technology (ICT) is valued for its abundance rather than scarcity (e.g. Alavi & Leidner, 2001; David & Lopez, 2001; Toft, 2002). The lack of concern related to growing wealth through creation of new knowledge is an

93 This theorem resonated with similarities to Putnam’s Bowling Alone (Putnam, 1995a) and his critique of social isolates in modern America. A solution was to add the neighbourhood, or ethnic capital, to the economic entities of the family, the firm and the nation.

94 http://education.illinois.edu/newlearning/knowledge-society.html
ethico-political act of faith (Peters, 2003, 2004). Those whose skills are dated are encouraged into ‘life-long learning’ programmes which teach computer skills. The ICT space has been viewed as a community by some, where all meet in the social milieu of the international market (OECD, 2001, p. 6). Others dispute this, arguing that it further isolates those on the far side of the digital-divide (Harvey, 2005; Oxley & Thorns, 2007). Women seeking a return to the workforce after child-rearing, children in ECE centres, and new immigrants to the country are all viewed as being in need of ICT skill training to enhance their present or future social capital and thus access to employment (Cachia, Kluzer, Cabrera, Centeno, & Yves, 2007, p. 29).

With the downturn of national economies in the 2008-11 period, some nations are viewing immigrants with a jaundiced eye. The state has two options, according to Zygmunt Bauman (2003, p. 35), who uses a biopolitical analogy: it can absorb them into the body, or vomit them out. Debates about who can enter the country to compete for jobs are a central political issue.95 Immigration concerns are the focus of economists and policy analysts, who map, document, classify, tabulate and interpret patterns and forecast trends. I give two econometric examples in the following section: (1) the issue of migrant skills; and (2) the perception that education adds value to one’s community and thus grows the nation’s wealth.

5.3.1 Ethico-politics: the responsibilisation of ethnic communities

No longer does the United States welcome the tired, the poor, the huddled masses: these populations are instead viewed as ‘dangerous’ and ‘risky’. George Borjas, an immigration econometrician, has researched Hispanic immigrants to America in the late twentieth century

95 Both the 2010 Australian and British elections centred on entry of migrants to the country (Chapman, 2010; Rodgers, 2010). National’s Minister of Immigration Jonathan Coleman is on record as saying immigration supports the GNP to grow (Editorial, 2010). Prime Minister John Key supported Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s advocacy of an immigration port in the Pacific to screen Asian boat-people seeking new opportunities in Australasia. An August 2010 news item reported ‘embedded racism’ in Australia, particularly towards the Aborigines and the refugee population (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2010).
National origin and immigrant skills are so intimately related that any attempt to change one ‘inevitably changes the other’, Borjas suggests (cited in Lowenstein, 2006). Immigration remains a substantial contributor to growth in the low-skilled work-force, he argues, with immigrant communities exhibiting a ‘daunting skill deficit’ (cited in Lowenstein, 2006). Alien populations hold ‘ethnic capital’ equating to the socio-background of the neighbourhood, so group and intergenerational issues in ethnic communities are the result of skill deficit over time (Borjas, 1995a, p. 372). Not only did the skills of new immigrants decline in the 1970s, but their earnings suggested they would be unlikely to catch up with those born in America (Borjas, 1995a, p. 202). When there are low-skilled role models, and community members lack social bridges to the wider society, children do not aspire to higher education or career options. When the 1996 Clinton welfare reforms targeted such ghettos, a large illegal alien population was threatened with withdrawal of benefits and schooling benefits. Although there was an immediate steep decline in immigrant participation in welfare, many immigrants found ways around the policy by, for example, becoming naturalised citizens (Borjas, 2002). Despite being an Hispanic immigrant himself, he is uncritical in his acceptance of the norm of skill-acquisition in econometric discourse.

5.3.2 Neighbourhoods as growing social capital

When President Clinton signed into law Public Law 104-193 in 1996, his wife, in an example of Rose’s ‘Janus-faced logic’, spoke movingly of the community’s responsibility to support children. Hillary Clinton’s ‘feel-good’ tale, which used the African proverb ‘It takes a village to raise a child’, has been adopted by many, including the American conservative right, to urge the community to support parenting in dysfunctional families. Given the historical breaking up of African American families through slavery, this could be interpreted as a cynical ploy. A 1997 White House Conference on Child Development pointed to an enhanced policy interest in the

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96 Borjas was not referring to indigenous First Nations Americans.
state of the nation’s children (White House, 1997); immigrant communities like Borjas’ were its subjects. Enabling and empowering communities were expected to mobilise on behalf of children to prevent youth poverty and incarcerations (e.g. Families and Work Institute, 1996; Newberger, 1997, p. 9). Caring communities, Hillary Clinton suggested, could turn children into future productive workers.

‘Third way’ advocates adopted ‘social capital’, a term first used by John Dewey, then James Coleman, but most influentially by Robert Putnam (Farr, 2004).97 Putnam’s 1995 articles portray individuals as ‘bowling alone’ – a reference to increasingly isolated societies – after a breakdown of traditional supports like church and community (Putnam, 1973, 1995a, b, 1995). Putnam was invited to the White House to meet President Clinton, who made communitarianism a central focus of his political platform. Educated people develop social skills that support them to join groups and maintain friendships, Putman argued; no longer seen as an individual entitlement, education is viewed as a value-added neighbourhood component. Education has become a tangible indicator of community capital. David Kirp has suggested that much of the shift to preschool education has come from neighbourhood pressure to ‘add value’ to the community (Kirp, 2008, Feb. 25). The concept of investing in children to grow their brain development has become a central policy platform as the term social capital has filtered into economic discussion.

In this view, sections of society are unsuccessful because they lack social capital, a term which relies on binaries of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ (e.g. see Parks-Yancy, 2006). When the phrase shifted from sociology to other disciplines, the uses of the term became imprecise and insufficiently theorised (Navarro, 2002; Portes, 2000). Social Capital ignores issues of class, power and politics and assumes competition as unproblematic (Navarro, 2002). It locates control of local governance with the community, removing and absolving the state from any active responsibility. Farr has undertaken an exploratory genealogy of social capital. He views it as being essentially about shared public work, of civic education for the less fortunate, that

97 I argue that Coleman’s and Putnam’s use of the term ‘social capital’ differs epistemologically from Bourdieu’s (see Chapter 9).
depends to a large degree on ‘public sympathy’, ‘cooperation and solidarity’ and trust (Farr, 2004, p. 26).

Recent economic researchers use the terms ‘trust’, ‘community’ and ‘co-operation’ in very performative ways (e.g. Burt, 1997; Fukuyama, 1999; Janssens, 2004). Social capital is created ‘spontaneously’, which, it is assumed, leads players to a cooperative outcome. Entrepreneurial traders meeting in the market have a ‘reputation for honesty and reliability [while market forces support] … bourgeois social virtues like honesty, industriousness, and prudence’, Francis Fukuyama (1999) argues. Not all societies or cultures have strong familial links and family togetherness is not always positive in its outcomes – what is needed instead is trust (Fukuyama, 1995). However, rather than being a collective good, social capital is seen as a private one, a result of input in economic terms (Fukuyama, 2002). For Fukuyama state policy can never build trust, which is a Hayekian argument. Trust can be supported by institutions that have grown out of Roman or common law, but needs to be built at the micro-level of the firm or the village. Social capital, he concluded, is not very different from HC, and relies on education and investments in training (Fukuyama, 2002).

Hedonist views of community, many of which are at best nostalgic and at worst poorly articulated, can be found in a number of economic writings (e.g. Gamarnikow & Green, 1999; Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002; Healy, 2005; Teachman, Paasch, & Carver, 1996; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Economists such as Barro and Glaeser et al. (2002, p. F438) utilise social capital as an aggregate of individuals and as the ‘social component of human capital’ that incorporates both intrinsic abilities and investments. Some reports note the co-relationship of both human and social capital to overall wellbeing as well as to economic growth and promoting happiness (OECD, 2001, p. 4; see also OECD, 2007, 2009). Relationships are created in the context of the family and community; thus state investment in such skills will contribute to both social capital and HC (Stroomberg et al., 2002). With greater community trust, these economists argue, the outcomes of reduced crime and improved health outcomes are possible. Social capital appears, in some cases, to have overtaken the term human capital. Becker agreed

98 F.A. Hayek – see chapters below.
in a 2001 interview that Chris Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal’s recent use of the term social capital was very similar to his concept of HCT (Manville, 2001; see Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). The use of human and social capital interchangeably seems to be a strategy that HCT theorists and international agencies have adopted since the 1980s (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; World Bank, N.D.). It is the poor who ‘need’ community, as the definitions of decaying capital project the negative onto the other (Marginson, 1997, p. 98). In SPECE, the New Zealand government’s plan for enhanced partnership, it is the Māori and Pasifika communities who are charged with the responsibility of growing both the parental and infant skills.  

New bodies of risks continue to be identified in the ‘village’. The Lisbon Council has published a Human Capital Index (Ederer, 2006a, p. 4) which constructs a new reality based on life trajectories and demographics of nations’ populations. With increased migration across countries within the European Union, forecasters project a drop in populations: by 2030 the working-age population may have dropped by 15% (2006a, p. 5). In an echo of Bauman’s (2001) tourist/indigent binary, the Council suggests there is likely to be a migration of skilled professional labour to certain well-paid countries, while other nations are at risk of losing their

99 For example, Atawhai te pa harakeke and Whanau Ora (names of Crown contracts with Māori-based providers).
100 The research was modeled from Eurostat, ILO and OECD statistics, across 13 countries. Each component ‘is measured either in terms of direct expenditures or in terms of opportunity cost’:

1) Parental education is measured in opportunity cost (lost wages) to the parent. This is especially high in the early years before formal schooling but continues until the children leave home. This type of education consists of essential cultural skills like speaking, trust, empathy, languages, taking responsibility, etc.
2) School education ranges from early childcare in formal settings such as kindergarten through Primary and secondary school and consists of general skills such as reading, writing, quantitative reasoning, self-management and basic factual knowledge relevant to the economic participation in society. It is measured in terms of costs expended on teacher wages and educational facilities.
3) Investments in higher education refer to university and other tertiary education that is again measured in terms of input cost. It consists of the acquisition of sector-specific knowledge and skills that enable the student to participate in the discourse and mode of thinking of the chosen career.
4) Adult education is the formal and informal learning by adults and includes activities such as the employer-sponsored management course or the learning of a new software programme on one’s own time. It is measured primarily in opportunity cost of lost wages. Unfortunately, transparency of this kind of human capital investment is much lower than for the categories listed above although a number of empirical studies exist.
5) Finally, adults re-invest in human capital when they perform their work. Every new technology, every new market requires investment into skills that may later produce returns. This type of human capital is also measured in opportunity cost’ (Ederer, 2006a, p. 20)
skill-base. In the contemporary view of biopolitics, a new body of risk has also been identified: the ageing population.\textsuperscript{101} ‘The German, Italian and Spanish mothers who could be giving birth to more children have themselves never been born’ (Ederer, 2006b, p. 21).\textsuperscript{102} Present demographics, in a view not foreseen by Malthus in the days before contraception, are a contemporary concern, because nations are not reproducing themselves. In the 1980s, economists viewed women as choosing when to return to the workforce (Barro & Becker, 1989; Becker & Barro, 1986, 1988). Now, as the baby boomers retire, the working population is not being replaced, Ederer argues, thus presenting a risk to the model of growth. The problem is now constructed as the ‘wrinklies’ putting stress on an already overloaded national health and social security system, while requiring younger workers to carry an increased tax load (Duncan, 2007; Royal Geographic Society with IBG, N.D.; Tetlow, N.D.; Heckman & Masterov, 2006; Heckman & Jacobs, 2009). HCT may be inadequate in world of fewer workers needing to support a top-heavy nation of retirees.

The maternal parent is another risk – seen as the nurturer of the child a century ago, she is increasingly constructed as a ‘danger’ and is the object of state-targeted interventions. Whether the risk is dependency; indolent or hysterical traits; ignorance; imprudent fecundity; or lack of desire to reproduce, the maternal parent is viewed as needing re-education. Earlier views of phlegmatic\textsuperscript{103} women lurk in such constructions. The community, in partnerships with educational and health experts, offers parenting programmes to mediate risks. Behaviour interventions such as the Incredible Years programmes (e.g. Arizona Community Foundation, 2008; Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco, 2007; UK Government, unknown), and research from institutions like the Harvard Centre for the Developing Child (2007,a,b) are viewed as

\textsuperscript{101} Bauman suggests modern society constructs us in a binary of tourist or indigent; it is the latter that is of concern to the state (Bauman, 1998, 2001).


\textsuperscript{103} Brookes (2003) talks about humorous views held by many working class women. Phlegmatic, describes a person’s humour, and is term derived from Aristotelian views of the world – see below.
efficient economic investments delivering proven outcomes (Heckman & Masterov, 2007). Policy suggestions include investments in preschool, home visiting programmes, and intervention in multi-generational programmes (Doyle et al., 2009; Harvard Centre on the Developing Child, 2007a, p. 18). Sure Start, offering in-centre parental support, was one of Tony Blair’s policy platforms (Channel 4 News, 2006, July 6; The Guardian, 2010; Whalley, 2006). In New Zealand the authors of the Otago and Christchurch longitudinal studies are called upon to offer prophylactic solutions to the body politic by mitigating risks to the wellbeing of the population. Interventions in the bodies of young children are increasing with the re-introduction of preschool checks on health and abilities (Silva, 1979; Fergusson, 2003; Fletcher, 2007; MoE, 2006, 2007; Ministry of Health, 2007). Dysfunctional parents are guided, based on aspirational hopes for their children, of re-conceptualising their roles and responsibilities to fit an accepted societal norm.

5.3.3 The ‘war on poverty’: embodying salvation in the child

In 1964 the Head Start programme was one platform of President Lyndon Johnson’s ‘war on poverty’ policy. For a period, this war rumbled below the surface but has recently re-emerged (Dean et al., 1993; Silver & Silver, 1991; The Guardian, 2010). Psychologists, sociologists and educators have been the foot soldiers of the initial onslaught of policies to reduce the risk of poverty in Western countries (Rose, 1990, 1998). The armies of interventionists have swollen in the past few decades: now there is active collaboration between educationalists, neurologists and economists to prevent risk to the body politic (e.g. New Zealand research from the Dunedin longitudinal study as well as Liggins Institute information is used in Heckman’s work (e.g. Heckman, 2008; Poulton, 2008; Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto, & Savelyev, 2010). The focus on the poor in the 1970s and 80s suggested the incorporation of the ‘standard of living of “poorer” persons into the utility function of “richer ones”’ (Becker, 1974, p. 3). The authors of an OECD publication on ECE used the terminology of ‘supply and demand’ for parental employment options, framing education for children in poverty-stricken areas as shifting from ‘the remedial to the preventative’ (OECD, 1977, p. 9). These authors cite publications with titles such as ‘Care of Children of Working Parents’ (1974) and ‘Strategies of Compensation’ (Little & Smith, 1971). The Watson et al. (1981) and Bereiter (1985) research, they continued, showed deficits in language in low socio-economic cohorts of children which could be addressed by early intervention.
Kilburn & Karoly, 2008; Shonkoff, 2010 Shonkoff & Bales, 2011). In some ways this battle continues the ‘war of races’ identified by Foucault, with immigrant families and the poor being viewed as ‘dangerous’ (Foucault, 2003). His inversion of Klaus von Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is politics’ to ‘politics is war’ continues to be relevant in contemporary society. The interests of the bourgeoisie remain central in such societal battles, where the rational scientific voice obscures partisan intents. The use of sociological tenets and terms such as ‘empowerment’, ‘resilience’ and ‘communities of interest’ are increasingly evident in the works of contemporary subaltern advocates, such as educators (e.g. Duncan, Bowden, & Smith, 2005). However, it is the captains of industry, the economists and bankers, together with the scientists, who are leading the charge. Their recommendations support the normalisation of the science of intervention for the good of the child. Their support influences the Polizeiwissenschaft of contemporary Western states, including New Zealand\textsuperscript{106}.

Their target is the child, now constructed as an agent judiciously choosing to avoid poverty. The state can ‘feed the mind’ of such children.\textsuperscript{107} Interventions in the body and brain of the child can alleviate biological determinism, inadequate mothering, and risky homes. When the child is viewed as a predetermined entity, locating problems in the child and/or family justifies the status quo, diverts any criticism of the political, judicial, economic or social conditions (see e.g. Cannella, 1997, 2000). No longer, as at the turn of the twentieth century, is the problem of the present the maternal body; the focus of expertise is now on the neurons and synapses of the developing child.

The focus of the twenty-first-century state is on the soul of the child as the site of interventions to create future resilient, compliant, skilled workers able to grow the nation’s wealth. The child is an object of governmental scrutiny because the ‘science’ of ECE demonstrates that ‘[l]earning abilities, emotional and social skills develop together (Shonkoff, 2010). Education now joins other disciplines in building the ‘psychologics’ of the child (Rose, 1998, p. 190); in this discourse, the child is constructed as ‘saviour’ of both the state, her

\textsuperscript{106} Polizeiwissenschaft: the science of police/ internal order. Foucault used it as a descriptor of governmentality studies.

\textsuperscript{107} Feed the Mind was a MoE-focused parental encouragement of their children’s literacy and numeracy skills.
community and her ‘dysfunctional family’ (Rose, 1996; for alternative constructions see Cannella 1997; Dahlberg et al., 1999; Dahlberg & Moss, 2005).
6 Ethics of care – ‘just’ rights

This chapter first sets out discussions on normative expectations, changing norms, and constructions of the societal ‘other’ in Western biopolitical discourses. I offer a genealogy of sites of struggles against political and economic norms. In dealing with the discourse of ‘rights’, intertwined with the economic discipline, I suggest they are indicators of sites of biopolitical contestation; often of ‘race’. Later in the chapter, I suggest that the ancient world ordered its systems differently from the modern, which links to self-responsibility-wealth. The social contract models of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke replaced the triadic God-Sovereign-Subject, mediaeval moral order, with a modern understanding of State-Citizen rights. Likewise, the mediaeval market had supported a ‘just’ price rather than the later ideas of a ‘good’ price. The seventeenth century mercantile concept of enhancing sovereign wealth through external trade, was in turn replaced by the ideas of eighteenth century political œconomy. Political œconomy support of both internal and external trade, however, promoted both individual and national growth; ideas which underpin contemporary economic understandings.

Governance in contemporary Western society puts large emphases on the norm as a behavioural and economic regulation of the citizen. Norms are the often unspoken rules that govern populations’ conduct on a day-to-day basis. Yet today’s fundamental assumptions about humankind have not been the accepted views of all societies through history. As the discipline of economics emerged, a number of ideas, previously seen as disconnected, have become accepted in the contemporary order of the science. The norm has differed over cultures, societies, and periods. This chapter presents a discussion of normative expectations as a measure in economics. I argue that norms have been an integral part of economic measures, with some sections of society (those who are viewed as risky deviants) always represented as diverging from the expected norm. Normative expectations assume that all citizens will aspire to meet a societal model, which is accepted as a ‘natural’ aspect of humanity. These expectations are about what each individual feels he or she ‘ought to do’. Examples of such normative expectations are the assumptions that all women want to be

108 Foucault, (2008, p.61) named them as a ‘superrace and a subrace’ split from a single race.
mothers and that all parents are altruistic and have hedonistic aspirations for their children. At the centre of twentieth and twenty-first-century state concerns are issues of economic egalitarianism. Economists and policy-makers try to answer the following question: if all do not start life with equal genetic potential and talents, how best to motivate people to improve, to bring them up to the norm?

Gary Becker of the Chicago School of Economics suggested that it would be fine if ‘theorems about human behaviour ... were the same for all persons’, however, observation in the real world, he believed, supported the concept of ‘natural selection’ (Becker, 1981, p. 322). Some groups, he believed, are ‘fitter’ than others. In contemporary economics there is the assumption that the skills and abilities of the population can be represented graphically as a concave parabola, clustering around a statistical norm at the peak (e.g. Becker & Murphy, 1988). Economic policy seeks to address the ‘tail’ of this representation – the population that is represented as problematic (Becker, 1992, p. 52). Micro-economists have investigated the benefits of compensatory education for this group (e.g. Becker & Tomes, 1986). In economic models, there is the assumption of the rational choice-making ‘average individual’,109 which shows the ‘representative person as if he lives forever’ (Becker, 1991, p. 177, emphasis added). As Becker moved to investigate the family, including women’s fecundity, and time spent in child-rearing away from direct employment, there proved to be difficulties with this assumption. Societal norms could be a central part of economic theory, and should take account of such intangibles within families as guilt and selfishness (1988, p. 10). One intangible, to which Becker sought solutions, was how women’s behaviour involving ‘marriage and the spacing of births’ could be factored into economic forecasts (Becker, 1981, 1991, p. 178). However it was not just the behaviour within the home, but other intangibles as well that HC theorists needed to solve. As social inequalities across regions and countries arise from intangibles (Schultz, 1974; Becker, Philipson, & Soares, 2003), the discipline of economics, Becker and Cheswick asserted, still ‘desperately need[ed] a reliable theory of the distribution of income’ (Becker and Cheswick 1969, p. 369). Although difficult, if identified these would,

109 Heckman locates an initial use of this term in 1890 by Alfred Marshall, who took the idea from ‘a Belgian statistician, Adolphe Quetelet, who in 1850 formalized the idea of the “average” man’ (Clement, 2005).
Becker believed, offer ‘rich ... implications’ for solving economic problems (Becker, 1975, p. 236). Some later micro-economists criticised the use of the standard representative norm in an increasingly heterogeneous population (e.g. Heckman, 2000; True, 2005, p. 18). It appears, however, that normative measures have been present as a central element in political economy since its emergence in the eighteenth century, and that they have always been contested. Below I discuss normative expectations, and set out the changing views of the ‘other’ over time.

Early twentieth century economics was torn by tensions between ideas of the ‘general good’ and the ‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’ (Peart & Levy, 2005). Peart and Levy suggest that there was a shift in the representations of normative evaluations at the turn of the twentieth century. ‘Fitness’, in Darwin’s use of the term, was no longer a descriptor but a normative judgement. It signalled biological perfection, rather than happiness, as a measure, with an element of sacrifice in the present to achieve better stock in the future. Ideas on racial betterment became entangled in utilitarian thought on social welfare, Peart and Levy argue (p. 868). Lionel Robbins, for example, did not believe that all were created equally, but found ‘political calculations that did not treat them [so] morally revolting’ (1938, p. 635, cited in Peart & Levy, 2005, p.851). Economists in the twenty-first century have not resolved tensions arising from normative evaluations. James Heckman believes that markets ‘do useful things, but they do not solve the problem of race’ (Clement, 2005, p. 3). He may well have said the same about class, gender or age.¹¹⁰ Struggle is implicit in the genealogy of rights, and appears in a number of writings where liberty, freedom and the consideration of others are discussed (e.g. Paine, 1792; Wollstonecraft, 1792; Godwin, 1798; Marshall & Harrison, 1963).¹¹¹ Economists avoid politico-historic-contexts: Carl Menger argued against such constructs in the writings of Gustav

¹¹⁰ In fact, as with the resistance to historicism amongst neoliberal economists, so there is a resistance to a sociological understanding of diversity. Much difference in HCT is reduced to a skill- or environmental base in writings such as Heckman (2008). Heckman (2011, p.2), in a letter to the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Reform said “The term “equity” has two different meanings. From a social science point of view, equity is providing equal opportunities for success—a playing field that is as level as possible to create greater achievement among people from all walks of life. In economics, achieving equity is to build lasting value that builds upon itself. My work has shown that proper investment in people builds stronger equity on all fronts.”

¹¹¹ Ferguson, Steuart, Smith, Malthus and Say all compared ‘civilised’ Europeans with savages as oppositional images.
Schmoller’s German School, while Friedrich Hayek and others at the Mont Pèlerin Society published tracts on the poverty of historicism. Economic writers on rights like Francis Fukuyama, Heckman, Becker and Kevin Murphy believe that the ‘primacy of the West’ was the result of ‘a “lucky” timing of technological and political changes’ (Becker, Murphy, & Wernin, 2005, p. 345). Such positions ignore or deny the historical violence sustaining the acquisition of resources from the colonies of Western powers (see Fukuyama, 1992).

By caring for ourselves, we were also drawn into caring for the ‘other’. Foucault set out three axes: people as subjects of knowledge; as an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to ourselves as subjects acting on others; and as an historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents’ (1994f, p 262).

Ethics had been constructed in the nineteenth century as focused on issues of population; the fecundity of the ‘other’ and the general health of the body politic (1994f, p.255). Nation states continue to manage, identify, and then minimise ever-present threats within the body politic; to control populations, to discipline those who do not fit societal norms. The focus of state discipline is on risky bodies – ‘the population one wishes to regularize’ (Foucault, 2004b, p. 253). The notion of ‘race’ permanently and ceaselessly permeates the social body and is constantly being created, as one element of a binary, within it (p. 61). Rights, Foucault asserted, arose initially in battles around sovereign power; the asserting of juridical limits to royal power (2008, p. 8). They remained in the contract between the sovereign and his subjects as the natural rights of man. The perpetual problematic is ‘what rights can be recognised’ (p. 21, fn.4a).

112 The Mont Pèlerin Society is discussed in chapter below.
6.1 Herkunft: a genealogy of economic struggles

A Foucauldian genealogy of rights can be sought in sites of conquest and bloodshed: one must search not for origins, but for connections. Nietzsche, in his *Genealogy of Morals* (1887), had noted the struggles between the Church of Rome and the Jews: ‘the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of prey’, the ‘privileged rights of the majority’ against the rights ‘of the very few’ (Nietzsche, 1887, sect. 16, original emphasis). The conquered, through manipulating the conquerors’ feelings of guilt (*ressentiment*) and moral concepts, attempt to control them. With concepts of conscience and duty, guilt remains in our social contracts where ‘blood, tortures and sacrifices’ are linked to memory (Nietzsche, 1887/2003, pp. 37, 40). The rights discourse questions the comfort of a safe present, of our identity-history. It blocks creativity in favour of fidelity (Foucault, 1984, p. 160). Rights both constitute and are constitutive of the modern individual; of the history of the individual or collective, rather than the story of sovereign might.

The debate on rights is always relational, tied endlessly to the norm, and debated by the ‘other’. Those seeking rights do not wish to become the Lord, some suggest (e.g. Chueh, 2005a,b), but to ease the burden of the collective bondsmen, to seek a more hedonistic future. However, Zygmunt Bauman suggests that modernity has created a tension as Western society searches for ever more freedom. If there is a ‘fundamental dialectic of modern society’ it is where freedom is developed at the price of constant estrangement from one’s neighbours (Bauman 1988, p. 41, cited in Rose, 2000c, p. 66). We now trade freedom for security, argues Bauman, despite ‘community’ being presented as a hoped-for ‘paradise’, a warm, cosy place (2001, p. 3). We are confined by community, with the ‘erection of closely guarded boundary checkpoints’, where the ‘other’ is excluded (p. 76). Individuals look inwards, avoiding any contact with the ‘other’. We attempt to avoid, eject or absorb the ‘other’ into our community. Humans define their identity in relation to those who are ‘other’. For instance, Māori define themselves as ‘normal’, which is the literal meaning of the term, and others as Tauiwi or ‘outsiders’.

Any genealogy of economic rights focuses on struggles within the nation state. Sites of ‘conquest and bloodshed’ are intertwined with the emergence of the modern nation. The use
of ‘raison d’État’ during the sixteenth century in France (Foucault, 2008, p. 4) drew criticism from the nobility about the growing power of the monarchy, with its increased financial demands (Macfarlane, 2000). Members of the ‘parlements, protestants, and the nobility’ used historical-juridical institutions to get their way (Foucault, 2008, p. 9). Denis Meuret suggested the state aimed for a domestication of commerce when it abandoned its alliance with the nobility, whose commercial interests threatened to undermine its power (1988, p. 235). Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, suggested the sovereign should introduce only ‘gradual regulations … but no confiscations, no agrarian laws, no expunging of debts’ (Montesquieu, 1914). His *The Spirit of the Law* was about eighteenth-century struggles over taxation – struggles by the nobles to break the power of the monarch and to create spaces for freedom.

Struggles around individual rights in Britain can be traced back to challenges to the monarchy in the eighteenth century. There were a range of challenges over the next two centuries; to the state and to the concept of property and civil rights. Thomas Paine, writing in the context of the French and American revolutions, suggested that no generation can determine the good of any later one. Writing on the American Declaration of Rights, he argued that government, instead of ‘consolidating society … divided it’ (Paine, 1792). William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft disputed male property ownership of women, children, servants and slaves (Wollstonecraft, 1792; Godwin, 1842). A century later, J. S. Mill won a parliamentary seat campaigning against the view that the ‘wife is the actual bond-servant of her husband, and any children, are the legal property of her husband’ (Mill, J. S., 1869). Women’s struggles against being viewed as dependants continued into the twentieth century. Blood continues to be spilt over ‘natalist’ policies (Foucault, 1997, p. 243) such as the uses of the woman’s body and rights of the unborn child. Such rights were all individual. Collective rights, together with individual rights are of interest to Māori in this country and other indigenous peoples (e.g. Mataatua, 1993).

From the fifteenth century to the twentieth, indigenous peoples had suffered at the hands of European colonisers. There were mounting calls in the twentieth century for
restitution or acknowledgement of indigenous rights, including collective property rights. From the 1970s Māori were able to take claims to a judicial hearing by the Waitangi Tribunal which was able to make non-binding recommendations. New Zealand became a signatory to the Declaration of Indigenous Peoples in 2010 (United Nations, 2007). Struggles continue, as seen in Te Mana o Te Tamaiti Maori: A Draft Charter of the Rights of the Maori Child and children’s rights centres (Te Kōmako, 2002; Biddulph, 2004).

There are now a number of competing and contradictory discourses on rights in contemporary society. Race struggles were always present in the classroom, as in the nation. Ludwig von Mises wrote the ‘national struggle is not at all limited to schools and educational institutions ... It embraces all of political life’ (1983, p. 82). Civil rights have been at the forefront of educational disparity debates for much of the past century (e.g. Bishop, 2005; Heckman, 2011). In America, the 1966 Coleman Report examined the issue of educational rights for minorities, especially blacks, while Herrnstein and Murray’s psychometric research concluded that skills were part of genetic inheritances (Heckman, 1995). Herrnstein and Murray’s The Bell Curve (1994) demonstrated risks of the statistical tail of disadvantage to national wellbeing. Binet’s and Gesell’s tests, which rendered the intellect manageable, were an answer to the problem of ‘un-educable’ children in an era of compulsory schooling (Rose, 1990, p. 137). There were debates about curricula content – in New Zealand the authors of Government Management (GM) (NZ Treasury, 1987) asked if it would be fair to compel everyone to learn Te Reo as ‘rights ... available to all New Zealanders ... include freedom from racial or cultural discrimination’ (p. 224 emphasis in original). Rights were to become explicit in a number of educational documents, for example, in the ECE curriculum (e.g. Ministry of Education, 1996, pp. 55, 64). Some have described access to ECE as a ‘right’ (e.g. May, 2005; Noonan, 2010; Te One, 2005). Rights are at base struggles for recognition, for restitution; they are searches for entitlements to property and resources.

ETBM (1988a, p.7) included a section on rights: both those under the Treaty of Waitangi and rights of the child. In October 2010 the Waitangi Tribunal released a pre-publication report on the status of Te Reo Māori (Tribunal, 2010), citing the Crown’s failure to protect Te Reo, particularly over the past few decades.
6.1.1 Interstices of ‘race’ and policy

The language of war and struggle is a central aspect of ‘rights’, with war being framed as rescue. The narrative where the hero fights the brutish villain has lexical roots in mediaeval feudal society (Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006). Military metaphors are evident in the terms ‘provider capture’ in GM\textsuperscript{115} and ‘targeted populations’ in SPECE. The term ‘strategic’ is itself of military origin, and has slipped into the field of education management (see Whipp, 1996; Stuart, 2009). Struggles, for example of ‘rights to recognition’, provide a ‘setting of ever new battlefronts, and a drawing and redrawing of dividing lines along which ever new conflicts will be waged’ (Bauman, 2001, p. 75). Rights are a part of an assimilatory technique – a direct outcome of a ‘liquid’ society needing to maintain a veneer of peace by integrating difference (Bauman, 2003, p. 35). The discourse of ‘rights’ in the contemporary Western world has replaced the concept of social justice (Bauman, 2001, p. 74). With rights comes individual responsibility to avoid the risk of poverty and dependency on state welfare.

War is a struggle of one group against another with no neutral position. Modern racism, Foucault suggested, has replaced the historical theme of war with that of biological struggle. He talks of the specific function of the ‘double-twin’ binary, suggesting that instead of seeking origins, we ‘speak of rights, to speak of power’s right’ (2004b, p. 116). Rights were made possible by the organisation of the judicial code in ways that concealed purposes ‘heavily ballasted by the mechanism of disciplinary coercion’ (p. 37). The social body is at base articulated by two races: the “them” and the “us”, who exist in an organic whole, but who struggle for balance. There is a ‘physiological’ reason underlying discourses on the state’s ‘constitution’. The body seeks equilibrium; seeks to deal with internal organisms that pose risks to the body politic. Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is merely a continuation of politics’ – ‘politics being a continuation of war’ – underpins his analysis of

\textsuperscript{115} The challenge in the early childhood field is to develop the diversity of arrangements that exist, so as to ensure greater equity in access, process and outcome and to ensure that the system remains focused on the needs of parents and children and is reasonably resistant to provider capture and centripetal tendencies. The Kōhanga Reo movement demonstrates what can be done’ (NZ Treasury, 1987, p. 137).
biopower in policy (Foucault, 2004b p. 21, fn 9). When investigating a genealogy of rights it is ‘a question of finding the blood which has dried on the legal codes’ (Elden, 2002, p. 43). The ‘other’, whose blood has dried, differs over time, but remains like a ‘double outline or a twin’ (Foucault, 1997, 2004, p. 116). The ‘other’ has been identified differently by dominant discourses as the Gaul, the Frank, the Jew, the Irish, the poor white, or the immigrant. In New Zealand the ‘other’ is usually Māori or Pasifika.¹¹６ The historic-biological struggles are cast in evolutionary and developmental terms, where the ab-normal can work on their capabilities and ‘improve’ (e.g. Heckman, 1999, 2011; David & Lopez, 2001, p. 18; Heckman & Masterov, 2004). Central to the concept of economic policy is a desire to manage the ‘other’; to motivate them to aspire to the norm as ideal. Much HCT is concerned with the subject of developing the skills of the ‘other’ (e.g. Mincer, 1962, 1964; Barro, 1991; Becker & Rayo, 2007; Heckman, 1999, 2007, 2011).

Foucault (2004b) defines biopolitical struggle in terms of physical vigour, force and energy where one race is compared unfavourably, the strong being contrasted with the weakness of the other, the ‘subrace’ (p.61). Such a struggle goes on beneath a veneer of peace and order. There are numerous examples of blood saturating the juridical codes in New Zealand. In one example, after bloody land wars, Native Land Courts changed confiscated land formerly owned collectively by Māori into individual property title in the 1880s (e.g. Ward, 1997; Binney, 2009).¹¹７ The descendants of early settlers continue to struggle with issues of indigenous rights, with debate about access to the coastal foreshore, or, as set out in the Waitangi Tribunal’s (2010) ruling Wai262, on the use of Te Reo in state-funded education institutions.

When a hierarchy of race enters the marketplace, the binary of ‘other’ is intertwined in its norm (Marginson, 1997, p. 98). In many HCT writings workers with the skill-deficit come from lower-socioeconomic groups (e.g. Heckman, 2007, 2010), or are blacks (e.g. Schultz, 1961, ¹¹６ Foucault’s example is of the Franks, descended from the Trojans, and whose story elides with imperial Rome; Rome remains in a displaced form.
¹¹７ Nineteenth-century law included the New Zealand Land Settlements Act 1863, where land was confiscated for ‘rebellion’; and two decades later, the Rebellious Natives Act, whereby Taranaki peoples were transported and held without trial (Boast, 2009; Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).
The norm of the productive worker is central to neoliberal economics. Yet a pathologised ‘other’ lies within such discourse, for example views that certain groups lack appropriate work attributes and are therefore a cost to the employer. The psychologist is co-opted into changing workers’ behaviour as management, in this argument, needs to monitor these groups for compliance to expected norms (e.g. Fallon, Woods, & Rooney, 2010). In a biopower perspective, threats to the firm, society or to the body politic are risks requiring ongoing vigilance.

‘Natives’ of the new European colonies appeared as such a displaced twin in eighteenth-century economic writings. Frances Hutcheson thought an English workman’s poor life expectancy was preferable to living ‘ninety years as a Hottentot’ (Hutcheson, 1750). Adam Ferguson suggested a ‘never-ending generation of history without degeneration’; of stages of progressive civil development (Foucault, 2008 p. 306). When the ‘Europeans first landed on the shores of … America’, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, they were inhabited by ‘wandering tribes’ (1835, summary, ch. 1). These had been ‘placed by Providence amidst the riches of the New World to enjoy them for a season, and then surrender them’, to be ‘consigned to … inevitable destruction’ (1835).118 In all utopias, including Crusoe’s island, there is a risk lurking, needing to be tamed.119

Members of the Austrian School120 demonstrated anxieties about liberal ideas of equal treatment for all. Schooling, von Mises believed, should be limited to the basics (1949, p. 876). In Human Action he stated, ‘[t]here prevails today the tendency … to deny the existence of inborn inequalities in intellect, will power, and character … Innovators and creative geniuses cannot be reared in schools’ (p. 314). With his theory of ‘polylogics’, von Mises denied that “nature” ha[d] bestowed upon every man certain rights’ (von Mises, 1996, p. 84). Asiatics and Africans chose not to adopt Western ‘ideologies … which would have made the evolution of autochthonous capitalism possible’ (von Mises, 1954, pt. IV). Hayek was more circumspect in

118 He noted the land was ‘not devoid of inhabitants’ – a contrast to the concept of terra nullius utilised in New Zealand’s colonisation discourse.
119 Daniel Defoe is often cited as a writer whose assumptions of norms exemplify eighteenth-century mercantile viewpoints on gender, class and their place in trade (Sherman, 1995; Smidgen, 2001; Latta, 2002). Friday, the compliant savage, is an oppositional counterpart to acting European man Crusoe (Flint, 1998). Robinson Crusoe was one of the early books translated into Māori by Rev. Kemp in the 1850s (Rogers, 1998).
120 The Austrian School included Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises and F.A.Hayek. See chapters below
his attitudes, avoiding the issue of individual ignorance. Instead he argued that collective habits of institutions moved civilisation forward to a higher plane (Hayek, 1953). Like Robert Malthus, von Mises and Hayek rejected any structural causes of poverty, seeing it solely as individual responsibility. There was no requirement for a ‘just’ outcome from trading on the market; it was human action that was unfair. Social justice was a ‘mirage’ (Craver et al., 1983, p. 218).

Becker felt that the ‘trouble with the Malthusian approach is not its use of economics per se, but an economics inappropriate for modern life’ (Becker, 1992, p. 47). He, like Malthus and the Austrian School, believed that government intervention clouded the workings of the marketplace. Chicago School economists constructed hierarchies from animal to human; black to white; female to male; college drop-out to graduate; child to adult. These entered economics with nineteenth-century hedonic measures for a cardinal ranking of populations (Peart & Levy, 2005). Jacob Mincer compared black women’s earnings to norms of the comfortable white wife able to choose to ‘work … after the children have grown’ (Mincer, 1962, p. 76). Edward Denison argued against reverse discrimination and taxes to support the under-privileged (Denison, 1972). A central focus of econometrics theory concerns welfare measures as supply-side which supports dependent behaviours (Lucas, 1990; de Goede, 1996). In the 1960s and 70s Carl Bereiter, Sigfried Engleman, James Coleman, Alan Little and George Smith were researching compensatory education for poor black populations (Coleman, 1966; Little & Smith, 1971). Many recent theorists cite proven improvements demonstrated by the HighScope/Ypsilanti research (e.g. Heckman, 1999, 1973, 1974; Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2003; Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, & Shonkoff, 2006; Heckman et al., 2011). The homes of the poor are contrasted with those conforming to middle-class norms (e.g. Clement, 2005). Such ontological attitudes, when they underpin state policy, are ‘dangerous’ in the Foucauldian sense.

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121 Twentieth century theory has overtaken the Malthusian model, Becker et al. claimed. Bigger and more important urban areas supported the specialisation of skills and increased investment in knowledge. HC in cities is raised, they argue (Becker, Glaeser, & Murphy, 1999).
Education as a ‘right’ can be viewed as conflictual. Here, Suzanne Maurer (2007) offers a collective alternative to a ‘them/us’ dichotomy. Unlike the neoliberal theorists, she embraces historical memories from plural perspectives. Are, she asks, ‘processes of remembrance (which also includes counter remembrance) a productive way to develop an analytical perspective?’ (p. 132). She draws on Foucault’s concepts of ‘struggles about the past’ to argue a fluidity, a move from a petrified historical monument to insights of ‘social work as society’s memories of social conflicts’ (p. 134). Maurer makes historically specific references to post-World War II Germany, and one can infer from her work that local memories may support local solutions. In Becker’s model, the ‘other’ family is not seen as having any historical handicap, and is expected to accrue capital like the normative family. HC theorists have universalised the rational individual, with little accounting for black slavery, or illegal migration across borders (see e.g. Birzer & Ellis, 2006). All entrepreneurs operate on an equal ‘playing field’ in HCT. In New Zealand, where violence has also resulted in loss of language, spiritual links to land and mana, the Maurer model of historical memories may have relevance for the discipline of education.

6.1.2 Philanthropy: care for the ‘other’?

In this section I examine first the descent of Aristotelian sciences, then the emergence of Newtonian mathematics, and thirdly the general nineteenth-century acceptance of evolutionary improvement. The latter two topics have epistemological relevance to contemporary HCT. Aristotelian science had influenced thought in the Western world for much of mediaeval and early modern times. An archaeological shift, concerning accepted ‘truths’,

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122 At the Koroneihana, Ngaruawahia, August 19, 2011, Tukuroirangi Morgan, speaking on behalf of the Iwi Leaders Forum, challenged Prime Minister John Key to set up a Cabinet post with responsibility for protecting Te Reo Māori. The Kōhanga Reo (language nests) were not merely ECE centres, he stated, but places charged with retaining and protecting the Māori language.

123 Maurer is interested in the ‘political potential of historical (re)construction in relation to social work’ (2007, p.132). She defines aspects of memory that can support the political and self-critical dimension of her discipline. These are, firstly, collective memory and processes of remembrance; secondly cultural memory and processes of trans-generational cultural transmission; thirdly places of memory which can represent collective experience in a national context; and lastly social memory. They are ‘different kinds and practices of remembering in a social, every-day context’ (p. 133).

124 There was a general mediaeval acceptance of ideas attributed to Aristotle. These included concepts of the body being composed of humours; and the universe of elements, including several with magical virtues.
occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which gave us the ordering of the modern world (Foucault, 1970). The order of the mediaeval world had come under challenge with discovery of new lands, trading routes, as well as challenges to the accepted concepts of creation offered with the discovery of prehistoric fossils.\(^{125}\) These notions of the place of humankind in the accepted hierarchy of mankind, sovereign, deity were conflictual. Yet many Aristotelian ideas continued to co-exist, for a time, alongside the new ‘sciences’. Bryan Robinson’s ‘chymical’ theories of respiration in his 1734 *A Treatise of the Animal Oeconomy* (Brown, 1987) and Isaac Newton’s attention to careful demonstration in his scientific works remained interwoven with magical concepts (Thorndike, 1953, p. 704).\(^{126}\)

It was the shift in the understanding of the concept of science that supported the emergence of political œconomy. Some of the earlier political œconomic writings were a conscious reaction against earlier constructs. Many of the earlier concepts remain as traces in contemporary economic theory; they are always present, yet effaced (Derrida, 1973). Sometimes terms drawn from an earlier lexicon are used to disparage another’s work: for example John Maynard Keynes used the alchemic terms ‘black magic’ and ‘statistical alchemy’ in disparaging Jan Tinbergen’s *On the Theory of Income Distribution* (Hendry, 1993; 2003, p. 14; Keynes, 1938).\(^{127}\)

In the mediaeval view of the world each person was to perform a role in society and show fraternal care for their less fortunate brothers. Poverty, however, was seen as the responsibility of the individual. The poor had played an essential social role in mediaeval states – they had cleaned sewers, collected rubbish, and redistributed or resold materials (Foucault, 1974, p. 152). In the eighteenth century, however, the well-to-do no longer gave alms as a moral duty. The ‘just price’ was a concept in the mediaeval market but with the emergence of

\(^{125}\) The discovery of fossils challenged the accepted ideas of divine creation over six days and the planet earth being 6,000 years old (e.g. Thorndike, 1953, p.700).

\(^{126}\) Recent research into Newton’s papers shows a strong influence of alchemy on his work (e.g. Thorndike, 1927, 1953).

\(^{127}\) Tinbergen’s work was on econometric models. In his Nobel Prize (1969) acceptance speech he said: ‘If I am allowed to quote a recent example I am guilty of myself, the same can be said of models introducing the difference between tradables and non-tradables.’

123
mercantile trading interests in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nations began to seek
the ‘natural price’.

The ordering of the mediaeval world had utilised three pairs of concepts – ‘function and
\textit{norm, conflict} and \textit{rule, signification} and \textit{system}’ (Foucault, 1970, p. 169, emphasis added). There was a change in emphasis in early modern times, Foucault argued, onto the second part
of each constituent pair. Shifts in epistemological thinking included re-evaluations of the view
of a static world; and the understandings of God-given sciences, together with an ontological
repositioning of humankind.\footnote{Foucault (2005) suggests, a ‘great mutation’ in Western thought, when mankind began to assess possible future risks. Concepts of care of the self and forward-looking assessments of possible risks are central to the rational economic entrepreneur who needs to manage transactions to enhance their competitive position in the employment market. Looking to the future, a central economic premise, is neither ‘natural’ nor ‘human’ as other cultures, for instance Māori, have the concept of looking \textit{backwards} to assess risk.} The ideas of the Aristotelian sciences, Newtonian mathematics
and evolutionary improvement are of importance to this thesis as many of these earlier
concepts can be found in writings of the Physiocrats,\footnote{The Physiocrats were a seventeenth century movement, who believed that productive work, working the land, produced wealth} Adam Ferguson and James Steuart. The
writings of Adam Smith, Robert Malthus and others in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
consciously rejected Aristotelian ideas in favour of Newtonian sciences. The following
paragraphs prepare for a discussion of these writings by discussing aspects of mediaeval and
early modern thought.

Aristotle had described science as being divided into elements of moral philosophy,
metaphysics and natural philosophy (Whitney, 2004, pp. 2, 7). There were four base elements
of the terrestrial world: earth, air, fire and water. Elements of the earth, it was believed, could
be transformed by alchemists, who claimed they could turn base metals into gold through a
process of transmutation. There was an associated doctrine about well-balanced physical
bodies containing four humours – black bile, blood, phlegm and yellow bile – in the right
concentrations. Each individual had a dominant humour, which accounted for his or her
temperament: sanguine, phlegmatic, melancholic or choleric. The organic human body
paralleled the terrestrial world. Elements of ideas of society as organic, with the circulation of

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specie\textsuperscript{130} supporting equilibrium, can be found in the political œconomy writings of the Physiocrats, Ferguson and Steuart.

The shift from hierarchical assemblages of oppositional spaces – supercelestial, celestial and terrestrial – was replaced by a problematic of living spaces that were opened up by Galilean science. Many of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century political œconomists wrote using the new scientific language. Smith, for instance, used Newtonian constructs in his \textit{History of Astronomy} (Hetherington, 1983),\textsuperscript{131} while Malthus consciously used the term ‘oscillation’.\textsuperscript{132} Truth could now be sought on the earth; not only in the heavens (Malthus, 2004, 1976, pp. 112–117). Knowledge about the human body, for example the discovery of the circulation of blood, confirmed faith in human rationality and mankind’s ability to know things that had previously been hidden.

As the healthy body needed equilibrium, so the organic state was at risk of epidemics sapping the population’s strength. Bodies of population, discrete groups within the state, such as lepers, were risks analogous to cancers, requiring constitutional antidotes. Increased knowledge of its population, for example, the visual counting of plague-survivors, gave the state greater certainty and control (Foucault, 1995). It was at such sites that Foucault suggests the concept of biopolitics emerged, together with new understandings of governing the commonweal (Foucault, 2008, p. 16). It was not merely the risk of epidemics that needed ameliorating, but the day-to-day issues of illness, accident, morbidity and degeneracy. The poor in the modern world no longer had the certainty that their needs would be taken care of by their more fortunate brothers and sisters. In the eighteenth century some thought that the very presence of the poor was analogous to pathology in the civil body.

Under Elizabeth I, many traditional sites of welfare support for the poor disappeared, as Catholic alms-collecting monasteries had been dissolved under Henry VIII. With the 1601 Poor Law the poor were categorised as deserving or undeserving, based largely on a moral

\textsuperscript{130} Coinage: gold and silver, a term for metallic money.

\textsuperscript{131} Yet Dobbs (1982) suggests strong alchemic elements remained throughout Newton’s work.

\textsuperscript{132} A Term used by Condorcet to mean swinging back and forth, as a pendulum might.
understanding of their plight and whether they were capable of working. The poor were confined in the workhouse in the parish of their birth, with the parish being levied for their keep (Albrecht, 1969). Labourers lost the right to graze a cow on the commons land – to be self-sufficient (Hazlitt, 1807). Over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the population increased, which caused no problems as long as grain was available. However, this changed during the Napoleonic Wars (1793–1803) when food became scarce and the usual solution of importing grain as needed was not possible. This was viewed as a threat to mercantile interests, so Parliament introduced an import-prohibition on French grain to protect the state’s wealth and to prevent specie being exported (Malthus, 1973, ii, p. 108ff.). During the bad harvests of 1794, 1795 and 1800, the government tried unsuccessfully to use only home-grown grain. There were largely unsuccessful political attempts to deal with resulting social and political unrest – the 1795 Pitt government set minimum wages while Speenhamland\textsuperscript{133} magistrates tied labourers’ wages to the price of wheat. There was a very real fear of the poor at this time, with bands of vagrants including discharged soldiers roaming Britain. A new societal view of the poor as a risk to be managed, to be kept docile – an example of modern biopower – was emerging. However, a new understanding of mankind’s relationship to the nation was needed, of who was able to govern the civil body. A new political rationality of managing both wealth and risk was required.

\textsuperscript{133} A parish in Berkshire, England, the name of which became synonymous with the Poor Law rules instituted there.
6.1.3 Rights and responsibilities: English social contracts

Thomas Hobbes and John Locke wrote in the context of changing perceptions of the world. The accepted trinity of God, King and Subject was under threat. Both Hobbes and Locke offered views on government and on contracts between citizen and state in a world without the certainty of absolutist monarchy.

To Hobbes money was the blood of the commonwealth; specie was ‘naturall Bloud … circulating, nourisheth by the way, every Member of the Body of Man’ (Hobbes, 1651, ch. XXIV). In Elementa Philosophica de Cive, he questioned the subject’s right to challenge the state contract. ‘I shew farther . . . what rights particular men, who intend to constitute this civill government, must so necessarily transfer from themselves on the supreme power, whether it be one man, or an assembly of men’ (Hobbes, 1651, preface). Trust in the citizen-sovereign contract – a contract undertaken rationally between ruler and ruled, underpinned security. Hobbes argued that the benefits of absolute government included:

1. That they be defended against forraign enemies. 2. That Peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be enrich’t as much as may consist with publique security. 4. That they enjoy a harmelesse liberty; … [that] they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own industr[y] (1651, ch. XIII, VI.).

Hobbes’s de Cive used strong biblical metaphors to illustrate his views of the state: Leviathan – a whale, and Behemoth – a hippopotamus. Civil unrest at the time was partly due to the intrusion of lumbering state powers into the privacy of the wealthy. Nesta Devine suggests a ‘large part of the resistance to “behemoth”… was caused not by the inefficiency of this form of government, but its efficiency’ (Devine, 2000, p. 180, emphasis in original). Dynamic economic trade depended on political stability in Hobbes’s view; only moral civility prevented

\[\text{\textsuperscript{134}}\text{Hobbes used beasts Leviathan and Behemoth to illustrate struggles between absolutist states Behemoth was the Long Parliament (1640). The Leithvian was the metaphor for a strong sovereign who ruled to keep the peace and avoid war (written during the Civil War 1642-53)}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{135}}\text{Nesta Devine notes that the series of governments after Charles I lacked the authority of the ordained monarch (Devine, 2000). Thus, they had to govern through a bureaucracy, which raised the resentment of the local nobles. She describes this period as the ‘rule of the Major generals’ (p. 180), who were seen as ‘foreigners’ from a different part of the country, and lacked the traditional links of the local gentry with their community.}\]
degeneracy. Hobbes’s theodicy was to be influential on political œconomists, especially Malthus, who had a conservative acceptance of the order of class and state. Hobbes was the arch-conservative, grieving the threatened loss of the monarchy during the English Civil War. Traces of Hobbes’s thought can be found in those Austrian School economists who advocated for small government and greater individual freedom.

Critics of Malthus like William Hazlitt and Godwin were guided by the more liberal ideas of Locke. Absolute government was inconsistent with civil society in Locke’s view (Locke, 1980, sec. 90); humans lived instead in a commonwealth, or civitas. In his Two Treatises, Locke argued that God-given rationality was the birthright of each citizen, where citizens exchanged freedom for the protection of the law (Locke, 1980, sec. 63, cited in Uzgalis, 2007). Property needed prudential care, as the laws of Nature were offended against if resources were wasted (Locke, 1980, sec. 50). The chief matter of property was land itself:

Though the Earth ... be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person ... WHATSOEVER then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property ... it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men (Locke, 1988, II, para. 27, cited in Uzgalis, 2007).

Locke predated the HC theorists in linking the education of children to the wellbeing of the nation in his Some Thoughts concerning Education (Locke, 1693, foreword): ‘He’ who did not ‘submit his Will to the Reason of others, when he is young, will scarce hearken or submit to his own Reason, when he is of an Age’ (p. 36, emphasis in original). Employing a tutor for one’s offspring, he continued, would be a more valuable investment than using capital to purchase land (p. 105). Political œconomists, accepted the rational individual as a given, while the

136 Belief that rational man, by utilising his God-given faculties, could divine God’s plan on earth
137 ‘Locke is thought to have set three restrictions on the accumulation of property in the state of nature: 1) one may only appropriate as much as one can use before it spoils (Two Treatises 2.31), 2) one must leave “enough and as good” for others (the sufficiency restriction) (2.27), and 3) one may (supposedly) only appropriate property through one’s own labor (2.27)” Tuckness, A. 2008
138 Sections 31–40
issue of labour-added value was to be one of the crucial economic disputations of the following century.

Hobbes’s and Locke’s views influenced later political economic thinking and both liberal and conservative understandings of the social contract. The poor were deemed to be like children, capable of saving themselves from starvation by working. However, by their very presence they represented a sign of the nation’s organic being, a ‘stigmata’ on the body politic (Foucault, 1984d, p. 83).

6.2 Guiding morals

With the overthrow of the French King, Louis XVI and the usurpation of sovereign powers in England, the order had changed. Morals and economic management were intertwined in eighteenth-century writings. Political œconomy emerged as an adjunct to government; a moral support in unsettled times. Both John Wesley and Adam Smith spoke of the rapacious ‘proud and unfeeling landlord’ (Smith, p. 164). Many were affected by the sight of children with swollen bellies. Wesley saw women scavenging for ‘stinking sprats’ on a dunghill and stewing the dog’s bone for a meal (Wesley, 1773, p. 274). He blamed farmers’ self-interest in diverting grain to distilleries (p. 277). Smith suggested that the wealthy, by their deeds in the market, unwittingly also supported the poor – an eighteenth-century version of what has become known as the ‘trickledown theory’. Providence, it seemed, used the rich to fulfil her wishes (Smith, 1790, IV, i, p. 165). Early political œconomists were concerned morally about the greedy search for wealth for its own sake.

The state, the public and capitalism were all contested political terms and players in England at this time, where terms like commerce, capital, and economy were fluid and dynamic (Meuret, 1988, p. 227). Wealth from the land was a moral issue concerning the state’s absolutist management of commerce (Meuret, 1988, p. 235). Arguments concerning the

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139 ‘As to the Charge of it, I think it will be the Money best laid out, that can be, about our Children; and therefore though it may be Expensive more than is ordinary, yet it cannot be thought dear. He that at any Rate procures his Child a good Mind, well principled, temper’d to Vertue and Usefulness, and adorned with Civility and good Breeding, makes a better purchase for him, than if he laid out the Money for an addition of more Earth to his former Acres’ (Locke, 1693).
Mercantile protectionism such as tariffs on imports merely supported inflation and the failure of country banks, Malthus (1815) believed. There was a moral distrust of banks that issued notes with insufficient funds to back them. Should, wondered the political œconomists, mankind be meddling in matters beyond their sphere? There was anxiety too about the replacement of metallic money with banknotes. As coinage held an Aristotelian signification\textsuperscript{141}, how could a paper – a signification drawn from trees – represent a value equating to coinage, some wondered, without the essence of metal? There was belief that ‘the ordinary standards of value, gold and silver, being got rid of, bank paper’ would depreciate (Senior & Malthus, 1828, p. 72). At the turn of the nineteenth century there was debate about the role of government sparked by the grain shortage in England. How, the political œconomists wondered, could wealth be ‘grown’ internally from the land rather than from exporting – by circulating specie, as the mercantilist theorists such as Steuart, believed? 

\textsuperscript{140} Dangers were perceived by earlier writers, as capitalism was seen to undermine the ‘nature’ of the state. Meuret (1988) notes a ‘crisis’ in the seventeenth century, when a confidence in the state’s ability to manage commerce, was threatened (p.235).\textsuperscript{240} notes that Adam Smith started from an assumption that mankind wished to improve material conditions, rather than the state’s interest in commerce which served to mitigate the danger through moral strictures. 

\textsuperscript{141} The mediaeval beliefs, derived from Aristotle, was that item each retained its essential essences, which were unaltered, unless by magical process such as alchemy. In this case, the tree and specie from gold or silver were seen as having contradictory essences.
6.2.1 Fraternal wealth: the purposes of trade in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe

The liberals in seventeenth-century England, according to Meuret (1988), expressed annoyance with state protectionist policies — alliances between state and manufacturers restricted the potential for growth and wealth (pp. 236–237). National wealth was not an issue of surplus, but of total exchanges. English liberals, by addressing the evil of protectionism, raised the spectre of social unrest. Smith’s prescription avoided unrest, and offered a moral option of individual betterment in a just society. His model included balances and mechanisms which the public, rather than the state, determined.

Mercantilism involved fraternal trade to preserve the commonweal of Christendom.\textsuperscript{142} The doctrine supported trade in specie and surplus goods to illustrate nations’ strength and wealth (Defert, 1982, p. 17). As value was volatile, circulation of specie, it was believed, contributed most to national wealth.\textsuperscript{143} More goods needed to be exported than imported; distribution was more important than manufacture (Schmidgen, 2001). However, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries there was a rupture in the way things were ordered, as codes and writings in the lingua franca\textsuperscript{144} became accessible to a greater critical reading public (Defert, 1982). The Napoleonic Wars of 1793–1815 put circulation at risk, affecting the internal health of the nation (Riemersma, 1952, p. 25). Further, in 1810 there was a worldwide silver famine. Political œconomy was able to offer both order and moral suasion on ways to increase national wealth in a potentially unstable world.

\textsuperscript{142} Jeremy Bentham, writing in 1830, argued for trade that did no harm. Dealings between states or individuals should not ‘seek to advance his property’ at the expense of any other, other than ‘competition between individual and individual’ (Bentham, 1843, ‘The constitutional code’, ix, pp. 202–203; Bramstead & Melhuis, 1978, pp. 352–353).

\textsuperscript{143} Given that Robinson Crusoe is beloved by economists as an indication of solitary man, isolated from any market, this may be worthy of further exploration.

\textsuperscript{144} The common national language, i.e. English in England, or French in France, rather than Latin.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the notion of wealth as something that could be grown at home was new. Previously, in mediaeval times, barter, or ‘alienation’, was a deliberate act to acquire what one did not need but another desired. As the monarch was charged by the Deity to guarantee his people’s subsistence, individual citizens’ wealth was not a central issue. Nothing essential to life produced by one’s self would be available for barter (Foucault, 1989, p. 209). Because the sovereign’s domain was seen as co-extensive with national wealth, internal trade was barely accounted for and was almost invisible in mediaeval understandings (Meuret, 1988, p. 233). Governments were actively interventionist, dictating what could or could not be exported, protecting gold and silver reserves, setting tariffs and bounties, and supporting monopolies that met mercantilist interest. This concept of wealth acquisition changed when the sovereign’s power was reduced in the seventeenth century. Nations then began supporting internal trade as a vital element of healthy equilibrium (Foucault, 1989, p. 190).

The earlier view of mediaeval science was never completely extinguished in the twentieth century, although the grid of norm, rule, and system had by then replaced the earlier axes of function, conflict and signification (Foucault, 1970, p. 169, emphasis mine). The function of hierarchical terrestrial rule had been superseded by the biological concept of a nation comprised of many heads; conflict about accepted economic ‘truths’ had descended, while Aristotelian signification had been replaced by Newtonian and Galilean understandings of the world.

A central question for contemporary liberal governments is how to govern ‘economically’ rather than ‘justly’ (Smyth, 2008). The mediaeval concept of the ‘just price’ has been replaced by a ‘good price’, mediated by the market, which itself is a site for veridiction (Foucault, 2008 pp. 30–31). As the concept of ‘use-value’, utilised by Smith and others, disappeared from common usage, the concept of value-in-exchange became dominant (see below). It was Menger’s image of humankind as entrepreneur trading marketable goods that

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145 An understanding of a truth, as Foucault (2008, P.31) states, the ‘market appeared as something that obeyed had to obey ‘natural’ ... spontaneous mechanisms’.
became dominant in the twentieth century. These fundamental economic assumptions about humanity were not central to all earlier economic formulations. Disparate interests, earlier viewed as dissimilar, have in the past 200 years come together to form contemporary ‘webs’ of tactics supporting the individual in managing his or her affairs economically. By revisiting the earlier political œconomic concepts of use-value and exchange-value, I aim to make the natural ‘strange’; to set out contemporary grids of norm, rule, and system (Foucault, 1970, p. 169, emphasis mine). The theories of Ferguson and Steuart are analysed in the next chapter in an attempt to unsettle the assumed naturalness and truth of the prevailing view attributed to Smith.
Shifts from the Aristotelian view of the world, to a Newtonian understanding of the sciences are set out in this chapter, which covers the emergence of political œconomy as a new science. Some political œconomists viewed society as organic, subject to maladies, which could be managed by statesman as interventionist, seeking the wellbeing of all. Others, however, supported non-intervention government. These political œconomists were wary of upsetting a balance in ‘nature’s plan’; feast or famine, for example, being a natural oscillation. There were searches by all political œconomists for clear definition of ‘laws’ that could be followed. They asked questions for example, about what is ‘valued’, what are ‘goods’. I explore below the differing perceptions of value that have been held by political economists.

Exchange-value is privileged, in a market economy; this is, however, a recent view of value. What is ‘valued’ is a question central to the disciplines of neoliberal economics and of HCT. I argue that such ideas were debated strongly at the cusp of the nineteenth century – they were not taken as evident by the writers of the time. Early political œconomists saw parallels between government of the state and paterfamilias government of the household: ‘the art of providing for all the wants of a family, with prudence and frugality’ (Steuart, 1767, bk 1, intro.). The wealthy eighteenth-century family differed from the contemporary Western nuclear family: servants, children, and family members were cared for by the head of the household. In rural cottage-industries, housewives managed the household and dairy, while children and servants tended gardens and flocks. Farmers took corn to the miller for grinding, then to the baker, and then traded surplus grain directly in the markets, of which there were a variety of local and regional options. Local assizes and proclamations to limit price-fixing regulated trade (Thompson, 1971). Prices were determined by social, rather than market forces (p. 125). Working-class ‘bargaining’ tactics of food-riot threats were equally as efficient as landowners’ strategies of calling in the troops. Some political œconomists thought state management should be similarly prudent.
Adam Ferguson (1767) and Sir James Steuart (1767) portrayed society as organic and interdependent. According to Ferguson, human beings were not intended to live as isolates but to engage socially with neighbours (Ferguson, 1767, bk. 1, sect. vi). The government’s policy concerned civic and economic interaction; protecting and monitoring the social body. State management was likened to the paterfamilias, who would ‘secure to the family its means of subsistence and settlement; to protect the industrious in the pursuit of his occupation; to reconcile the restrictions of police, and the social affections of mankind, with their separate and interested pursuits’ (1767, part iii, sect iv). Models of political and civil government were not universal but would change to suit the differing needs of time and place (1767, part 1, sect. ix).

Ferguson viewed society as essentially a moral and social commonwealth. The state was a body with each vital organ related to the others, and governed for the good of its interconnected elements:

[Where] shall we find the talents which are fit to act with men in a collective body, if we break that body into parts, and confine the observation of each to a separate track? To act in the view of his fellow-creatures ... seems to be the principal calling and occupation of his nature. If he must labour, that he may subsist, he can subsist for no better purpose than the good of mankind ... to act with men (1767, bk 1, sect. v).

Civil societies, to Ferguson, like individuals, have a ‘constitution’ subject to risks: ‘temporary humours, sanguine hopes, or vehement animosities’ (1767, part v, sect. i). Citizens’ involvement in virtuous behaviours such as temperance and moderation ensured the vigour of the state. When there was an imbalance of humours in a state, or when an empire grew too large, there could be gangrene-like risks at its extremities. Citizens’ involvement in social arts and literature was considered an antidote to constitutional ills. Industrious, busy agrarian populations supported a well-balanced, healthy national body creating both familial and national wealth. Equilibrium between healthy and harmful humours in the civic constitution created balances of power. Nobles, for instance, formed a bloc preventing the sovereign’s over-reaching power.

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146 Foucault (2008, p. 298) details Ferguson’s ‘civil society’ which was i). a historical-natural constant, ii) a product of spontaneous synthesis, iii) a matrix of political power and iv the motor of history. There is a danger in Ferguson’s element not present in Smith’s model, as the bond of civil society is weakened, the more the individual is isolated by the economic bond (p. 303).
Ownership of land motivated a citizen to labour for personal and national advantage (Ferguson, 1767, part iii; sect. iv). Each citizen played a part in the organic whole of the civil society.

Steuart shared Ferguson’s organic view of a social commonwealth but advocated more active state management. The prime role of government for him was to ensure subsistence for all citizens and manage actively to ensure equilibrium by reducing bad humours in the body politic. Steuart was influenced by the Physiocrat François Quesnay, who viewed circulating capital as being akin to a venous supply feeding the nation’s economic health. Physiocrats believed the nurturing land provided produce from labour. Providential laws ensured a balance of food to population growth. When food was abundant, the population multiplied; when scarce, famine reduced the population. Active management by the government, Steuart believed, ensured equilibrium in the case of a threatened imbalance of industry over agriculture. Steuart used terms that were personification of status: statesman, and freehands. Citizens of the state were depicted as ‘as children of the same family, and as being under the care of the same father’ (Steuart, 1767, bk. ii, ch. xv). Steuart’s family was comprised of a ‘master’ who was both ‘lord’ and ‘economist’ and who supported a family of children and servants (bk. i, intro.). The wise statesman, in his view, exercised wisdom, assisting Providence to ensure good regulatory laws.

Equilibrium for Steuart was a balance between work and demand; if either increased, a wise government needed to introduce taxes to restore balance. Care must be taken to protect the home market, although in bad seasons there could be short-term importations of grain. A reliance on foreign imports could cause the agricultural heart of the nation to wither. Regulation ensured stability, and supported the ‘freehands’ to operate in the market. An economic balance within the body politic was vital in a commonwealth where no one segment of society should accrue wealth. Wealth was evidence of industry, and it circulated around the

147 Was a French medic, who is considered a head of the Physiocrats. His Tableau Economique detail circulatory flow around the civil body as blood circulated the human. Only agriculture, growth from the land, was productive, while manufacturing, he considered sterile.
148 It was state rather than market regulation of supply-demand that ensured this balance, which differs from the later understanding of market equilibrium.
body politic ensuring there was general improvement for all prudent and industrious classes. Responsibility for wealth was shared across all stations of life.

Multiplication, in Steuart’s view, was the efficient aim of agriculture, supported by active government interventions when required. When the manufacturers created wants, statesmen would ensure sufficient work for the agricultural workers to allow them to purchase the goods of the manufacturers. The industrious workers on the land added true value with their labour, which acted as a moral brake, preventing a proliferation of luxury manufactured items when industry workers traded their goods. Labour on the land was central to the nourishment of all citizens and thus needed state encouragement. Steuart envisioned an agricultural model of concentric rings: kitchen gardens surrounded towns; cattle pastures lay beyond, while on the periphery were unimproved lands.\(^\text{149}\) He advocated for the growth of local production to reduce transport costs.

Only after the family’s and the nation’s subsistence needs had been met was it possible to trade surplus non-essential items. Trade for Steuart was not about selling goods above their value merely for profit. Money was the ‘instrument of alienation’ when goods left one trader to be acquired by another; they were trading only what was not needed for subsistence. A state–trading bank partnership ensured best possible healthy domestic circulation of specie (Steuart, vol. ii, p. 608, cited in Sen, 1947, p. 34). Steuart portrayed trading negotiations as involving ascending and descending ‘vibrations’, where two elements, ‘the value, and the profit’, came together (Steuart, 1767, vol. x).\(^\text{150}\) The principle of value was tied to a ‘just and equable vibration of prices’ (p. 206). Trading was about both parties being satisfied with the deal (bk 3, ch. i). Competition diminished when prices fell, so while the law of demand and supply could be predicted, price could not (Steuart, 1767, vol 2, ch. vii). Steuart differentiated between the real value of goods, and profit from alienation (Marx, 1861). ‘In the price of goods,’ he wrote, ‘I consider two things as really existing, and quite different from […]

\(^\text{149}\) Von Thünen’s 1826 model was similar (see Kiker, 1969). Thünen believed that there was a relationship between the farmer and the land. It took several years for the farmer to get to know the land.

\(^\text{150}\) ‘The several interests of individuals affect each other, and make the balance vibrate’ (Steuart, 1767, bk. ii, ch. vii).
another; [...] the *real value* of the commodity, and the *profit upon alienation*’ (l.c., p. 244 in Marx, 1861, VI-220 emphases in original).

Whenever a question arises about price, alienation is necessarily implied; and when we suppose a common standard in the price of any thing, we must suppose the alienation of it to be frequent and familiar. Now I must here observe, that in countries where simplicity reigns ... it is hardly possible to determine any standard for the price of articles of the first necessity (Stewart, 1767 bk 2 p. 395).

Smith’s view of alienation, however differed from Steuart’s; and it was the Smithian view that came to be accepted by many nineteenth-century economists. Smith’s ideas are now accepted as a contemporary ‘truth’, where economists, quoting his foundational ideas, argue against state regulation and unfettered free-trade determinants of price. To him, state intervention to protect merchant interests was abhorrent. Many a hazard-averse merchant chose to sell goods on the local market (Smith, 1776, p. 363), and resented any state levy or tariff, or prohibition on raw goods as interference, he maintained. Vested interests were supported by government tariffs and bounties. Smith was vehement in his opposition to mercantilist ideas\(^{151}\) and viewed as morally wicked the sixteenth-century mercantilist perspective of increasing exports to purchase specie.\(^{152}\) Mercantilist precepts could only be successful if the trading nation was surrounded by others of great wealth. Even feeding goods into the mother country by colonies of the commonwealth failed to completely support the mercantile system (Smith, 1776, p. 434). Smith’s use of value was a rebuttal of the Physiocratic view that all worth derived from the land (Devine, 2001, p. 7). Political economists before Smith had debated if national interest was best supported by government prohibition on raw goods, or by imposed duties. Often states measured the gain from trade on the value of exports alone: ‘the greater the exports and the smaller the imports, the greater ... the employment of English labor’ (Viner, 1930, p. 298). Exported manufactured goods, it was believed, had a higher value than raw materials because of the added component of labour (1930, p. 299).

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\(^{151}\) See ‘Of the Advantages which Europe has derived from the Discovery of America’ (Smith, 1776, pt. 3, bk. iv).

\(^{152}\) e.g. Locke’s ‘moveable goods’, mentioned in Adam Smith’s *Wealth* (Smith, 1776, p. 311).
Government tariffs, Smith believed, interfered with the liberty of the market, where the natural price could be negotiated. Unlike Ferguson or Steuart, Smith used Newtonian descriptors in his writings.\(^{153}\) Smith’s oft-quoted phrase, about market forces being ‘led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention’, describing a trader’s beneficial exchange was an attempt to bring Newtonian principles into political œconomy (Smith, 1776, pp. 330–331).\(^{154}\) State government, he stated in an echo of Hobbes, should be limited to the functions of protecting the nation’s borders to ensuring peace at home, and to undertaking some public works. Economic issues should be decided by market mechanisms.

It was difficult to ascertain the value of labour added to a commodity, so to Smith the price negotiated between willing buyers and willing sellers was the ‘exchange-value’.\(^{155}\) Struggling with what Viner (1930, p. 298) has described as the ‘employment argument’ of his time, Smith asserted that the ‘labourer is rich or poor, is well or ill rewarded, in proportion to the real, not to the nominal price of his labour’ (Smith, 1776, Bk. 1 Ch V p..9). However, he argued, there are a range of interest considerations and outgoing costs to be factored in when determining any final price, so the ‘whole produce of labour does not always belong to the labourer’ (Bk 1 Ch VI p..7).

\[\text{One part pays the rent of the landlord, another pays the wages or maintenance of the labourers ... employed in producing it, and the third pays the profit of the farmer...A fourth part ... is necessary for replacing the stock of the farmer (Bk 1 Ch VI p.11).}\]

The division of labour helped to stabilise the price, Smith argued, by enhancing efficiency and reducing costs. A labourer, working in isolation to manufacture pins, might be able to complete 20 a day; however a chain of ten, working together, could complete many more (Smith, 1776,

\(^{153}\) In History of Astronomy (1795) Smith describes Nature as an ‘immense chain of the most important and sublime truths, all closely connected together’.

\(^{154}\) He uses the same phrase in Moral Sentiments (1795, p. 99).

\(^{155}\) See Smith, 1776, (Book i, p. 38) and (Book i, p. 40)
Labour was ‘the real value of exchange’, with the toil required to gain it, the effort the labourer puts into it with his own body (Smith, 1776, Bk 1 ch. V, p. 23). Nesta Devine suggests that the concept ‘someone has to work’ was to have future economic and educational implications (Devine, 2001, p. 7). The teacher has to motivate the student to work, or motivation has to come from the student. It is, Devine concludes, an ‘industrial process’, observable and measurable (p. 7).

There were a range of views on price and value evident in the eighteenth century, ranging from those privileging the collective to others emphasising the atomistic individual. Ideas about the value added by labour were part of Junker Johannes von Thünen’s 1826 agricultural model (Smith’s and von Thünen’s workers were male). von Thünen visualised wages increasing as the worker’s dexterity and education improved (Kiker, 1969, pp. 339–340). A worker whose intellect had been sharpened, who had been educated to think, was both a better worker and a better citizen. Further, as the cost of subsistence increased, the worker would become more productive to maintain the same standard of living. Education added value to the nation’s capital, von Thünen argued (p. 341).

Although morals were central to all models, Smith’s individual was more self-interestedly Calvinistic than Ferguson’s or Steuart’s. Smith’s atomistic individual in his Moral Sentiment (1759) was industrious and prudent in his habits; someone who sacrificed ‘enjoyment of the present moment for the probable expectation of the still greater ease and enjoyment of a more distant but more lasting period of time’ (Smith, 1790, Bk. VI. Ch., p.12). Such an individual was to become the atomistic element of twentieth century HCT, who needed to look ahead, assess possibilities, and navigate to achieve maximum advantage for him or herself. In the eighteenth century there had been a number of political economic alternatives, however it was the Smithian model that won ascendancy and accumulated power in the twenty first century.

156 The example the manufacture of a pin was divided into 18 distinct operations by Smith. His example was later utilised and adapted by Milton Friedman (1999), who wrote the introduction to Read’s work describing the manufacture of a lead pencil.

157 This concept of labour was to be utilised by both the Marxist and neoliberal schools.
7.1 Malthus: decrying human intervention in providential population balance

Robert Thomas Malthus was an avowed disciple of Smith who wrote tirelessly on population pressures on the nation. I use Malthus in this section as an example of a political economist positioned at the nexus between Aristotelian science and Newtonian mathematics. There was much debate at the turn of the nineteenth century about mankind, morality, and the place of government. Two who took a Lockean view of humankind were Hazlitt and Godwin (Godwin, 1964, 1842; Hazlitt, 1807, 1819). Hazlitt (1807) argued that it was not so much that the population had doubled, as Malthus (1798) had suggested; but that the cost of labourers’ provisions had increased. Godwin asked if ‘vice and misery ... [were] indispensable ingredients in the permanent composition of the body politic’ (Godwin, 1964, p. 341). Surely money was merely an ‘engine’; a means to an end, he argued. It was in part to refute the arguments of these critics that Malthus initially published.

Malthus’ ideas first appeared in the polemic Essay on the Principle of Population, published during the period of ‘extensive warfare’ which critically interrupted food imports and put the population’s subsistence at risk (Malthus, 1966). He portrayed society in more measured tones, however, in later editions of this work. The civil state was an organic body subject to the same stresses, including disease, as other bodies (Malthus, 2004, pp. 117 & 126). Mankind was as much at risk of ‘waste of seed’ as were plants and animals (Malthus, 1966, p. 2), where any expansion of one species could affect the balance of nature. Because the lower classes were undisciplined and imprudent, with any improved land production was tied a risk of over-population. Such a risk was ‘one of the invariable laws of nature’ (Malthus, 1826, p. 344). Patterns of stable populations or epidemics were ‘oscillations’, he believed: periods of plenty,

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158 Blaug (1963, p. 161) notes that ‘In 1795, a single man working full time in the Midlands or the southern counties would have earned about 8s. 6d. a week. Supplements in kind ... would bring this up to about 10s. a week.’ On p. 162 he notes that the gazette price of wheat in ‘1811-1812, 1816-1817,1823-1825, and 1828-1831 were years of poor harvests when both relief spending and the price of wheat rose’. 

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alternated with famine and plague. Because populations increased geometrically, while food and agricultural production increased arithmetically, these oscillations could be anticipated (Malthus, 1966, p. 13). But since Elizabethan times, governments had meddled and interrupted God’s plan – for Malthus, suffering was an inevitable disruption of the harmony of nature being out of balance.

There was a need to ‘ascertain how much of this unhappiness arises from the principle of population, and how much is fairly to be attributed to government’ (Malthus, 1826, p. 321). The man-made institution, the Poor Laws, Malthus argued, had clouded human perceptions of providential patterns. The colonies, however, offered a laboratory, uncontaminated by disease or state intervention, where oscillation was evident. Populations of new colonies increased, while misery and vice from state interference, such as taxes, decreased. Ireland was an example of an older, less vigorous body, while the colonies of North America were examples of invigorated organic renewal (Malthus, 1966, pp. 103–104). Regular emigration kept both colonies and the mother country healthy. Malthus’ argument was a theodic one: government should not attempt to meddle with the natural equilibrium; any human intervention to reduce human suffering upset Providence’s innate measures that were designed to produce a balance in the organic body.

Malthus’ discourse placed biopower at the centre of the leading problem of his day: how to emphasise individual actuarial responsibility. Although each individual was responsible for his or her own welfare, poor people needed to be motivated, he believed, to ensure that the ‘race did not stagnate’ (1798, p. 41, cited in Bowler, 1976, p. 640). Occupancy of the poor house was therefore framed as a choice. Malthus’ one solution to poverty was to encourage prudential habits among the labouring classes. He revisited and debated the themes of his 1789 ‘Essay’ in publications up to his death in 1834, as he attempted to find a fit between

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159 Malthus used Condorcet’s term ‘oscillation’, but it was also used by Smith in History of Astronomy. 
160 Such claims led Hazlitt to suggest Malthus’ one solution to society’s ills was moral restraint (Hazlitt, 1819). Moral strictures as solutions to poverty can be found in many contemporary economic writings (Swan, 1986; Rogers, 1997; Heckman & Smith, 1998).
political economy and poverty (Malthus, 1800, 1809; 2004, 1814, 1815a,b; 1820; 1827; 1872; 1973, 2004; 1976; Senior & Malthus, 1828).

7.1.1 Prophylactic solutions to weaknesses in the body politic

Some of the difficulty in computing the ‘problem of the poor’ came from the measures used at that time, as to who and what to count. Malthus assumed that there were two classes: the wealthy – who through primogeniture law concentrated land and wealth within a few families; and all the others. Peter J. Bowler (1976) suggests that the eighteenth-century concept of laissez-faire was understood differently in the nineteenth-century. Any misery was a part of God’s plan, but there was also an element of individual responsibility – to work or not to work. Poor-house occupancy, Malthus, like his Elizabethan forebears, believed, was a choice – parish work measures could motivate the lazy and work-shy. Bowler suggests that Malthus’ concern may have been less about the individual rising to a ‘higher station’ and more about the contest ‘within the different classes’: struggles for resources between them (p. 639). Even if the wealthy wished to assuage the poverty of the poor, this would be impossible, as that would ‘relieve them of but a small portion of their burden by taking a share’ (Malthus, ‘Essay’, 1817, p. 41, cited in Bowler, 1976, p. 640).

The concept of evolutionary development was one of immense importance to nineteenth-century ideas. The idea of individual struggle or competition for scarce resources

\[\text{\textsuperscript{161}}\text{Bowler (1976, p. 643). ‘}\text{‘The laissez-faire school saw a natural harmony between the different sections of the economy, with competition between self-seeking individuals at each level leading to a balance in which all would benefit. Fluctuations of supply and demand could be smoothly accommodated, and the activity of the wealthy ensured eco-nomic development.’}’\text{This was unlike a later view pitting workers against capitalists.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{162}}\text{Blaug (1963, p. 151) says this idea was so commonly accepted it was almost ubiquitous.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{163}}\text{James Mill argued for the superiority of the ‘middle rank’, which was more numerous, the chief source of ‘science, art and legislation’, and held the wisdom which offers the foundation for ‘good government’ (Mill, J., 1828) Encyclopedia. Britannica, (1820); Bramstead & Melhuis, 1978, pp. 334–335). James Mill was father to John Stuart Mill.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{164}}\text{Darwin, in his 1876 autobiography, acknowledged that Malthus’ ideas on scarcity influenced his.}\]
is a critical element of price theory and an undisputed truth in twenty-first-century economics. Bowler’s ideas, I argue, are essential to an understanding of biopower.

[T]here are two quite different concepts of struggle involved ... the competition between the different individuals of the same species ... I shall call ‘struggle (a)’ ... [it is] related to another concept, namely that of the struggle of the ... species as a whole against its environment ... This concept of inter-species struggle I shall call ‘struggle (b)’ (Bowler, 1976, p. 632).

The laissez-faire school, Bowler suggested was unlike a later view pitting workers against capitalists. It was a world where each species was kept in check by others’ activities.

[They] saw a natural harmony between the different sections of the economy, with competition between self-seeking individuals at each level leading to a balance in which all would benefit. Fluctuations of supply and demand could be smoothly accommodated, and the activity of the wealthy ensured eco-nomic development (p. 645).

Malthus, Bowler argues, replaced harmony in nature with the theory of ‘struggle (b)’ as an agent of balance.

The shift in the understanding of science, so different from the mediaeval idea of knowledge, can be placed on the Foucauldian grid signifying a new order. Shifts were evident across a range of disciplines including architecture, science and ‘political arithmetic’165 (Cowles, 1937; Craske, 1999; Hoppit, 1996). As the idea emerged that wealth equated closely with population, tables of ‘medical arithmetic’ of mortality, public finances, life-insurance, trade, and crime statistics became increasingly evident. The new ‘art of reasoning upon figures related to government’ (Hoppit, 1996, p. 519), i.e. tracking information on population changes, required the collection, collation and analysis of information (p. 532). Such a requirement for statistics was partly brought about by the need to account for the growing costs of eighteenth-century wars (p. 532). The need to identify and interpret patterns was aided by the new concept of political arithmetic, which was able to support a range of government policy.

165 William Petty’s phrase. Petty, a sixteenth century writer, is seen by some as an early political oeconomist and was said by Simon Marginson (1993) to use the term ‘human capital’ p.32.
Science has the aura of authority despite its unclear definition. The sciences of life allowed humankind to form a knowledge of self in ways that allowed ‘men’ to act on this knowledge, to act on themselves (Foucault, 1999h, p. 256). It was this ‘authority’ that the nineteenth-century French and British economists were intent on writing into being (Meuret, 1988) as scientific societies expanded in Britain and France. No longer a private process, science had become a public one, utilising systems to interpret and unify observation with ‘data’ used to test the theories (Hendry, 1993, 2003). Malthus’ work was pivotal to exploring biopower – the issue of the state’s interest in population with its potential to grow wealth. Such issues of public interest continue to support an intrusion by the state into the bedrooms of nations in the twenty-first century, with its interests in mortality, fertility and morbidity. Neuro-economic science can now support society’s poor and less able to achieve their potential by offering interventions that will enable them to take a place in the employment-market. These interventions will both ensure each is ‘fit for work’ and ameliorate any pathological risk to the civil body. The next section sets out the foundational economic belief in laws of development.

7.1.2 Searches for evolutionary laws

Civilisational evolution and development, together with humankind’s rational ability to utilise such laws, is embedded as a new faith in contemporary economics. ‘Catallactics’ was an eighteenth-century concept that moved from political œconomy to science and then to Austrian School economics. Evolutionary descriptors were evident in the writings of Carl Menger who believed that institutions evolved from the unplanned actions of individual members of society (e.g. 1985, p. 155). These, he wrote, evolved ‘gradually, scarcely perceptibly … [and were] completed in the course of thousands of years’ (p. 103). Menger’s disciple, Ludwig von Mises, also used concepts of slow progress and individual struggle. The flowering of Asiatic countries later withered, as their ‘citizens lost vigor and energy’ (von Mises, 1954, pt. iv). Von Mises was inconsistent in his use of struggle theorems. In an example of
Bowler’s ‘struggle (a)’, he discussed the division of labour (von Mises, 1996, p. 667) but he used ‘struggle (b)’ to describe competition for scarce resources (1957, pp. 38, 39, & 56; 1996, p. 171; 1949, p. 669). Those who wished to eliminate birth control were suggesting a scenario of ‘struggle for survival’, he maintained (1949, p. 672). There are many examples of evolutionary Darwinism in von Mises’ Human Action (1949, e.g. pp. 85, 160, 169, 171, 176). Friedrich Hayek believed that the theory of catallactics, where institutions, rather than individuals evolved, avoided any issues about ‘displacement of one group by another’ (Hayek, 1988a, p. 12). He used evolutionary terms to describe the morality and rationality which he believed were embedded over time in human institutions.

Chicago School theorists used both the competitive struggle and the catallactic descriptors of evolution. Gary Becker’s writing uses both individual and cultural competitive analogies (e.g. Becker, 1962, 1974, 1975), while James Heckman prefers the child development model ( Heckman, 1973, 1974, 2007, 2010, 2011; Heckman & Cunha, 2007; Knudsen et al., 2006). Investment in human capital, these theorists affirm, will lead parents to invest in their children’s education in the belief that this will pay long-run dividends. They assume that parents altruistically invest in their children because they perceive the benefits of intergenerational mobility in a growth model, and the theorists are thus able model utility and value functions for dynastic families (e.g. Becker, 1988). The assumption that family preferences and behaviours are stable over time supports the use of economic modelling. The development of skills gives children a competitive advantage in the employment marketplace. Parents tend to invest more in their better endowed children, to give them a competitive advantage (Becker & Tomes, p. 12); and will give the less-well endowed children more non-HC to compensate. The well-endowed children will have developed skills that can be exchanged and traded: developed skills have an exchange-value. With HCT there has been transference of

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166 He argued that ‘Malthus was far from believing struggle to be a necessary social institution’ because before he had absorbed the ‘spirit of Classical Political Economy’ he had completed his first draft of Population (p. III.19.11; III.19.18).

167 von Mises (1949) was not interested in the ethics surrounding a choice of birth control; that was a matter of ‘bodily and mental hygiene’ (p. 543).

168 Becker suggested that it would be fine if ‘theorems about human behaviour ... were the same for all persons’, however observation in the real world, he believed, supports the concept of ‘natural selection’ (Becker, 1981, p. 322).
the education concept of human development to economics. Human development is seen as both slow individual improvements of skills over time and as the evolution of civilisational institutions which support national improvement. Both support national competitiveness in a global education and skills market.

7.2 Value: what is the individual worth to the state?

Contemporary economists rarely use the term ‘use-value’; ‘exchange-value’ has become the preferred term. The decline of the use of the former was partly due to the ascendency of Smithian theory. Exchange value is central to Menger’s ‘building stone’, the individual entrepreneur who trades goods that are the product of his labour in the marketplace. Unlike barter which is an exchange entered into when the item is not necessary for subsistence, use-value is a concept that applies in subsistence economies, where goods are valued in their own right (Devine, 2004). Smith used the early self-sufficient Scottish Highlander family that was not reliant on trading surplus goods as an example (Smith, 1776, bk. 1, Ch. 111 p. 2 17). This position changed, however, he argued, when Highlanders began to trade with the Lowlands and participate in exchange-value markets after union with England (Smith, 1776, bk. 1, Ch.X 128).

Smith did distinguish ‘value in use’ from ‘value in exchange’ in ‘The Origin and Use of Money’:

The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called “value in use”; the other, ”value in exchange” (Smith, 1776, bk 1, Ch IV p. 44).

169 Adam Smith, it is alleged (Devine, 2000), took much of his information in Wealth from James Steuart.
170 Denis Meuret (1988) offers a strong argument for understanding why some economic theories emerged, while others faded. Smith’s primary interest in the creation of wealth through exchange-value offered options to mitigate contemporary political risks. Capitalism was a considerable force in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but many felt the ‘thirst for profit’ could lead to disorder. Meek supposes that in the early nineteenth century the ‘industrial bourgeoisie … were obsessed … with the great importance of the accumulation of capital’ (Meek, 1953, p. 18).
171 Every household had to perform the role of butcher, baker and brewer, Smith said, ‘must learn to perform themselves a great number of little pieces of work’ (Smith, 1776, bk 1, Chp. 111, p.2).
Other eighteenth-century political economists such as Malthus wrote on use-value:

[An] object which it does not require any portion of labour to appropriate or to adapt to our use may be of the very highest utility, but as it is the free gift of nature, it is utterly impossible it can be possessed of the smallest value... Value has two meanings – value in use and value in exchange. Value in use is synonymous [sic] with Utility. It rarely applies in political economy, and is never implied by value when used alone (Malthus, 1827, p. 234).

In Definitions of Political Economy (1827), Malthus disputed J. B. Say’s and James Mill’s definitions of use, but agreed with David Ricardo that nature bestows on us all gifts of the highest value. The political economists wrote their discipline into being by the sheer volume of material they produced on the subject of political economy (Meuret, 1988, p. 229). There were numerous letters, tracts and publications interconnecting W. F. Lloyd, J. S. Mill, Ricardo, Say, William Senior Nassau, de Tocqueville and Malthus (Malthus, 1815a,b; Ricardo, 1815a,b, 1820, 1911, 1962, 1966; Lloyd, 1833; de Tocqueville, 1834–1859; Say, 1821, 1855, 1880; Simpson, 1872).

Use-value’s relation to exchange-value was central to debates at the time. There are many examples: Say suggested that Smith was in error by imputing the labour of man alone as value, but that the utility of the object determines the value rather than the toil (Say, 1821, cited in Saunders, 1994, p. 142). Lloyd suggested that Say’s view that all value is relative was analogous to the view that all motion is relative (1833, p. 146). Both Say and Ricardo engaged with the concept of the value of the sun, the air or atmospheric pressures which Ricardo

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172 His Measure of Value (1823) sets out these definitions too (p. 1).
173 For Malthus education could be valued as private good. A wealthy merchant could, he suggested, buy increased private services for his family ‘by the employment of his capital at the ordinary rate of profits, such an income as will enable him to get a governess for his daughters, and to send his boys to school and college’ (Malthus, 1827, p. 122).
174 Say (1821, A 12) said that Ricardo had made ‘undue generalizations and perversions of language’, in attempting to refute Smith. Political economy, Say stated, ‘has only become a science since it has been confined to the results of inductive investigation’ Traité d’économie politique, p. Xxvvi.
175 Say stated that the costs of production are not the foundation of price. It was not the rim of the vase that prevents water spilling when held under a fountain, but its role in preventing ‘the liquid falling below a certain height’ (Say, 1833, p. 146, cited in Sanders, 1994, p. 142).
defined as serviceable, therefore ‘value in use’ (McCulloch, 1856, p. 172). In refuting Karl Marx’s concept of labour as having intrinsic economic value, Menger insisted there was no direct link between the value of the good and the amount of labour applied to its production. ‘A non-economic good (a quantity of timber in a virgin forest, for example) does not attain value for man if large quantities of labour or other economic goods were applied to its production’ (Menger, 1996, p. 146). The contract of exchange comes from the services the goods will render the purchaser, Menger concluded.¹⁷⁶

However, it was Smith’s view that became the accepted foundational truth. ‘Smith founded a city, our own, in which this science [economics] is possible and necessary’, states Meuret (1988, p. 229). As the order of absolute monarchy was swept away, citizens and the state had begun a dialogue about roles in the new order. Despite Smith’s theory mediating tensions between the powers of capitalism and the state, Meuret suggests there were also those wary of the power of both the state and capitalism. National wealth contradicted the ideas of the group seeking absolutist economic management (Meuret, 1988, p. 237). Smith’s domesticated commerce gave an account of capitalism which offered the state legitimacy. His moral philosophy contained elements of justice, encouraging all to ‘better their condition’, while state protection of the local corn trade kept the price just. This view fitted the moral mood of the times. Smith’s views were a middle way in a society which craved certainty.

It is here that the application of two terms use-value and exchange-value to this thesis becomes apparent. In New Zealand, education had until 1980s been viewed as having use-value, like other taken-for-granted elements such as air, water or the sun, by its very commonness education was not valued (Devine, 2000). The issue of ‘value’ in education is, however, one of great interest to contemporary policy-makers who view education as having

¹⁷⁶ In Investigations (1985), Menger defined economic science as including both terms; one dealt with the general nature of human activity, while the other dealt with the singular phenomenon of human economy, e.g. the nature of the needs of the individual, of goods, barter and ‘use value in its subjective form’, (p. 118, fn). The ‘ultimate goal’ is that of meeting our direct material needs (p. 216). In a footnote he refers readers to his Grundsätze and his hierarchy of first, second, third and higher orders (p. 216, fn146).
'exchange-value'. Gerald Grace (1989), in his critique of education as a commodity, may be seen to value education in terms of use-value. He argued against the NZ Treasury’s view of the ‘value of educational qualifications’ as an issue of ‘scarcity’ (p. 210), which shared ‘the main characteristics of other commodities traded in the marketplace’ (NZ Treasury, 1984, p. 33, cited in Grace 1989, p. 213).

Nevertheless the view of education as exchange-value remains embedded by regulation in the Education Act 1989. When, in 1997, the National government reviewed educational Crown agencies they looked at their effectiveness and value to education, arguing that students and employers needed ‘a consistent assurance of the value of skills and knowledge inherent in a qualification’ (Creech, 1997). Likewise, Steve Maharey (2000, July 21), in a speech on values, stated that ‘education, like other key areas of public provision, has to be fundamentally shaped by our agreed priorities as a society. This does not rule out the strategic use of market mechanisms where they can serve those purposes.’ The ECE service, school or tertiary provider is presently charged with adding value to each student’s vocational qualification. In New Zealand, since the Foucauldian rupture of the 1990s, education has been viewed as having exchange-value.177 I suggest Ferguson’s and Steuart’s visions of civil society may be spaces for the examination of different possibilities. Perhaps, as Meuret (1988, p. 247) argues, capitalism is ‘eclectic’ and its industrial form merely one of its ‘avatars’; some of its characteristics may wither.

177 There has been an introduction of the economic terms, exogenous and endogenous, in education, with moves by the National-led coalition government (2008–2011) to public-private partnerships in the building of educational sites for the compulsory sector. The Fifth Labour Government (1999–2008) had encouraged such partnerships in the non-compulsory sectors of ECE and tertiary. Governments are keen to see that the investment of vote: education dollars gives value, i.e. is a cost benefit for state educational investments. To ‘prioritise education funding so that dollars are spent where they will make the biggest difference for children [to get] maximum value for education dollars (Tolley, 2009a). The 2010 Budget removed general funding for ECE, but allocated a targeted scheme where only those most in need would be eligible. Such ‘funding shows that Government values quality early childhood education and the contribution it makes to a good start for our children’s education’, Tolley said. ‘We also want it to provide value for money for taxpayers and make sure it can be accessed by those families who are not currently taking part, but who will benefit the most’ (Tolley, 2010a).
Marilyn Waring\textsuperscript{178} has challenged the economic view of the world as that of the ‘masters’, where their mistresses’ work ‘counts for nothing’ (Kember, 2004). Waring suggested that rather than accepting that ‘economics is a social science, which we know it is ... people try to treat it ... as if it empirically has this capacity like the natural sciences’ (2004). Since publishing her initial research, Waring has reflected on the measurement of economics more savagely. In a letter to the *NZ Listener*, she referred to the loss of endangered native birds, whose value is computed as negligible, but whose conservation value may be immense.

All the estimating of values did not make it easier to exercise judgment across a range of variables ... [economics] is just another social science, and can have no more claims to clinical, detached, objective or dispassionate approaches than [any other social science] (Waring, 2010).

In this she has joined environmentalists such as Nicholas Sterne, and educationalists such as Nesta Devine, in critiquing paternalistic values disguised in neutral terms. Economic growth models may be under threat, with challenges to sustainable planetary ecology. In an employment ‘marketplace’ where growth may not be a given, we can question the view of education as having ‘exchange-value’ in the employment market.

\textsuperscript{178} Waring was a very young member of parliament in 1978 in the Muldoon led National parliament. She subsequently took up an academic post at Auckland Institute of Technology. She has published on economics. She has a wider readership following in Canada than in her homeland. *Counting for Nothing* was a feminist analysis of work in the private sphere of the home.
8 Enstehung: emergence of economic science

Concepts adapted from economists Carl Menger, Karl Popper and Vilfredo Pareto, which are discussed in this chapter, were not simply new discoveries, but a ‘whole new “regime” in discourse and forms of knowledge’ (Foucault, 1984g, p. 54). I set out how nineteenth and early twentieth century economists sought objective measures and evaluative tools, which included those of marginal utility, ordinal ranking and a rigorous testing of hypotheses as in other sciences.

Nineteenth-century empiricism brought ‘Newton’s mathematics and Bentham’s utility into intimate association with economic theory’ (Cotter & Rappport, 1984, p. 511), with the consequent ability to support economic policy in the twentieth century. Moral political economy with its ethos and ethics of paternalistic care for less fortunate groups waned. Twentieth century writers, following Lionel Robbins, instead emphasised Wertfreiheit\textsuperscript{179} economy. After the 1930s, political economists no longer counted sets or groups. The mathematical equation became concerned with aggregates of individuals. It was the aggregation of groups\textsuperscript{180}, of comparisons with an excluded group with an accepted mean, which offered hope to policy-makers as Keynesian economics, with its strong welfarist veneer, was overthrown. Instead, there was a new sovereignty, the governmentality of the individual, who could choose a life trajectory, invest in him or herself as an embodiment of capital, and support an accrual of national wealth. HCT offered new policy solutions for both parents and their offspring to grow the economy. For the Chicago School, and its HC supporters, Gary Becker, Jacob Mincer and Theodore Schultz, effects of power had come together to merge into a discipline that offered a ‘set of propositions’ with a synthesised theory (e.g. Becker, 1975, 2007; Mincer, 1974; Schultz, 1971, 1973). The conjoint theoretical concepts which laid the

\textsuperscript{179} Value free – German term

\textsuperscript{180} Aggregate of individuals are assumed in computation units such as ‘firm’, ‘family’ or ‘nation’. Each individual is seen, for modeling purposes, as a utility maximising individual. See Deaton & Muellbauer (1980). Aggregates of such individuals are, again for modeling purposes, assumed to be multi-person units, which demonstrate the same behaviours.
foundation for this regime were marginal utility – with the framing the ordering of preferences as a mathematical science (whereby preferences could be ordered); and the scientific hypothesis that theories should be tested for their falsifiability.\textsuperscript{181} The descent of use-value and the ascent of exchange-value was an illustration of Foucault’s concept of savoir: ‘not a change of content ... nor theoretical form ... [but] a question of what governs statements’ (Foucault 1984g, p. 54 emphases in original).

Several theoretical constructs dating from the early nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth centuries were to support the power of twentieth century economics. David Ricardo and both J. S. Mill and his father James had viewed as an issue of equilibrium, the balance between production of food from available land, and increases in population. As the population increased, their argument went, so the marginal land was brought into production, at greater cost and with less profit accruing (Mill, J. S., 1965, bk. i, ch. xii). This first view of scarcity meant there was uncertainty in the market which meant the prices of produce could not be predicted. Menger’s marginal utility theory represented a second shift. Based on the ordinal ranking of preferences, this theory was to become central to the theoretical framework of twentieth century economics, and was utilised by the theorists of the Chicago School. The third construct, Pareto-optimal ranking (discussed below), by which scarce resources could be allocated efficiently, removed any vestige of subjectivity, leaving the mechanics of the market sovereign.

Contemporary micro-economics is concerned with individuation of economic interest. A sub-section of micro-economics, econometrics is a field of study that has been increasingly used by contemporary international agencies and nations, to offer advice on welfare policies (Giovannini, 2007; Lazear, 1999; OECD, 2007a, b). Its usefulness to politicians came from its drawing on economic theory reconceptualised from nineteenth-century political œconomy, which in the twentieth century became viewed as an objective science. The earlier, debatably

\textsuperscript{181} Popper, 1945, in the last of his three articles on the Poverty of historicism stated ‘the doctrine of tests by way of deduction (‘deductivism’), and of the redundancy of any further ‘induction’, since’ theories always retain their hypothetic character (‘hypotheticism’), and the doctrine that scientific tests are attempts at falsifying theories (‘eliminationism’); see also the discussion of testability and falsifiability (p. 79, fn2).
subjective ideas were now viewed by those seeking political advice as a mathematically robust science, offering dispassionate theorems to state advisers. The economically empirical concepts mentioned above, together with a shift in mathematical computation (discussed below), supported the emergence of the ‘science’ of econometrics. Although the concepts were historically contingent, they were redefined as value-free universals, which are robustly empirical. The building of such concepts in the twentieth century supported the power-full discipline of contemporary economics.

Tensions in nineteenth-century science, Hayek suggested, had placed ‘man, midway between natural and social phenomena [:] of the one of which he is an effect and of the other a cause’ (Hayek, 1935 cited in 1952, p. 66n.). Economists, keen to join the ‘hard sciences’, and not to be seen as allied to soft disciplines such as history or sociology, consciously adopted a scientific posture. Robbins suggested economists were like scientists operating in a social laboratory. ‘You invent in science hypotheses, you test them for their logic … you try to falsify them or you try to verify them, it is a matter of words – by collecting relevant facts’ (Robbins, 1998, p. 58, cited in Thomas, 2007, p. 415). It was this ‘matter of words’ with which Robbins and Hayek among others struggled: how did mankind verify and recognise ‘truth’?

8.1.1 Unsettled problems: the issue of lineage

Difficulties to be addressed by these twentieth century economists included the nature of man, the nature of science, and the management of a nation’s populations. Alfred Marshall spoke of the rapid changes in the understanding of principles about ‘economic truth’ (1897, p. 117). General principles, he said, ‘no longer wield the big battle-axe and sound the loud war cry’ (p. 118). Economists at the cusp of the twentieth century saw the hard sciences like physics as an aspirational model. To realise this model in their discipline they would have to reposition the prevailing view of mankind and the world; to define new economic epistemologies (e.g.
Fisher, 1918). Tensions between the Baconian and Descartean\textsuperscript{182} views of the world were at the heart of the tensions – how were ‘facts’ to be determined? There was sustained debate about methodology: could natural or empirical laws be known through inductive or deductive methods?\textsuperscript{183} Could one deduce from a local example wider patterns and laws of nature?; or should one be working from the general to the specific? Such a quest involved a rejection of the earlier views of political œconomists. Robbins took the title of his 1929 essay ‘Unsettled Problems’ from the J. S. Mill paper of the same name, as he and others wrestled with issues in the newly-defined discipline. Robbins and other economists in the 1930s were searching for new insights to replace nineteenth-century empiricism. The political œconomists had engaged with the debates about the determination of natural and empirical laws throughout the nineteenth century. At the turn of the twentieth century, there were economic clubs and societies in Britain, Europe and America founded by economic enthusiasts keen to debate ideas and promote their discipline (Viner, 1963).

J. S. Mill struggled most to understand and formulate ‘laws’ in the nineteenth century. In his 1822 ‘Two Letters on the Measure of Value’ and his 1848 Political Economy (Mill, J. S., 1965), he set out his views of the unresolved matters of his day. As a utilitarian, he saw laws of ‘consumption of wealth as the subject of a distinct science … [as] the laws of human enjoyment’ (Mill, J. S., 1965, p. 318, cited in Cooter & Rappoport, p. 510).\textsuperscript{184} Daniel Hausman suggests that Mill took ‘it for granted that individuals act rationally in their pursuit of wealth and luxury and avoidance of labor… [B]ut since he d[id] not have a theory of consumption, he develop[ed] no explicit theory of rational economic choice’ (2008, p. 15). J. S. Mill and his father James, together with their contemporaries, debated the definitions of political œconomy (de Tocqueville, 1834–1859; Marshall & Harrison, 1963; Mill, J., 1966, 1820; Mill, J. S., 1844b, 1965, 1866; Ricardo, 1966; Say, 1821, 1880). Mill and his contemporaries wondered if there was an

\textsuperscript{182} One preferred induction, the other deductive methods of assessing reality. Bacon saw induction as most useful, while Descartes believed that the senses could confuse or mislead humankind. He privileged rationality (Slowik, 2009; Klein, J., 2011)

\textsuperscript{183} What Popper, describing the scientific nineteenth-century quest, labelled as ‘laws’ and ‘trends’ (Popper, 1945, p. 944).

\textsuperscript{184} Robbins took the title of his 1929 ‘Unsettled Problems’ from the Mill. In 1930 he gave a series of lectures on the nature and significance of economics. Lecture 2 was entitled ‘The Place of Induction’. The place of induction is twofold, he argued: ‘a) firstly it in this way we are enabled to select our assumptions, b) Secondly it in this way we test the suitability of our theories’ (Howson, 2007, p. 436).
innate, given human knowledge and about the place of empiricism. Had the firm edifice of the ‘collection of truths’ (1844b, essay v) of political œconomy, they wondered, been established on shaky ground? How useful was it to see political œconomy as analogous to the running of a household? Was there a more suitable analogy? Such were questions nineteenth-century economists engaged with. ‘Political Economy,’ J. S. Mill wrote, was a science and not an art ‘that ... is conversant with laws of nature, not with maxims of conduct’ (1844b, essay v).

J. S. Mill explored the concepts of a priori and a posteri as reputable theories. The a priori concept assumed that ‘there are truths which it is necessary to prove, not for their own sakes, because they are acknowledged, but that an opening may be made for the reception of other truths which depend upon them’ (Mill, J. S., 1838, rev. 1859). Such a belief was an ‘intuitionism’, a general sympathy. It was an acceptance ‘that the laws of the human intellect have a necessary correspondence with the objective laws of the universe, such that these may be inferred from those’ (Heydt, C. (2006) Collected Works, XI. P.343, cited in Hausman, 2008, p. 15). J. S. Mill emphasised the need for evidence, as set out by the a posteri, or empirical position. ‘He must use observation to see, reason and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decisions’ (Mill, J. S., 1930, p. 71). Political œconomic conclusions can be true, he asserted, only ‘in the abstract ... [concerning] causes common to the whole class of cases’ (1844b, essay. v, emphasis in original). Economists, he concluded, needed to know both the laws and the exceptions to the laws of the science. J. S. Mill did not resolve all ‘issues’ posed by the emergent discipline, however. Economists a century later were still seeking solutions to the discipline’s tautologies.

Austrian School economists and their colleagues at the London School of Economics (LSE) had been exposed to the philosophy of logical positivism in the 1930s, and argued against any ‘intuitionism’ or sympathies. Science, in this positivist view, privileged only observable events (Cooter & Rappoport, 1984, p. 522). Knowledge of wealth and its acquisition was a science, LSE economists argued in line with the positivist framework, and thus free of subjective

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185 Jacob Viner (1917, p. 236) engaged with the concepts of induction and deduction. Induction, he argued, had a psychological and intuitive basis, unlike the deductive method which can bring a greater certainty.
evaluations. In his 1926–1927 *Nature and Significance* lectures, Robbins gave definitions of what he thought was ‘the science of material satisfactions’. His second lecture, titled ‘Place of Induction’, began:

the functions of such [empirical] studies are twofold:

(a) Firstly it is in this way that we are enabled to select our assumptions.
(b) Secondly it is in this way that we test the suitability of our theories (cited in Howson, 2007, p. 441).

A decade later he argued that ‘we need induction and deduction, observation and theoretical system; and that the important thing is to suit the method to the job’ (1938, p. 352).

Firstly there is what is known as the inductive method. It consists in the deduction of general statements from the examination of particular instances. You make an exhaustive study of the habits of pigs and you say pigs reach certain proportions at certain parallels of latitude ...

Secondly there is what is known as the deductive method. Starting from certain proved generalizations or certain hypotheses which you are valid you deduce what must happen if the forces described in these generalizations are combined in isolation (cited in Howson, 2007, p. 439).

In *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (1932), Robbins argued that as economics concerned all human action it could apply theorems from other disciplines to economic concepts, models and techniques. Tensions between the ideal and the real world – what ‘ought’ to be and what ‘is’ – remained, however. He was careful to craft his argument in scientific terms. ‘Economics acquires its practical significance, [when it] can make clear to us the implications of the different ends we may choose ... [Difficulties may arise] because our aims are not coordinated ... To such a situation economics brings the solvent of knowledge’ (Robbins, 1945, p. 157).

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186 Robbins began to critique the standard ontology of economic theory and history he had been taught as a student in the late 1920s. He published papers on ‘the unsettled question’ of the definition of economics. He was particularly influenced, initially, by Philip Wicksteed’s ‘The Scope and Method of Political Economy in the Light of the “Marginal” Theory of Value and Distribution’ (1914) and his *Common Sense for Political Economy* (Howson, 2007, p. 438).
Robbins, in search of a ‘truth’ like W. S. Jevron\textsuperscript{187}, Marshall, and J. S. Mill, was keen to move away from the marriage of morals with political economy: ‘[e]conomics...is in no way to be conceived, as we may conceive Ethics or Æsthetics, as being concerned with ends as such’ (Robbins, 1945, p. 32). There was, he argued, no ‘penumbra of approbation round the theory of equilibrium. Equilibrium is just equilibrium’ (p. 143). Economics was value-free, in the Weberian\textsuperscript{188} sense – when operating only with ascertainable facts, aesthetic value judgements about whether or not people were prepared to buy pork, for instance, were irrelevant. What was relevant was the way purchasers can assume equilibrium, outside subjective value; this was a ‘pure theory’. No longer were economists concerned with ‘prudence, justice and benevolence’ as their eighteenth-century predecessors had been (Smith, 1790, p. 239). In Robbins’s argument, economics was a neutral mechanism, operating scientifically, uncontaminated by moral considerations. Moreover, he concluded, the chief assumptions of this science were ‘applicable whenever and wherever the conditions which give rise to economic phenomena are present’ (Robbins, 1945, p. 80). As a science, economics now stood outside any specific historical or social conditions, and Robbins perceived it as universal in its application to all acting entrepreneurs.

Robbins wished to ensure there were no ‘gaps in the unity of theory’ of material welfare economics (Robbins, 1945, p. 3). With the publication of his work there emerged a new ‘conceptual framework’ which replaced the nineteenth-century ‘science of material welfare’ with a twentieth century definition of scarcity. Price theory, which called for competition in the marketplace to ensure the best value, relied on the concept of scarce resources, marginal utility and Pareto-optimal ranking. Such ideas were not central to economics before the ordinalist revolution of the 1930s (Cooter & Rappoport, 1984, p. 512). Prior to the ideas mooted by Menger, Pareto and John Hicks (discussed below), nineteenth-century economists had focused on the production of what was necessary to alleviate want (Cooter & Rappoport, 1984, p. 512).

\textsuperscript{187} See below. Jevrons, Leon Walras and Carl Menger are considered to have independently discovered the theory of marginal utility.

\textsuperscript{188} Max Weber, German philosopher, believed that science was value-free, able to be validated as laws (see Giddens 1971, p 138).
The concept of material wealth was utilised for national aggregates and when making comparisons between groups of people who varied widely in their unmet needs, for instance ‘the rich’ and ‘the poor’. The rationale for relieving want was based on both increased efficiency and the resolve to civilise by encouraging the lower classes to use their higher faculties (p. 514).

8.2 Is stability of measure possible: cardinal or ordinal rankings?

Ordinal ranking, gave the consumer a clear model by which to prioritise purchases. Economists could view choice as a scientific matter. For Hayek:

[T]he pure logic of choice ... has demonstrated conclusively ... constructing and constantly using rates of equivalence (or “values,” or “marginal rates of substitution”), i.e., by attaching to each kind of scarce resource a numerical index which cannot be derived from any property possessed by that particular thing ... In any small change he will have to consider only these quantitative indices (or “values”) in which all the relevant information is concentrated; and, by adjusting the quantities one by one, he can appropriately rearrange his dispositions without having to solve the whole puzzle ab initio or without needing at any stage to survey it at once in all its ramifications (Hayek, 1945, p. 20).

Twentieth century economics viewed preferences as ordinally ranked, which represented a shift from earlier political œconomic concepts (Cooter & Rappoport 1984, p. 503). Robert Cooter and Peter Rappoport set out a shift in the conceptual framework of political economics: the materialist welfare definition, an empiricist framework, and the concept of interpersonal utility was replaced with a new order. This new framework utilised a scarcity definition, a positivist methodology, and an ordinalist utility (p. 508). The welfarist

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189 The rationale for relieving want was based on both increased efficiency and the resolve to ‘liberate the race from the wants of “the brute and the savage”’ by encouraging these classes to use their higher faculties, Cooter and Rappoport argue (1984, p. 514).

190 Peart and Levy (2005, p. 853) note F. Y. Edgeworth’s theory ‘that biological fitness mapped to the capacity for pleasure: as people were biologically superior, they possessed a greater capacity for pleasure’. 159
framework supported political economists to make comparisons of groups based on material, i.e. subsistence needs. The notion that individuals could be computed, that groups could be ordered mathematically and statistically and then compared to each other, was a later idea.

In many ways the nineteenth-century economists of the material welfare school had held a concept of ‘utility that was similar to the old idea of use-value’, Cooter and Rappoport argue (1984, p. 516). Economic thinking derived from Jeremy Bentham’s 191 cardinal concept of ‘material wealth’, whereby the utility of one person could be observed then added to that of another, and thus by computation one could arrive at a total utility for society (Bentham, 1776, cited in Cooter & Rappoport, p. 511). Cooter and Rappoport suggest that the nineteenth-century political economists had asked different questions from those asked by later economists – such as ‘if income is redistributed to the poor, with no change in national income, does national income go up or down?’ (1984, p. 508, fn. 2). An increasingly secular view of the world involved a questioning of the biblical dictum ‘go forth and multiply’ (Tomaselli, 1988, p. 27). There was a new concept of a national body with so many heads they could not be counted, requiring instead forecasts and estimates of measure (Foucault, 2004b, p. 245). Economics in the nineteenth and early twentieth century required new measures, and different tools to measure the populations’ wealth.

Over the latter part of the nineteenth century, a number of concepts had shifted radically. An earlier, mediaeval-Tudor model of maintaining social, class and price stability was replaced by a model of growth (Wilson, 1975, p. 63), which remains a fundamental aspect of twenty-first century economics. The ‘just price’ had been a central consideration in the mediaeval model; a concept foreign to dynamic economics. Bert Mosselmans suggests that a shift, as important as that of ordinal to cardinal mathematics, occurred when the economic world began to be seen as a ‘non-reproductive environment with external scarcity’ instead of a ‘reproductive environment with internal scarcity’ (Mosselmans, 1998, editorial). In a reproductive environment such as that understood by Malthus, human beings were seen as

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191 As author on works on utility, the rich could transfer wealth to the poor to make the latter better off, Bentham greatly influences the Mills.
responsible for the rise of scarcity by their actions. In this view the misguided exercise of free human will was the cause; if humans upset the population balance by irresponsible breeding, famine would result. Prudence should be exercised to ensure equilibrium. However, in a non-reproductive environment, such as that envisioned by economists like Ricardo and Jevrons, scarcity is determined externally. It is land that is scarce. Land, unlike the production of food, is not the product of human labour. Thus careful husbanding of the resources is necessary. Scarcity was, Mosselmans suggests, determined by outward causes—a mechanical system. The Ricardian model of scarcity positioned the state’s and the citizen’s responsibilities differently.

Nineteenth-century economic writers took one of two ontological views of the state: either it was seen as organic and interdependent, as viewed by Ferguson, Steuart, and von Thünen (see Tawney, 1950, pp. 27–29, cited in Wilson, 1975, p. 63); or mechanical, subject to natural laws, as portrayed by Adam Smith, Jevrons, and Menger. While descriptors such as growth or organic depictions may be viewed as metaphors, they are also indicators of a deeper ontological structure: a ‘root metaphor’, i.e. a fundamental image of the world and its makeup (Brown, 1976, p. 170; Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006). In the first ontological view of the state, the environment, like all organisms, was portrayed as unpredictable, subject to disease and thus needing human intervention to mediate risk and ensure balance. When the political economist perceived the environment as organic, the role of statesmen was seen as actively interventionist, so that antidotes could be applied to alleviate possible social problems and manage risk. In the second ontological view of the state, man was perceived as operating in an environment with predictable, rhythmical patterns that could be anticipated. In this mechanical view, state regulation clouds the understanding of natural laws, and upsets their equilibrium. The latter view positions the economic individual as capable, as seeking to understand such natural laws and able to navigate the free, dynamic market.

There were tensions between these two views which were difficult for nineteenth-century theorists to reconcile. If there were natural laws, surely these could be discovered (Mill, J. S., 1844). In seeking to describe the set of principles underlying the new discipline, J. S. Mill together with his contemporaries sought answers to the nature of man, the nature of science, and its relation to economics, together with the management of a nation’s populations.
and wealth (see e.g. Price, 1771; Godwin, 1964; Malthus, 1827; Mill, J. S., 1965; Ricardo, 1821; 1962; Skinner, 1966; Steuart, 1767; see also Wicksteed, 1905).

8.3 The emergence of economics as a science

Three economic constructs were to be adopted and tested in the period between the two World Wars which were to offer apparent resolutions to perceived problems. As noted above, these constructs were: (1) marginal utility, a formula that denotes a higher price for a scarce product traded in a market; (2) the examination of falsifiability, a scientifically testable hypothesis; and (3) Pareto-optimal ranking, i.e. the ordering of preferences, the method by which individuals rank purchase choices. The combination of these factors was to give status to the advocates of micro-economics in the post-war era. It would also give enhanced responsibility to the agentic individual.

In the 1930s, when many countries were experiencing high unemployment, it appeared that economics as a discipline had been unable to prevent a severe depression. Planned socialist economies, such as that of the USSR, were an anathema to conservative economists. Economics, its disciples felt, was facing a crisis, and in seeking answers to this they discovered what they thought were scientific bases for the discipline. Robbins was not alone in sharing the Austrian School’s abhorrence of centrally planned socialist and Marxist economies; as well as seeing laws in history’s presumed patterns. ‘Men wiser ... than I have discerned in history a

192 For example, the titles of the recent articles ‘Did Hayek and Robbins Deepen the Great Depression?’ by L. H White and ‘What – or Who – Started the Great Depression?’ by Lee E. Ohainan (2009).

193 The individual is responsibilised, the lone entrepreneur operating to maximising self-interests.

194 Robbins laid much of the fault for historical materialism with the ‘German Historical School [of Schmoller, which] was responsible for the intrusion of all sorts of sociological and ethical elements which cannot, by the widest extension of the meaning of words, be described as Economic History’ (Robbins, 1945, p. 40fn., emphasis in original). In his Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (1871) Menger had reacted against Schmoller’s Historicism School. In ‘The Place of Menger’s Grundsätze in the History of Economic Thought’ (1973) Hayek viewed Menger’s model as empirical; rather than historical laws and patterns there was knowledge of probability. See too Hayek’s ‘Economic Order and Individualism’.
plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern’, wrote Karl Popper scathingly (p. 100). In *The Poverty of Historicism*, Popper (1944a,b, 1945) called for rigorous debate about subjective methods in economics. While it may be possible to centralise all power, it was not humanly possible to centralise all knowledge, he noted, using Austrian Catallaxy concepts. Therefore there was a need to test hypotheses for falsifiability, as experiments in science led to unforeseen results. No longer would there be any confusion between inductive and deductive principles. The use of theory for prediction, in Popper’s view, could only be accepted once it had been subjected to independent tests of its falsifiability, as small changes are made to each criticism. Popper too, supported a hard science, based on rigorously testable methods. In doing so he adopted many of the Austrian School’s ideas as scientific principles, including that of the atomistic individual, and Hayek’s theorem of catallaxy.

Twentieth century economics, once it had apparently overcome some of the problems of the time, offered assertive clarity about economic principles and laws. Economics ‘has been successful because, above all, [it] is a genuine science’, Edward Lazear argued (1999, p. 1), noting the expansion of the discipline’s influence and scope since the 1960s. The power of economics ‘lies in its rigor. Economics ... follows the scientific method of stating a formal refutable theory, testing the theory, and revising the theory based on the evidence’ (p. 5). The discipline ‘emphasizes rational behavior, maximization, tradeoffs and substitution, and insists on models that result in equilibrium. Economists are pushed to further inquiry because they understand the concept of efficiency’ (p. 53). Such a definition of economics could not have been written in the nineteenth century. Lazear uses concepts which were refined in the early twentieth century, and which served to support the power of micro-economics in the later part of that century.

The concepts of marginal utility and falsifiability were supported by a third concept, that of ordinal ranking, which was developed by Pareto. It was this concept that Lazear (1999)

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195 Popper was quoting from H. A. L. Fisher: rather than searching for imputable laws, Popper argued, social scientists should seek practical models and be like a Galileo or a Pasteur (Popper, 1944, p. 86).

196 From 1937 until after World War II Popper was based in Christchurch, New Zealand.

197 Hayek noted that Menger wrote ‘compositive’ above Schmoller’s term ‘deductive’ (Hayek, 1979 p. 67, fn. 4).
values as giving economics efficiency. Pareto’s preference-ordering theories have been summarised by Kenneth Arrow (1972). If there is no ‘feasible allocation which will make everyone better off … it was held that a competitive equilibrium necessarily yielded a Pareto efficient allocation of resources’ (p. 111), which means market resources are allocated so that no one person is worse off: even if were it to mean that some become better off than others. Distribution, Arrow emphasised, has nothing to do with a just or equitable outcome, as the rich can have their resources enhanced further. Pareto integrated the theory of markets with his concept of constrained optimalisation as a central feature of efficiency. His theorem is often cited in the context of a voting system: If there is no dictator and if every individual prefers $x$ over $y$, then the group will prefer $x$ over $y$; if a third choice is added, of $z$, and each individual’s choice remains unchanged, the group’s choice will also remain unchanged. Provided no one individual is worse off, the outcomes are described as ‘Pareto-optimal’ or ‘Pareto-efficient’. This has become ‘economic common-sense’.

Further, as will be discussed in the next section, responsibility for welfare was now the responsibility of each rational individual. Active behaviour in markets, to achieve equilibrium, meant each calculating entrepreneurial agent needed to be ‘alert to opportunities’ (Kirzner, 1976, part 3, essay 1, p. 14). Such entrepreneurs visualised the ‘market as a process, rather than as a configuration of prices, qualities, and quantities that are consistent with each other in that they produce a market equilibrium situation’ (part 3, essay, 1, p.11). When operating in workplaces and firms, the concept of equilibrium is now viewed as ‘the outcome of the profit-maximizing activities of firms and the attempts of consumers to best satisfy their preferences as an equilibrium in which there is no excess demand on any market. What this means is that anyone who wants to buy anything at the going market price is able to do so’ (Hausman, 2008). It also provided a technique for predicting and modelling elements essential in micro-econometrics.

In Robbins’s day the family was not a focus of economic predictions. At the turn of the twentieth century, prediction of change, through the supply-demand axis, was not possible.
Robbins wrote:

We can conceive, as did the classical economists, of a final equilibrium in which the value of the discounted future remuneration of labour is equal to the discounted costs of bearing, rearing, and training labourers...

We have done nothing which enables us to predict changes in the ultimate conditions of supply of labourers. The broad vicissitudes of opinion on the optional size of family or the most desirable entourage of slaves—these lie outside the scope of our technique of prediction (Robbins, 1945, pp. 132–134).

However, half a century later, HC theorists like Becker and Nigel Tomes (1986) were arguing that the family was a genuine site for economic examination:

Ever since Pareto ... economists have continued to discuss inequality in the distribution of earnings, income, and wealth among individuals and families. However, they have paid little attention to the inequality within families over generations as determined by the relation between the incomes or wealth of parents, children, and later descendants ... assume that parents must finance investments in children either by selling assets, by reducing their own consumption, by reducing the consumption by children, or by raising the labor-force activities of children (pp. 257, 267).

In the discourse of these theorists family became a central site of interest and concern; what Lazear (1999) describes as ‘economic imperialism’ had evolved. The savoir of late twentieth century HCT micro-economics placed population, fertility, and familial maximisation of behaviour – with parenting of children viewed as consumption costs – at the centre of normative economics. A former HC theorist who is now an apostate, Mark Blaug, suggested in his 2007 paper on welfare economics that Adam’s Smith’s invisible hand was a modern reading through the lens of Walras and Pareto as translated by Arrow, i.e. a modern interpretation (p. 8). Blaug was scathing of ‘The Chicago View’s ... good approximation assumption’. Each optimum must be studied on its own merits, with any comparisons relying on an accompanying ‘massive amount of context specific knowledge’ (p. 13). Blaug’s attack on the accepted historicist ideas concluded that the canonical concepts only apply to utopian models of dynamic growth – not to the real world. The assumptions of Hicks, Arrow and even Amartya Sen that interpersonal comparisons of utility can be ruled out as unable to be observed are mistaken,
Blaug argued. It is not possible to place upper or lower bounds on any efficient allocations and income transfers (2007, p. 12). Nevertheless, the Chicago School’s ideas of stable preferences, maximising behaviour, and market equilibrium were accepted by the majority as a science of micro-economics. The ideas of the nineteenth century supported the rise in the twentieth century of the economic approach to the family. They were a part of a new savoir.
Which ancestor? Taking stock of possibilities

Nineteenth century political œconomists sought scientific answers to questions such as is there an essential a priori moral human? Has society any influence on the individual? What is the place of ‘value’, (use & exchange) in economic evaluative judgments? In this chapter I set out attempt to define economic laws (praxeology, catallaxy, measures) and methods. I then cover an application of economic laws to education. Finally, I set out an argument about the imperialism of economic sciences.

There were struggles for dominance among a variety of economic theories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The nineteenth-century debate centred on the questions of whether there is an essential humanness and whether there should be a moral element in rational trading. Part of the problematic of the time that continues to confound economists was the place of ethics in economics. Das Adam Smith Problem (Viner, in Coase, 1976, p. 543), of the self-seeking individual, devoid of social benevolence, as set out in Adam Smith’s Wealth, was an apparent contradiction to the moral citizen of Smith’s earlier work Theory, a work advocating Stoic morals. Gustav Schmoller (1881) called into question Adam Smith’s view that the high earnings of a physician or lawyer were just. Smith had failed to clarify, Carl Menger suggested, whether the propensity to truck, trade or barter was a fundamental element of human nature (Menger, 1976, p. 175). As theorists of the discipline increasingly identified economics with the field of the objective sciences, any moral element was viewed as subjective. The problematic hinged on what was deemed to be use-value, and what should be exchanged for a price.

There had traditionally been a ‘cross-fertilisation’ of ideas between Britain and Europe, with some like Schmoller, being influenced by the Scottish School of political œconomists which included Adam Ferguson, Smith and James Steuart. Many of the

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198 The Adam Smith Problem is the name given to economists’ anxieties about the two major Smith works. It sets out apparent tensions between the types of individuals in his writings.
European economists were influenced by Kantian and Weberian ideas about the ‘ideal man’ exercising free will. Ludwig von Mises’ adaption of Menger’s view directly affected some of the ideas of economists at the London School of Economics (LSE), such as Philip Wicksteed, Lionel Robbins’s mentor. Antony Giddens (1971), two generations later, explored the contemporary influences of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber on capitalism. As a result of the diaspora from Nazi Germany a number of the Austrian School members moved to Britain and America. The concepts of ‘praxeology’ and ‘callactics’ developed by Hayek and von Mises were to directly influence HCT. The attraction of praxeology was that its evolutionary development over time allowed active individuals to develop logic by engaging with the environment. It supported an alternative to the large bureaucratic social government abhorred by the Austrian School. The focus on acting man was in contrast to the collective, context-specific views like those of Schmoller, Marx and Friedrich Engels. Evolutionary development was viewed as a scientific alternative to any historical specificity, i.e. historicism.

9.1.1 Competing ideas on value: Marx, Engels and Schmoller

Schmoller, a member of the German Historical School, thought it ironic that at the very moment, the English nation was consolidating its great power with a combination of tariffs and naval wars, a doctrine of the ego of the individual should be formulated (1884). At this time there were two radically diverse views of the economic world: the socialist and the individualistic. The Austrian School economists detested the views of socialists such as Marx and Engels who viewed mankind as innately and collectively industrious, struggling together against social and geographic conditions. They maintained that through industry individuals would satisfy a variety of needs, which could lead in stages to the abolition of private property and utopian cooperation. Marx and Engels posited four historical periods: the hunting-gathering period; a slave and land ownership period; a feudal period; and a capitalist period. The feudal period,
coincided with the emergence of nation states and in this period the labourer’s welfare was protected by the guilds. With capitalism’s emergence came a rise in the social means of production: a time of the silent usurpation by the capitalists of the modes of production and exchange. The labourer was unable to sustain himself in difficult times, Marx and Engels argued, as all employment contracts were narrowed at this stage, to a variable price contract between the wage-labourer and the capitalist hirer.

Both ‘use’ and ‘exchange’ were social values which came from concrete labour in Marxian theory. Marx and Engels, like other nineteenth-century economists, utilised a chemical analogy: the mutuality of market-exchange, they believed, transformed use-value into that of an exchange source. An essential consideration was the ‘amount of labour-time contained in a commodity, and therefore its exchange-value’ (Engels, 1970, Part 3). By adding value to the capitalists’ raw material with his or her labour, the worker added value, in exchange for wages. Private property removed the labourer from the ownership of production (Marx, 1859), so the worker was reduced to trading his or her labour. Despite their ideas setting out a progressive stepped development from hunter-gatherer to utopia, the Marxist ideas on value were not so very different from Adam Smith’s.

Schmoller, however, believed the market was a ‘moral union of confidence’, the site of a ‘just’ distribution of wealth. Rather than ‘nature’ organising demand and supply, it was a social process of ‘human relations and powers, human deliberations and actions’ (1881). Justice was in the eye of the beholder; a complexity that in his view was not easily resolved. There could be no universal rules for man or economics as each era was historically contingent. As nations grew more civilised, with more complex social relations, the state and the individual needed a ‘growing interaction, a harmonious joint-movement’ (1897). ‘The idea that economic life has ever been a process mainly dependent on individual action...is mistaken’ (1884), Schmoller asserted. These ideas were an anathema to Menger, who expended much of his academic energy refuting them.
9.1.2 Struggles for definition: praxeology

In his *Principles of Economics* (1871), Menger argued against measuring the ‘value of land or the services of land by reducing them to labor services’ (p. 167). Attempting to differentiate use-value from utility was a fruitless exercise, he maintained. The fact that individuals used goods directly in isolated households was irrelevant once such people perceived the value of trading goods to satisfy their needs. Use-value was ‘the importance goods acquire for us because they directly assure us of satisfaction of needs’ (p. 228, emphasis in original). Menger’s definition of exchange-value was the importance goods promise us satisfaction *indirectly*. Price was the defining factor. What was important was how people ranked their needs and determined the price they would pay: ‘[i]n a market with many buyers and sellers, the price reflects the valuations of the buyer least willing to buy and the seller least willing to sell (Klein, foreword in Menger, 1871, p. 8). Menger believed that as mankind accumulated capital, more of the originally free factors would be valued as scarce goods (Hayek, 1976, p. 19, fn 1.).

Menger’s second major publication, *Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der politischen Oekonomie insbesonde,*¹⁹⁹ was published in 1871. In this he rejected Schmoller’s familial analogy. The nation’s wealth had no social element; it was in his view ‘only the summation of individual economies in a nation’ (p. 194, emphasis in original). It is the concept of aggregations of the basic unit, the rational trader, that underpins the contemporary methodology of HCT models.

Menger contributed two central concepts to economics – representing measures as cardinal rather than ordinal; and the effect of scarcity on price (Hayek, 1976, p. 19). The idea of scarcity of goods, of marginal utility, where the individual competed to get or offer the best price is no longer viewed today as problematic. Menger had defined first a useful object, then a good, then a scarce or economic good, including:

¹⁹⁹ The English translation: Investigations into the method of the social sciences with special reference to economics.
... factors determining its value in terms of its marketable exchange. Only, in this argument, when things are scarce, and are sought for social reasons, will individuals be able to determine the marginal price in the market, as things are exchanged. Value is determined by the wants of the person acting on his knowledge of facts; of relations between things, or “services” (Hayek, 1976, p. 275).

Von Mises had come across these ideas as a student. In the 1920s he attended the Menger family colloquia, as well as the ‘Vienna Circle’, a private seminar held by Moritz Schlick and Richard von Mises, Ludwig’s brother where there was debate on ideas such as logical positivism or the a priori of human nature. The concept of Walrasian ordering of mathematics was part of such debates. Menger’s behavioural ideas, his definition of realism, and observable behaviours were the basis for von Mises’ theory of praxeology. He in turn influenced Hayek and Robbins.

Like Menger, von Mises believed that any social economy is the sum of its individual economies; the only interaction was that of the unfettered market (von Mises, 1920, 1945). Believers in ‘society’, he argued, ‘must also accept ... private ownership in the means of production’ (von Mises, 1951, C.13). There was no parallel between the individual family and collective national wealth; the only relational aspect was the interactions between traders and prices. He differentiated between methodology and rationality, seeing these as separate and discrete concepts. Although the methodenstreit had, in von Mises’ view, been won by the Austrian School, there remained the issue of reduced capacity for human actions. Thus, in his Human Action von Mises moved the human element to the forefront of economics. His theory centred on the individual, preferring Menger’s belief in ends and means over any collective or social reality (1949, p. 92ff).

200 Leon Walras one of the nineteenth century economists, together with Jevrons and Carl Menger introduced the concept of marginal utility, using ordinal ordering
201 The name given to the theoretical dispute between the German and Austrian Economic schools. Gustav Schmoller headed the first, Carl Menger, the second.
‘Out of the political economy of the classical school emerges the general theory of human action, *praxeology*,’ wrote von Mises, explaining the essential kernel of his theory (von Mises, 1966, p. 1, emphasis in original). In von Mises’ view the epistemologies of praxeology were antecedent to historical facts; logical mankind had evolved through active engagement with his environment (von Mises, 1920, 1945). Since to act is the outcome of sentient, rational individual human decision, any ‘conception of sentient thinking, willing, and acting communities is merely anthropomorphism’ (von Mises, 1951, C.1). There is no such thing as a social being, only an individual, von Mises argued – a phrase that would be later echoed by Margaret Thatcher. In von Mises’ theory, praxeology had both subjective and objective use-values which must be differentiated. Action itself did not measure utility or value; mankind chooses because prices are derived from subjective use-value (von Mises, 1966, p. 122). Money was an example of an institution which had evolved as a social solution (von Mises 1912) to support such choice.

In *Human Action* von Mises stated his view of acting man:

Economics is the youngest of all sciences ... [It has opened up new understandings of the] regularity in the sequence and interdependence of market phenomena ...

[The economist] must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature. Human action and social cooperation [are] seen as the object of a science of given relations, no longer as a normative discipline of things that ought to be ... It is the science of every kind of human action. Choosing determines all human decisions. Nothing that men aim at or want to avoid remains outside of this arrangement into a unique scale of gradation and preference (von Mises, 1966, pp. 1; 3).

The regularities of his theory were *a priori* concepts of logic and mathematics ‘not subject to verification or falsification’ (1966, p. 826). Von Mises was to oppose both Robbins and Hayek, however, who were attracted to Karl Popper’s ideas on verification
(Howson, 2007). Hayek, once he arrived at the LSE and fell under new influences, challenged von Mises’ idea that the market was *a priori*, rewriting his article on the economics of knowledge (Hayek, 1937). This rift in the relationship with von Mises made their differing epistemological views explicit (Kresge & Wenar, 1994, p. 72).

Hayek and von Mises, while still in Vienna, had collaborated on a theory they named ‘catallaxy’, the theory of natural order without planned ends. This concept, central to Hayek’s later writing, was to influence the economists of the Chicago School. Hayek believed that the complexity of the market acted as a natural nexus to myriads of transactions, although traders ‘may never be in a position to watch the whole process or... predict its result’ (Hayek, 1952, p. 41). While catallaxy remained central to the writing of both, Hayek privileged the market as the governing force over von Mises’ ratio-centric individual.

### 9.1.3 Struggles for definition: evolutionary institutions

Hayek’s ontological view of mankind involved two concepts: *taxis*, the conscious ordering of systems and institutions, and its binary concept, *cosmos*, an unconscious, spontaneous natural ordering. His interest in sensory stimuli in the brain was sparked by Schlitz’s 1918 *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre* (Leube, 2003, p. 16). Hayek had also worked briefly, in 1919, with Constantin von Monakow, a brain anatomist. Both Hayek and von Mises believed that ‘mental events are a particular order of physical events within a subsystem of the physical world’ (Leube, p. 17). Hayek believed such organisms were subspecies within the whole system which enabled the organism to survive; a theory he revisited in his *Sensory Order* (1952).

The rules of human conduct, ‘especially those dealing with several property, honesty, contract, exchange, trade, competition, gain and privacy’, had evolved over

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202 ‘Catallaxy’ was adapted from the nineteenth-century economist Archbishop Whatley (Levy & Peart, 2008).
203 General theory of knowledge.
time, argued Hayek (1988, p. 12). Humans, as rational beings, learned to distinguish between the sensory order and that of the physical world; then to differentiate orderly actions that regulate behaviour. Preferences, Hayek stated in his 1937 Presidential Address to the London Economic Club, are ‘datum’: important in determining equilibrium. The concept of complete or transitive preferences was central to Hayek’s theory of catallaxy:

[T]he knowledge and intentions of the different members of society are supposed to come more and more into agreement ... In this form the assertion of the existence of a tendency toward equilibrium is clearly an empirical proposition, that is, an assertion about what happens in the real world which ought, at least in principle, to be capable of verification ... Pure Logic of Choice starts [from] facts which we know to be common to all human thought ... They are therefore universally applicable to the field in which we are interested – although, of course, where in concreto the limits of this field are is an empirical question. They refer to a type of human action (what we commonly call ‘rational,’ or even merely ‘conscious,’ as distinguished from ‘instinctive’ action) (Hayek, 1937, p. 44-5).

No one person or aggregate of people, he believed, will be able to operate in an environment of complete knowledge. It is the market that operates as a mechanism to order preferences, within which the rational trader acts.

Hayek’s wide social experiences supported his belief in the universality of economic laws. Hayek was raised in Vienna, served in the Austro-Hungarian army in 1917, visited America in the 1920s, moved in 1931 to the LSE as Tooke Professor of Economic Science before moving to Chicago and then Frankfurt. While in London he continued to distil the elements of catallaxy. The ability to acquire skills, Hayek maintained, does not stem from reason, but evolves from human interaction in civilised institutions. Institutions such as the family mould the genetic material, as the individual learns moral judgement by absorbing the results of a tradition not genetically transmitted (Hayek, 1988, p. 22). The actions or inactions of others may benefit us; independent actions of individuals can, over time, create order. For example, the first
individual stumbling through the woods creates a path. As others, each individual operating alone, follow this track, it becomes more evident, easier to follow, until gradually there are well-defined routes (p. 40). Such a process may have been initially stumbled upon, but was constantly repeated as if new, as instanced by the formation of prices (Hayek, 1945, p. 7; 1952, p. 41).

Both von Mises and Hayek demonstrated deep anxiety in the 1930s and 40s about the Soviet and Fascist governments. Their early experiences of the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s bureaucracy had also coloured their distrust of ‘big government’ (see Sauer, 2007, p. 219, on the makeup of the Empire). From these experiences they generalised about the inefficiency of all bureaucratic governments (e.g. von Mises, 1944), which also, they felt, proved the empirical validity of catallaxy. As government officials lack complete knowledge, states that plan for their citizens prevent the market from operating efficiently, they argued. In his accessible and widely-read book, *The Road to Serfdom*, 1944, Hayek set out his concerns about government intrusions into the freedoms of the individual. In a post-war environment exhibiting anxiety about communism, for example the phenomenon of McCarthyism in the United States, his ideas were eagerly accepted. Hayek established and became founding president of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. This was to be a meeting place for those purporting to be economic liberals and was to be an influential political force in the next few decades (Price, 1993; Hartwell, 1995). Members like Robbins, von Mises, Hayek, Popper and others met annually to offer seminars on topics such as ‘historicism’ and ‘scientism’ and publish tracts on economic freedom (e.g. Hayek, 1944, 1960 1963; von Mises, 1920,

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204 Hayek was careful however to differentiate the economic ‘laws’ of economic evolution from the socialists which only look like ‘the kind of laws which the natural sciences produced ... in an age when these sciences set the standard’ (1943, p. 59).

205 Founding members included Milton Friedman, his brother-in-law Aaron Director, Frank Knight, William Ropke, Michael Polanyi and George Stigler, as well as Robbins, Popper and von Mises. Later members included several from New Zealand including Don Brash, former Governor of the Reserve Bank, later National Party leader and Act Party leader; Roger Douglas, finance minister in the Fourth Labour Government and member of the 2008-11 National-led coalition; and Ruth Richardson, a finance minister in the Fourth National Government.
1949; Robbins, 1935; Popper, 1957). Concern about planned ‘big government’ has left its sites of origin and shifted; it was now to be found in numerous contemporary economic and policy documents.

Many of von Mises’ and Hayek’s theorems were to influence economists of the Chicago School. Forward-looking behaviour, teleological ideas, stable preferences and Hayekian catallactics suffused Gary Becker’s HCT writings. Competition could be a powerful tool for understanding the behaviour of allocating scarce resources and the maximising of human interests (Becker, 1981, p. 322). These ideas were to become popularly accepted in the New Zealand of the 1980s. With the recent emergence of neuro-economics, Hayek’s influence could be seen as being doubly-embedded in policy.

9.2 Interminglings: economics migrates to education in the mid-twentieth century

We should ‘invest in children’, Brian Easton (1979) told the Early Childhood Convention in Christchurch. Seeing children as an investment, he continued, was a way to bring the informal (or private) parts of the economy into the mainstream where its value could be measured and the implications of parents as a production unit assessed (p. 3). Such ideas were those of Chicago School economists like Becker, Jacob Mincer and Theodore Schultz who had published throughout the 1970s and early 1980s on children, families and education (Becker, 1975, 1976, 1981, 1992, 2007; Mincer, 1962a, 1974; Mincer & Ofek, 1979; Mincer & Polacheck, 1974; Schultz, 1971, 1973). Their ideas were to assist in the breaking down of the private domain of the home. Economists were to be increasingly interested in aspects of life behind the front doors of suburbia.

Issues of a rationality of freedom, as autonomy of decision were invoked; as with all rationalities their very power is an indication of their ‘danger’ in the Foucauldian meaning of the term. The rationality of freedom was to be expanded mightily in
Chicago economics in the last third of the twentieth century. Parents’ altruism should be sufficient to encourage investment in their children’s care and education, rather than seeking assisted side-supply tax measures from governments, the Chicago School theorists suggested. State provision of education blocked the free operation of the market, Becker argued (1991, p. 369); instead parents could weigh benefits and costs to themselves and the family (1992, p. 42). Becker differentiated between elementary schooling and adult on-the-job training. The latter was about investments in people, while schools were firms specialising in the ‘production of training’ (1975, p. 37).

Educational choice was particularly important in the areas of vocational training, as people spent time building their skill-levels. Youthful decisions to invest in education would pay dividends in later life, Becker believed, as people work hard when their productivity is greatest, then retire later in life, when their productivity is low (1975, p. xv). Skills the individual gains are his or her ‘property right’ (1975, p. 26), however, as the individual’s acquisition of skills was a cost to the firm (p. 17), it had an interest in ensuring employees’ skills did not ‘depreciate’ (p. 22).

Time became a newly-emphasised element in the equation: firstly there was a consideration of foregone earnings during the training period (1975, p. 99); secondly, household behaviour was influenced by anticipated future marketplace incomes (p. 228). Economists should now take into account both calendar time and the trajectory of income over the lifecycle (Ghez & Becker, 1975). Teleological concepts were crucial in the newly constructed education theory, with interest in the individual’s development of skills over the economic lifespan. We should never rest on our educational laurels but constantly hone our skills and assess opportunities in a competitive environment, the Chicago School discourse suggests.

Becker summarised his theory in his Nobel Prize for Economics acceptance speech:

[T]he economic approach ... does not assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or gain. It is a method of analysis ... I have tried to pry
economists away from narrow assumptions about self interest. Behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences ... Forward-looking behavior, however, may still be rooted in the past ... Actions are constrained by income, time, imperfect memory and calculating capacities... and also by the available opportunities. These opportunities are largely determined by the private and collective actions of other individuals and organizations...Utility maximization is of no relevance in a Utopia where everyone’s needs are fully satisfied, but the constant flow of time makes such a Utopia impossible (1992, pp. 38–39).

Time is a scarce resource to be effectively prioritised and used efficiently.

Such ideas reflected Becker’s Malthusian attitude to fertility. The economic factoring of time out of the workforce, and the numbers of children in families linked reproductivity to productivity. In making actuarial investment decisions, the family was viewed as ‘active, rather than passive’, and ‘endogenous not exogenous’ (1988, p. 11). The promise of sustained growth complemented the fertility of populations, and built ‘on the special properties of education’ (p. 5). Actuarial investments in the family’s HC could arrest any possible economic decline of family fortunes in cases of redundancy or illness. Under-investment in their children by poor families created a culture of poverty, in contrast to the rich who gave gifts and bequests, Becker argued.

As women spend less time in the labour force than men, they had less incentive to invest in skills, Becker asserted (1975, p. 74). The institution of marriage and the family was viewed as a ‘firm’ (1988, p. 10). The choice of partners took place in ‘a reasonably efficient marriage market’ (p. 10), where parties ranked their mate’s preferred traits by complete versus transitive preferences (1981, p. 327). Once marriage partnerships produced offspring, child-rearing became a cost-benefit consideration. Economic investments included consideration of parental effects of altruism, bequests and investments in their children’s ‘health, training and other capital’

206 The term endogenous had its origins in the work of Robert Lucas (1988) and Paul Romer (1994, p. 4).
207 A modeling assumption, based on predicted behaviours about choice. Transitive preferences, exercised by the rational entrepreneur, are assumed to be stable over time.
(1988, p. 8). Politicians could consider reducing the high cost of childcare to both families and the state, thus releasing women of child-bearing age into the workforce (Ghez & Becker, 1975, p. xiv). Child-rearing was a serious economic decision, which created gaps in earnings. Births in this view could be viewed as ‘flows’ to the ‘stock’ of children, just as car purchases are flows to the stock of cars (1976, p. 191). For families, having children had become a formal economic consideration.

For Becker the family was a Hayekian institution that had evolved over time, and required prudent resource management by all its members to prevent the risk of degeneracy, or having a ‘rotten kid’ (1981, p. 9). His *A Treatise on the Family* presented a model based on ‘investment demand’ (1981, p. 157), with costs impacting ‘negatively on lifetime earnings of children, and positively on the costs of rearing children and investing in their human capital’ (p. 177). Becker and his colleague Robert Barro argued in number of publications that in the cost of rearing children ‘the utility of parents depends on the utility of each child as well as on the consumption of parents’ (Becker & Barro, 1986, p. 1). Parents’ own consumption needed to be balanced against the net cost of children on this consumption as ‘utility maximization requires equality between the marginal benefit of an additional descendant and the net cost of producing that descendant’ (p. 177).

Becker and others continued to publish on such topics (Barro, 2000; Barro & Lee, 2000; Becker & Barro, 1986), seeing HCT as a lens through which to view the world and offering solutions on issues as varied as gender, class, ethnic and international inequalities (e.g. see Bergmann, 1996; Figart & Mutari, 2005). Becker wrote on the economic role of polygamous and monogamous marriages; on criminal behaviour; on the place of economics in determining happiness (Becker & Rayo, 2007).208 There was

208 “[M]en and women chose mates ... in well organised “markets”. Some species including fireflies, locusts, grouse, antelope ... literally form arenas ... where males and females jockey for position ... and choose mates ... A market is efficient if all participants with the same characteristics expect to obtain the same fitness income’ (Becker, 1991, p. 208)
little in this new invasion into the family that could not be investigated under the guise of efficient allocation of resources within the domain of the home. As the understanding of external/ internal national wealth was examined in the eighteenth century, so was the public/private production of education as wealth investigated in the twentieth. There was a fundamental shift in the view of private spaces, previously viewed as inviolable (Foucault, 1984).

Becker’s colleague Milton Friedman adapted Schultz’s and Becker’s ideas in a more radical argument advocating for ‘less-government involvement; freedom to invest in one’s self’, where education was viewed as a solely private matter. Friedman’s essay ‘The Role of Government in Education’ (1955) was later incorporated into a book co-authored with his wife, Rose, titled Free to Choose (1962). Vocational schooling was a ‘form of investment [analogous to] … non-human capital’. The state had no interest in either supporting the individual or any benefits accruing from this education, the Friedmans argued. The state could support individual education apart from that of ‘primary and secondary education … [where] the three R’s cover most of the ground’ (Friedman, 1955) by offering vouchers as an entitlement (Friedman & Friedman, 1962, p. 86). Any education-entitlement monies could be allocated to individuals, rather than schools. Individuals would be freed to seek out the service that best suited their needs in exchange for such a voucher. If the state stays out of the relationship, the individual bears all the costs and gains all the benefits from the returns on this investment (1962, pp. 100–101). ‘We must have a system’, wrote the Friedmans (1980), ‘under which those who are not able or do not go to college are not forced to pay for those who do.’ They published on the topic of education-entitlement over several decades (Friedman, 1980, 1995; Friedman & Friedman, 2003a).

312). Animal patterns of mating have been investigated (p. 307) and conclusion drawn about choosing mates based on efficiency.

209 It was this shift that the young Brian Easton rationalised as being helpful in his speech to the Early Childhood Convention in Christchurch in 1979 (Easton, 1979).
The debate on vouchers has remained central to neoliberal debate about the role of the state in education in many Western democracies (see e.g. Roy & Douglas, 2009). While the New Zealand state has not adopted the voucher scheme in any major way, government accepts only primary and secondary schooling as its responsibility, viewing the ECE and tertiary sectors as ‘financial partnerships’ between the state and individuals. The ‘twenty free hours’ offered by FLG in 2007 for 3-4 years olds attending a teacher-led service allocated to eligible families, was a subsidy over and above the bulk funding. It might be considered a form of voucher.

The actively-choosing individual remains as the ontological base of HCT. Becker published a number of articles on human capital at the same time as Pierre Bourdieu (1983) was writing in France on Social and Cultural Capital, yet the two theorists’ understanding of human nature differed radically (see 1983; 1998). Some, perhaps including the authors of the NZ Treasury document Government Management (GM), have confused the two theories.

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210 Money follows individual children considered to have an ongoing disability, presently through the Ongoing and Reviewable Resourcing Schemes through the Ministry of Education’s Group Special Education Services.
211 Twenty-free hours was available to eligible families in ECE centres who had opted into the scheme. Centres were not able to charge fees for these hours.
212 The authors of GM appear to confuse the two concepts (NZ Treasury, 1987, pp. 237–238, 252–253fn) because of their semantic similarities.
Table 2: Comparisons of differing epistemologies: Bourdieu and Becker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bourdieu’s epistemological framing</th>
<th>Becker’s epistemological framing</th>
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<tr>
<td>Knowledge is organic and dynamic (1983)</td>
<td>Knowledge is the ‘empty vessel’ model. (Becker, 1993, p. 327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on an investigation in a specific locale: French colonies and society</td>
<td>Sought an economic science with universal application across both the Western and developing worlds (Becker, 2008, p. 95ff).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal institutional power is a prime cause of inequality (1983)</td>
<td>Located responsibility for poverty with individuals who made poor decisions about the utilisation of time, and maximising opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The individual is formed in a social milieu, the ‘habitus’(1983)</td>
<td>The ‘head’ governs the interests of the economic unit, the family (Becker &amp; Tomes, 1976)</td>
</tr>
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Bourdieu (1998) refuted any similarities between Becker’s and his own work, describing the Walsarian theories as a ‘mathematical fiction’ – individualistic in its intent, meeting the needs only of supra-national agencies such as the IMF and OECD and their bankers. With a reserve army of employees made docile by flexible employment conditions, and an ideology of the neutrality of the market, a Darwinian world of competitive struggle has been supported; in fact neoliberal economics, Bourdieu concluded, was an ‘infernal machine’ (1998). While Bourdieu’s ideas were influential in educational circles in New Zealand in the 1980s, it was Becker’s concepts which were to be more significant to the New Zealand education policy milieu over time, underpinning the Education Act 1989 and subsequent education policies.

This section has set out the struggles in the nineteenth century between the socialists’ view of collectivity and those supporting the theory of the atomistic trader. Central to these struggles were definitions of the uses of ‘goods’, and how these were ‘valued’ in relation to the market. The ideas of Smith, Menger, and his Austrian School disciples had, by the mid-1970s, been accepted as economic fact, which laid the foundations for the neoliberal contemporary understanding of market operations. It was the groundwork upon which the human capital theorists were to build and which
supported the economic invasion into the previously private site of the family, with children being seen as a consumption good.

9.3 A ‘secure stock of knowledge’?

Our aims are first and last scientific. We do not stress the numerical aspects just because we think that it leads right up to the core of the burning questions of the day, but rather because we expect, from constant endeavor to cope with the difficulties of numerical work...the suggestions of new points of view, and help in building up the economic theory of the future. But we believe ... that indirectly the quantitative approach will be of great practical consequence. The only way to a position in which our science might give positive advice on a large scale to politicians and business men leads thorough quantitative work. For as long as we are unable to put our arguments into figures, the voice of our science ... will never be heard by practical men. They are, by instinct, econometricians all of them, in their distrust of anything not amenable to exact proof (Schumpeter, 1933, pp. 5–12).

In this section I set out the emergence of economics as a robust science in the early part of the twentieth century. The theorists hoped to slough off any vestige of moral suasion that remained as traces in the discipline. With the Walsarian and Mengerian breakthrough in the uses of cardinal ordering, and the ability to use algebraic representations in forecasting, theorists believed economics rated with other ‘hard’ sciences such as logic and physics.

Econometrics is a field of study that has been increasingly used by contemporary international agencies and nations to gather information on statistical trends of national economic interest. Such analysis is used by governments to support policy about the welfare of nations’ populations (Giovannini, 2007; Lazear, 1999; OECD, 2007a,b).\(^\text{213}\) Twentieth century economists took concepts from political œconomy which they reformulated with new mathematical analyses.

\(^{213}\) Walras, Jevrons and Menger in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and then Robbins (1945), Popper (1944), Hicks (1939) and later economists from Chicago University (Knight, 1922; 1934; Hayek, 1931; 1952; 1973).
There was a shift in the epistemology of economics in the period between the work of W. S. Jevrons, Léon Walras and Menger, and that of the Chicago School theorists. Economists debated what was needed to raise economics to the status of a hard science (e.g. Schumpeter, 1933; Coase 1937; Hayek, 1937; Robbins, 1938). Was mathematics, the early twentieth century economists wondered, an engine of enquiry or a method of recording? Jevrons, Walras and Menger all independently suggested the uses of cardinal ordering in economics. Jevrons had argued that if economics was to be a science at all it would be a mathematical one (Jevrons, 1871, cited in Schumpeter, 1933, p. 8). The idea of marginal utility was to be one of the concepts that supported economics’ rise to the status of a science. By the late 1930s there were books, papers and serials dedicated to the newly-emerged discipline of econometrics – evidence of a ‘ponderous materiality’ (Foucault, 1979). In the first edition of the journal *Econometrica*, Joseph Schumpeter wrote, ‘[w]e do not impose any credo – scientific or otherwise – and we have no common credo beyond holding: first that economics is a science, and secondly that this science has one very important quantitative aspect’ (1933, p. 5 emphasis in original). The exponents and audience deemed the discipline to be value-free. Some nineteenth-century economists such as Alfred Marshall and A. C. Pigou had remained interested in the civil notion of welfare economics: of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. This concept too came under debate. If economics was a science, surely its effects would apply to all equally; it should be ‘objective’ in its methods and findings.

There was much discussion in the twentieth century about the notions of positive economics and normative economics. John Hicks held that ensuring the efficiency of an economic organisation was the central tenet of positive economics (Hicks, 1939, p. 699). Positive economics deals with what is; with assumed reality. The

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214 Joseph Schumpeter, while remaining in the Austrian School camp, was keen to reconnoitre the weapons of opposing schools. He utilised the metaphor of warfare in his overview of the ‘forerunners’ of twentieth century economic thought in ‘Review of the Troops’ (1951). His *Common Sense* also used military metaphors such as ‘special bearing on the mission’ (p. 10), and terms such as ‘banners’, ‘coalitions’ and ‘breach’.

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notion of welfare is implicit in normative economics, which deals with what *ought* to happen (see Becker, 2005a, b, 2008; Becker, Murphy, & Werning, 2003; Becker & Tomes, 1986; Schultz, 1971, 1973). The political attraction of normative economics is its ability to predict; thus offering options of diverting or minimising problems. Modellers make assumptions about the political goals of the discrete portion of humanity they have deemed to be a societal category, some of which will ‘regress … from the mean’ (e.g. Becker & Tomes, 1986, p. s3). An example of a normative assumption is that utility-maximising individuals rank their preferences in rational ways. This behaviour is then taken for prediction purposes as a basic computation assumption. If the goal of all rational-choosing humans is to increase one’s wealth then, *ipso facto*, wealth accumulation will be deemed to be the sole or main goal of aggregations of individuals, like the nation, or community.

Milton Friedman, like Hicks, suggested positive economics could be an ‘objective’ science, ‘in precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences’ (1953, p. 5). His *On the Methodology of Positive Economics* sought ‘to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions’. Normative economics, he maintained, could not be independent of positive economics, as any ‘policy conclusion necessarily rests on a prediction about the consequences of doing one thing rather than another, a prediction that must be based – implicitly or explicitly – on positive economics’ (p. 5). While there may appear to be a disjuncture between models and the real world, the science of economics can meld any lack of theoretical specificity.

[Any] criticism … [is] based almost entirely on…perceived discrepancies between the ‘assumptions’ and the ‘real world’…A fundamental hypothesis of science is that … there is a way of looking at or interpreting or organising the evidence that will reveal superficially disconnected and diverse phenomena to be manifestations of a more fundamental and relatively simple structure. And the test of this hypothesis, as of any other, is its fruits …If a class of ‘economic phenomena; appears varied and complex, it is, we must suppose, because we have no adequate theory to explain them (sic) (Friedman, 1953, p. 33).
Theory is thus merely a ‘filing system for organizing empirical material’, supporting the theorist to offer good science which is fit for the purpose [as the relevant question to ask] about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is ...whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand ...whether [the theory] yields sufficiently accurate predictions’ (p. 15). Friedman’s theory became accepted for modelling purposes, as prediction could support policy more effectively than testing for falsifiability.

Micro-economics, the branch of economics examining the minutiae of the discipline, needed to assume that the rational actors’ behaviour could be predicted, whether they were making choices about meat or marriage. Unlike the Muslim Sultan, the rational (American) actor chose monogamy as a stable preference. The individual component of this model was then aggregated using HCT to give a national picture of skills and knowledge. It was this concept of ‘aggregated wealth’ that was to interest OECD policy analysts in the 1970s, where micro-econometricians were increasingly utilising norms as measures of efficiency in predicting institutional outcomes (Baron & Hannan, 1994, p. 1140).

There was a three-fold increase of published HCT articles in the decade between 1977 and 1988 (p. 1113, fn.). Many HC advisers to international agencies, Simon Marginson (1993) noted, were simultaneously publishing academic papers and advising a range of supra-national and national agencies on economic matters.

The political acceptance by international agencies of the HCT model as predictive tool assisted its dominance in the following decades. There had been, Marginson noted, a brief period of eclipse in the 1970s before HCT returned in a reinvigorated form, supported by ‘screening’ theory. This theory viewed education as a sieve for employers
(Marginson, 1993, p. 44), with qualifications acting as a ‘surrogate for qualities employers want, such as willingness and the capacity to learn’ (Blaug, 1976, pp. 849, cited in Marginson, p. 44). The scientific acceptance of economic forecasting, and of its branch of micro-economics, HCT, was unchallenged by the end of the twentieth century. It acquired a sovereign power to advise and effect change based on the science of the discipline.

**9.3.1 Seeking continuities: the pedigree of science**

The evolution of economics was not a linear rise; there had been obstacles to overcome in defining economic laws. It was the actions of economists seeking to overcome perceived problems in the discipline that supported its power. Menger had suggested that when a large number of confusions existed it was the science of economics itself that needed reform (1871, pp. 144–145, in Stigler, 1937, p. 247). He was one of several theorists who sought evidence of laws which would remove any trace of subjectivity from the discipline and embed economics as a science with undisputed maxims.

English political œconomists had struggled, late into the nineteenth century, with the validation of laws or principles of economics. Alfred Marshall perceived that political œconomy offered a growing body of investigative tools (1874, 1897; Marshall & Harrison, 1963, p. 425); Jevrons privileged logic over deduction (Brown, 1976; Wicksteed, 1905); Edgeworth sought a model for perfect competition (Hicks, 1930); while Menger wondered if economics constituted a ‘law of nature’ or an ‘empirical law’ (Menger, 1985, p. 199). Whatever the law, all accepted the need for economics to be seen as a science comprising ‘complex economic phenomena evolv[ing] from their elements according to definite principles’ (Menger, 1976, p. 46). Hayek (1973) explained that Menger’s theory came to be central to Austrian School economics because:
He began with a basic element and used it to build models of possible configurations [showing that] in principle the hypothesis about individual behaviour that micro-economic theory requires can be stated [without reliance] on subjective observation [with] ... adequate knowledge of the probability that certain typical situations would occur ... [It] could be shown that they could be combined only into certain types of stable structures but not into others. In this sense such a theory would indeed lead to predictions of the kind of structures that would occur, that are capable of falsification...Micro-economic theory ... remains thus confined to ... ‘pattern predictions’ ... [which supported] the whole body of micro-theory which was gradually built up on the foundations of marginal utility analysis (Hayek, 1973, pp. 277–278).

The economists of the 1920s and 30s were hoping to give economics a gravitas it lacked in the early days of the Great Depression. Despite Hayek’s caution about some ‘overpure’ economists wishing for ‘an empirical science’ (Hayek, 1937, p. 6), Frank Knight and George Stigler agreed with Robbins’s assertions that economics was a ‘pure theory’ (Knight, 1922; Stigler, 1943, p. 354). There is, wrote Knight (a Chicago School theorist), ‘a science of economics, a true, exact, science with laws as universal as those of mathematics and mechanics’ (‘Selected Essays’, cited in Knight, 1956, p. 135). Such an empirical understanding of the social was later to become a central tenet in Becker’s HCT.

### 9.3.2 What counts as method?

Another pillar was to be offered to support the discipline that would serve to reduce any confusion between economic laws and trends: Popper’s theory of falsifiability offered an enhanced scientific methodology. With the discipline’s elevated status, economists’ writings needed constant peer critique to ensure rigour (Popper, 1944, p. 119) and that ‘only the fittest theories survive’ (Popper, 1945, p. 80). Economics as a discipline needed to test hypotheses for falsifiability – to ensure there
was no possibility of unforeseen results. Hypotheses should be tested by the use of ‘artificial experimental isolation’, as in the physical sciences (Popper, 1945, p. 81). The use of theory for prediction, in Popper’s view, could only be accepted once it had been tested for its falsifiability. Popper further argued that scientists needed to agree on the base unit of computation for economic purposes – such as viewing individuals as basic ‘building stones’. Together Popper’s and Hayek’s economic ontologies were to further the science of economics. While Popper accepted Hayek’s model of catallaxy of evolutionary progress, Hayek adopted Popper’s test of falsifiability, marrying it with Menger’s ‘methodological individualism’ in his model of praxeology. A third concept, explored below, supporting Hayek’s theory was the law of diminishing marginal utility.

However, rich and poor alike were able to equally utilise the value-free market. The key problem of the times, of the measure of ordinal or cardinal mathematical arrangements, continued to create concerns. Economists also wondered how the discipline could accept Jeremy Bentham’s theories about the happiness of the majority, together with the evolutionary concept of development of individuals and species. Darwin’s concept of improvement of the species was to be married, as a preferred economic consideration, to long-run investments over the individual’s lifespan. Despite the theory that rich and poor in this value-free theory were able to utilise the market in equal ways to achieve their ends, outcomes for groups and individuals continued to be problematic. Of issue was the difference between groups of the population. A problem for the theorists was: if all humans were accepted as being from the one species, why were some groups of the population inferior in their economic outcomes? To a discipline which perceived itself as objective, universal, unaffected by historicism, this was a significant problem, which led to a tendency to simplify. For example, Becker (1987) was able to say, in the economists’ ‘infelicitous language’ (p. 5), that the poor

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215 Popper used Hayek’s example of a physicist’s examination of the social world, where she cannot know all aspects of complex problems.

216 The term ‘building stones’ was Menger’s. Popper believed that the task of economists was to ‘analyse our social models carefully in descriptive or nominalist terms; viz in terms of individuals’. A postulate that may be called, he said using Menger’s term, ‘methodological individualism’ (Popper, 1945, p. 80).
under-invest in each child ‘because they have larger families and less stable marriages’ (p. 10), with no acknowledgement of any wider social conditions; despite having earlier referred to himself as a ‘sociologist’ (p. 9).

Theodore Schultz was chair of Chicago University Economics Department in the 1960s, when he and colleague Edward Denison began publishing on the theory of human labour as capital. Were, Shultz wondered (1961, p. 1039), ‘differences in education ... the major explanatory variable for the very large non-white differentials in the United States’? (1961, p. 1039). Schultz’s interests included bringing marginal land into production, at greater cost and reduced profit. His experience of American farmers’ increased skill-level in growing wealth formed the basis of his HCT. Politicians needed a definition of what counted as public, what private, and the definitions needed to be made in cognisance of policy implications. As farmers needed to differentiate between household and farm expenditure, he argued, so boundaries between public and private expenditure on education were also needed (1961, p. 1035). Questions about the social market arose for the HC theorists. Should society ‘deny advanced education to women merely because most of them do not enter the labor market’ (p. 1038)? Were people willing to trade leisure for labour in a Pareto-improving program of childcare benefits linked to work (Clement, 2005, p. 11)? The pillars of ‘economic logic’ set up by the Austrian School, Popper and Pareto could support the new theory (Shultz, 1961, p. 1035).

9.3.3 What counts as measure?

It would be hard to imagine the contemporary discipline of economics without numbers. Numbers allow economists to compare, contrast, measure, and represent realities. In contemporary society, numerical representations are ever-present in political and educational realities. Rose (2000d) notes the power of numbers in Western liberal societies, where for example, they are used to sort political parties’ status at elections (p. 198). Economists when forecasting skill formation use the ‘adult earnings
of the child, which have a well defined cardinal scale’ (Cunha & Heckman, 2008, p. 5). Educational determinations of the excellent, average and mediocre involve evaluations of students who are ranked by teachers numerically. Such figures are also used for economic projection purposes, despite raw scores not being ‘intrinsically satisfactory’ (p. 10). This section sets out some historical contexts and a new emergence of mathematical evaluations in the discipline of economics.

Economics had reached a pinnacle of influence after World War II as a hard science, despite Hayek’s cautioning (Hayek, 1974). The use of numerical representations of exchange-values had coalesced into a powerful theory of transitive preferences which remained stable over time. The ontological shift in the relationship of the individual with the economic world was radical. Marshall (1885, p. 154, cited in Hodgson 2005, p. 334) too had suggested that while ‘subject-matter is constant and unchanged in all countries and in all ages’ the mathematical understandings may shift from age to age. However, the ordinalist revolution in the 1930s was well-embedded by the beginning of World War II. Economics was no longer the preserve of the gentleman, but of the scientist, noted Robbins. He described the sudden change in the 1930s in understanding the ordinal nature of valuations as an example of Occam’s razor (1945, p. 56, n. 2).

Here the economic ‘Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility’, which implies, Robbins suggested, ‘that the more one has of anything the less one values additional units’, came into play. Robbins argued that ‘the more real income one has, the less one values additional units of income. Therefore the marginal utility of a rich man's income is less than the marginal utility of a poor man's income (Robbins, 1945, p. 140). In 1934 Knight had written about the ‘rich-man-poor-man’ difficulty. He argued that as all entrepreneurs establish the same relative marginal utility between two products, the market was in fact “objective” for all exchangers’ (Knight, 1934, p. 664).

The discourse of competitive advantage – be it between individuals, groups or countries – requires cardinal ranking as the neutral measure of order in contemporary
It is the balance, Hicks noted, between economic distributive justice and efficiency (Hicks, 1939, p. 712). Both rich and poor utilise the market in equal ways to achieve their ends; as marginal utility is a mechanism that allocates without judgement or evaluation. Hicks’s *Value and Capital* (1939) built on ordinal utility with an indifference curve, whereby individuals valued things as even, worse or better. The marginal rate of substitution exists in economic theory if, when consuming, an individual will continue until the ratios between the marginal utility and the prices of goods is equal. ‘Positive economics’ ought to be the same for all men, ‘irrespective of one’s political view point’ (Hicks, 1939a).

Policy was not the concern of economic theorists; Hicks held that social choice was not a normative issue, but a political one. The economics of economic policy was ‘too unscientific in character to be a part of economic science’ (Hicks, 1939, p. 696, emphasis in original). Leave policy to the politicians, as a subjective matter, he suggested, as any proposal that goes beyond a point that is universally accepted and any political conclusions depend on the social values of that investigator. Such views were to become known as New Welfare Economics. Hicks and Keith Arrow shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1972. Arrow’s acceptance speech referred to the earlier view of material wealth as ‘the sum-of-utilities’ (Arrow, 1972, p. 113). In the context of social choice, that choice could be judged in terms for the consequences for the members of society; in the present terminology, this means in terms of the individual preference scales ... it is implicit in classical utilitarianism that there is a second level at the individual judgments that are aggregated into what might be termed a welfare judgment (1972, pp. 128–129).

Hicks, like Robbins, rejected the moral and political solutions of earlier welfare economists (e.g. Marshall, 1892, 1897, 1969; Marshall & Harrison, 1963; Pigou, 1932). Many economists believed that economic scientists should clearly differentiate their
role, which should never be that of the social reformer, i.e. subjective and value-laden (see e.g. Stigler, 1943). Diverting discussion from questions of equity over equality placed the onus for one’s welfare on the atomistic freely-choosing individual.

With *Value and Capital* Hicks believed he had resolved the issue. He utilised Pareto’s concepts of constrained optimalisation to demonstrate that all are equal in the sight of the market. Every economic policy imposes a loss on some people, Hicks argued. Social income, he argued, was a ‘mere aggregate of possibly inconsistent expectations’ (Hicks, 1939, p. 178). All human beings’ prosperity was affected by the price system, and by the economic activities of others. His model allowed for a balance to any loss, which ensures all have in fact benefited (Hicks, 1939, p. 711). Over time all would benefit; none would be worse off than previously. Or if there were any who were worse-off, they could be compensated by the better-off (Kaldor, 1939, p. 555).

Concepts in economics were increasingly used to compare discrete groups against others, in apparently objective ways, shorn of any moral evaluative judgements.

Schultz’s and Denison’s theories synthesised praxeology, marginal utility, and the ordering of preferences together with ‘testable hypotheses’ (Schultz, 1973, p. 3) but introduced a new emphasis on time as a crucial element, such as predicted future earnings over lifetimes. Future earnings could be broken down into a ‘future consumption component and a future earnings component’ (Shultz, 1961, p. 1037), while a third consideration was that of education for skills and knowledge useful for the job. Schultz used an economic calculus to differentiate between humanist cultural education and education as vocational skill-training (1961, p. 1038).

Schultz used a new concept – that of ‘production functions including the bearing and rearing of children’ (1974, p. 6). Transitive preferences now involved considerations of ‘the economic value of education, job opportunities, the incentives to migrate towards better economic locations, opportunities to reduce infant mortality, and the improvement in contraceptive techniques and the decline in their cost’ (pp. 8–9).
Children, he noted in his 1979 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, were part of the poor man’s capital (see also Schultz, 1973, p. 7, S5). Concepts such as the value of children and the value of time, and the use of scarce resources to ensure good rates of return on the investments, could now be computed algebraically. Education, Shultz believed, had some value for a student’s current consumption, but was of a more important consideration as a future investment which could be recovered over a longer period.

| Although human capital takes many forms, including skills and abilities, personality, appearance, reputation, and appropriate credentials, we further simplify by assuming that it is homogeneous and the same “stuff” in different families. Since much research demonstrates that investments during childhood are crucial to later development (see, e.g., Bloom 1976), we assume also that the total amount of human capital accumulated, including embodied training, is proportional to the amount accumulated during childhood. Becker (1965) notes that human capital and earnings are determined by endowments inherited from parents and by parental (and public expenditures (5)) on his or her development:

$$H = \psi a i, \ldots, E$$

Ability, early learning, and other aspects of a family’s cultural and genetic “infrastructure” usually raise the marginal effect of family and public expenditures on the production of human capital; that is,

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial E} = \psi a > 0, \quad j = 1, \ldots, E$$

The marginal rate of return on parental expenditures \( (\psi a) \) is defined by the equation

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial E} = \frac{\partial H}{\partial E} \psi a = 1 + \psi a \psi a, \ldots, E$$

where \( \psi a, \psi a > 0 \) by inequality (5).

Figure 18: An illustration of algebraic formula in economics. Source: Becker & Tomes (1986, p. 56).

Numeric and algebraic measure had become an accepted mode of representing HCT concepts. These representations had links to the status of economics as a ‘hard’ science. Becker and colleagues utilised robust scientific procedures such as stating assumptions and hypothesising and propositions.

No longer was a mathematical representation an option when writing on economic theory, as it had been at the turn of the twentieth century. Economists, stated James Heckman, ‘developed and adapted tools of statistics and probability in an effort to understand, predict, and control the economy’ (Heckman, 1992, p. 876). Heckman and colleagues could debate, using cardinal ordering, the IQ scores of the Armed Forces Qualifying Test, the ‘bell-curve’; the ‘tail’; and ‘data sets’ (Heckman, 1995; 1998; Cunha, et al., 2005; Heckman & Masterov, 2006; Cunha & Heckman, 2008). Despite the criticism of the algebraic representation being, as Bourdieu (1998) suggested, a ‘mathematical fiction’, most HC theorists prefer such ways of engaging their audience.
The relation between numbers and politics, Rose has suggested, is ‘reciprocal and mutually constitutive’ (2000, p. 198), as political judgements are implicit in deciding what to measure and interpret. It is the valuing of numerical procedural elements that support power of education as individual investments able to be exchanged in the marketplace. Students seek an hierarchical ranking of their grades to demonstrate their value to prospective employers, when measured against their peers. Numbers are integral in the power/knowledge grid of economics, and of governments, who can plot change, progress and shifting patterns among the many heads of the nation. Numerical rankings of data forecasting are evident in the graphics throughout micro-econometric writings of, for example, in those of Heckman and World Bank (e.g. 2006; 2011). Figures give authority and mystique to economics; they are privileged over words, as a figure is ‘worth a thousand words’. Power/knowledge relations of figures constitute the rationality of the state.

In SPECE, too, scientific statistical graphs are used throughout the document to demonstrate changes over time in the chosen categories of Maori and Pasifika. Graphs show attendance at the different types of ECE services and overall participation by ethnicity attending any form of preschooling. By representing population groupings graphically, these groupings become a reality, in this case of sections of the population that are ‘under-represented’ in ECE in New Zealand. To question the underlying assumptions becomes more difficult when the ‘facts’ are

217 Among their tutoring lecturers, who are now valued for research outputs, a Performance Based Research Funding rank becomes similarly valued in the competitive employment world.
represented numerically and graphically.

There was a new form of sovereignty: the governmentality of the individual, who could chose a life trajectory and invest in him or herself as an embodiment of capital. Responsibility for both personal and national wealth was in the hands of the individual. I suggest the new understandings discussed in this chapter, supported by the ability to mathematically represent outcomes and forecasts, were not simply new discoveries, but a ‘whole new “regime” in discourse and forms of knowledge’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 54). Frank Knight had suggested that there could be no distinction between the economic and recreational individual, between money uses and other uses of time and labour (Knight, 1934, p. 667). Such an argument opened up the possibility of economic penetration into the private domain. There remained nothing within the human domain that was not subject to economic penetration.

To international agencies performance measures of countries are important. Institutions such as the OECD, IMF, World Bank and United Nations measure health and education differences in children’s cognition and vocabulary, early education and years of schooling (e.g. see World Bank, 2006 pp. 11, 35, 284). They measure inequalities between regions, across groups, as well as between groups and across generations (2006, p. 46). Yet it is admitted that measuring inequality is difficult, partly because ‘countries differ in their data collection systems. The lack of a uniform basis for measuring economic inequality in different countries has serious implications for comparability’ (World Bank, 2006, p. 38). Measurements remain a ‘problem of the present’. For example, the World Bank has published a number of Development Reports aimed at ‘building a good climate for investment and empowering the poor. The first pillar combined the strands of thinking on the primacy of markets and on the centrality of institutions. The second pillar [sought] the empowerment of poor people’ (2006, p. 277). Such market measures, they maintain, will provide security for the poor and support the UN Millennium Development Goals’ (UNMDG) aim ‘of halving the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day’ (p. 66).
9.4 A supra-agency interest: shall the poor inherit the earth?

With Jeffrey Sachs\(^{218}\) morality was once again reunited with economics in the twenty-first century. We need to overcome the ‘Malthusian Scourge’, argued Sachs, in August 2010, in a syndicated newspaper article (Sachs, 2010). Much of the intervention to prevent world poverty is merely a stop-gap measure, he asserted. While the nineteenth century focused on the health of nation and empire, the twenty-first needed to look globally at planetary conditions. While some countries experience economic growth, others, Sachs suggested, are in ‘Malthusian decline’, needing a ‘multi-pronged development strategy’ (Sachs, 2000, p. 598).\(^{219}\) Economic science, Sachs insisted, can prevent disaster, and his ideas have been accepted by the United Nations in its fight against poverty. Only 10% of the world’s children are born into rich OECD countries, while the rest are born into poverty (Gammage, 2008, p. 3). Of these the most at risk are female, rural, orphaned, or child labourers, and those whose mothers lack education (UNESCO, 2007, p. 34). Here, ECE development as a secondary support science can have a role: ‘education is crucial in developing human capital ... Education systems... fail to cater for the needs of every student, meaning some get left behind’ (OECD, 2007a). UNESCO suggests that in the battle against scourges such as HIV/AIDS, child labour, and armed conflict involving child soldiers, sound government planning can support education for all (UNESCO, 2007, p. 7).

Despite the hard science of neoliberalism, and the capacity-building notions of HCT, the world poverty gap widened after World War II. The UNMDG were ratified in 2002 by the United Nations Assembly, where wealthy countries offered to support the poorer ones. However, the method of redemption of promises made in 2002 relies on the science of economics, including that of HCT. While improving gender and health outcomes is included, centrally the project depends on capacity-building and resource allocation.

\(^{218}\) Jeffrey Sachs, Director, Millennium Development Project,  
\(^{219}\) Articles by Sachs and his colleague John L. Gallap cite HCT theorists such as Robert Barro (see e.g. Sachs & Gallap, 2001).
utilisation. At an international consensus at Monterrey the same year, the World Trade Organization, World Bank and IMF, together with heads of nations, agreed to assist the underdeveloped by increasing aid and trade opportunities. Official development assistance is provided by the OECD at reduced lending rates to countries undertaking development and welfare assistance programmes. A range of supra-agency monitoring reports have been published such as the *Equity and Development, World Development Report* (World Bank, 2006). Such reports continue to use the discourse and techniques of HCT to foster intergenerational upward mobility, with ECE as its subaltern (e.g. p. 48). Good governance and sustained economic growth, stated Tony Blair, ‘are key to eradicating poverty’ (Time, 2010, p. 48). Of special concern is the poverty in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Sachs et al., 2004), where ECE professionals have been brought up to the front-line as tactical experts with the ‘Education for All Fast-Track Initiative’, an arm of the World Bank (e.g. Garcia & Pence, 2010). This has put some early childhood writers in an ambivalent position\(^{220}\), as there have been resistances to ECE as a colonising discourse (e.g. Dahlberg, Moss & Pence, 1999; Garcia, Pence & Evans, 2007). Programme leaders have deliberately attempted to retain indigenous knowledge in curricula, however, the unitary (and de-cultured) nation remains embedded as an ontological given in the UNMDG programmes by the major funder, the World Bank. Education as pedagogical training mission, however, is gathering pace, which is seen in the multiple tactics in diverse sites. Some hold a ‘multifaceted vision of ECD capacity building’, as tutors and students in Sub-Saharan Africa supported by ICT experience a ‘leap of faith’ (Pence & Marfo, 2004, p. 9).

Jack Shonkoff (2010), at the launch of the World Bank’s Early Childhood Initiative, discussed ‘the need to drum up broad based support for Early Childhood by viewing expanded opportunities for all children as a moral responsibility and good’. If

\(^{220}\) Alan Pence has supported indigenous Canadian peoples to regain their knowledges and images of the child; yet he has also been a key supporter of World Bank Sub-Sahara ECD initiatives, where ECD is allied to improved GDP and prosperity. Others have suggested that the discourse of Reggio Emilia is a colonising discourse (Johnson) Perhaps things are never clear-cut, but diverse, dissonant and dangerous.
we do not act now, Shonkoff continued, we put ‘our future prosperity and security at risk’. The dominant discourse now promotes ECE as a universalist prophylactic solution, backed by international instruments such as the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 1990 World Declaration of Education for All. The 2002 UNMDG, under Sachs’s guidance, uncritically adopted core beliefs of neoliberal economics, including HC. Food production, health and education investments, together with family planning strategies can, they argue, support countries to climb the development ladder to avoid the poverty trap (UNMDG, 2005; see also World Bank, 2008). The construct of sovereign ‘nation’ remains in this conceptualisation, with resources, boundaries, and population bodies accepted as given. Educational planning, good governance, and economic development, supported by the Knowledge Economy, will increase national wealth, the argument goes. Planning to foster growth and development is now a central premise, unlike the Hayekian antipathy of a previous generation (e.g. Giovannini, 2007).

Nineteenth-century colonial powers carved the world map like a jigsaw with arbitrarily imposed boundaries, creating an ‘(un)holy trinity of territory, nation and state’ (Bauman, 2003, p. 28). These remain today as twenty-first-century nations, whose governments are both the ‘guardian and the prison guard’ (p. 29) of their populations. At present supra-national agencies both promote, yet deny, the existence of nations to support competition between ‘groups of states’ (Bauman, 1998, p. 63 emphases in original). Helen Clark was keen to see the country rise to the ‘top half of the OECD’ on the Knowledge Wave222, for instance (Clark, 2001; Easton, 2004; Bassett, 2008). The twenty-first century continues, despite international instruments promoting free-trade, to be driven by a sentimental ‘Love of our Country’ (Price, 1789). The supranational states promote their own wealth: ‘[r]obbing whole nations of their resources is called “promotion of free trade”’ (Bauman, p. 123), while it is the poor,

221 UN General Assembly resolution 55/2.
222 Catching the Knowledge Wave was a conference hosted by Auckland University, and the Government in 2000.
lower, immobile classes that are criminalised (p. 125), just as was the case two centuries ago. However, in the twenty-first century, capital is no longer tied to the land; indeed capital is no longer something that can be viewed, it is now deemed somatic.

Dichotomies remain integral to economics: Rich/poor; Centre/ periphery; Developed/underdeveloped; White/black continue the problematic of dichotomous representations. In a complex world, positivist positions create tensions: we need, instead, a plurality of planetary perspectives. There have been calls to have a wider representation of ‘developing’ countries on the IMF. Some think that the twenty-first century’s areas of growth will be in these areas, rather than in the Western liberal economies (e.g. Dadush & Shaw, 2011). Some peoples, as von Mises had suggested, may not choose to adopt Western ideologies. Struggles from parties, countries and institutions to influence supra-agencies may be emerging in new nodes and grids, of redefined ordering the norm, rule, and system of a post-modern world (Foucault, 1970, p. 169). There may be a ‘global good’ where the effect of unfettered growth of trade, rather than population, puts the planet’s resources and peoples at risk.

Policy, Robert Doherty suggests, should be purposeful and directed towards a problem, need or aspiration to support actions that will achieve goals. It is also essentially conflictual (Doherty, 2007 p. 198). Gerald Grace (1991), when discussing the ‘making of a crisis’ by the NZ Treasury in 1987, also saw policies as sites of struggles; the policies which fractured the Lange government were similar to those causing problems in the UK at the same time (p. 25). Outcomes of such conflict are ‘complex and contested’, with no clear victories, Grace concluded (p. 26). Researching the motives, the ‘politics and ideologies’ involved in policy-making, could, he suggested, make clear the interest groups involved (p. 26). As much as things have changed, yet they remain the same. Policy that utilises social exclusion binaries continues to support missionary strategies to find solutions, where one becomes the helper, the other the helped. Economics, despite Heckman’s protestations of heterogeneity, continues with the norm of the Western, white, heterosexual male entrepreneur.
Doherty also suggests that policy can be examined in a forward direction, in search of the technical forms, organisational arrangements, practices and forms of knowledge that are mobilised in making political reason operational and material (2007, p. 198). In 2008, the National-led coalition Minister of Education Anne Tolley brought in a number of HCT measures. Many of the goals of SPECE remained under her management, although watered-down in their implementation. There were policy and funding changes after Treasury’s recommendations that the costs of education be shifted from government to parents (e.g. NZ Treasury, 2009; ECE Taskforce, 2011). There is an increased use of messianic metaphors to describe ECE investments. As both major political parties in New Zealand are enamoured of HCT, it appears unlikely in the immediate future that policy will change. Presently, it appears that the discourse of HCT reigns supreme as sovereign technology of government, as a present rationality of state. Despite the downturn in the global economy, nations continue to believe that education provides the foundation for national wealth. Education cannot be borrowed against by the investing parents nor, with the exception of repaying loans, by the child. Education continues to be seen as having exchange-value to the individual. President Obama’s 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act invested heavily in ‘education both as a way to provide jobs now and lay the foundation for long-term prosperity’ (www.recovery.gov.).

The New Zealand Early Childhood Taskforce Agenda for Amazing Children, 2011 talks of the ‘on-going benefits’ from ECE. Yet there are some small cautionary voices suggesting that research done in one site should not be constructed as universal across time and place (e.g. Penn & Lloyd, 2007). The robust pillars of economics: mathematics, universal objectivity, and falsifiability may be beginning to crack a little, as science that emerged in the twentieth century is challenged. There are, it appears, as many things that cannot be measured as there are that can be calculated.

223 Arne Duncan, Secretary of Education has talked of Cradle to Career financial support (EdGov, May 22, 2009).
10 *SPECE: Ngā huarahi arataki* (2002) — an alchemy of wealth?

In this chapter I return to the issue of ECE within the context of NZ neoliberal economics, including the 1988 ruptures that saw a shift in the public perception of education towards a private advantage, rather than a public good. As part of a new perception of education as a private good, I investigate a key ECE document *Education to be more* (Department of Education 1988a). I argue that at this time there was an enhanced state interest in funding and regulatory measures (including teacher credentials). Public Choice Theory offered sectors of the community choices, offering language and cultural options to Māori and Pasifika communities. *SPECE* was a further elaboration of neoliberal constructs, with a new emphasis: that of HCT. I conclude that *SPECE* was a biopolitical tool which aimed to grow the skills of the national population.

I set out a genealogical investigation of *SPECE*; which amounts to a history of our present in ECE in Aotearoa, New Zealand. From the 1980s, education in this country began to be viewed as a personal investment; with credentials as the stock to be exchanged on the employment market. Societal understanding of the purposes of education changed to the point of rupture between the post-war period (1945-84) and the 1990s. As noted in chapter 4, at the beginning of the twentieth century, ECE was considered to be a private, familial concern. Initially, ECE was linked to eugenic anxieties about the children of the poor. This occurred as a result of the state instigating a national system of public primary education for all. In a society where the children of the poor were expediently looked after by their siblings while their parents

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224 Bailey Report, (1947, p. 9) stated, that ‘New Zealanders prefer public to private schools, and look to the ‘social-service State’ to lay down good standards for social services. Such a state support system, the Hill Report (1971, p. 11) stated was an integral though specially administered part of the national school system’. 202
worked, a system of national compulsory education implied a reconsideration of familial care.

Kindergartens were established in urban areas at the turn of the twentieth century, approximately a quarter of a century after state instigation of compulsory primary schooling. In the years of depression during the 1930s, kindergartens were supported only by voluntary funding. Any initial government acceptance of state funding did not continue through those depression years. During World War II, however, the emergence of a local version of ECE in the form of Playcentres showed that a different societal view of preschooling was developing. Among other things ECE was seen as a relief and support for women with children. Many women provided essential services that supported the war effort, including work in munitions factories, and as landgirls on farms. The chance to meet together, with their preschool children in local kindergartens or public halls, was viewed as a ‘good’ for rural and small town mothers. The Playcentre movement had, early on, an interest in parent education.

10.1 Education as public good

After World War II, the Bailey Report suggested that there be a state-supported national system of provision based on the then existing services (p. 6). Kindergartens, it recommended, be absorbed into the state system, with the consequence that the training of teachers and a subsidy for buildings were seen as a state responsibility. This was a specific rejection of the idea of voluntarism in preschooling (e.g. pp 9; 34; 43). There was, the Report stated a demand for sessional ‘kindergarten rather than all-day nursery’ education options (Bailey, 1947, p. 5). There was, however, recognition by the state of the role of Playcentres. The Bailey Report portrayed services of both Kindergartens and Playcentres as an adjunct to the home with an implied understanding that provision of an education option was a part of a public good. The state, while

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225 Teachers, the Bailey Report (1947, p. 34) suggested, should be qualified in areas ‘other than academic’: having ‘musical capacity, personal or emotional balance and intuitive feelings for young children’.

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ignoring the economic position of those women who ‘needed’ to work, accepted a responsibility for the ‘general good’ of most women – a normative expectation tied to the Keynesian ideas of the two-parent model of care and support, with a working father and a home-based mother ‘who manages her home single-handed’ (1947, p.43). It could also, perhaps, be interpreted as an initial intrusion by the state into the middle-class home; into the domain of that previously considered as ‘private’.

Members of the Bailey Committee considered aspects of ‘mental, physical and moral health of children” (1947, p. 5) and included representatives from the realms of health (e.g. Dr. H.B.Turbott and Dr Helen Dyer from Plunket), morality, (Miss W. Wilkie, National Council of Churches) and education (e.g. C. Robertson from the Department of Education, Miss M. England from NZ Free Kindergarten Association, and Mrs. B.E. Beeby from Nursery Play Centres Association). The Report showed a state willingness to involve its agencies of education, and health in envisioning an educational future.

Writings from professionals offering parenting advice continued to depict preschool education as a general good (e.g. Begg, 1968, p. 142; Ashby, 1972, cited in Dinniss, 1974, p. 14). Provision for care for working class children, however, continued as a welfare discourse until the 1970s (Julian, 1977).

In the discourse of welfare, care continued to be a familial responsibility, or a private contract between parent and her child’s carer (Hill, 1971, p. 29; Meade & Podmore, 2002, p. 6) As it was a private matter, many believed, it was not a state investment or regulatory responsibility: this despite a number of anecdotal accounts of poor care putting children at risk of health and psychological problems (Meade & Podmore, 2002, p. 6).

Oversight of childcare conditions was not accepted by the state until the 1960s. The Child Welfare Division of

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226 Initially ‘Play Centre’ was a two-word term.
227 Begg appeared disdainful of Bereiter and Engleman’s ‘repetitious, high-pressure teaching’ for the disadvantaged child (1968, p. 142)
228 Begg (1968, p. 149) did note that some mothers may be ‘out at work all day’
229 Meade & Podmore cite the 1958 case of ‘baby farming’, that served to change public attitudes to such state oversight (2002, p.6).
the Department of Education, which had interest in child-protection matters, had oversight of the 1960 Child Care Regulations. These regulations focused in the quality of environments rather than staff credentials. Most childcare centres were stand-alone units, with no affiliation with regional or federation bodies, unlike the Playcentres and Kindergartens of the time (which were viewed as an adjunct to the carer’s home).

The Hill Report (1971) noted that working mothers’ and solo parents’ care ‘needs were] not met’ (p.28). There were, the authors noted, societal reservations ‘about arranging an educational environment outside the home for the normal young child’ (p.27). It suggested, however, that credentials be a consideration for the Association of Child Care Centres, and operators of independent pre-schools. ‘[T]hat wherever possible, those working in the independent sector take their training through courses provided for Kindergarten and Playcentre’ (p.115). However, society was changing: a greater diversity of children attended preschools, and the preschool population was growing at this time (an increase of 10,000 children between 1960 and 1971). Preschooling, as defined by the two sessional models of the Kindergarten and Playcentre, was the preferred model, which was ‘in the main designed for the needs of middle-class children’ (Hill, 1971, p. 32). However, many kindergartens, the report

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230 The Child Welfare Division oversaw issues such as care of state wards. In 1972, it was merged with the Department of Social Welfare.

231 Peter Dinniss (1974, p. 17), an ECE academic, noted the Hill Report’s recommendations [ 1971; 7.2] to give recognition to Playcentre supervisors of knowledge gained while rearing their own children, together with a refresher training course (Dinniss, p. 12). He began by setting out an argument for broadening requirements of teachers to include the function of parent education. He secondly noted calls internationally, for the evaluation of aims and objectives. This involved, he argued, a shift from the accepted state view that ‘the main objective of pre-school education, is to work with parents... reinforcing experiences that children have at home’ (Department of Education, 1973, cited in Dinniss, 1974, p.15). A definition of the term professional, was needed, Dinniss argued, as it involved’ the consumer’s or client’s opportunity to select for himself (sic) the professional from whom he requires service (p.16). Dinniss (1974, p.12) noted that the childcare centre may well become a third source of early childhood education for a considerable number of children (alongside Kindergarten and Playcentre). Rae Julian (1977, p.1) suggested that the term ‘child care’ should include Playcentres, Kindergartens, informal care as well as care in the home. She too, suggested policy makers consider training for minders (p.120).
noted, had waiting lists of over 60 children (p.14), so some provision needed to be developed to accommodate children who were missing out. The Report also considered the needs of other groups, such as ‘children with special needs’ (pp 46 ff), and rural families.\(^{232}\)

Māori families in remote rural areas provided Playgroups, (10 in the Waikato Maniapoto area) where families could use Te Reo Māori (1971, p. 20) and work within a cultural framework. Māori Women’s Welfare League, together with the Māori Education Foundation, employed staff such as Miria Pewhairangi, Lex Grey\(^{233}\) and Leonie Shaw, to encourage Māori families\(^{234}\) to attend Playcentre, and undertake parent-training sessions. The discourse of reports and other materials suggests that education continued to be viewed as a community good, with some state support of approved types (e.g. Hill, 1971, p. 9: Meade, 1979, pp 33 ff). There were two rights discourses, however, which appeared in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The first was that of Māori, seeking recognition of their rights as indigenous peoples. NZCER research undertaken by Richard Benton (1979) had demonstrated that the Māori language was in a parlous state, Ngā Kōhanga Reo were established to rectify the peoples’ language loss (de Bres, 2008, p.3). These were seen by the Māori community as ‘language nests’, places to foster fluency in young children in Te Reo Māori (see Waitangi Tribunal, 1986, Wai 11, par 3.3).

A second rights discourse was that of women: there was a new perception that women could to gain self-fulfilment through work (e.g. Sutch, 1974). With a greater number of women wishing to work, especially middle-class mothers, there was pressure to ensure good care (other than backyard arrangements) for their children (Julian,

\(^{232}\) Geraldine Macdonald (1974, p.21) noted that the Hill Report, was implicitly invited to bring up recommendations for children of Māori descent, ‘it declined to do so’.

\(^{233}\) Grey had been appointed as the 1st Māori Preschool Advisor in 1963, after the Hunn Report (1961) recommendations, that the government accept a greater responsibility for Māori education. This report suggested that earlier educational policies had been overtly assimilationist.

\(^{234}\) Many of these trained Māori women were to support the establishment of Ngā Kōhanga Reo in the 1980s (Bushouse, 2008, p. 6).
Childcare Regulations were passed in 1985, the year the Department of Education took over responsibility for childcare services from the Department of Social Welfare.

Discourses about diversity, work, and the needs of multiplicity of peoples were to influence education in new ways in the future. These concepts offer the antecedents of ideas, which were to emerge more strongly in the educational policy of FLG. No longer was there an assimilatory assumption that Māori, Pasifika, or families with children with physical or sensory needs, were able to have their needs met by the two primary sessional ECE models (e.g. Marshall, 1987, 7-8). There was a growing societal recognition that special groups needed consideration. These historical discourses of indigenous struggle for culture retention, and a newly minted discourse of education as private good, grounded, in a value of market exchange came together as a ‘problematic’ of SPECE. The discourse which incorporates them all emerged as ‘cost-benefit analysis’, an economic discourse was to became a dominant educational idea, which I now set out.

10.2 Education as private, exchange, good

A rupture in the formerly accepted discourse occurred in the 1980s, as first NZ Treasury, then politicians, then government education discourses adopted terms from the Chicago School of Economics. In their first term of office, buoyed by electoral success, and intending broad consultation on their social agenda, the Lange government implemented a policy of broad social change. They were keen to be responding to their electoral support, much of which had come from Māori and Pasifika communities. In their second term of office, the Fourth Labour Government set up a review of the administration of education across the early childhood, compulsory and tertiary sectors. Both GM (1987), Tomorrows Schools (1988), and Education to be More (1988) (ETBM)
made explicit reference to the aspirations, cultural and language needs of Māori and Pasifika communities.\footnote{ETBM (p.38, paragraph 8.4.2) noted that NKR ‘provide an early childhood service – and indeed some are registered as childcare centres’. Meade A., & Podmore V., (2002) stated that although NKR were transferred from Ministry of Maori Affairs to the Ministry of Education in 1989, that the ‘Child Care Centre Regulations were their regulatory guidelines. Thus, from the 1980s any policy change for childcare services was to have implications for nga Kōhanga reo as well. For example, whenever the fees subsidy was reviewed, Kōhanga reo gained (or suffered) from any increases (or decreases).’ (p.20).}

The overarching economic theory of all the government’s working groups was underpinned, however, by the Chicago School’s concept of education as ‘private good’, as set out in the *GM* and *ETBM*. Many policy documents, now adopted the economic terms as used in GM that framed education as a private, exchange-good, rather than a public, a general-use good. Government saw ECE as a priority among its social policies – within the new administrative framework of the Picot Report. Implicit in the views adopted by the government at that time is the view that management could be undertaken efficiently by anyone who understood the strategies of economic administration. Brian Picot, manager of a grocery chain, was attractive to Minister of Education, Lange, as ‘a businessman with a practical social conscience’ and a strong democratic vision, who could offer strategic advice on the field of educational management (Friske & Ladd, 2000, p. 40). The Fourth Labour Government commissioned Picot to oversee a new administrative framework, for all education sectors, published as *Administering for Excellence: Effective Administration in Education* (Department of Education, 1988b).

*ETBM* was the white paper published at much the same time, by the ECE Working Group, headed by Anne Meade. The Terms of Reference for the ECE working group required them to give advice on a balance between ‘private and social costs and benefits’ (Department of Education, 1988a, p. iv, see too, p. 3). The introduction to *ETBM* made explicit references to the Picot reforms (p. 3; see also, p. 47). Unlike the earlier working group membership (Bailey 1947; Hill, 1971), made up primarily of representatives from churches, as well as departments of health and education, there
was too, a representative of NZ Treasury, Mark Prebble.\(^{236}\) As in the other sectors, the mechanism of the charter was to be a two-way contract’ (Department of Education, 1988a, p. 50) between the ECE centre and the government. The concept that the government did not need to become an ‘ECE provider’ (Department of Education, 1988a, p. 20) came directly from \(GM\).\(^{237}\) \(ETBM\) suggested devolution of government day-to-day management to local sites through the charter, a regulatory and bulk-funding mechanism. In return for providing agreed services, the Ministry of Education would fund chartered services dependent of the provision of a number of child-spaces. Since the 1870’s, governments legislated and provided for mass education through its own institutions. But \(GM\) made the claim, revolutionary in NZ, that ownership of schools and other key infrastructure is costly and could be more efficiently decentralized, to local decision makers. There was no need for government to own the supply of services (Department of Education, 1988a, p. 41), which instead could be contestably contracted out, thereby avoiding any ‘provider capture’ of vested educational interests (Department of Education, 1988a, p. 44).

\(ETBM\) set out key ideas about economic ideas for ECE. The government, it emphasised, was supportive of ‘women’s participation in economic and social life’, (p.vii, see also p.40; p.73). It was keen to ensure the viability of ECE services (Department of Education, 1988a, p. 61) and thus build (future) citizen’s skills to grow the competitive wealth of the state. This was viewed as promoting long term economic and social benefits (Department of Education, 1988a, p.15 & 16). Outcomes for families could bring direct benefits to children (e. g. ‘fulfilled parents … mothers who have some choice and control over their lives, [as well as] increased paid employment) therefore state support is not necessary. But children are not ‘producers’ and do not receive ‘individual economic benefit’ from ECE (Department of Education, 1988a, p. 15). Such

\(^{236}\) Prebble had an interest in ensuring NZ Treasury’s interests were evident in the document. It might be surmised that the ‘Overview’ section was penned by Prebble himself.

\(^{237}\) See too, ‘Overview’ (p.vi) – “Should the government be involved?” where the government’s recommended role was that of administrating funding, monitoring and as a provider of training.
arguments framed education benefits as a ‘private benefit’ to the family, assuming, as did Becker (1974, p. 1080), that children benefit from their family’s externalities (a ‘benefit to a third party’).

In late 1988 the government published a series of documents setting out their intent to accept the Picot Report’s recommendations. *Tomorrow’s Schools* set out intended reforms to the compulsory sectors. *Before Five* (1988c) was the government’s statement of intent for ECE, based on the working group’s recommendations. Prime Minister and Education Minister, David Lange began ‘[o]ur children are our future ... Improvements in this sector are an investment in the future’ (1988c, p.iii). The ECE sector, would have ‘equal status’ with other education sectors’, he continued (1988c, p. 2 emphases in original). In this case the economic underpinnings delivered great advantage to ECE. New Zealand ushered in reforms that were to ensure the best qualified staff, with a diversity of delivery styles appropriate to a number of cultural and linguistic communities. In this New Zealand was unlike all other English-speaking countries (Moss, P., personal communication, March 7, 2012). While there was a discourse of less government,238 which prescribed the state as facilitator rather than management, this government did retain a large amount of control through central regulation, and the specific requirements of charters. In return for bulk-funding support, centres signed charters which were contracts setting out the delivery of expected educational outcomes, through approved governance structures. In return for signing and agreeing to maintain the terms of the charter, all centres received a measure of bulk-funding on a per-child; per-hour basis. All licensed and chartered ECE centres were equally eligible for such funding; a change from an earlier diversity of funding and regulation.

Under National Party Minister of Education, Lockwood Smith, the policy of the 1990 incoming government was to institute national guideline-assessment of children’s

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learning, for the compulsory sectors which would introduce a ‘seamless’ curriculum. The Ministry of Education tendered a contract to write an ECE curriculum as part of this seamless programme which was won by Waikato University ECE specialists Helen May and Margaret Carr. The idea of a national curriculum for all sectors of the ECE community was a new one; previously each sector had defined and delivered their own programmes. Because of the diversity of the sector, its writers were keen to ensure its purpose was accepted by all, and therefore initiated a broad consultation across the ECE sector. *Te Whāriki Matauranga mō ngā mokopuna o Aotearoa, Draft ECE curriculum*, (1993) was trialled for a time. It was then published (in a somewhat altered form) in 1996, by Ministry of Education, as the national ECE curriculum.\(^{239}\) It is a non-prescriptive curriculum with a bicultural underpinning. In this document, it is possible to see a more liberal and humanistic view of the child, than the economic view presented in policy documents of governments at the turn of the twenty-first century. *Te Whāriki* has provided other possibilities; provided sites for struggle against the economic instrumental construction of child-as-skill-bundle. As a national curriculum accepted, and eventually embedded in regulatory assessment expectations, it was to sit rather oddly against the prescriptive curriculum of the compulsory sector.

ECE options had been brought under the one centralized regulatory and funding framework, which was an innovative move. In this it differed from many other national models. This framework, together with the fact the Fourth Labour Government had emphasised equality of both educational opportunity and credentials was to have long term implications for ECE in the following decades. Māori and Pasifika centres had access to the same funding and regulatory requirements in recognition that they could ‘complete’ equally in the new educational field, in ways not previously possible.

\(^{239}\) See Te One, S., (2003) for greater detail.
Ngā Kōhanga Reo were brought under Vote: Education, rather than Vote: Māori Affairs ministerial portfolios and budgets for the first time. The increasing use of terms derived from Public Choice Theory positioned parents as exercising choice of educational provision in the educational marketplace. The ‘choice’ discourse was found in media, centre branding, marketing brochures and in educational policy documents (e.g. Department of Education, 1988a, p. 6; MoE, n.d.; ERO, 2009).

240 The first TKR was established in Wainuiomata in 1982. In 2011 the Te Tino Rangatiratanga Trust of TKR took an urgent claim to the Waitangi Tribunal (Wai), claiming that NKR are not an early childhood option, with a Māori veneer, but was“aimed at ensuring the survival of the Māori language ... It is a total immersion programme for young children from birth to six years old.” (Radio New Zealand News, 7:18 pm on 12 March 2012).
Choice applied to all aspects of the education market: to both parental options of ECE services, as well as beginning teachers’ option of training providers. For parents to have real choice, so the argument went, there needed to be an emphasis on trained staff in all services. And this was a part of the regulatory framework, with the consequence that each chartered ECE centre had to have some staff with recognised credentials. There was heightened demand for qualified staff. There were many private training providers setup to meet the market need for initial teacher education, a possibility created by a move away from the earlier model of state-supported teacher-education for kindergarten teachers provided through Schools of Education. The Lange government gave initial support for qualified staff, but the issue of credentials for ECE staff was contested in the 1990s by later National Coalition Governments. For example, Associate Minister of Education, Brian Donnelly (29 May, 1997), removed the requirement that kindergarten salaries be set by the State Services Commission. His successor, Nick Smith (24 August, 1999), did not agree that the higher wages earned by Kindergarten teachers should apply across the sector. Since primary teachers had won ‘pay parity’ with Secondary teachers, and Kindergarten teachers had also gained ‘parity’ with Primary teachers, the implications for ECE salaries amounted to a huge increase, particularly for those in private ECE settings.

Comparing ECE teachers to secondary teachers was, Smith noted, taking things to extremes. This view was not shared by FLG Education Minister, Trevor Mallard. In 2001, he wrote ‘My vision for early childhood education is one where all centre-based early childhood educators will have at least a Diploma of Teaching ECE and will be registered teachers’ (Mallard, 2001, cited in Tarr, 2006, p. 28).
The lexicon of choice was to permeate education for several decades. In *SPECE* (2002), for example, ‘New Zealand parents generally have considerable choice for their children’s early care and education’ (p. 6). A former Secretary of Education, Maris O’Rourke, had initially overseen the Picot reforms across the three education sectors. Later she became an apologist for the neoliberal HCT education ideas as 1995-2001 Director of Education at the World Bank (one of the supra-national agencies that have made aid to developing countries conditional on the HCT message of ECE).

In *SPECE* (MoE, 2002b) Education Minister Mallard repeated his predecessor Lange’s 1988 affirmation of ECE education. ‘Getting it right at this vital stage will build the lifelong foundations of success, not only for our children, but also for New Zealand’ (MoE, 2002, foreword). The discourse of *SPECE*, however, had moved from an emphasis on Public Choice to Human Capital Theory. Mallard noted that ECE was the ‘cornerstone’ of the country, which will support the nation’s ‘strong future’. We cannot,
he emphasised, leave the education of our children to chance, as our ‘social, educational and economic health can only benefit from efforts and resources focused on young New Zealanders’ (MoE, 2002b, Foreword). He utilised the metaphor of ECE as foundational in other forums, too, telling an economists’ conference (Mallard, 2000e), ‘foundations for children’s cognitive development, [and]...the social behaviours required for success in school’. He noted that the government’s aim of ‘[reducing disparities in outcomes for different parts of the population country’ would be ‘[i]nvesting for tomorrow’. by improving ‘the nation’s skills’...so that all New Zealanders have the best possible future in a changing world’ (Mallard, 2000e).

*SPECE* constructed families and ECE educational agencies as fixed rather than fluid entities, in the manner of the accepted economic units of the ‘firm’. The authors use forecasts, statistical analyses and a variety of measurements all of which are techniques providing rationales for regulatory measures such as targeting of resources. For example, in a speech to the economist’s conference, Mallard (2000e), noted ‘an opportunity to raise quality and participation rates in early-childhood education simultaneously without creating great pressures for new expenditure’. It was the need for efficient and effective targeted spending to specific areas of the population, which led his government ‘to increase the quality of early childhood education for all New Zealand children and raise participation by Maori and Pacific peoples’ (Mallard, 2000e).

Although the *SPECE* document has images of agentic children—children taking responsibility and initiating actions— some highlighted phrases could be seen as presenting a more instrumental view. For example, although there is a long history of environments as vital in supporting children’s learning, a carefully chosen, highlighted quote, from *Quality in Action* could be read through an HCT lens. James Heckman emphasised the role of ‘enriched environments’ (1999, 2007, 2012a; Carneiro & Heckman, 2003; Cunha & Heckman, 2004; Heckman & Klenow, 1998; Heckman &

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241 *Quality in Action, Ka mahi whai hua* (MoE, 1996) was a supplementary document to the ECE charter, which offered examples of expected practice for each charter specific.
Many ECE teachers may read the following quote unproblematically: ‘[q]uality early childhood education lays the foundation for children’s later learning, through an enriching environment that facilitates the development of cognitive skills...’ (MoE, 1996, p. 5; cited in MoE, 2002, p.12). Such views, however, can also be read as underlying a micro-economic perspective. Perhaps when put alongside the claim that ECE can ameliorate ‘low progress’ (MoE, 2002b, p. 17), (which could have come directly from Heckman’s (2007, a, b; 2012)) such a message is more evident.

As ECE is a non-compulsory sector, any compliance measures seeking improved outcomes can only be a matter of encouragement rather than compliance as far as the parents are concerned. For example, parents whose children do not attend ECE cannot be prosecuted, unlike parents of children at primary or secondary school. Thus, when one of the state’s goals is to ‘increase participation’ (MoE, 2002b, p.2), it needs the allied support of the ethnic or communities of interest to ensure success (p. 13).

Some policy documents appear to construct the ‘other’ as a risk to the body politic by their higher fecundity. SPECE (MoE, 2002b, p.10) falls into this category when it states, ‘Māori [and Pasifika] children will form a larger proportion of this country’s birth-to-five-year-olds within the next 10 years’. Such groups have lower participation levels, and implicitly lower skill-bases (as evidenced in graphs of groups by comparative participation). Graphs, themselves, with the aura of

Figure 22: The ‘risky’ populations, those who are ‘missing out’ on preschool attendance ‘primarily...come from Māori, Pasifika, and low socio-economic backgrounds...lack of access to appropriate ECE services is also proving a barrier to rural families and to around 15 percent of parents wanting employment’ (p. 6). The normative comparisons find these named groups wanting. The use of graphs continues the apparent objective use of statistical information and measure. The footnote cites ‘Childcare, Families and Work: New Zealand Childcare Survey 1998, Labour Market Policy Group, 1999, p 46. This impacts on women much more than men (mothers’ participation: 22 percent, fathers’: 5 percent)” (p. 6).
apparent factual objectivity soften an otherwise harsh message. The assumption of discrete groupings by ethnicity can be understood as proxy for socio-economic categories, in an environment of scarce educational resources. The focus on the populations of concern to the government can be read as a racist one, both assimilatory in its intent, and in depicting groups, in a deficit mode, as ‘less likely’ to participate in ECE than other ‘New Zealanders’. Strategies to soften SPECE’s racist messages include a range of aspirational images, which differ depending on which language-version one views. The cover of SPECE shows a montage of images, depicting ‘ethnically diverse’ groups and individuals, with an adult’s hand scaffolding a child to stack blocks. It is a biopower discourse that is racist, in that it adapts identity aspirations to economic and performative needs to skill enhancement. It is normative in its expectation, and governmental in its technologies of inclusion and responsibilisation.

Iwi or Pasifika groups are made responsible for participation of their children. As in Heckman’s papers, there is the recommendation that the community build ‘stronger links between ECE services, ante-natal programmes, parents and whānau, parenting programmes, schools, and health and social services [to] improve a child’s educational achievement” (MoE, 2002b, p. 16). There is an emphasis on building ‘skills’, which in the context of a favoured term, ‘capacity-building’ (MoE, 2002b, p. 7), is a euphemism for bringing Māori and Pasifika communities up to a societal ‘norm’. For example ‘formal iwi/Māori and Crown working relationships ...agreements focus on

Figure 23: A montage of images – one of those on the cover of Strategic Plan (MoE, 2002b).

lifting the achievement of Māori children and building the skills of whānau, hapū and iwi so they can be more actively involved with the education sector'(p. 7).

There is also a covert message of danger, of distrust of those who do not conform to our norm. The implicit message, as in the Heckman papers, concerned the dangerously poor sole parent of colour. The dual responsibilisation of the (ethnic) community, and the ‘skilled ‘and qualified teacher, would, it was hoped, ameliorate any incipient dangers to the child.243 There cannot be too great an exercise of freedom (not to work; to prefer welfare, not to enrol your child in an ECE centre) if, it is believed such individuals put the greater society at risk. By making both the ethnic community and the qualified teacher responsible, the government sought to avert the risk of too much freedom. Dangers of low skilled parents needed to be managed, to avert any possible risk to the national wealth. The sites of ECE services would, it is believed, enhance the skills of these perceived as the ‘dangerous’ classes (both those from geographic ghettos and from those beneficiaries not actively supporting the economy through paid work).

The enhancement of skills, and improved achievement, it is suggested, will build community and national foundations. Such phrases are repeated, throughout, for example:

children develop and enhance strong early learning foundations through participation in quality ECE services’ and ‘children, parents, families and whānau can access ECE services that meet their needs (including training, education, and employment needs of parents, and cultural and language aspirations of children, parents, whānau and wider communities’ (MoE, 2002b, p.9).

SPECE (MoE, 2002b) uses ‘a priori’ assumptions about the nature of entities. Terms such as families, and community, are used as economic proxies for the ‘firm’; with comparable instrumental assumptions of child and community development over time. In the wider discourse (that of NZ Treasury, and social agencies), many of Becker

243 Equity funding (MoE, 2002b, p.12) gave some support to ECE services in low socio-economic areas. This was a funding over and above bulk-funding, aimed to ensure such services were sustainable.
and Heckman’s theories are implicit, if not explicit (e.g. Treasury 2001; 2002; 2004; Dyson, et al., n.d.; Colmar Brunton, 2006). Such documents accept Becker’s basic thesis (1992, p. 43) that ‘Human capital … starts with the assumption that individuals decide on their education, training …and other …health by weighing the benefits and costs. The authors also accepted Heckman’s (2011, p. 33) view that good ‘parenting is more important than cash’, that the risk of ‘parenting deficits can be addressed … [by] early access to education’.

While a generally accepted view from many within ECE was that SPECE (MoE, 2002b), was a welcome acknowledgement of the value of their discipline (e.g. Duncan, 2004; Mitchell et al, 2008), another reading is possible. It may be the moment that our discipline has become ‘pious’ (Foucault, 1984c, p. 82) — with its implicit ossification of thought. Perhaps we are so enthralled with the positioning of our discipline in the centre-stage, (with attendant funding, and policy support) that we have become less than critical.

It could be argued that matters of differential skill-bases and accredited teachers
are a result of racialised geography, (Rose, 2000a) that certain groups located in areas of disadvantage, are ghettoized. Yet despite exhortations to be more culturally sensitive to children who are ‘different’, many ECE centres and staff ‘treated all children the same’ (e.g. ERO, 2008, p. 1), and parents reported they were rarely consulted on cultural values and beliefs (2008, p. 11). At the Childrenz Issues Conference Getting People Together in Early Childhood Education Diane Mara (2006) noted that some ECE services had ‘difficulty forming collaborative relationships with Pacific communities’. There is a strong traditional egalitarian position that ‘good’ teachers treat ‘everyone the same’. The assimilatory message of this position remains strongly entrenched (e.g. ERO, 2012).

It could similarly be argued that some people and ECE centres hold a ‘positional good’ (Thrupp, 2007, p. 80), as scarce resources are maximised to middle class advantage at the expense of the lower classes such as Maori & Pasifika in rural or South Auckland areas. Unlike the earlier GM discourse of ‘provider capture’, Thrupp’s ‘positional good’ makes explicit that there are more ECE centres in the richer suburbs. There is a normative expectation implicit in ECE policy that all families have access to a transport. SPECE is, too, about governing the state’s population through the discipline of child development, allied to parental employment release, by provision of teacher-led services. While trained teachers are encouraged to support parenting, there is little acknowledgement that the task of parenting for those who lack middle-class resources, is more a complex, erratic, and often fraught endeavour.  

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244 Parent education support was presented as an expectation of ECE teachers as early as the Bailey Report (1947p.41 ff).
The role of teachers is a central theme in SPECE. In the introduction to SPECE, Minister Mallard sets out his view that early childhood teachers should ‘maintain the same professional standards as school teachers’ (MoE, 2002b, Foreword). This includes the requirement for teacher registration (p. 2). Unlike the earlier policy document ETBM, the message in SPECE is carried as much by photos, graphs and pictorial montages as by the text. There are images of happy children scaffolded by supportive adults throughout the documents, (although the Māori language text portrays fewer teachers than individuals or groups of children). SPECE attempts to portray teachers as professional: qualified, registered, enhancing children’s learning through close relationships. Mallard set out a stepped plan for increasing the numbers of qualified and registered teachers in teacher-led services that are ‘of the same professional standards as school teachers’ (MoE, 2002, Foreword). The document implies that an essential skill for teachers as primary carers is cultural knowledge and sensitivity towards Māori and Pasifika children is an essential skill (p.13). This may be the reason that pay parity, is recommended (p. 14).

Teachers in teacher-led services were to benefit greatly from the plan and its proposed stepped stages of implementation. Teachers, as knowledgeable professionals supporting the child’s learning, were a key ECE policy interest of the Clark Coalition Government. In 2007, the FLG offered ‘twenty free hours’ 2007 for 3-4 years olds attending a teacher-led service. Eligible families were those whose children attended for a stated minimum of hours a week, and whose ECE service had opted into the scheme. The ‘free hours’ were a subsidy over and above bulk funding (parent-led ECE services were not initially eligible). Although the uptake of this was initially variable, by

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245 For the background to Mallard’s view on teachers as qualified professionals, contrasted with his view of his predecessor’s attitude to pay for qualified ECE teachers, see Mallard, 2000c.
the end of the FLG’s term, over 70% of services had taken up this offer. John Codd (2005) suggested that the professionalism of teachers had important implications for society’s relationship to teachers. The narrow, instrumental presumption that education produces student outcomes from teachers’ inputs, Codd suggests, reduces teachers to a part of a global skill-industry. ECE teachers are no different from their colleagues in the other sectors, in being co-opted into delivering managerial values and ‘quality’. As Codd (2005, p. 200) noted, this term, ‘quality’ has ‘become a powerful metaphor for new forms of managerial control’, as education is reduced to measurable quality indicators. Many teachers are under pressure of co-option by neo-liberal governments, (notably that of FLG, in ECE by SPECE), as agents promoting the state’s interest in wealth-producing skills. The prime focus of providing release for working parents, (a shift from an earlier family- and child-centred basis) is an economic, rather than an educational one, which has become an accepted rationale in teacher-led services.

Services that did not benefit greatly from the move to professionalism were the parent-led services of Playcentre and Ngā Kōhanga Reo. In fact the requirement for a tertiary qualification effectively halved the national number of Kōhanga Reo from 800 to 400 (Walker, personal communication, March 7, 2012). No longer, in the twenty-first century, is the place of volunteer-service valued; no strong ethos of volunteerism, as was possible in the post-war (1946-1970s) years (Meade, 1979, pp 32 ff). While the Keynesian economic model allowed for the role of volunteerism, the neoliberal

246 See the Memorandum of the counsel for the claimants, July 25, 2011 for further detail. Lawyer Mai Chen filed the memorandum supporting a claim by the TKR Trust against MoE’s view that Köhanga Reo be treated as any other early childhood service.
247 Anne Meade that the ‘high degree of parent involvement … in playcentres … free kindergartens, Parent Centres, the Plunket Society and the NZ Society for the Intellectually Handicapped … indicates how much we VALUE parents’ (1979, p, 32, emphasis in original). Māori would not see their involvement from the perspective of ‘volunteerism’ (a philanthropic concept) but from that of manākitanga and whanāutangata.
economic model values paid work. Volunteers continue to ‘count for nothing’ in a world offering childcare outside the home.

There are always groups whom the state wishes to ensure are docile and self-regulated. By supporting the production of docile child bodies (assisted by the notion of ‘quality’ as regulating for minimum standards of teacher credentials) aimed at reducing educational and income disparities among discrete ethnic groups, the state seeks to reduce risk to the ‘foundations’ of its wealth, the very young. It has, at the same time, produced strategies to ensure the parent is productively employed in the workforce.

In SPECE the government sets the groups perceived as ‘dangerous’ against the unmarked ‘other’ in a comparison that found the former wanting. Foucault’s concept of biopolitics supports the idea that society is at base a struggle for scarce resources between groups; of management of the population as a ‘political problem’ requiring efficient economic management. In order to prevent the government falling behind other wealthy members of the OECD in competitive trading environments, it needed to reduce any pathological risks within its own national body; to apply mitigating measures to those deemed risky. However, in doing so HCT constructed all in the one mould.

Figure 26: Heckman’s ideas in Aotearoa: A New Zealand education publication cites the ‘truth’ of educational benefits accruing from ECE. An example of the imperialism of ECE constructed as a child development ‘prophylactic’ mode of cost-benefit state investment.

By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, HCT discourse was largely accepted. Initially the HCT discourse was implicit, with the exception of NZ Treasury documents, by the end of the decade, it had become explicit. New Zealand research, too, was referred to by Heckman, and his ideas cross-referenced in NZ publications (e.g. Heckman, 2012, makes reference to Gluckman & Hanson, 2006; while Gluckman, 2011, uses Heckman’s research pp 27 & 29). Source: Clement, D. (2010). Lifelong benefits. *Weduction Aotearoa*, Spring, 10–13.

The basic assumption of HCT is of the atomistic entrepreneur, which individualises all economic perceptions. The entrepreneur, operating within units such as family, community or firm, remains constructed within SPECE as the Hayekian utility-maximiser, operating by ordering preferences in a value-free exchange market. In SPECE the parent, the child, the teacher and the EC owner are all viewed as entrepreneurs competing where, (as in a scientific analogy) the ‘best’ in the market will rise to the surface, —will be successful. Such a view minimises other possible images of the parent or teacher as altruistic, rather than self-interested. HCT theorists feel they do have regard to the perspectives of the altruistic parent. Becker (1985) acknowledged that mothers earned less in the marketplace, because of their time in the private occupation of housework and childcare. However, they are able to ‘choose’ the number and spacing of children (Becker, 1987) (and therefore still qualify as utility maximisers). Becker, more recently has acknowledged that ‘[s]ocial phenomena are important in markets’ (Clement, 2002). There is a revised HCT view that suggests social capital, the value of a supportive community in a changing society, e.g. the increasing number of divorced women, and people living alone. Presently the atomized individual remains an entrepreneur operating in and fostered by the local community. It is here that economic values of ‘good’ enter the theory. Woolcock (1998, p. 166) notes that communities can create positive or negative social capital which, in turn, can affect the aggregate of the national wealth.

Within three decades there had been a radical shift in the country, encompassing a number of interlinked rationalities. No longer, in the twenty-first century is it acceptable for women to stay at home, to take their children for occasional socialisation to a ‘preschool’. Instead it is assumed that mothers’ ‘natural’ place is in the workforce, while ‘qualified’ people (often, also women) worked with their children, in ‘enriched’ environments, to build and mould the skills of future workers. Such women were fore-grounded in salvational policy, as able to perhaps, using the alchemy of ECE, turn dross into gold. The way to equalise opportunity comes down to merely a wise
investment, by which, many believe, it is possible to increase the productivity of the national economy; to control ‘our destiny’ (Heckman, 2011a, p. 47). Such ideas are not merely old ideas revisited, but a new order, whereby within a connaissance of fitness to work, of a belief that some are born ‘fitter’ than others (Becker, 1981, p. 322), there was a redefined ordering of educational value in the late twentieth century. There is a widespread acceptance of Heckman’s (2011a, p.47) assertion that we can “invest early ... or we can pay to remediate disparities later, when they are more expensive ... Either way we are going to pay”. Such instrumental views of ECE can be challenged. It may be time to do so.
11 Concluding thoughts

In my concluding chapter, I summarise my critique of the unchallenged dominance of HCT and an uncritical acceptance of its measures to ECE. I further query the imperialist application of HCT to ECE in third world countries. I lastly ask if there are local sites and indigenous options that could be preferred instead, and activated as sites for struggle against this neoliberal dominance.

Using Michel Foucault’s methodological tool ‘genealogy’ I have traced the emergence of human capital theory (HCT) as a discourse from its small disparate beginnings. As streams from numberless sites of origin have joined in a confluence, I have argued that the power/knowledge of HCT has achieved the status of a ‘science’. It is assumed by policy advisers nationally and internationally that this neoliberal economic ‘science’ can offer solutions to contemporary economic problems. I suggest that normative assumptions about discrete groupings have been carried in the streams of neoliberal economic knowledge, which continue today as a form of biopower. In New Zealand these discrete groupings include ethnic groups (e.g. Māori and Pasifika) which have become proxies for low socio-economic categories. Within these groups, the mother/child dyad has become fused in a discourse of workers supporting economic growth and future productivity.

In this thesis I have undertaken a Foucauldian discursive analysis of the early childhood education (ECE) policy documents of the Fifth Labour Government (FLG) (1999–2008) to illustrate my arguments. Central to this study is the economic interest in the dyad of the mother and child, who are viewed by HCT as subjects to be disciplined in order to meet the state’s needs in its competitive search for wealth and compliant workers. I now set out some reflections on the work carried out in this thesis.
The methodology of genealogy gives researchers the ability to question the unquestionable and to seek other perspectives – they are enabled to look behind the face of any ‘truth’. I have used genealogy to analyse an apparent rupture in the accepted view of New Zealand education in the late 1980s. Actions by the Fourth Labour Government (1984–1990) brought in an era of changed perceptions. There was a shift in the accepted view of education: it began to be as a private good instead of a public one. Education became commodified and viewed as sets of skills that could be exchanged by individuals operating in a market economy. Since that shift the various governments have continued with similar neoliberal economic techniques and regulatory practices. Many politicians, together with the general public today accept education skills as individual property.

The FLG was considered by many ECE professionals to be a true friend, on its promises of improved funding and professional status. After consulting widely, it implemented a ten-year strategic plan (SPECE). The FLG supported an enhanced qualified teacher workforce for ECE centres. It also supported increased participation in ECE by those groups deemed to be behind the norm in all educational statistics: Māori and Pasifika children and others from low socio-economic groupings. While increased participation was widely seen by many in ECE as a matter of social justice and equity, I argue that the interest was instead performative, and was in fact largely linked to HCT economic interests, with a focus on skills. I further suggest that the ‘third way’ focus of the FLG utilised the same neoliberal economic policies of earlier governments, merely dressing them with a veneer of social responsibility and ‘care’. ECE services in the period 1999–2008 were increasingly portrayed by the FLG and its policy agencies as supporting a dual goal: of releasing mothers from the onus of caring for their children (empowering them to participate in the workforce); and concurrently to mould their children into compliant workers in a future economy. Then Prime Minister Helen Clark articulated her hopes that New Zealand would ‘rise’ to the top half of the OECD (Clark, 2001) and that her government’s policies would get more mothers ‘back to work’ (Clark, 2005). In
Chapter 3, I offered examples of micro-practices which illustrate ‘third way’ interests in ECE as one tool to support long-run international competitiveness. I further set out the genealogy of SPECE in the penultimate chapter.

Those of us in ECE are moulded, I argue, by the micro-practices of a power/knowledge normative discourse which shapes us into a desired form. The discursive shaping has a long history. The first establishment of kindergartens in this country was a part of a wider societal focus on hygiene in its widest meaning. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provinces and towns in Western countries were concerned about sites of overcrowding and disease. States articulated eugenic concerns about threats to the national stock, one instance of which was a high infant mortality rate. Politicians in New Zealand suggested that European ‘babies were the best immigrants’ (cited in Bryder, 2003, p. 1). A number of philanthropic and state initiatives to support mothers as the ‘bearers of the race’ began at this time. Kindergartens were part of hygienic initiatives which included building birthing hospitals, like St Helen’s in Christchurch, as well as Plunket Society work. At kindergarten, it was believed, disadvantaged urban children could learn hygiene and social practices. This discourse was set out in Chapter 4. After World War II, the state showed increasing interest in ECE as a tool to relieve stressed mothers and support children’s learning. In the closing years of the twentieth century supra-national agencies such as the OECD began to publish papers on the value of ECE in supporting the economic and social aspirations of working families. Urban populations internationally became increasingly diverse in the 1970s and 80s as immigrant populations moved into towns. Government policy in New Zealand supported a move by Māori into towns to meet the needs of a growing economy and its labour demands. Pacific Island peoples, too, moved from their islands to this country to meet a growing economic demand for labour. Increasingly the state viewed Māori and Pasifika children

249 Heckman, (2011, p.17), refers to the Lamarkian views of early times. He suggests ‘Adversity is partly heritable. The adversity of the mother affects the gene expression of the child’. 228
as lacking skills crucial to the country’s economic needs. State policy was a tool to address the perceived skill-deficit across all education sectors. HCT, allied to ECE, began to influence educational policy in this country at the turn of the twenty-first century, as it emerged as a prime interest of supra-national agencies like the OECD.

HCT had its origins in America in the 1950s and 60s, as discharged troops sought civilian employment opportunities. At much the same time a state interest in ECE began. US presidents such as Lyndon Johnson and Bill Clinton articulated visions for improved social and economic outcomes that positioned ECE as a central policy plank. Johnson and later presidents, after the removal of racial segregation measures, invested in preschool education for poor black populations. These included programmes like HeadStart and Ypsilanti, which were well-researched and long-running. It was data from programmes such as these that were researched four decades later by HCT micro-econometricians such as James Heckman. This micro-economic interest in ECE as a site of efficient investment was covered in Chapter 5 where I used Heckman’s research as an example of HCT intrusions into the realm of ECE. Heckman used panel data from a range of sites and multi-disciplinary information to argue that ECE can be a solution to a contemporary skill-deficit problem among segments of the population. He has articulated from this research an economic mantra that ‘skills beget skills’ (Heckman, 2008, p. 21). He advises that ECE monies targeted to populations deemed to be at risk of under-achievement, are the most cost-effective state investments. He has co-authored works on neuro-economic policy advice expressing faith in early investments to produce good outcomes. Children will learn both ‘soft’ social and cognitive skills in quality ECE programmes, the authors argue (2011, p. 13). In a 2011 discussion paper titled The American Family in Black and White: A Post-racial Strategy for Improving Skills to Promote Equality, Heckman suggests that skill formation involves both nature and nurture. Recent research, he says, establishes that the environment can be modified to maximise the genetic traits of disadvantaged children. ECE, Heckman concludes, can
mitigate the social risks of dysfunctional families which create a ‘Great [educational] Divide’ (Heckman, 2011, p. 19).^{250}

This ‘Great Divide’ (Sarah McLanahan’s phrase, cited in Heckman, 2011, p. 19), I argued in Chapter 5, has historical roots which coincide and intermingle with eighteenth-century political œconomy, as well as with nineteenth- and twentieth century economics. I set out some early perceptions of the risk of the ‘other’ in economic writings. Racial misgivings can be found in, for example, eighteenth-century hierarchical views of history. Racial misgivings can also be found in Austrian economic writing, which influenced the Chicago School HC theorists. I have used Foucault’s concept of a ‘hidden twin’ (2003, p. 116), of the ‘other’, as a central aspect of biopolitics and states’ concerns about the management of risk to the civic body in a genealogy of struggles for civil rights since the eighteenth century. Such struggles are a part, I argue, of the construction of the early nation-state’s mercantilist search for wealth. As nations traded with their fraternal neighbours, the concept of growing wealth internally was of little interest. New civic theories challenged the earlier accepted realities as the power of the sovereign was tested. As sovereign rights waned, the nation perceived population, rather than territory, as of central importance to wealth production (Foucault, 1994c). A central part of this new biopolitical focus was collecting statistical and demographic data so as to better know the population’s makeup and identify possible risks to the state.

Population continued to be a governmental concern in the eighteenth century. Mercantilist trade had traditionally been supported by tariffs and bounties to protect exports over imports. The British wars against France at the cusp of the nineteenth century were a test to the ideas of both mercantilist and social contract understandings. There was a need to grow grain at home, rather than for export. I used Robert Malthus in Chapter 7 as an example of an eighteenth-century political œconomist. He offered a

^{250} More liberal economists, such as Paul Dalziel, Brian Easton and Gosta Esping-Andersen, use similar material to reach similar conclusions.
moral prudential solution to the problem of food scarcity. Malthus utilised eighteenth-century demographic and political œconomy ideas as he wrote extensively on the ‘problem’ of the poor. He, like his contemporaries, believed that human beings could develop to a higher level of civilisation by using their rational faculties. It is this concept of development that I suggest was at the heart of nineteenth-century economics. Adam Smith, Malthus and others engaged with ‘unsettled’ economic problems. The concept of use-value, pertaining to things that are not a part of any exchange economy, began its descent of significance to economic theory at this time, I argue, while exchange-value emerged to become a central concept of market economy. Malthus and his contemporaries adopted Smith’s ideas, in preference to other possible economic models like those of Adam Ferguson and James Steuart.

In Chapters 8 and 9 I set out a genealogy of struggles for an ascendency of economic ideas. The epistemological underpinnings of the economic discipline could have come from collectivist ideas – it was not a foregone conclusion that the concept of the individualistic trader would win out. I have suggested that the accepted economic underpinnings of the HC theorists Schultz, Becker, Mincer, and later Heckman, arose in very specific historical contexts. From nineteenth-century theoretical arguments between the Austrian and German Schools the concept of the atomistic individual emerged as the accepted economic entity. The Austrian School theorists argued that the trader operated in markets utilising civilisational institutions that had developed over time, free of human intervention. They believed that the twin concepts of praxeology and catallaxy prevented any chance of societal and civilisational regression.

Other nineteenth-century ideas were to be adopted by twentieth century economists, among them the concept of ‘ordinal’ rather than ‘cardinal’ measures and ‘marginal utility’, a concept by which traders could order scarce resources. In the early twentieth century there was a successful attempt to uncouple economics from its moral roots. Economics was consciously written into the status of a ‘hard’ science by individuals like Lionel Robbins, Karl Popper and Milton Friedman. Neoliberal economic
theorists escaping pre-World War II Germany supported the acceptance of their theorems by the Chicago School theorists. In the 1980s some of the Chicago School became economic advisers to the Regan government and a number of Western governments adopted neoliberal economic ideas at this time. The alliance of neuroscience with economics in the twenty-first century is a final invasion into the private domain and into the body of the growing child, I suggest.

I have also noted criticisms of HC and neoliberal economic theories. Pierre Bourdieu (1998) asserted that when the ‘science’ of neoliberalism is converted into a political plan of action to ‘create the conditions under which the ‘theory’ can be realised, it becomes ‘a programme of the methodical destruction of collectives’.

What if, in reality, this economic order were no more than the implementation of a utopia – the utopia of neoliberalism – thus converted into a political problem? One that, with the aid of the economic theory that it proclaims, succeeds in conceiving of itself as the scientific description of reality? (1998, p. X, emphasis in original).

It is unlikely, Bourdieu concluded, that any calls to social or capital enablement will overthrow the ontological centrality of the atomic individual. Other critics, like Mark Blaug (2001), have been scathing of the Chicago School’s economic theorems.

In chapter 9, I tracked the acceptance of the Chicago School’s ideas, especially those of the HC theorists, by supra-national agencies including the OECD, IMF and World Bank as the ‘natural’ economic way. The methods, measures and technologies of HCT have been adopted by the United Nations in its Millennium Development Goals (UNMDG) as a solution to poverty in Third World developing countries. The ‘natural assumptions’ of child development and of ECE as a cost-effective investment are now taken as ‘givens’ in a range of national and international publications in their search for solutions to world poverty.

251 Bourdieu calls it a ‘mathematical fiction’.
In setting out these thoughts and considerations from my research, I note that Foucault suggested no one can replace one universal solution with another (1985, p. 343). The researcher should merely indicate sites for local struggles rather than offer simple solutions to complex problems.

11.1 HCT as devolved responsibility

In a socially egalitarian milieu where the HCT discourse holds sway, the state supposes support will come from the employer who will offer skill-training. If the individual is not in employment, it is assumed, the geographic or cultural community will offer training-support. To achieve the desired devolution of responsibility, governments have presented ‘community’ as a newly minted entity in the discourse of political rationality. States have devolved a limited amount of self-governance and responsibility for regulation to community agencies. Communities are seen by the state as accepting accountability for their members with a measure of responsibility for enskilling individuals. This devolution dovetails with the neoliberal discourse of ‘less government’ in supporting state withdrawal from engagement in day-to-day local management of regulatory responsibilities. The power of the discourse is gaining pace with the emergence of multi-disciplinary advocacy of community to enhance child development (e.g. Poulton, 2008; Heckman, 2011; Shonkoff & Bales, 2011). The individual, supported by her peers, is expected to discipline herself to enhance her skill-base in order to be work-ready. These are contemporary forms of state reason – redefined biopolitical rationalities that are unlike earlier governmental rationalities. The subjects of New Zealand are governed as economic subjects with convergent interests that are balanced by civil rights which act simultaneously through what Foucault (2008, p. 302) calls a ‘principle of dissociation’. 
11.2 Policy implications when HCT becomes the ‘taken-for-granted’ assumption of ECE

Through this thesis I have cast doubt on the efficacy of HCT to support the broader humanistic goals for ECE, and on the expectation that ECE policies based on the principles of HCT will be able to achieve what they promise. In seeking better educational outcomes and future job opportunities for Māori and Pasifika children through the myopic lens of HCT policy, there are tensions between the plural perceptions of ‘family’ and ‘child’ in our national curriculum. I suggest that a possible area for future investigation could be that of the unfulfilled promise of HCT. Highly educated people who have devoted time to accessing qualifications and skills as a means to accept responsibility for self and their dependants have found themselves surplus to organisational requirements, made redundant or institutionally demoted. The fluctuations of the economy are deemed to be systemic normalities that individuals must prepare for. They must, among many other responsibilities, manage the associated risks of a market-based existence. Where individuals have not planned well for, or did not successfully manage to navigate, such down turns, this risk becomes a collective endangerment which justifies the state’s intervention. As the state can only intervene in ways that are in keeping with the theory, there is increasing support for preschooling within local neighbourhoods, where mothers can retrain while their children are cared for. The community is ‘empowered’ by the state to support the maternal training and skill-enhancement of her children, together with the monitoring of their future employment. Such is the nature of contemporary devolved accountability and enhanced community responsibility.

Liberal governmentality is a constantly shifting ‘motor’ as the freedom to govern, but not too much, is renegotiated in civil society. There is an oscillation between the independence of the governed and the requirements of governmentality (Foucault, 2008, p. 42). In liberal societies, however, HCT has become a contemporary alchemy, a residual trace from Aristotelian science. Its assumption that if society invests in
knowledge, skills and competencies then the wealth of the country will grow exponentially is at odds with the basic tenets of liberality. Society is removed from moral involvement, leaving the ‘market veridication’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 44) to order and sort, thereby hiding the interplay of interests in determining the exchange value of things. The reliable and trusted ‘truth’ that education delivers goods and services through an efficient marketplace and will instil values and skills deemed useful assumes there is an ever-expanding employment market with room for all to flourish. The recent downturn in the global economy and increased unemployment has only slightly tested the faith of HCT believers. Nations are assumed to depend on the industry of their population, which is urged to believe that everyday dangers are risks which must be managed by individuals: workers must ensure that skills do not ‘rust’, that life-long learning is continual, for the good of both the individual and country. When the monitoring of the individual’s skill-base becomes the responsibility of the family, the firm or the community, the state is freed to actively manage those groups deemed dangerous. Faith in HCT’s universal truths may be sorely tested in a world with scarce jobs and in a global economy which shows signs of staggering rather than growing, as we are seeing in the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Traditional understandings of the role of ECE managers, staff, parents and children have been reconceptualised since the 1980s: they are now seen as managers, employers or clients of a firm. The entrepreneurial individual continues to be viewed as a ‘purchaser’ of the ‘service’ offered by ECE centres. Such centres are constructed as being essential to management of the community, with neoliberal constructions of cost-benefit investment remaining central to the construction (e.g. Tuijnman & Wright, 2004). ‘Community’ and ‘collectives’ are valued educational terms which have, in the economic lexicon, become performative: terms of measure, calculation and regulation (Ball, 2003). NPM techniques in New Zealand have framed devolution as ‘narrowly contractual’ in the lexicon of mitigating risk. The outcomes of policies framed under the Education Act 1989 and later amendments were to have the effect of creating ‘winners
and losers’. Parents in this lexicon are encouraged to believe that they manage the risk of poverty, subsistence and unemployment by investing in growing their children’s skills to enhance their marketability. The discourse supports parents to believe they can alleviate the danger of poverty by acting as entrepreneurs of themselves and their children. Sole parents, recent immigrants and the transient are viewed by the state and supra-national agencies as risky to wealth production. Portraying such groups as pathological risks to the nation generates an argument for direct state intervention into the lives of those deemed to be dysfunctional parents in the interests of their children. Such intervention is viewed as necessary for the mother’s sake, the sake of her children and the good of the nation. Some economic writings (e.g. Feeny, 2006; Knudsen et al., 2006; Cunha et al., 2005; Carneiro & Heckman, 2003; Heckman, 2000, 2010, 2011; Shonkoff & Bales, 2011) suggest that ECE centres can be surrogates for dysfunctional parents. These economists are ambivalent about the role of the teacher, Heckman, in particular preferring to talk about enriched ECE environments, while maintaining that schools be ‘free’ to choose and manage their teachers (2009, 2010 b).

11.2.1 The implications of HCT as a globalised discourse

As noted above, HCT acts as a modern-day form of alchemy in contemporary Western societies. It is assumed that if society invests in knowledge, skills and competencies then the wealth of the country will grow exponentially. Elements of faith, ethics and beliefs about mankind and the world remained interwoven in neoliberal economics in the form of normative judgements.

Empirical facts support HCT as an imperial tool of economics. Supra-national agencies gather statistics on areas as diverse as maternal education and outcomes of early intervention programmes as they seek to measure national wealth. The IMF hopes that structural adjustment measures, i.e. reforming penurious communities into market economies, will support developing countries to conform to the neoliberal market model of education. Humanitarianism is the twenty-first-century face of fraternalism in
the ‘war on poverty’ in Africa and Asia (e.g. Garcia & Pence, 2010; World Bank, 2008). The UNMDG evoke a duty to our global neighbours to support their economic development, yet the tools of such fraternal support remain the narrowly conceived HCT measures.

HCT’s conception of the economics of human development and of the unequal effects of early life-chances between groups or countries is now standard advice:

A healthy cognitive and emotional development in the early years translates into tangible economic returns. Early interventions yield higher returns as a preventive measure compared with remedial services later in life. Policies that seek to remedy deficits incurred in the early years are much more costly than initial investments in the early years (World Bank (n.d. c), cited in Woodhead, 2007, p. 14).

Such advice is given by agencies like the World Bank to developing countries whose social and historical contexts differ radically from HCT’s sites of origin – America and Austria. HCT is a ‘travelling theory’ that has become reified (Said, 1983, p. 163). Discrepancies in earnings are not due to employer attitudes or ‘market discrimination’ but to a group skill-disparity, Heckman (1998, p. 101) argues. Because workers’ skills are traded on the margins, it is the employment market that discriminates, rather than any individual. The discourse of science continues to claim privilege as data, statistics and information are collated to demonstrate the need for early intervention. Supra-national agencies make low-repayment loans conditional on offering educational investments (e.g. IMF, 2001; Sachs, 2003). ‘Early child development (ECD) remains one of the most powerful levers for accelerating Education For All (EFA) and meeting the MDGs for reducing poverty’ (Worldbank, N.D. c). These goals offer quantifiable targets that can be assessed and monitored and the World Bank uses micro-econometric costing models to predict efficient sites for investments. International agencies now view developing countries as the ‘swamp’ in the ‘global village’ (as early twentieth century hygienists had viewed the disadvantaged of their day). Just as the mercantilist theory viewed trade as
a fraternal responsibility, supra-national agencies recommend fraternal trade on the open market as the solution to Third World poverty. Faith in wealth, progress and human development has superseded faith in rewards in the next world. Now individuals in the twenty-first century minister to their own faiths, to their belief in personal and national wealth. It is time to question the apparent alchemy of neoliberal discourse that advocates seeking economic wealth over other values.

11.3 Questioning our ‘truths’: why is ECE important?

Despite its dominance coming under critique in some quarters (e.g. Cannella, 1989, p.45) the positive value of ‘child development’ is generally accepted as an educational tenet and practice. The epistemology of ‘development’, which is embedded in education, gives humanitarianism its ally in the global ‘war on poverty’. The emergence of these nineteenth- and twentieth century assumptions about evolving and developing humankind has been set out (see e.g. Heckman & Masterov, 2004; Knudsen et al., 2006), but a further weapon of economic imperialism has appeared on the horizon. With the publication of joint articles by neuro-scientists and economists, a new branch of HCT, called neuro-economics, has emerged and it is becoming a powerful discourse in its own right. It is an example of a new alliance between the economic and social machines (Meuret, 1981, cited in Rose, 2000c, p. 124). As political interest has heightened, and as neuro-development has been co-opted into HCT discourse, children are being viewed as the ‘saviours’ of our economic future. If supported in enriched environments by social agents such as parents, teachers and communities, young children reach optimal development as skilled future workers for their families and their nation. Education ‘is crucial in developing human capital ... [to prevent some being] left behind’ (OECD, 2007a). While HCT writings avoid talking about teachers as essential, they note that enriched early environments are (e.g. Heckman, 2008, p. 19ff; 2010, p. 5). ECE centres are viewed as necessary in ensuring that each child has the dispositions required of a skilled, compliant worker. Parents, educators and managers of ECE
centres have been so immersed in neoliberal discourse for the past two decades that they accept it as reality. Such imperialism also co-opts ECE into a welfare-agency discourse. It is suggested that dysfunctional parents, with their genetic inadequacies in poor environments, are a risk to their children’s optimal development (Heckman, 2011, p. 16). Heckman suggests that, to ensure such parents do not disadvantage their children, the children should be placed in quality ECE centres.

There is no neutral place in a biopower discourse. The subject, who speaks, writes Foucault (1994g, p. 61), must stand on one side or the other in the biopolitical war. Despite a rhetoric of freedom for individuals, parents or teachers; and another which positions ECE teacher advocates for social justice who actively struggle against any co-option, there are tensions. Nikolas Rose suggests that educational discourse is a ‘contingent lash-up’ of two differing ideas: those of nineteenth-century ‘working-class pedagogy’ and civic aspirations for ‘order, civility and domestication’ (2000d, p. 276). The teleological view of development is merely one view. There are other perspectives which may offer opportunities for new understandings. Earlier discourses were concerned with children’s souls, rather than their synapses. Some contemporary ECE ontologies emphasise the value of children’s learning in the present, rather than as future workers (e.g. Canella, 1989, p. 45 ff.; Dahlberg, et al, 1999, pp 121ff; Moss & Petrie, 2002, pp 123 ff). Vestiges of the understanding of education as a public good remain. Teachers in ECE presently seek to balance tensions between the humanist image of the child evident in the New Zealand ECE curriculum as ‘competent and confident’ (MoE, 1996, p. 9) and that of the narrowly agentic child portrayed in HCT discourse. As teachers we can seek to articulate and privilege other narratives and to escape the economic bonds of HCT.

By making the familiar unfamiliar, by seeking to make the positivity of this ‘truth’ stutter, there is the hope that we can take stock of HCT and seek diverse solutions, other discourses, within which we can reconstitute ourselves as moral agents (Foucault, 1985). Dahlberg & Moss (2005, p. 90ff.) have suggested that educators have ethical
responsibilities to critique policy and its effects on children. There may be a tension between education viewed as a commodity and the image of the competent child. The rights of indigenous peoples, of children, of minorities have been articulated strongly by ECE advocates for social justice in New Zealand in the past two decades, on issues such as the retention Te Tiriti o Waitangi in curriculum document. In this view Māori are given primacy as tangata whenua, the indigenous peoples of this land, rather than penurious inheritors of earlier economic resource confiscations. Neoliberalism may be a seen by some as a ‘New Zealand experiment’ (Brash, 1996; Kelsey, 1997), but its atomistic epistemologies sit oddly in a cultural context where Māori affirm an holistic collectivity.

Nikolas Rose and Peter Moss have suggested that the state has entered the very soul of children (Dahlberg & Moss, 2005; Moss & Petrie, 2002; Rose, 1990, 2000, p.1409). Foucault has suggested that societal pressure shapes the aspirations of both parent and child. Not only to shape them as they are now, but ‘also on what they are, will be, may be’ (1995, p. X, emphasis in original). It therefore limits new visions, aspirational hopes and dreams which may be needed in a society where the truth of universal jobs and prosperity may not be possible. There is a need to confront the understanding that ECE is now seen as benefiting all children. All rationalities are dangerous, so our contemporary rationalities affirming the twin influences of nature and nurture can be viewed as a discursive construct. We should be wary of all sciences bearing ‘truths’. By using Foucault’s methodological tool of genealogy we are able to ungroup the relations of such statements in the hope of uncoupling the image of the child from the order of economic discourse.
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