Implications and impacts of terrorism on sporting events: Is the hospitality industry prepared and equipped to host mega events?

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Cyril Ravindran Peter
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Primary Supervisor: Dr Jill Poulston
Secondary Supervisor: Erwin Losekoot
Table of Contents

Attestation of Authorship ....................................................................................... vi
Acknowledgement .................................................................................................... vii
Confidential material ............................................................................................... viii
Abstract .................................................................................................................. ix

1. Chapter One: Introduction ................................................................................... 1
   1.1. Terrorism .......................................................................................................... 1
   1.2. Research topic ................................................................................................ 2
   1.3. Purpose and parameters of the research ....................................................... 2
   1.4. Rugby World Cup (RWC) ............................................................................. 3
   1.5. Overview of the thesis ................................................................................... 4

2. Chapter Two: Literature Review ......................................................................... 6
   2.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 6
   2.2. Overview .......................................................................................................... 7
   2.3. Hospitality and terrorism .............................................................................. 8
       2.3.1. Discussion .................................................................................................. 13
   2.4. Sport and sporting events ............................................................................. 18
       2.4.1. Benefits of sporting events ....................................................................... 19
       2.4.2. Sporting events, politics and terrorism ................................................... 21
       2.4.3. Discussion ............................................................................................... 22
   2.5. Modes of attacks ............................................................................................ 23
       2.5.1. Suicide bombing ..................................................................................... 25
       2.5.2. Kidnappings and hostage takings ........................................................... 27
       2.5.3. Food terrorism .......................................................................................... 28
       2.5.4. Discussion ............................................................................................... 29
   2.6. Safety and security concerns .......................................................................... 29
       2.6.1. Participants ............................................................................................... 31
       2.6.2. Spectators ................................................................................................. 32
       2.6.3. Discussion ............................................................................................... 33
   2.7. Rugby World Cup (RWC) security ................................................................. 34
       2.7.1. Discussion ............................................................................................... 35
   2.8. Political ideology ............................................................................................. 36
       2.8.1. Discussion ............................................................................................... 37
   2.9. Risk sensitivity ................................................................................................ 37
       2.9.1. Discussion ............................................................................................... 40
   2.10. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 41

3. Chapter Three: Methodology .............................................................................. 44
   3.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 44
3.2. Qualitative research method ................................................. 45
3.3. Interpretivism ........................................................................ 47
3.4. Research question .................................................................. 48
3.5. Participant selection and recruitment ...................................... 49
3.6. Three different interview methods ......................................... 50
  3.6.1. Structured interviews ...................................................... 50
  3.6.2. Unstructured interviews .................................................. 50
  3.6.3. Semi-structured interviews .............................................. 51
3.7. Ethics approval ..................................................................... 51
  3.7.1. Purpose ........................................................................... 52
  3.7.2. Process ........................................................................... 52
3.8. Data collection, analysis, management and storage .................. 53
  3.8.1. Data collection .................................................................. 53
  3.8.2. Data analysis .................................................................... 55
  3.8.3. Data Management ............................................................ 56
  3.8.4. Data storage .................................................................... 56
3.9. Conclusion ............................................................................. 57

4. Chapter Four: Findings ............................................................... 58
4.1. Introduction ........................................................................... 58
4.2. Data collection process .......................................................... 59
4.3. Limitations ............................................................................ 59
4.4. Significant observations ........................................................ 60
4.5. Research data ........................................................................ 60
4.6. Themes ................................................................................ 79
  4.6.1. Political ideology and awareness of international politics ........ 80
  4.6.2. ‘She’ll be right’ attitude. ..................................................... 80
  4.6.3. Vetting of staff and suppliers ............................................. 82
  4.6.4. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) food guidelines .... 82
  4.6.5. Who is responsible for security? ......................................... 83
4.7. Conclusion ............................................................................. 83

5. Chapter Five: Discussion ............................................................. 85
5.1. Introduction ........................................................................... 85
5.2. Political ideology and awareness of international politics .......... 86
5.3. ‘She’ll be right’ attitude. ......................................................... 88
5.4. Vetting of staff and suppliers ................................................... 93
5.5. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) food guidelines ...... 96
5.6. Who is responsible for security? .............................................. 100
5.7. Conclusion ............................................................................ 103
5.7.1. Key theme – laissez-faire .................................................................104

6. Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendation ....................................106
  6.1. Terrorism .........................................................................................106
  6.2. State of preparedness ......................................................................106
    6.2.1. Security vetting process ..............................................................106
    6.2.2. Laissez-faire attitude towards security .........................................107
  6.3. Important lessons ............................................................................107
    6.3.1. Management implications ...........................................................108
  6.4. Recommendation ............................................................................108

References ..............................................................................................109

Appendix 1: Literature Guide ....................................................................122
Appendix 2: Food chain and security guidance and checklist .....................123
Appendix 3: ‘She’ll be right’ lyrics ...............................................................137
Appendix 4: Indicative questions .................................................................138
Appendix 5: Participant Information Sheet ................................................140
List of Tables

Table 1: Terrorist events involving hospitality properties (2001 to 2011)..............17
Table 2: Uncertainty avoidance ranking - Hofstede's model ..................................40
Table 3: Quantitative and qualitative comparison..................................................47
Table 4: Hotel codes ...............................................................................................56
Table 5: Participating property's background information.........................................61
Table 6: Properties that received the MAF guidelines and checklist .......................99
Table 7: Properties that did not discuss the MAF guidelines and checklist ............99
Table 8: Security responsibility................................................................................101

List of Diagrams

Diagram 1: Main components of a mega sporting event ........................................8
Diagram 2: Economic gears ....................................................................................20
Diagram 3: Components of terrorism ....................................................................21
Attestation of Authorship

“I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.”

Signed: _________________

Cyril Ravindran Peter

December 2011
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Having completed this study, I now realise that it is just the beginning of a long journey for me. It has created some new areas that I want to research.

A thesis of this nature requires four main components: good topic, supportive supervisors, willing participants and unconditional family support. I was blessed with all four.

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I was merely the instrument in this joint effort. I am grateful to all of you. Thank you once again.

This research was approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on 7th June 2011. AUTEC Reference number 11/96.
Confidential material

Participants in this research have retained the right to have their identity kept confidential. Each participant has been assigned a code and all other identifying features have been removed or assigned a pseudonym. For security reasons, names of VIPs in this thesis have been replaced with XXX.
Abstract

‘Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you’.

~Paul Wilkinson~

Globally, over a 32 year period to 2003, there were 168 attempts by terrorists to disrupt sporting events (Taylor & Toohey, 2007). These include the 1972 Munich massacre and the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America (Hall, Marciani & Cooper, 2008). It is these 168 incidents that gave rise to this particular exploratory study which examines the relationship between terrorism and hospitality in New Zealand. The study also examines the level of preparedness of the New Zealand hospitality industry for hosting the Rugby World Cup 2011 (RWC) from 9th September to 23rd October 2011.

Eight participants were selected and interviewed. The participating properties included a serviced apartment building, two hostels / backpackers and five hotels, including a 5-star property. This broad range allowed for the level of preparedness to be investigated for each type of property. Approximately 200 articles were used to provide the framework upon which this research is based.

Some of the key themes that were discussed in the interviews were:

1. The relaxed attitude of the industry regarding terrorism
2. The lack of security vetting
3. The direction and support from government agencies
4. The impact of political ideology on level of preparedness
5. The question who should be responsible for security in the hospitality industry

The main finding that underpins this study is the laissez-faire attitude of the industry towards security. There is a level of risk acceptance demonstrated in the collated interview responses. Parallels can be drawn between the responses and one of Hofstede’s (1984) cultural dimensions – uncertainty
avoidance, which explains how cultures have different levels of risk acceptance, and some operate under very few regulations and formalities.
1. Chapter One: Introduction

‘This mass terrorism is the new evil in our world today’

~Tony Blair~

1.1. Terrorism

Terrorism is defined by the United States Department of State (2011 Sec. 2656f(d)2) as ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents’.

Ruby (2002) refers to terrorism as an act that is ‘committed in order to create a fearful state of mind in an audience different from the victims’ (p. 9). The victims of terrorist acts are not the intended targets. They are merely sacrificed in order to instil fear in the witnesses and governments (Bergesen, 2006). Governments are likely to react when their citizens are casualties of a terrorist attack. Terrorists generally are trying to raise awareness of their plight or predicament and terrorism is an effective method to gain the desired attention. It is difficult to acquire immunity from terrorism; even if terrorism does not take place in one’s home country, innocent individuals can be victims of a terrorist attack while travelling overseas.

Terrorists will often attempt to gain maximum attention while expending very little effort and resources. They tend to attack ‘soft’ targets which include restaurants, hotels, schools and cinemas (Goslin, 2008; Brandt & Sandler, 2010). They often try to focus their efforts where international tourists gather which will ensure the attention of the world media. For example, an attack on a hotel with international guests will attract the attention of government in the countries of their origin.

Sport events have been disrupted by terrorism 168 times in the last 32 years, which is approximately five attacks every year (Taylor & Toohey, 2007). International sporting events are popular targets for terrorists because they attract media from around the world, making terrorism an attractive technique for those who wish to raise matters that are very important to them.
Defining terrorism is not easy. Ganor (2002) for example, questions whether it is possible that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ (p. 123). However, most definitions describe terrorism as illegal and therefore wrong. Larobina and Pate (2009) state that ‘a specific aim of terrorism is to disrupt and destroy ongoing businesses’ (p. 147). The intention is to adversely affect the economy of the country. Pizam (2002) explains that tourism has a ‘multiplier effect’ which will be lost if terrorists are successful in disrupting tourism (p. 1). The multiplier effect refers to the monetary relationship between tourist spending and the economy, a tourist spends money on hotels, restaurants, entertainment, shopping during their stay. Hence, the money they have introduced into the economy flows into various sectors. Henderson (2004) stresses that terrorism has far reaching implications, ‘beyond the particular location where it occurs’ (p. 17). Henderson studied the impact of the Bali bombings on Singapore and concluded that surrounding destinations would also be affected by any terrorist attack.

1.2. Research topic

The main purpose of this research is to explore the implications and impact of terrorism on sporting events and also to investigate whether the hospitality industry is prepared and equipped to host such mega events.

1.3. Purpose and parameters of the research

The first part of the research seeks to review the literature around the topic of terrorism and sporting events, explore its relationship and find out what and how terrorism can impact major sporting events. The second part explores the preparedness of the hospitality industry to host mega events safely. It will examine guidelines set by government agencies and also consider the hotels’ contribution and obligation concerning security.

New Zealand had six years after winning the bid to host the RWC to prepare the country for this event. To service the expected large crowds, stadia had to be upgraded, special areas had to be established for fans to gather and watch the games on big screens (fanzones), accommodation for the international visitors had to be arranged, and internal transport systems had to be upgraded.
Generally the country was ‘cleaned up’ in preparation to be presented to the world. Both individuals and businesses were preparing their support for the event.

The perception that New Zealand is not high on the list of terrorist targets perhaps will explain the amount of time and effort that went into planning and implementing security strategies.

This research has been confined to interviewing eight participants across a broad cross-section of accommodation properties. The findings from this research cannot be generalised because of the small sample size. However, it is considered sufficient to provide an idea of the security measures undertaken by hotels and their reasons for them. The interpretivist methodology was semi-structured interviews. These were deemed most appropriate for a study of this nature. An explanation for selecting this approach and method is provided in Chapter three.

1.4. Rugby World Cup (RWC)

This tournament, which is played every four years, started in 1987 with New Zealand and Australia as co-hosts. New Zealand won the inaugural tournament. The RWC has become the third most popular international sporting event after the Olympics and the FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association) World Cup (International Rugby Board, 2011a). An increase in viewership is expected from 300 million in 1987 to approximately four billion in 2011 (RNZ, 2010). Given its popularity, the RWC is defined as a mega event. Mega events are large global events, requiring countries to bid for the opportunity to act as hosts (Getz, 2008; Anderson, Armbrecht & Lundberg, 2008; Giulianotti & Klauser, 2011).

The games were played in 11 cities (Whangarei, Auckland, Hamilton, Rotorua, New Plymouth, Napier, Palmerston North, Wellington, Nelson, Dunedin and Invercargill) around New Zealand with the finals being held at Eden Park in Auckland (International Rugby Board, 2011b). Games that had been scheduled to be played in Christchurch were reassigned to other cities due to a major earthquake affecting the city on 22nd February 2011 (FOX Sports, 2011).
Rugby has been played in New Zealand for about 140 years and the first official game was played in Nelson in May 1870 (Tourism New Zealand, 2011). The enthusiasm for this contact sport has since developed to a passion. In explaining New Zealand’s passion for and success at this particular sport, All Blacks 2011 captain Richie McCaw paid tribute to his predecessors. He said, ‘traditionally we’ve been off-the-land sort of people, pretty strong rugged people … and when they got out in the field they were tough, hard men. That’s why they had success in the earlier years and it’s just carried on’ (Tourism New Zealand, 1999).

1.5. Overview of the thesis

The thesis is structured as follows.

Chapter one defines terrorism, explains the research topic including the aims and parameters of the research and also provides a synopsis of each chapter in this thesis. Chapter two provides a background to terrorism. It identifies and examines cases of terrorist acts or threats, defines the terminology, and outlines the theory used in the research. This literature review chapter is akin to the scaffolding erected prior to the actual construction of a building and is a vital component of any research. Approximately 200 articles were selected for review. The literature review covers a wide range of relevant topics which have been categorised under six separate headings. Chapter three introduces and explains the methodology used in this research and also the methods employed to collect, analyse, manage and store the data. It discusses and explains qualitative research, interpretivism and semi-structured interviews and explains the reason for their selection for this research. Chapter four presents the findings in their raw form. All the questions and participants’ responses are listed. Brief commentaries pertaining to each question is provided to explain and analyse the findings. The data are presented in its raw form because while the researcher interprets the findings, others will have their own interpretation. The advantage of this mode of presentation is that it allows the reader to be active and involved in the research rather than merely accepting the interpretations provided. Chapter four also presents five themes and issues from the participant’s response. An explanation for each is given to help provide an understanding of the reasoning behind the importance and selection of each of
the themes. In chapter five the five themes and issues from the preceding chapter will be discussed in greater detail. The format of the discussion is to:

- identify each individual theme and provide an explanation
- identify literature from chapter two that is relevant to the theme
- highlight responses from the participants that relates to the theme
- interpret the data and provide an opinion

The focus of chapter six is to summarise the main findings and interpretations of this research. This chapter also includes recommendations for further research.
2. Chapter Two: Literature Review

‘Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed’

~ Martin Luther King, Jr. ~

2.1. Introduction

Interpretivism requires that in order to analyse the findings, one must first thoroughly understand the context or the topic which is the main purpose of this literature review. Without fully comprehending the background of the broader topic of terrorism, it is very difficult to understand the actions or in some cases, the inactions of the authorities, event organisers and hotel managers. The reference materials covered in this chapter are freely available in the public domain and interested parties can access them after consulting the reference list at the end of this thesis. This research seeks to understand why affected individuals and organisations, which have been charged with managing the event (including providing accommodation), are acting in the manner they have chosen to. Without this thorough understanding it will be very difficult to interpret the findings of this study.

A list of possible topics was developed and it was then decided that seven pertinent sections would best assist in answering the research question – ‘Implications and impacts of terrorism on sporting events: Is the hospitality industry prepared and equipped to host mega events?’ They are all important, though not necessarily equally so. A secondary research approach was taken for this part, studying the thoughts and experiences documented by other researchers.

The majority of the literature available on terrorism describes it as wrong and illegal. McPherson (2007) refers to this as the ‘dominant view’ (p. 524). It is difficult to find academic literature that supports terrorism. McPherson, however, compares terrorists attacks to conventional war and argues that they should be treated similarly because of their purpose and intentions and the manner in which they are executed. But this viewpoint is uncommon.
The review focuses on the following seven topics:

1. Hospitality and terrorism
2. Sport and sporting events
3. Modes of attacks
4. Safety and security concerns
5. Rugby World Cup (RWC) security
6. Political ideology
7. Risk sensitivity

After this brief introduction, there is an overview explaining the definition and relevance of each section to the research question being investigated. The overview outlines each section and its importance. Each section reviews relevant literature pertaining to it and concludes with a brief discussion before moving on to the next topic. Most of the literature in this chapter are from academic journals and were selected to provide an understanding of the topic. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main points.

2.2. Overview

This section defines and explains the relevance of each of the selected seven sections. This overview acts as a signpost so it is clear what to expect from this thesis. It also provides a list of literature for each section. A literature guide is included for ease of reference (Appendix 1).

While there are several areas that are being researched for this study, there are three main components relating to hosting a mega sporting event: hospitality, security and sport (HSS). Diagram 1, a Venn diagram, shows the three component parts, with the overlapping section marked ‘HSS’. All three components can exist independently without relating to the other two components or any two of the components can operate together. However, the literature regarding this topic suggests that for a mega sporting event to be successfully staged, all three components have to be present (HSS). The relationship between sporting events and terrorism has been clearly established. Clark (2004) states that sporting events have been disrupted 168 times in 32 years. Hall, Marciani and Cooper (2008) and Toohey (2008)
describe the Munich Massacre, where several officials and athletes died. This terrorist strike took place during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, West Germany. Those captured, were taken hostage from their accommodation. This clearly demonstrates the interdependence of the three main components: hospitality, sport and security.

![Diagram 1: Main components of a mega sporting event](image)

Sönmez (1998) explains how terrorists deliberately attack tourists thereby demonstrating the need for security. Taylor and Toohey (2011) explain how planning for mega events had changed since the events of the September 11 2001 attack in New York (9/11). Terrorism had intensified security arrangements. In a study based on the security at the FIFA World Cup 2002, Toohey, Taylor and Lee (2003) researched the attendees’ perception of security at the following locations: airport, stadium and accommodation. The study found that attendees were satisfied by the security provided during the Games which were jointly hosted by South Korea and Japan.

### 2.3. Hospitality and terrorism

This section discusses the relationship between hospitality and terrorism. It explains the reasons terrorists choose hotels to carry out their acts. It documents some of the historical terrorist events that have included hospitality properties. It also examines specific cases and tries to understand the motivation for them. This topic addresses the need for hotels to be protected while remaining open and inviting, something that is not easily achieved.
The relationship between hospitality and terrorism is a long one. Pizam (2010, p. 1) notes,

‘from the terrorists’ point of view, only through violent means can their message be heard and seen, since all their previous attempts to address their injustice through peaceful means, have failed. Therefore they have to not only cause great damage to life and property but also select a target that gives them the maximum exposure with the minimum chance of failure’.

Hospitality (and hotels in particular) exudes a sense of affluence that terrorists target. Foreigners, especially Westerners, are popular targets for terrorists. For example, in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, terrorists were specifically targeting Westerners according to Gupta (2008). Attacking a restaurant or hotel filled with local people may not be news worthy, however terrorist acts involving foreigners is reported widely. Stafford, Yu and Armoo (2002) found that some terrorist organisations specialise in and only target hotels and international tourists. They explain how managers respond to terrorist events or threats which demonstrate a high level of planning. Stafford et al. (2002) also explain that the managers divide their initial response into two phases – internal response and external response. In the internal response phase, managers assess the situation, gather more information and deploy their staff to reassure, calm and provide as much information as possible to the guests. In the external phase, the manager connects with the authorities and emergency services to inform them of the situation in the hotel as well as to collect more information.

In order for managers to quickly make important decisions regarding security, they must have the required knowledge, experience and maturity. Decisions are final and bring conclusion or solution to a problem according to Tannenbaum (1950). Staff take instructions even from a young manager because of the authority they have by virtue of the managerial position they hold. Tannenbaum also states that the gender of the manager is not material in the decision making process. According to Bartol et al. (2008, p. 105) there are three types of problems that managers are required to deal with – ‘crisis, non-crisis and opportunity’ problems and the kinds of decisions that relate to terrorism can be described as ‘crisis problems’. Crisis problems are not dealt with on a regular basis which makes them difficult to solve. There are no fixed rules that can be applied to them to aid the decision making process. Parsons (1996, p. 26)
states that ‘crises by their very nature, are unexpected and brief with few managers possessing either first-hand knowledge or practical experience’. He clarifies that there are three types of crises: ‘immediate, emerging and sustained’. The key is to understand the possibility of a crisis and preparing for it. It may not happen but if it does; all the prior planning will be useful. Ritchie (2003, p. 669) agrees with the long term view, describing it as ‘proactive pre-crisis planning’.

Planning and preparing for terrorism is similar to preparing for any crisis in business. Companies have contingency plans in place in case of a crisis. While it may not be easy to achieve a high level of preparedness, McConnell and Drennan (2006) emphasise the importance of planning for a crisis. Daft and Marcic (2004) state that the ‘world has become so fast, interconnected, and complex that unexpected events happen more frequently’ (p. 21). Unexpected small-scale events such as theft, fire and production line breakdowns can affect a business. On a larger scale, stock market crashes and wars are events that will have worldwide effects. The statement by Daft and Marcic with regards to interconnectivity means that organisations are not immune to crisis events and logically businesses must have contingency plans in place to deal with such events when they do occur. Therefore, terrorism could perhaps be treated in the same manner, as other unexpected events which are also increasing in frequency. Hotel managers could therefore be trained in providing leadership for these kinds of events when the need arises.

As a result of being targeted by terrorist groups, hotel brands will suffer. Marriott’s Islamabad hotel is described by Gunaratna (2008) as ‘the most protected hotel in the world’. It has endured three attacks, in 2004, 2007 and again in 2008. Exposure to these attacks may have negatively affected their ability to attract guests and even staff.

A North American study by Pennington-Gray, Thapa, Kaplanidou, Cahyanto and McLaughlin (2011) found that hospitality organisations have a high level of preparedness. They claim that many organisations have written plans that are updated at least once a year. Their study also shows that many organisations kept in touch with their local authorities as part of their crisis management plan.
The study was based on 155 telephone interviews with respondents from lodging, attraction and promotion sectors of the hospitality industry.

Table 1 lists some of the hospitality properties that have been attacked since 2001. This is not a comprehensive list, but catalogues only 50 documented incidents; there may have been many more. This list shows only hospitality properties which are the focus of this study, but it does not include road side bombing, bombing of military installations and government offices. The list of targeted properties in Table 1 demonstrates the relationship between hospitality and terrorism. Hospitality properties have been specifically targeted because of the international guests they accommodate (Pizam, 2010). The reason for this, according to Pizam (2010) is the accompanying media coverage. Information in this table also highlights the importance and significance of this thesis which is to study the security preparedness of the hotels in New Zealand prior to the RWC 2011. According to Goslin (2008), hotel designs do not incorporate significant security features. Goslin also states that because military installations and government offices are becoming more difficult to penetrate, terrorist are choosing easier targets which are more accessible. Brandt and Sandler (2010, p 214) describe the fortification against terrorism as ‘target hardening’. Hotels and restaurants fall into this category (soft target) along with stadia and cinemas. Paraskevas (2010) argues that small incremental changes, minor alterations such as the installation of bollards and vapour detectors are no longer the solution. He explains that a well-planned, long term strategic approach to this problem is needed. The first step is to understand the problem and only then can solutions be created. Rousaki and Alcott (2006) agree with Paraskevas (2010) in that they too promote the idea of a strategic approach and state that it should be ‘flexible and far-sighted enough to be aware when alterations to it are required’ (Rousaki & Alcott, 2006, p. 27). A well thought out long term plan will be required to gain wider support. The key to any effective and successful strategy is support from stakeholders who in this case are the owners, management, staff, contractors, suppliers and guests of the property.

Feickert, Verma, Plaschka and Dev (2006), Palmer (1989) and Lashley (2000) claim that the hotels have an obligation to protect their guests. Feickert et al. (2006) explain that guests tend to relax when they arrive at their hotels. While
they may be more cautious of their surroundings and environment while travelling and at airports, they are more likely to feel safe when they have arrived at their destination and checked-in. They assume that they are in a safe place and that they will be looked after. Hotels have to balance security needs with appearing to be welcoming which is not always easy. Lashley (2000) explains, while discussing the history of hospitality, that it is not sufficient for hoteliers to be merely generous and charitable, they must also protect their guest. Lisante (1972) and Cetron (2006) also agree that protecting the guests is the responsibility of the hotel. Lisante (1972, p. 2) describes a hotel as a ‘private property with public areas’ which makes protecting it that much more difficult. Enz and Taylor (2002) describe hotels as being ‘semi-public’ and a challenge to protect the building, guests and staff (p. 120). To ensure a secure environment, the hotel has to monitor guests, members of the public using the hotel and also their own staff. Cetron (2006) states that ‘by far the greatest risk of trouble comes from your staff and suppliers’ and he also declares that ‘no one anywhere in the world is immune to the threat of terrorism’ (Cetron, 2006, p. 33).

Hanna (2011) explains that the Taj Hotel which was attacked in November of 2008 has become the subject of a study by the Harvard Business School (HBS). Apparently the staff, who knew all the hidden exits of the hotel, did not leave, but stayed on to help and protect their guests. According to Hanna, Rohit Deshpande of HBS is investigating the reasons the staff decided to stay. Was it their training or was it just pure instinct to help their fellow man? The study hopes to find out the motivation for the staff’s actions. This is a relevant and interesting study because it could help understand why some staff took their obligations as innkeepers seriously to the extent of putting their own lives in danger.

Cetron (2004) explains the reasons hotels are a good choice for terrorists. It is because of the many entry and exits points of the property, the large number of people present at any one time, the ease of transporting a car bomb into the property, the complex and vulnerable ventilation system and water supply. These and many more can justify the terrorist’s choice. Hotels are perceived as
a friendly, relaxed and easy target and one that does not seem security-conscious, as least not openly.

Another possible lapse in security is that extra staff will be required for the major events like the RWC by most businesses. Clement (2011) claims that the hospitality industry will experience an increased demand for temporary staff. This means that temporary staff may be hired without proper security vetting. While the majority of the temporary job seekers will be legitimate, there could be some amongst them with criminal intent. Frewin (2004) describes a case where proper security vetting of staff was not carried out, which resulted in the staff getting access to the United Kingdom House of Commons parliamentary building in 2004. In this particular case the staff member was a journalist posing as a waiter. This incident demonstrates that terrorists interested in destruction can infiltrate an establishment quite easily posing as a staff member. Such a vetting process could perhaps be extended to suppliers with access to the property.

2.3.1. Discussion

Research by Stafford, Yu and Armoo (2002) and Pennington-Gray, Thapa, Kaplanidou, Cahyanto and McLaughlin (2011) suggests that there is an acceptable level of planning and preparedness in the hospitality industry against terrorism, but that might be the case only in the USA where the study was carried out.

The choice of hotels as a target for terrorist organisations points to their weak architecture and design. Terrorists select vulnerable properties whose design allows easy access. Another key point in deciding to attack hotels is the hotel’s limited security arrangements, many entry and exit points and the relaxed attitude of the guests. It is possible that future hotels are destined to look like military installations with 24 hour security. There could be security checks at every entry and exit point. For example, Jackson (2009) recommends the use of biometric security systems in hospitality for both staff and guests. Some hotels have started using finger scanning though it will take some years before all hotels use some form of biometrics. Airports have started the use of biometrics which could act as a catalyst for hotels to follow suit and invest in security.
According to Murphy and Rottet (2009) guests welcome any form of increased security as long as it does not intrude on their privacy. Goh and Law (2007) discuss a new exploratory study where objects can be made invisible. They believe that this new technology will be useful in hospitality in that armed security guards will appear ‘invisible’ to guests while on duty. The purpose of this is that guests while they want to feel secure, do not want security to be intrusive. The use of biometrics could be a realistic solution.

Much is being done to increase the security around hotels because of the threats they are being exposed to. Security may therefore be a very important and integral subject with reference to hospitality of the future. While Coaffee (2009) agrees that urban areas are vulnerable and difficult to protect, he insists that short term measures such as ‘attempting to design-out terrorism using military fortification techniques’ will not work (Coaffee, 2009, p. 350). Instead he suggests that authorities should try to understand the root causes of terrorism and work to solve them. However, it could be argued that this is not the responsibility of hotel managements.
## Terrorist events involving hospitality properties (2001 to 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/05/2001</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>(CNN World, 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/08/2001</td>
<td>Sbarro restaurant</td>
<td>Jerusalem, Israel</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>(Goldenberg, 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/04/2002</td>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>(BBC News, 2002a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/10/2002</td>
<td>Paddy's Pub &amp; Sari Nightclub (Kuta)</td>
<td>Bali, Indonesia</td>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Sheridan, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/10/2002</td>
<td>MacDonald's</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(Ria Novosti, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/12/2002</td>
<td>MacDonald's</td>
<td>Eastern Indonesia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(news24, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/12/2002</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>Bogota, Colombia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>(CNN World, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/04/2003</td>
<td>Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant</td>
<td>Jakarta, Indonesia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(The Telegraph, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/04/2003</td>
<td>Mike's Place (restaurant)</td>
<td>Tel Aviv, Israel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(Huggler &amp; Morris, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/08/2003</td>
<td>Marriott Hotel</td>
<td>Jakarta, Indonesia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>(Elegant, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/01/2004</td>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>Bagdad, Iraq</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>(de Quetteville, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/03/2004</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon Hotel</td>
<td>Bagdad, Iraq</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(BBC News, 2004a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/03/2004</td>
<td>Karaoke bar</td>
<td>Sungai Kolok</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>(Mail Online, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/05/2004</td>
<td>Tavern / discotheque</td>
<td>Bogota, Columbia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>(Associated Press, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/06/2004</td>
<td>Pahalgam hotel</td>
<td>Kashmir, India</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>(Fazili, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/10/2004</td>
<td>Taba Hilton</td>
<td>Sinai, Egypt</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/10/2004</td>
<td>Marriott Hotel</td>
<td>Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/02/2005</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/10/2005</td>
<td>Palestine Hotel &amp; Sheraton Ishtar</td>
<td>Bagdad, Iraq</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11/2005</td>
<td>Radisson, Grand Hyatt and Days Inn</td>
<td>Amman, Jordan</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/01/2007</td>
<td>Fast food chain</td>
<td>Cotabato, Phillipines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/01/2007</td>
<td>near tourist resort</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/01/2007</td>
<td>Marriott Hotel</td>
<td>Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/04/2007</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>Mogadishu, Somalia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/01/2008</td>
<td>Kabul Serena Hotel</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/04/2008</td>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>Baquba, Iraq</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/04/2008</td>
<td>Kebab restaurant</td>
<td>Ramadi, Iraq</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/05/2008</td>
<td>Cafe</td>
<td>Ampara, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/09/2008</td>
<td>Marriott Hotel</td>
<td>Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/11/2008</td>
<td>Oberoi Trident</td>
<td>Bombay, India</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/11/2008</td>
<td>Taj Mahal Palace &amp; Tower</td>
<td>Bombay, India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/2008</td>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/03/2009</td>
<td>Hostel</td>
<td>Cotabato, Phillipines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/05/2009</td>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>Bagdad, Iraq</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Establishment</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Injuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>25/05/09</td>
<td>Starbucks</td>
<td>New York, USA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>9/06/09</td>
<td>Pearl Continental Hotel</td>
<td>Peshawar, Pakistan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>17/07/09</td>
<td>JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton</td>
<td>Jakarta, Indonesia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>13/08/09</td>
<td>Cafe</td>
<td>Sinjar, Iraq</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>3/12/09</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>Mogadishu, Somalia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>15/12/09</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>14/02/10</td>
<td>German bakery</td>
<td>Pune, India</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>(BBC News, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>26/05/10</td>
<td>Cafeteria</td>
<td>Stavropol, Russia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(RIA Novosti, 2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>14/01/11</td>
<td>Café</td>
<td>Dagestan, Russia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(RIA Novosti, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>25/04/11</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>Maiduguri, Nigeria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>(BBC News Africa, 2011a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>28/04/11</td>
<td>Café in Djemma el Fna Square</td>
<td>Marrakesh, Morocco</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(BBC News Africa, 2011b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>3/05/11</td>
<td>Café</td>
<td>Bagdad, Iraq</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>(Omaha World - Herald, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>30/05/11</td>
<td>Super Waziristan Hotel</td>
<td>Miranshah, Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(Dawm.com Provinces, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>29/06/11</td>
<td>Intercontinental Hotel</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Rubin, 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 915 2095

Table 1: Terrorist events involving hospitality properties (2001 to 2011)
2.4. Sport and sporting events

This section focuses on the monetary and other benefits of sporting events to show the impact of terrorist attacks at sporting events. The success or failure of events are usually measured by the revenue generated but this section also explains the other benefits with more far reaching effects that are not always considered. Zimbalist (2010) states that sporting events can create ‘direct and indirect’ revenue for the hosts (p. 8). This includes spending on construction, transportation and also spending by visiting tourists. Oliver (2005) claimed that the tourism revenue for the London 2012 Olympics was expected to be approximately £2bn, with a further £2bn worth of media rights. This is a significant amount given the current economic climate. Sturgess and Brady (2006) claim that countries are queuing up to bid to host sporting events even if the financial benefits are unknown or uncertain. Sport is known to bring people together and that is a significant benefit. Unfortunately, politics and terrorism have for many years introduced themselves into sport and they continue to do so. The reason this topic was selected is because to organise any major event, hospitality, including accommodation, is required. Hotels and the supply of food and beverage are relatively easily targeted by terrorist groups planning to disrupt an event for political reasons.

Sport brings people, communities and countries together because of their common interests. It rarely discriminates and has no known boundaries. Sport teaches diplomacy and it helps to connect and encourages nations to engage with each other (Goldberg, 2000). It removes barriers in that it does not discriminate against the old, young, rich or poor. Sport has the ability to force people and countries to ‘set aside their conflicts, treat others as equals, and tolerate differences’ (Reid, 2006, p. 205). It teaches people to lose and win with grace. Sport emphasises the importance of discipline and it affects our character as individuals as well as as a nation. It demonstrates what can be achieved with a little sacrifice. Sport encourages fitness and makes people more health conscious. It also helps to model good behaviours and habits. So sport has numerous benefits.

The modern lifestyle is fast paced and as such it may not often accord opportunities for some people to unite and come together for a common
purpose. Sport provides that unifying factor. According to Branscombe and Wann (1991) people due to their geographic location or urbanisation may feel ostracised. Through sport they can still feel a part of society. This was dramatically demonstrated by New Zealand proclaiming the entire country to be ‘a stadium of four million’ for the RWC 2011.

Overall, sport helps create healthy minds and bodies, thereby creating a productive work force that can drive the economy. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that sport can have a positive effect on an individual’s health as well as the economic health of a country. The multiple benefits of sport include mentally and physically healthy individuals who feel a part of their community and who are productive at work. Productive workforce means less absenteeism and a healthier nation would mean less stress on the country’s healthcare system. Swanger (2002) describes how companies are introducing wellness programs in an effort to keep their workforce fit and healthy.

### 2.4.1. Benefits of sporting events

When a country hosts major sporting events, sport-loving and even non-sports loving citizens may feel pride and satisfaction at an individual level. Rugby New Zealand (RNZ) Chairman Brian Roche mentioned how New Zealanders came together to make the RWC a success (RNZ, 2011). Citizens generally come together and volunteer their services to be a part of that event and even history because it is not often that countries get the honour of hosting major sporting events. Kavetsos and Szymanski (2010) discuss the state of ‘national well-being’ or the ‘feelgood’ factor being very important benefits of sporting events. Sport is a group activity that encourages people to come together either to watch or to play.

Another key benefit of sport events is its positive economic impact. Preuss (2006) argues that sport can stimulate growth in the economy and attract much needed revenue. Aside from media rights, one of the main beneficiaries is the hospitality industry. Teams and supporters need accommodation, meals and entertainment during their stay and some supporters also stay on after the event to tour the country. According to Burgan and Mules (1992) approximately 6,000 international visitors attended the 1982 Commonwealth Games in
Brisbane and the America’s Cup in 1986/1987 in Fremantle, Western Australia had about 700,000 attendees. This is a large number of sport tourists which translates into revenue. Barclay (2009) claims that while the benefits may not always be proportionate to the amount the host nation spends, many people attend sporting events and yet many more watch from home. The opportunity to host major sport events is also a very good opportunity to promote a country to the rest of the world. Not many countries will be able to successfully host major events because of its complexities, risks and other variable factors. An example of this is the 2010 Commonwealth Games in India, where according to Bedi (2010) facilities were not up to the required standard. A country that is successful in hosting a mega event will be regarded very highly. Therefore, at an individual level, there is pride and satisfaction and that leads to national pride. Economically, the country gains largely because of the hospitality and tourism opportunities which they would not have had otherwise. Diagram 2 shows the relationship between individual pride, national well-being and national economy, and how a change in one has an effect on the other parts of society.

Brown (2004) claims that sport events can be useful in ‘healing’ a nation that has been struck by tragedy to stand defiantly against its aggressors. According to Brown, USA has on many occasions allowed sporting events to carry on as scheduled to give the impression that they will not cower in fear and allow terrorism to change their lives. Moore (1996) in his article, ‘Munich’s message’ states that the organisers of the 1972 Munich Olympic Games insisted that the Games be allowed to continue after the massacre in which 11 people lost their
lives. The purpose was apparently to demonstrate the will of the people and that the event would proceed despite the setbacks.

2.4.2. Sporting events, politics and terrorism

Czula (1978) explains in detail that the relationship between sporting events, politics and acts of terror has existed for a long time and it is difficult to separate them. He explains how in 1976 during the Montreal Olympics, there was a protest against the New Zealand team by 16 Black African countries. They felt that the New Zealand government was endorsing the South African government by allowing their national rugby team to play in South Africa after 170 black Africans were shot dead during race riots in Soweto by the South African police. This offers an example of the relationship between politics and sports.

In the same article, Czula (1978), provides another example of mixing politics and sports. He explains that the Chinese government applied pressure on the Canadian government to eject the Taiwanese team from the Games. The Canadian government obliged because apparently they were concerned that it would affect trade with China (Czula, 1978).

According to Taylor and Toohey (2007), there were 168 terrorist attempts on sporting events from 1972 to 2003, a 32 year period. Of these 168, according to Hall, Marciani and Cooper (2008), two were notable – the 1972 Munich massacre and the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta, Georgia. The Munich massacre of 1972 where 11 Israeli athletes along with a German policeman and four Palestinians died is an example of the relationship between sporting events, politics and terrorism. A Palestinian group decided to use the
Games for the world to see. According to Czula (1978) they waited till the Games started before they acted to ensure maximum media coverage. Diagram 3 shows how groups with opposing ideologies can and will use major events to highlight their plight or cause. The terrorists are not specifically targeting the spectators or participants. The main purpose of the attacks is the possibility that billions of viewers will witness the attacks from home. According to the terrorists, the spectators, participants and others that may be killed in the process are just collateral damage, and a very small price to pay.

Thompson (2008) explains how success and failure is measured with regards to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. He quotes Interpol Secretary-General Ronald Noble: ‘the absence of a terrorist incident and serious criminal activity will be an important measure of the success of these Games’ (Thompson, 2008, p. 46).

Wade (2009), in an article in the Sydney Morning Herald, explains that the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team which left eight people dead and six players injured, happened on a politically chaotic week in Pakistan. The Pakistan Court had ruled that a former Prime Minister could not stand for election due to his previous criminal convictions. While the article does not specifically claim that the attack was caused by the court ruling, it does imply that the court ruling had caused problems in the city of Lahore. This is another example of how terrorists have used the visit of an international sporting team to their advantage. They were thus able to get the attention of the international media.

2.4.3. Discussion

The literature provides examples of terrorists’ attempts to disrupt sporting events. The economic benefit is the main item normally considered when deciding on the success or failure of sporting events but there are other benefits as well. Lee, Shin and Park (2009) examine the non-monetary benefits of sporting events. They conclude that if the community feels that they have received some sort of non-monetary benefits they will be supportive of future events. They need to know that they have a stake or almost a kind of investment. Mules and Dwyer (2005) on the other hand, insist that studying the
economic impact of sporting events is very important. However, they include the intangible factors when they study four main issues:

1. estimating the economic impacts of sport events
2. estimating some wider economic effects of sports events
3. estimating the intangible (non monetary) impacts of sport events
4. cost benefit analysis to determine the extent of public sector support for events. (Mules & Dwyer, 2005, p. 338)

As outlined both monetary and non-monetary benefits are important.

There is also an implied need for hoteliers to understand domestic and international politics because of the impact it has on their industry. This understanding and knowledge of world affairs can help them make the correct decisions for their properties especially with regards to security.

2.5. Modes of attacks

This section examines some of the methods that are currently being used or considered by terrorist organisations. In order to protect the industry and individual properties, it is important to first understand how terrorists operate and the different methods they use. This will help the industry to look for weaknesses in their security protocol and address them. For the purposes of this study only a selected few forms of terrorism that have been successful will be presented.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) claimed responsibility for the 12th October 1984 bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton, England. The intended targets were the cabinet of the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher and the Prime Minister herself. The statement claiming responsibility included the following sentence, ‘Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always’. However unfair, this statement was also very true, because the terrorists were willing to keep on trying and the intended targets had to be constantly security conscious and alert.

Using explosives and other incendiary devices is just one method used by terrorists. This method was used in the Brighton Hotel bombing in 1984 where
explosives were planted and detonated at a later time. Other known methods include close quarter shootings, bio-terrorism, suicide bombings, kidnappings and hostage takings and food terrorism.

A recent example of close quarter shooting is the two Taiwanese tourists who were shot prior to the Commonwealth Games in New Delhi in October 2010. Two terrorists on a motorcycle opened fire randomly outside a mosque during the day causing innocent tourists alighting from a tour bus to be shot.

Bio-terrorism is the process of releasing viruses and bacteria intentionally to cause people to become sick, sometimes fatally. This includes viruses such as smallpox and also anthrax which was discussed after the 9/11 attacks (Malet & Rogers, 2010). Smallpox can be transferred from person to person whereas anthrax works only on the contaminated individual. Economic chaos can be caused with minimal or no human fatalities through the introduction of diseases such as the foot and mouth disease. This causes turmoil, anxiety, confusion and negatively impacts an economy. It takes a long time to recover from the effects of such acts. If this occurs to a food producing country its image could possibly be damaged and it could take years to assure and convince consumers that the food is safe. However, Tucker and Sands (1999) argue that USA has wrongly focused on preparing for biological terrorism. They claim that in the USA only one person has died so far in the last 100 years as a result of bio-terrorism. They argue that as most of the threats have turned out to be hoaxes the government is wasting money preparing for a biological terrorist attack.

Another two forms of terrorism are nuclear terrorism and cyber-terrorism. Nuclear terrorism, while difficult to employ, would have devastating long term effects on the planet. Mattox (2010) describes it as ‘the other extreme of irregular warfare’ (Mattox, 2010, p. 160). Terrorists could attempt to destroy nuclear weapon sites or try and acquire weapons of mass destructions. Countries that currently have nuclear capabilities may not be able to protect their facilities or could involve themselves in state sponsored terrorism where the government provides terrorists with nuclear capabilities.
Cyber-terrorism according to Matusitz (2005) is about intentionally attacking computer systems around the world to cause its operations to cease. This can have catastrophic impact on lives because computers are used not only in telecommunication systems and financial institutions but also in aviation, medicine and other emergency services.

Suicide bombings, kidnappings and hostage takings and food terrorism will be discussed in more depth in the following sub-sections. These methods are very relevant to this research especially since they can be employed against the hospitality industry.

2.5.1. Suicide bombing

Aside from being a popular mode of attack, suicide bombing demonstrates the extent to which terrorists will go to achieve their aims. The reason suicide bombing is being discussed here is because it is very successful in crowded areas such as entertainment outlets, restaurants or hotels. Hoffman (2003) declares that ‘the suicide terrorist is the ultimate smart bomb’ (p. 40). Tosini (2009) estimates that there have been 2,197 suicide attacks worldwide with fatalities totalling about 25,000 between 1982 and 2008, a 26 year period. That works out to approximately 85 suicide attacks per year and an average of 11 fatalities per attack. Tosini (2009) claims that this method is increasing rapidly as a weapon of choice used by extremists. Palermo (2006) describes the method as very successful and one that utilises very little resources but yet capable of having a major impact. The main resource that is required for this method of operation is human volunteers. There is no shortage of volunteers, male, female, young, old, rich, poor, educated or uneducated. People are willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause. Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff and Weine (2009) claim that due to the high numbers of volunteer suicide bombers, terrorist organisations have a huge problem trying to turn them away. It is not just the poor and uneducated that volunteer their services and lives. De Mel (2004) describes the popularity and success of the female suicide bombers employed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). De Mel (2004) claims that of the 217 suicide attacks, 64 were carried out by women. De Mel (2004) also emphasises that the mission that killed the former Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, was carried out by a woman. According to Bloom
(2007), it is quite common to see women involved in this form of terrorism either because they support the cause or due to revenge. Most of the Shahidkas or Black Widows who are Chechen lost their husbands who were killed by the Russian army. Bloom (2007) states that women have been associated with political violence for a long time. It is important to note that suicide bombers are not just comprised of young males. A variety of people volunteer for a range of reasons.

According to Bergesen (2006) the people that are killed by the suicide bombers are not the actual targets for terrorist organisations. Bergesen claims that the real targets are those that are alive and have to witness the act. Those that have been killed have nothing more to fear but those that have been spared have to live in constant fear. This could perhaps force witnesses to apply pressure on their governments and influence their country’s future foreign policies. One way that this could be achieved is through elections.

Atran (2003) explains that suicide bombers are a popular choice of terrorists because of their ease of use. Aside from the ease of use, the volunteers can access many different locations without raising suspicions. They can very easily follow their targets. They can get in the middle of a crowd if required. Compared to covertly planting a fixed device and remotely detonating it, suicide bombers have a better chance of success. Kondaki (2001) argues that suicide bombing is ‘one of the most effective tools for inducing chaos in a target population’ (p. 8).

Volunteer suicide bombers are briefed and provided with explicit instructions before they are deployed to execute their missions. They are only provided with information specific to their own mission. These volunteers only have contact with their handlers. They are intentionally kept isolated. The reason for this is that in the event that these volunteers are caught they will not have any useful knowledge that they can divulge. Also the device that is strapped on to the volunteers is often made from very crude, generic and easily available material which does not have any electronic tags. This is so that the terrorist organisation cannot be easily traced.
Contrary to popular belief, these volunteers are not suffering from any mental health issues according to Atran (2003) and Post et al. (2009). They are sane, aware of their impending actions and sacrifice, and fully aware of the importance of the mission they are taking on. Post et al. (2009) claim that anyone thought to be insane or mentally unstable is not allowed to act as a suicide bomber because they are considered unreliable. In some sections of society, suicide bombers are treated with a great amount of respect. In the Muslim world they are known as martyrs. The Japanese had kamikaze pilots. Whatever they are called, they believed in a cause so much, they were willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause they believed in.

2.5.2. Kidnappings and hostage takings

Kidnapping and hostage takings have been selected for review because of their frequent use. They are perpetrated for financial gains, by terrorists and other criminal groups. In a paper on South East Asia, Mohamed (2007) notes that ‘kidnapping of foreign nationals globally have increased by 275% over the past 10 years’ (p. 61).

Kidnapping and hostage taking is a risk at sporting events. Yun (2007) and Macintyre (2006) claim that kidnappings and hostage takings have evolved into a very successful mode of attack. Calling it the terrorist’s ‘most valued weapon’ and a ‘political extortion’, Macintyre (2006) explains that there are essentially two types of methods: one in which an entire building is captured including the occupants and the other in which individuals are kidnapped and transported to other secure locations and held there for ransom.

Being taken hostage can be traumatic, not just for the hostages, but for family, friends and the general public, who may feel helpless. Authorities are sometimes forced into reactions that may ultimately be counter-productive. Speckhard, Tarabrina, Krasnov and Mufel (2005) describe a situation in which 800 people were taken hostage and held for three days in a Moscow theatre by Chechen terrorists. The authorities, after three frustrating days, decided to pump sleeping gas into the building before storming in and killing the hostage takers. They were criticised because 130 people died. However, of these 130,
only five were killed by the terrorists, and many more rescued hostages were expected to have long term illness due to the released gas.

This mode of attack can take place in a hotel quite easily and staff and management must be trained and prepared to act. Providing security in a hotel is a fundamental part of being hospitable.

2.5.3. Food terrorism

Food terrorism is reviewed to explore the possibilities, risks and the negative impact on the economy of this kind of terrorism. Spake (2001) describes a 1996 case where food supply was deliberately contaminated in a relatively small scale attack affecting 12 people. However the case highlights how easy it was for the food to be contaminated and shows the efforts the American authorities are taking to prevent food terrorism.

Keteyian (2010) claims that there was credible information that terrorists planned to introduce poison into food at various hotels and restaurants in several location across USA. The plan was to use the poisons ricin and cyanide to poison food on salad bars and buffets.

Food terrorism is a relatively inexpensive way to for terrorists to spread their message. Monitoring and protecting consumers could perhaps be a consistent effort – not just one used for major events. Yoon and Shanklin (2007) claim that if food terrorism strikes, it can cause major financial loss, and social disorder which it will not be easy to recover from. According to Bruemmer (2003), recovery from food terrorism will be costly. Reputations will be damaged and trust will be lost, possibly causing consumers to be wary of using a facility again. Yoon and Shanklin describe the proactive stance taken by the American government in preventing food terrorism. The government agencies include Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). All these agencies have very specific roles in the prevention of food terrorism.

This mode of attack is not easy to detect or trace. Event caterers can very easily introduce poison into the supply chain. Caterers generally employ part-
time workers as and when the need arises, so it is plausible that terrorist elements could join the workforce and carry out their plans. Vetting and monitoring of staff and suppliers is very important to ensure that terrorist elements are not present in the workforce.

Prior to the start of the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, an insightful interview by the Chinese authorities (Press Conference on Beijing Olympic Games Food Safety Assurances, 2008) provided information as to how the organisers went about ensuring food safety. During the Games about 1.6 million meals were served and of these about 1% or 16,610 meals were tested at random to ensure the food was safe for consumption. According to Wu et al. (2010) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags were used throughout the process to track the food in the supply chain. These kinds of security measures would have been expensive but the Chinese recognised the importance of such measures. They reported that they did not find any contaminants in the food they tested. There is no documented evidence to show the relationship between the organiser's security efforts and the lack of any terrorist threats at the games, but the Games were not affected in any way by terrorist activities.

2.5.4. Discussion

Many of the modes of attack described in this literature review could potentially include or affect the hospitality industry. For example a suicide bomber could use a crowded restaurant in a hotel to detonate bombs or a manufacturer or supplier of a common food ingredient such as salt, could contaminate the supply and potentially harm thousands or even millions of people. Kidnapping and hostage taking could happen anywhere including in a hotel.

2.6. Safety and security concerns

This section highlights the fact that safety is one of the most important concerns for any traveller. Leong, 2000; Milman, Jones and Bach, 1999; Shanahan and Hyman, 2007 and Tse and Ho, 2006, state that security is important and a deciding factor when making travel decisions. They explain the changes that have taken place over time in terms of security and the requests from prospective guests. Security interest have been heightened after the tragic
events of 9/11 and remains a very high priority. According to the 9/11 Commission Report set up in 2002 (National Commission of Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States, 2002), 9/11 was an attack carried out by the terrorist group al Qaeda where aircrafts were hijacked and intentionally crashed into prominent buildings such as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in New York and Washington D.C.

The hospitality industry could perhaps attempt to help travellers allay their fears. While it would be impossible to eliminate everyone’s fear, the industry has to demonstrate that it takes security seriously and has sufficient protocols in place. The industry has to prove that it is doing everything reasonable and within its means to protect its guests.

According to Clark (2004), sporting events have been disrupted by terrorists at least 168 times over a 32 year period to 2004. Therefore, personal safety and security is a major concern for any traveller especially sports tourists and athletes. Sensitivity to safety and security issues have been heightened since the events of the World Trade Centre attacks on 11th September 2001 (9/11). With regards to major sporting events, many were either cancelled or at least postponed immediately after 9/11, according to Taylor and Toohey (2006a). In the aftermath of 9/11, Libby (2002) claims that the al-Qaeda ‘manual of Afghan jihad proposed football stadiums as possible attack sites’ (Libby, 2002, p. 8). While many people returned to travelling for work or holiday, apparently many are still reluctant to travel by air. They have become very selective – choosing to fly only when it is absolutely necessary. According to Cornwell and Roberts (2010) international air travel was negatively affected by the events of 9/11. Araña and León (2008) also agree that there is a relationship between terrorism and tourism. They claim that the events of 9/11 have negatively impacted travel. ‘Tourism demand is sensitive to the influence of political violence and terrorist attacks, since tourists – like everyone else – value tranquillity and peace’ (p. 311).

Sönmez, Yiorgos and Tarlow (1999) describe the multiple risks involved with travelling and state that ‘tourists exercise their freedom and power to avoid risky situations or destinations’ (p. 13). Two main risks need to be managed: the risk of flying and the risk at the destination end. In a paper on 9/11 article, Reisinger
and Mavondo (2005) categorically stated that tourism cannot be established in any place that is perceived as being risky. Safety is ranked very highly by tourists and they believe that the risk of them being caught up in a terrorist event is much higher than before. It is a very real fear. Toohey and Taylor (2008) state that since there have been many terrorist events relating to sporting events, it is important that the risk is properly managed. As for sport tourists, there are effectively two main venues where risk occurs; one is at the event venue (stadium) and the other is at the accommodation (hotel). Shellum (2003) suggests that it is important for safety to be taken seriously since a terrorist group such as al-Qaeda ‘switched its focus to soft targets such as hotel resort properties’ (Shellum, 2003, p. 22). In spite of this, Shellum claims that hotels have not done anything to increase the security of their premises since 9/11 or the Bali bombings. Guests rightly expect to be protected and Ronan (1993) suggests that hoteliers could perhaps focus on ensuring their safety.

Groenenboom and Jones (2003) and Burton (2005) agree with Ronan (1993) that hotels need to provide security and protect their guests. It is not the responsibility of the authorities to provide security within the hotel. The authorities will coordinate and provide all security efforts in public areas. Private buildings are the responsibility of building owners and individual business operators. Groenenboom and Jones (2003) claim that hotels are reluctant to spend on security because they view the security department as a cost centre instead of a revenue generating department. Amur (2005) while explaining that security needed to be extended outside the perimeter of the building, states that hoteliers are reluctant to upgrade their security largely due to the cost factor. Longmore-Etheridge (1999) describing security as important claims that guests are willing to be slightly inconvenienced if the resulting security makes them feel safer. Enz (2009) claims that larger, newer hotels tend to have better, up-to-date security features. This group includes luxury hotels whose guests expect a secure and safe environment.

2.6.1. Participants

Tourists and spectators are not the only ones concerned about travelling to destinations or events that are deemed unsafe. In fact even participants,
volunteers, media, officials and organisers will also be concerned about their safety. They would not want to put themselves at risk unnecessarily.

Participants are especially wary about where and when they compete because of their short working life as international-level athletes. They cannot compete indefinitely. If they perceive the risk of danger (whether death, injury or even just food poisoning) to be high, they may withdraw from the competition. It is pointless for them to get unnecessarily injured in an event that could result in their not competing for the rest of the year or even longer. In the latest Commonwealth Games 2010 in India, Greg Henderson, the New Zealand road cyclist and gold medallist in the 2002 Commonwealth Games in England, withdrew from the competition citing safety concerns (One News / NZPA, 2010). Three Australian athletes also withdrew from the 2010 Commonwealth Games. They were Dani Samuels who was the world discus champion, Travis Meyer, an endurance cyclist and Stephanie Sang a table tennis player. They withdrew because they had safety concerns (AAP, 2010). It is not unusual to see world class athletes withdrawing from major sporting events because of the perceived dangers they present.

Even if athletes decide to participate in the Games, they will have safety issues on their minds which could negatively affect their performance. At the Games venue, they may feel secure but when they return to their individual accommodation, the perception of the risk may be different. It is reasonable to assume that the organisers would have made arrangements to ensure that the venues are well protected. However protecting individual hotels in several different cities would be very difficult. It will not be easy for the authorities to oversee the security of all the hotels in several cities. It will be up to individual hotels to accept that responsibility while liaising with the authorities. An individual hotel is in a better position to protect its own property by increasing security personnel and by vetting and training all staff to be vigilant.

2.6.2. Spectators

Spectators or fans – unlike the participants - do not have to be at an event but being devotees of a sport, they are likely to attend. The amount of pleasure they receive from attending an event cannot offset the risk they are taking. According
to Neirotti and Hillard (2006), if tourists were going on holiday, they will choose to stay away from unsafe destinations, whereas if they are attending a sporting event, they will not have any choice, because the venue has been decided for them. Sixty-six percent of spectators surveyed at the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, Greece stated that safety was a deciding factor as to whether they should attend the Games or not (Neirotti & Hillard, 2006). Taylor and Toohey (2006b), claim that the final number of spectators for the 2003 RWC in Australia was 40,000. This was a decrease of 35,000 from the original projection of 75,000. Almost half the people changed their minds. Again safety was cited as the reason for this drastic decrease.

It is this undecided group (spectators), that terrorists target. In between matches and events, spectators will congregate at all the various food and entertainment outlets thereby creating an effective and easy terrorist target. Spectators are not provided with any special security as they move from point to point unlike the participants. So they are exposed at all times which make them possible targets. Hurting and killing sports enthusiasts has the potential to make media headlines around the world thereby achieving the terrorist’s aims. This method seeks to instil fear in all who witness it, for they are the real targets. Those few that are injured or killed are sacrificed to get a message across to the rest of the world.

 Owners and operators of hotels and entertainment outlets could perhaps make more effort to ensure their patrons’ safety at all times. They have the ability to monitor their staff, premises and the surrounding environment. Wallace and Sherry (1978) emphasise the hotelier’s responsibility to protect their guests. They discuss cases where hotels have been held responsible for criminal acts carried out against their guests by 1) other paying guests, 2) employees of the hotel and 3) third parties.

2.6.3. Discussion

Literature on this topic notes that safety is a major concern to everyone involved. Organising and hosting a major sport event is not necessarily easy. Adding to that the prospect of terrorism makes the task that much more complicated and difficult. The year 2011 posed an additional but vital
consideration as it was the tenth anniversary of the events of 9/11. On Sunday the 11\textsuperscript{th} of September 2011, three RWC matches were scheduled:

1. Australia vs Italy (Auckland – North Shore)
2. Ireland vs USA (New Plymouth)
3. South Africa vs Wales (Wellington)

Anniversaries are significant milestones and always important dates to remember and it will be no different for terrorists. Arranging for the USA team to play on that particular day perhaps displayed a lack of forethought in planning. Either way security could perhaps have been increased around those matches.

2.7. Rugby World Cup (RWC) security

This section specifically examines the RWC security in New Zealand and what is being done. The information for this section is dependent on the local press coverage and periodicals. Unlike peer reviewed academic journals used in other sections, these are not academic, but are nonetheless considered robust. It is useful to understand what the authorities are trying to do prior to commencing the primary research. This information helps to shape some of the questions that will be asked of the industry. Once there is an understanding of the efforts of the authorities and organising bodies, it will be easier to question the individual properties.

Chapman (2010) wrote that authorities were more concerned with coping with drunk and unruly fans than with terrorists. However, while the authorities did not expect any terrorist attacks during the RWC, they were working hard to ensure that it did not occur. Dudding (2010) stated that the authorities were fully aware that the Games would fall on the 10\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of 9/11. On that specific date, the Americans were scheduled to play Ireland in New Plymouth. According to Dudding (2010) the police were planning to take extra precautions. Vass (2010b) claims that the police had also taken to forecasting the likely winners of the individual matches and also the tournament, in order to try and work out which dignitaries would most likely be attending the Games. There would likely be Ministers, Prime Ministers and Heads of State attending the Games. Police would also have their normal policing duties so they were expected to be under
stress for the duration of the Games. Some of the embassies were bringing their own staff to take care of their own security needs. Dignitaries and other VIPs were also bringing their own private bodyguards.

To assist with the security police planned to use cameras to monitor crowds at the various games venues according to Vass (2010a). All live television footage from all the venues was to be monitored from Wellington which would be the control centre. According to McRoberts (2010) and NZ Herald (2010) the New Zealand government had recalled the Special Air Service (SAS) to assist with the security at the RWC. Well known Victoria Cross recipient Corporal Willie Apiata also returned to New Zealand to assist with security.

In spite of the effort on the part of the organisers, Marshall (2010) explained how reporters from the Sunday Star Times were able to:

- enter Auckland's Eden Park during a cricket international without tickets or identification by dressing as construction workers;
- move around restricted areas at Waikato Stadium and get into the players' tunnel during a Super 14 international match;
- take toy explosives into AMI stadium in Christchurch, and Waikato Stadium in Hamilton, without being searched.


The article explained that the Games would be highly reliant on private security firms where most of the security personnel were untrained and on a low wage reflecting their qualifications. This critical article has pointed out some of the security breaches and has given the organisers the opportunity to rectify the situation before the Games. Some might view this as a necessary but independent audit.

2.7.1. Discussion

The RWC was the largest event organised in New Zealand in recent years. The other major events they have had were the Lions Tour in 2005, the annual Rugby Sevens and the America's Cup bid in 2007. However, all these pale in comparison to the RWC 2011 which attracted considerably more foreign
dignitaries, VIPs and international tourists. Also, the event posed other logistical complexities because it was played in various locations around the country simultaneously. Public and private resources were stretched. Security for the event was dependent on private security providers. Border security was on alert to ensure terrorists did not enter the country. Due to these complexities the government had appointed a minister (Hon. Murray McCully) to be responsible for the entire event.

The ability of reporters to enter Eden Park without being caught showed serious flaws in the security system. If it were that easy to enter the stadium under false pretext, it would be much easier to enter a public hotel. Perhaps the security was lax due to New Zealand’s perception that it is immune to terrorist attacks because of its foreign policies or geographical distance from the rest of the world.

2.8. Political ideology

In order to question the industry about its preparedness, one must first understand the political ideology and environment they operate within. Some may perceive that the current ideology being propagated will not encourage terrorism while others may differ. The reading by the industry of the current political scenario will help them decide how much they want or are willing to spend on protecting their investment. For that reason, this topic is an important part of this study. For example, if a country supports or participates in the American led ‘war on terror’, it could logically expect to be on a list of possible targets for terrorism.

Transnational terrorism results from the foreign policies of the West (Savun & Phillips, 2009). Countries that are marginalised will react and could respond through terrorism. Glynn (2005) discusses the topic of root causes of terrorism at length. He suggests that a possible reason for Americans being targeted is what he refers to as their constant need for control which he claims negatively affects many others. Those aligned with the Americans have also become targets for terrorism as well. For their part in the American-led ‘war against terror’, where according to MacAskill and Borger (2004), USA invaded Iraq without the support of the United Nations, London transportation was attacked
on 7th July 2005, 56 people lost their lives and approximately 700 were injured. Australians were the main target of the Bali bombings where 202 people lost their lives according to Murdoch (2009a). Of these 202, 88 were Australians. Singapore was one of 48 countries that supported the invasion of Iraq. For their support Singapore received several terrorist threats but was able to avert them before they took place (CBS News, 2009). Savun and Phillips (2009) claim that ‘states that exhibit a certain type of foreign policy behaviour, regardless of their regime type, are likely to attract transnational terrorism’ (Savun & Phillips, 2009, p. 878).

Any situation where certain countries have been marginalised or treated unfairly will give rise to feelings of contempt towards their perceived oppressors. A poorly performing domestic economy and high unemployment may cause people to react against the perceived unfairness. An example of a riot caused by high youth unemployment is that which took place in August 2011 in England (Peacock, 2011). Laqueur (2004) believes in the relationship between oppression and terrorism and he states that if there is no oppression then there will be not be any terrorism. He also warns of the emphasis and direction of terrorism in the coming years.

2.8.1. Discussion

Many questions arise regarding terrorism, such as: How safe is New Zealand from terrorism? What are our foreign policies saying about us? Have we participated or supported the American-led forces? These are just some of the questions organisers and even private individuals will have to ask themselves when making a serious assessment of the risk levels. Hotels and insurance providers could also be asking themselves the same questions. Foreign policies change according to the parties in Government because of their fundamental differences in political ideology. How safe is New Zealand from terrorism?

2.9. Risk sensitivity

This section describes the sensitivity and aversion of cultures to risk. Some cultures are more sensitive and will make efforts to mitigate the risk whereas others will be more accepting of risk, even believing that they are somehow immune. They are optimistic and believe that negative events will not happen to
them. McKenna (1993) describes this unrealistic optimistic view that though bad events exist, they ‘won’t happen to me’ (p. 39). McKenna explains two possible reasons for this belief: ‘unrealistic optimism and illusion of control’ (p. 39). Unrealistic optimism refers to believing and expecting positive outcomes in any situation and illusion of control refers to a pretence that everything is under control. This exaggeration is to ensure that others will evaluate the individual positively. It concerns the image of the individual that they are able to control most situations.

Hofstede (1984) describes his study of 50 countries using four dimensions: individualism versus collectivism, large versus small power distance, masculinity versus femininity and strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance. He studied the management and planning styles of businesses within these 50 countries. Hofstede (1984) defines cultures as ‘the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or society from those of another’ (p. 82). In this research, Hofstede compared individuals and companies from different countries. In some cases the companies were branches of the same organisation. He discovered that individuals working for the same parent company but in two different countries had very different responses and behaviours. However, individuals working in the same countries, even for different companies had similar responses to each other. From this he concluded that there was an overriding national culture that affected the individuals. However, Hofstede also states that it did not mean that all individuals in a particular country were programmed to behave uniformly.

One of Hofstede’s four dimensions explains the laissez-faire finding within this study on terrorism. According to Hofstede (1984), uncertainty avoidance is, ‘the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. This feeling leads them to beliefs promising certainty and to maintaining institutions protecting conformity’ (p. 83). Hofstede’s model helps to understand the behaviour of the companies and also their consumers. For example, it queries whether their customers would be willing to accept delayed delivery of products or sub-standard service. It is believed that individuals within the same country will react similarly.
Countries that scored high on Hofstede’s research required strict rules, regulations, procedures and formal protocols to function. Those that scored lower were more relaxed and even their local customers’ expectations would have been lower. According to Hofstede, these organisations would be more tolerant if their managers made mistakes, deviated from the norm or disregarded the rules. They were not strict. This style is referred to as ‘laissez-faire’, where managers are allowed a degree of freedom to make their own decisions. White and Shullman (2010) claim that the ability to function and lead under uncertain and ambiguous circumstances is positive, because managers must be able to operate in a dynamic environment. However, with regards to security, some rules must logically apply.

Table 2 lists and ranks all 50 countries that participated in Hofstede’s research. The data from this table were taken from Hofstede’s research but presented differently to demonstrate each country’s individual ranking. As this study is about terrorism, it must be noted that the data for this research were collated prior to the 9/11 events. There is no evidence to show whether these rankings have since changed.

Out of 50 countries, New Zealand was ranked 14-15 jointly with South Africa. At this lower end of the list it is possible to conclude that New Zealand’s management style was fairly relaxed and laissez-faire. New Zealand has been grouped quite closely with other countries mentioned in this terrorism study such as Singapore, UK, USA and Australia (1 = most relaxed and 50 is least relaxed).

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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>4-5</td>
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<td>Great Britain</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>U.S.A</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td><strong>New Zealand</strong></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14-15</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa</strong></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14-15</td>
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<td>Ranking</td>
<td>Index</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26-27</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>29-30</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>29-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
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<td>82</td>
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</tr>
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<td>85</td>
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<tr>
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<td>86</td>
<td>36-41</td>
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<td>36-41</td>
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<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>88</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>92</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>94</td>
<td>45-46</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>104</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Uncertainty avoidance ranking - Hofstede’s model

2.9.1. Discussion

The USA, UK, Australia and Singapore have all been affected by terrorism. New York City and Washington D.C. experienced a terrorist attack on 11th September 2001 (National Commission of Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States, 2002), London transportation was attacked on 7th July 2005 and several Australians died in the 12th October 2002 Bali bombings (Murdoch, 2009a). Singapore was able to avert the terrorist threats that were planned through early detection (CBS News, 2009). All four countries, USA, UK, Australia and Singapore have since fortified themselves against terrorist threats. However, in studying pre-9/11 data, it appears that most countries operated with very few regulations, allowing the industries to regulate themselves. That may have been the case and if a study of the same countries were carried out today, the findings could perhaps be quite different to the data presented in table 2. From
the small grouping of countries mentioned, New Zealand has not been directly affected by any terrorist attacks in recent years which is possibly why New Zealand still operates in a laissez-faire fashion. Whether this management style is appropriate for the hospitality industry is debatable, given the different nationalities and cultures of their guests. Being victims of terrorism has changed the recently targeted countries’ perspectives. These countries have adopted new, more stringent rules and regulations especially around money laundering, intelligence sharing and border controls as part of their counter terrorism effort.

Some of the countries at the higher end of the list (e.g, Pakistan, Spain) have also been affected by terrorism but their responses to any terrorist event could have been to add more rules and regulations as part of their counter-terrorism strategy. Certainly, USA, Australia, Singapore and UK have increased their security with more rules as a result of their negative experience with terrorism.

2.10. Conclusion

Believing that New Zealand is free of terrorist activities does not give managers in the hospitality industry permission to relax as far as security is concerned. The industry needs to continue to strive to protect its custom. The question is whether New Zealand is perceived as a safe destination and what terrorist organisations think about New Zealand’s information collection and sharing activities with USA and even the Israelis. Gorman (2011) warns that documents found with Osama bin Laden when he was assassinated, prove that terrorists were making plans to commemorate the 10th anniversary of 9/11. Warnica (2011) claims along with plans to attack Air Force One and assassinate US President Barack Obama, there were plans to ‘fly a small plane into a sporting event’ (Warnica, 2011). Whether these attacks materialised is not relevant. What is important to note is that threats still remain and terrorist elements are still planning more destruction and carnage.

New Zealand has a very fortuitous remote geographic location and the people are considered by some as trusting. Perhaps some New Zealanders believes that everyone is good and will not cause harm. That could be the explanation of a case mentioned by Rudman (2011), in which he describes how easy it was for an individual to break into ‘New Zealand’s main armed force ammunition depot’
(Rudman, 2011) and walk away with explosives. This is a cause for concern. For this to happen one month before a major event is disconcerting as it may give the impression that New Zealand as a country was not sufficiently prepared.

Some of the literature suggests hotels are targeted because the other traditional targets (military installations and government offices) have become harder to attack. Hotels are now perceived as easy targets. According to this argument it is possible that terrorists will perceive New Zealand as an easy target. They might consider that New Zealand is not sufficiently protected. New Zealand has been protected by her geographic location for a long time but the presence of the international media’s cameras could invite terrorism.

In order for the industry to be better prepared, hospitality managers would benefit from understanding the possibilities of a terrorist threat. For a tourism dependent country (New Zealand Tourism, 2010), it is important to demonstrate an understanding of the lack of security and the willingness to solve it through its investment in security matters. One of the main investments could perhaps be on staff. Staff could perhaps be better vetted and trained to handle terrorist threats and they could be trained to identify signs of criminal activities.

People who are unsuccessful in raising their concerns and plight may feel that terrorism is their only solution. Exhaustive open constructive dialogue could be the first choice, not harming innocent people and damaging valuable property. The hospitality industry as part of its obligations has to protect its guests while it houses, feeds and entertains them.

This literature review provides a useful background to possible inadequacies pertaining to New Zealand and its preparedness in terms of security. It addresses the main aspects of this research concerning security. This research will examine the manager’s age and seniority in the industry, New Zealand’s security vetting habits with regards to their staff and contractors and New Zealand’s ‘laid back’ attitude and its impact on security. There is also a focus on New Zealand’s awareness and attitudes towards risk.
The following chapters provide opportunities to reflect on this literature review and compare the findings against New Zealand’s hospitality security preparedness.
3. Chapter Three: Methodology

‘Terrorism has become the systematic weapon of a war that knows no borders or seldom has a face’.

~ Jacques Chirac ~

3.1. Introduction

This chapter introduces and explains the methodology used and also the methods employed to collect, analyse, manage and store data. The chapter is divided into nine sections.

The first section is the introduction and it outlines the topic. The second section discusses qualitative research, followed by section three which provides an in-depth explanation of the selected methodological approach (interpretivism). Section four discusses the research question and the desired outcomes of this study. Section five describes the process of selecting and recruiting participants. It will explain the criteria used in the selection process and the documents used in the recruitment process. Section six explains the use of semi-structured interviews. It describes the process and details the effort preceding the actual interview. This section will also explain the logic for using this method of data collection. Section seven details the reasoning behind gaining ethics approvals, the process itself and limitations of the approval. It also briefly discusses the way the research is monitored so as to ensure that the guidelines are strictly adhered to. Section eight describes the actual process of data collection, analysis, management and storage. The rules around each of these topics are explained and discussed. Section nine concludes the methodology chapter.

The military trained 34th President of the United States of America, Dwight David Eisenhower, emphasised the importance of the process of planning rather than the plan itself. The reason being, that the end product and the plans may change along the way as one navigates through this unknown process (research), but the process of planning compels researchers to think, explore,
debate and imagine their various routes and courses of action prior to actually committing themselves. This chapter is about that planning process.

3.2. Qualitative research method

The fundamental purpose of research is to intentionally investigate a phenomenon in order to gain a better understanding of it. ‘Methodology’ refers to the philosophy and its underlying principles which means that it provides the procedures, processes and theoretical grounding for the research. It answers some of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions surrounding the research topic. Research in general answers questions, seeks truths, proves and disproves hypotheses and in the process adds to the knowledge database. Both methods, quantitative and qualitative, will deliver answers but through very different processes.

The qualitative research method (a phenomenological approach) explains an individual’s acquired knowledge, behaviour, experiences, reactions and attitudes to certain ideas and circumstances. Qualitative research approaches help to explore and understand individuals’ motivations and why they behave the way they do. While this method is subjective and therefore perhaps does not allow for generalisability, it accords the opportunity to probe and gather an in depth understanding of a particular phenomenon.

Altinay and Paraskevas (2008) describe qualitative research methods as an inductive approach. With this approach the researcher makes an observation, looks for a pattern, arrives at a hypothesis, collects all the relevant data, analyses it and arrives at a conclusion. The deductive method used in quantitative research method, is diametrically opposite to the inductive method. With this method one progresses from known information to discovering the unknown. The purpose of investigating and exploring is to confirm or reject the initial hypothesis.

Some ways to collect evidence for qualitative research methods is to utilise semi-structured interviews, direct observation and focus groups. With these methods, the topic is introduced to the participants who are probed for their responses in order to elicit more information. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research utilises fewer participants and the evidence is generally text
based. According to Neuman (1997) in qualitative research the ‘context is critical’ (p. 331). This means that the researcher must collect, understand and analyse evidence in the correct context. The sequence of events must be exact to avoid biased or distorted findings.

Denzin and Lincoln (2000), describe interpretivism as understanding and interpreting certain actions. They explain that raising one’s arms can be interpreted differently according to different contexts. It could be construed as ‘voting, hailing a taxi or asking for permission to speak’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 191). This shows the need to research all current literature so that the context is framed correctly. This will in turn aid investigation and accurate interpretation of data. Walter (2010) also agrees with this concept. She states that ‘an interpretivist paradigm concentrates on social agency, and is concerned with the way we, as social beings, interrelate and interact in society’ (Walter, 2010, p. 21). It is impossible to decipher and understand a phenomenon without first understanding the context and surrounding information. Bryman (2008) describes interpretivism as ‘an epistemological position that requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action’ (Bryman, 2008, p. 694). With this research it allows the participants to provide information during the semi-structured interviews, thereby constructing a story.

Miles and Huberman (1994) describe qualitative research as being ‘a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts’ which they also claim ‘can preserve the chronological flow’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 1).

The comparison table (table 3) presents some basic differences between quantitative and qualitative research methods.
### Table 3: Quantitative and qualitative comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numeracy based</td>
<td>Text based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employs statistical analysis</td>
<td>Does not employ statistical analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods: surveys, questionnaires</td>
<td>Methods: interviews, focus groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less information collected</td>
<td>More information collected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More participants</td>
<td>Less participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deductive</td>
<td>Inductive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.3. Interpretivism

This qualitative study will take a more interpretive approach in that it will collate all the relevant data, analyse and interpret the data and arrive at a conclusion. It allows room for interpretation, unlike positivism in which the researcher takes a position on a particular idea. Here the interviewee’s experiences, knowledge and even thoughts are noted and analysed. The true value of the information and knowledge collected from interviewees lies in its interpretation. An interpretivist study is about building a theory as opposed to testing a theory and it is flexible in that there are no ‘fixed measures, indicators or values’ (Williams, 2003, p. 58). Interpretivists believe that society is not always clearly defined as black or white (objective). It is subjective and our reactions to situations give it that subjective meaning. All actions and behaviour must have an underlying purpose and intent.

Having researched topics relevant to terrorism, sporting events and hospitality extensively, using interpretivism is considered the most appropriate for this study because it encourages contemplation of the behaviour, thoughts and purpose of subjects described in the researched literature. Interpretivism involves searching for the meaning or an explanation according to Fay (1996). Fay claims that ‘to comprehend others is to understand the meaning of what they do, and that to understand this meaning is to understand them simply in
their own terms’ (Fay, 1996, p. 113). For this study, in order to understand the participants’ stand and preparation against a possible terrorist event, it is necessary to first understand the participants and their motives. Only then will a true picture emerge. Bilton, Bonnett, Jones, Lawson, Skinner, Stanworth and Webster (2002) concur with this. They claim that the ‘society only exists as a result of meaningful social interaction’. They also state that the best people to define the situation are the subjects themselves and the best way to investigate their claims is to observe them and work with them to collect the necessary qualitative data. (Bilton, et al., 2002, p. 449).

One of the methodologies considered for this study was Grounded Theory which is different from many other theories in that it works very much in reverse. Data are collected and coded. After the coding, themes and categories are created and analysed. However, this methodology was rejected because of the underlying principle that ‘the researcher goes into the field with an open mind and no presumed relationships’ (Altinay & Paraskevas, 2008, p. 78). In the case of this study, an extensive amount of research had been carried out in preparation for this research, including a directed reading paper, which could therefore affect the final outcome of the thesis. Some reading is acceptable but not to the extent that was completed in this case. Interpretivism, on the other hand does not specifically disallow researching and forming opinions before embarking on the study.

3.4. Research question

Creswell (2003) claims that ‘research questions assume two forms: a central question and associated sub-questions’ (p. 105). This section has been written with this principle in mind. The main research question is clearly stated along with a list of topics that will be used at the interview stage.

The central question for this research is to examine the implications and impacts of terrorism on sporting events and whether the hospitality industry is prepared and equipped to host mega events.

The research question is a starting point from where plans and strategies are put in place to obtain the desired results. The goal of this research is to explore
the capability of the hospitality industry to host mega events with regards to security issues. The research question itself was designed as a result of the literature from the preceding chapter. The literature researched showed a clear connection between terrorism and sporting events and it is from this that the research question was formed. For example, Clark (2004) claimed that there were 168 instances over a 32 year period where sporting events were disrupted by terrorism. This created the need to explore the security preparation carried out by the New Zealand hospitality industry for the 2011 RWC. The semi-structured interviews planned for this research covers several topics and the responses to those topics will provide the answer/s to the research question. Some of the responses from participants may be very clear and exact, but others may be implied and interpretation will be required to arrive at possible answers. Therefore, getting answers to research questions is not a straightforward process.

3.5. Participant selection and recruitment

Eight hospitality properties were selected according to their size and star ratings to participate in this study. These eight were identified through the researcher’s network in the hospitality industry. Eleven properties were approached for this research but only eight agreed to participate. The properties that declined to participate did so because they had concerns about discussing their security arrangements. The participants were all contacted initially by telephone. Once they had agreed in principle to participate, both parties communicated via email to agree on suitable dates for the interview.

Ideally there would be a mix of hotels, motels, apartments and other forms of commercial accommodation – preferably two from each rating category - 3, 4 and 5 stars. In selecting the properties for this study, possible venues where the participating teams and their supporters would most likely be staying were identified. The category of participating teams and supporters was extended to include the media, team officials and the organizers of the event. Each country was to send their own media team, which could also be treated as possible targets. Most of the top performing sports teams would most likely be staying at 4 and 5 star properties which made these properties possible terrorist targets; hence their inclusion in this study. Teams were likely to want to stay in a
property where they had special meals provided, and facilities for some light training such as a gymnasium and swimming pools. The reason for including three star properties was to yield a more complete picture of the measures being put in place. It was expected that the three star properties would be used by teams from smaller countries and supporters wanting just basic facilities. This study would also examine the relationship between security preparedness and property size.

Participants were informed about what to expect when they decided to participate in the study. They were provided with as much information as possible by way of the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 5). This document detailed the study and answered most of the frequently asked questions. The document also listed contact details of the supervisors for participants to call in the event they had any questions or if they wished to make a comment on the research.

3.6. Three different interview methods

This section briefly explains three methods of interviews, including semi-structured interview which is what has been selected for this research.

3.6.1. Structured interviews

Structured interviews as the name implies, are rigid. Fixed questions are prepared and administered to all the interviewees in a uniform manner. The interviewer should not exhibit any facial or body expression that may contaminate or influence the process. The interviews are carried out in a controlled environment and uniformity is the key element with this method. This is to ensure that the process is not biased. With this method the interviewer must ‘perform almost like a robot’ (Sarantakos, 2005, p. 268).

3.6.2. Unstructured interviews

Unstructured interviews are diametrically opposite in terms of the manner in which they are administered. According to Sarantakos (2005) questions are not fixed and they may be administered in a different sequence to each of the interviewees. New questions can be added as and when required. In fact, each
interviewee could be responding to a different set of questions. This can make the job of drawing out themes and analysing them more challenging.

### 3.6.3. Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews, on the other hand, combine the two extreme methods mentioned above. There is a certain amount of control and uniformity but it is not as clinical or exact as the structured method. Semi-structured interviews, as the name implies, will not place unnecessary rigid boundaries on the interviewer and will allow the discussion to progress naturally. A list of topics for discussion is prepared and administered to all the interviewees, but interviewees are encouraged to provide more information beyond the realm or limitation of the question. However, general parameters would be put in place to act as guides so that the discussion does not stray too far off topic. Aside from that, the interview will proceed in a manner whereby logical interpretation can take place and plausible themes and conclusions can be drawn.

Given the sensitivity and importance of the topic being researched, semi-structured interviews were considered the best method to use because it would allow in-depth questioning. Participants who are uncertain about the questions put to them may also seek clarification. Explanations and discussions may be required because security and terrorism are not necessarily very popular topics which participants will be well versed with.

### 3.7. Ethics approval

Ethics relates to moral principles and relates one’s own moral values. Ethics are rules which govern behaviour ensuring that no harm is intentionally done. Ethics is like an indicator identifying right from wrong. Ruane (2005) stresses that ethics has a very important role in research. She states that the fundamental principle is ‘cause no harm’ (Ruane, 2005, p. 17). Ruane also discusses gaining informed consent from participants who are capable and competent to provide that consent and who voluntarily give their consent. Once the participants have agreed to participate, they are given a Consent Form to sign. The form states what is expected of them as participants and also what they can expect from
the study and clearly states their rights. Ruane (2005) also discusses the importance of privacy and also about avoiding conflicts of interests.

All research projects whether they are for educational or commercial purposes must be subjected to strict ethical scrutiny. In the case of this particular study, approval to conduct the research was requested from the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC). Final approval was granted on 7th June 2011 (Ethics Application Number 11/96).

3.7.1. Purpose

The purpose and objective of the ethics committee is to ensure safety and welfare of the participants. Participants have certain rights and these must be observed at all times. The researcher must maintain high professional standards at all times.

- They must not skew the data to prove a desired outcome.
- They must be open with the participants. They should not set out to deceive them.
- They should maintain a balanced relationship with the participants. They must not pressure the participants to act or perform in a particular manner.
- They must be aware that their questions could be sensitive and create or cause emotional reactions from the participants.

3.7.2. Process

The process for this application through AUTEC started with the completion of the EA1 which is the ‘Application for ethics approval for research projects’. The information requested in this form includes a description of the project, the proposed methodology, the participant recruitment process, the collection and management of the data and the process of seeking a participant’s consent. Along with the application the following documents must be submitted:

- A consent form for each participant to sign.
- A participant information sheet which clearly explains to participants what the research entails. It also includes contact details of AUTEC and the
supervisors so the participants may make contact in the event they have a query or complaint.

- A list of proposed questions that will be used in the research.

3.8. Data collection, analysis, management and storage

This section addresses the operational aspect of research. There are legal requirements and guidelines around collection, analysis, management and storage of data. Marshall and Rossman (2011) emphasise the importance of proper management of data. They suggest the use of computer software to properly label and store data. Participants provide information voluntarily in the hope that it will be put to good use, so may have reasonable expectations that their information will be managed in a professional and secure manner. The Privacy Act 1993 governs the way in which information is gathered, stored and disseminated. It sets out to protect individuals against their personal data being made public without their consent.

3.8.1. Data collection

The method selected as being most appropriate for collection of the data is the semi-structured interviews. Given the topic of the research, it was expected that there might be some unease amongst participants about talking publicly about their property and their level of preparedness or unpreparedness. Therefore it was necessary to exclude the use of focus groups where participants would get to meet the rest of panel. They would immediately know their risk levels after discussing it with the other panel members. That is not the role or purpose of this study. It was therefore considered more appropriate and productive for the various hotel or motel associations and councils to organise such sessions with the involvement of various security agencies.

Printed surveys were also excluded because of the rigidity of such a process. These are surveys mailed out to a large number of participants in the hope that someone will respond to them, but there is no way of confirming that the respondent is knowledgeable about the subject being discussed. Semi-structured interviews provide the opportunity to meet respondents and ask follow-up questions as and when required.
A set of indicative questions (Appendix 4) was prepared for the interviews. Each participant was asked the same question, in very much the same setting to ensure uniformity, but some participants, after answering each of the prepared questions, may decide to provide more information that they deemed pertinent to the study. The researcher also asked more probing questions where appropriate or necessary. The questions were designed after reading the relevant literature that was available. While the literature addressed some of the issues surrounding preparedness, some under-researched areas were also identified. The responses to the questions were expected to fill in those gaps and also answer the overall research question.

The prepared lists of questions (Appendix 4) were organised into four main categories:

1. security preparation
2. guidance and support from authorities
3. policy and manuals
4. insurers.

Questions listed under the ‘security preparation’ category included issues around staff training, security preparation and planning, and security vetting for staff. These questions were arrived at as a result of some of the literature identified in chapter 2 such as Stafford, Yu and Amoo (2002), Clark (2004), Parsons (1996), Ritchie (2003), McConnell and Drennan (2006), Lisante (1972), Cetron 2006), Pennington-Gray, Thapa, Kaplanidou, Cahyanto and McLaughlin (2011) and Frewin (2004). These mainly discussed the need for security planning and preparation and the specific questions prepared for the study explored the participant property’s level of preparedness. The interview questions sought to confirm the ideas in the relevant literature.

Questions listed under the ‘guidance and support from authorities’ category tried to identify the level of support provided by the relevant authorities. These questions were arrived at after reading the following literature: Groenenboom and Jones (2003), Burton (2005), Ronan (1993), Amur (2005) and Longmore-Etheridge (1999). These articles debated the issue of providing security and who was ultimately responsible for providing security. The interview questions
specifically queried the level of support the individual properties were receiving from local and central government authorities.

Questions listed under the category ‘policy and manuals’ sought to understand the operating procedures that the individual properties had put in place for a terrorist threat or attack. Some of the literature that led to the design of this category were: Stafford, Yu and Amoo (2002), Tannebaum (1950), Gunaratna (2008), Hanna (2011), Mattox (2010), Tosini (2009), Yoon and Shanklin (2007), Palermo (2006) and Bergesen (2006). These discuss security preparedness and some forms of terrorist attacks. Given the available literature in the public domain, the questions put to participants sought to find out what, if any, policies they had in place in the event of a terrorist attack.

Questions under the category ‘insurers’ were meant to find out whether the participant properties had any difficulties with regards to securing insurance for the RWC or whether extra clauses or caveats were placed on them. The literature that aided the design of the questions under this heading were: Davies and Lamont (2010), Savun and Phillips (2009), Hofstede (1984), and McKenna (1993). These articles discussed the difficulty of securing insurance, the effect of political ideology on attitudes towards insurance and risk sensitivity and aversion. The questions put to participants explored their attitudes towards insurance and also indirectly, the attitudes of the insurers with regards to a terrorist threat at the RWC. Their analysis of the political scenario and risk sensitivity could perhaps have had an impact on their attitudes.

3.8.2. Data analysis

Once all the interviews were completed, a table was set up to record all the responses for each question from all the participants. This provided the opportunity to code and evaluate all their responses to each question. Marshall and Rossman (2011) state that during the process of coding, patterns and themes will emerge. All the extra information collected from the participants for the supplementary questions were also recorded and analysed in the same manner.
3.8.3. Data Management

Codes for the eight hotels were created (Table 4). Only the researcher knew the identity of the properties and the contacts person/s. This was to ensure total confidentiality and to allay any fears on the part of the participants that information may accidentally be made public. The codes were not provided with any identifiable information like their location or star rating. The researcher created and kept a master register which identified the codes and their corresponding properties. The participants were not told the code that was assigned to their property.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hotels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Hotel codes

3.8.4. Data storage

The researcher is responsible for the security of the data collected. While the study was ongoing, the data were stored in a secure location. Electronic data were stored on a memory stick used only for this research and all written notes and other recordings were kept in a locked drawer. One copy of the transcripts and interview audio recording is stored on the password protected drive of the researcher’s computer while another copy is stored on an online storage facility.

Immediately after the study was completed, all the data and notes were transferred to Auckland University of Technology (AUT) WH secure storage
room where it will be stored for six years from the date of completion of the study. After the six year period, all the information will be securely shredded.

### 3.9. Conclusion

This chapter has laid the foundation for the research, clearly outlining all the important areas affecting the study. Where required it justified the use of particular methods like the semi-structured interviews. It also provided an insight into the need for ethics approval and the safe and proper management of collected data.

Having worked through the process of planning this research, it is, upon reflection, easy to understand Dwight David Eisenhower’s (34th US President) emphasis on the process of planning.
4. Chapter Four: Findings

‘The outcome of any serious research can only be
to make two questions grow where only one grew before’.

~ Thorstein Veblen ~

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the research. The title of the research is
‘Implications and impacts of terrorism on sporting events: Is the hospitality
industry prepared and equipped to host mega events?’ To answer the research
question, eight semi-structured interviews were conducted with eight senior
managers from a variety of accommodation properties. One of the managers
interviewed was responsible for two separate properties. So, while there were
eight interviews, the data effectively covered nine properties. The managers
that participated in the research managed backpacker lodges, serviced
apartments and hotels, including one five star hotel. This research is not
focused on any one type of lodging property but instead includes a variety
(hotels, service apartments and backpackers).

Some of the questions are listed below with the participants’ responses. In
some cases, their complete response had been included while in others, only
excerpts. Where only excerpts are used, it is because part of their response did
not directly address the question being asked. Wherever possible, full
responses have been presented to help understand the frame of mind of the
participants and the context of their responses. Care had been taken to ensure
responses were accurately presented. Notes within parentheses have been
included by the researcher because participants sometimes made gestures
such as nodding or shaking their head in response to questions put to them
(non-verbal responses).

Participating properties were issued with a code ranging from P1 through to P8.
They were not ranked nor did the codes have any other connotations. The
information behind the coding is protected so that individuals, their employers
and the property cannot be identified.
Responses from the participants alone were insufficient to answer the complex research question. It is important to understand the rationale and intent of the question in the first instance. Each set of responses is accompanied by a brief explanation and summary of the findings. Themes derived from their responses are addressed in the discussion chapter.

4.2. Data collection process

The participants were contacted by telephone and email prior to their meeting so that they were prepared for the interviews. It was important for potential participants to understand the purpose and intent of the research before agreeing to participate. All participants were given a Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 5), which contained detailed information about the research. Participants were also asked to sign a Consent Form prior to the commencement of the interview. The data collection method used was semi-structured interviews and direct observation. The interviews lasted no more than an hour each and they were held at the participant's place of work and at their convenience. Audio recordings as well as written notes were taken throughout the session. It was ensured that the participants were comfortable at all times throughout the interview. This was to ensure good, accurate and usable information was being collected. A semi-structured interview method was selected for this research because of the depth and quality of the responses collected.

4.3. Limitations

It was quite difficult to recruit participants for this research. The reasons given by potential participants for not participating included lack of time and interest in the research. Some also felt that discussing security issues prior to the RWC 2011 was not very wise, even though they were assured of anonymity and confidentiality.

The other limitation was that for this type of research only interviews with very senior managers were planned. The reason for this was because the types of questions were of a nature that could only be answered by senior managers. Managers at this level were understandably very busy and arranging suitable
appointments was quite challenging. In the proposal for this research the target number of participants was set at between six and ten. With eight participants, that target was clearly met.

4.4. Significant observations

Part way through the questions, most of the participants had to be reassured that their responses were ‘normal’. This was because they were becoming concerned by the types and pattern of the questions, their responses and the discussion that showed that they were unprepared for the responsibility of hosting mega events such as the RWC. They were perhaps identifying deficiencies in their own plans. Some wanted to be reassured, while others wanted to know what other properties were doing. Some of the managers requested that the researcher visit their property to train and prepare their staff prior to the RWC. One of the participants (P2) sent an email after the interview. He said “I trust that the next few weeks will go peacefully and that we will not write a dramatic postscript to the report.” It is quite clear that this research made participants think about security quite seriously and in a way that they had not done before. It could perhaps have been the only opportunity where participants had scrutinised their security preparations. Participants had also made contact to provide extra information that they received or became aware about after the interview, that they deemed would be important to the research. The fact that participants were communicating and engaging with the researcher long after the interviews were completed demonstrated the positive effects the study had on participants.

4.5. Research data

In this section the participants’ responses for each question they answered at the interview will be presented in its raw form. Also their responses will be briefly analysed to provide explanations where required or to identify prominent themes. More in-depth, detailed discussions for each theme will be presented in the following discussion chapter.
Background information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Manager's age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Management experience</th>
<th>Staff numbers</th>
<th>Rooms / Beds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>36 - 40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>55+</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>17 years</td>
<td>180 - 200</td>
<td>192 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>36 - 40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>46 - 50</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18 years</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>176 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>20 - 25</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>8 months</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>220 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>31 - 35</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>&gt; 5 years</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>260 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>41 - 45</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>&gt; 6 years</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>140 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>26 - 30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>200 beds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

( > refers to a value greater than )

Table 5: Participating property's background information

Table 5 summarises information from the interviews to provide pertinent background information on the respondents. The age and range of work experience of the managers were quite wide. In comparison, there were two (P5 and P8) relatively young managers overseeing some of the properties. The staff numbers ranged from 9 to 200 and the property sizes ranged from 52 to 260 rooms. The staff to room/bed ratio is quite high for properties like P5 and P8 compared to P2 for example which is almost one staff member per room. This is an important point because the staffing ratio may have an implication on the level of security provided. In the case of P5, it would be harder for 9 staff to attend to 220 guests in the event of an emergency. If an emergency occurred when the property was operating at a 100% occupancy and they had all their nine staff present, each staff would have to be responsible for approximately 24 guests.

Respondent profiles are important especially in an interpretive study, when trying to understand the responses from individual participants. Their age, experience, property size, staff strength and sometimes even gender may help the readers to understand the reasons for their actions and responses to the questions put to them. The participants’ responses appended below should be read in conjunction with Table 5. For instance, when a manager claimed that they had VIP guests on a regular basis, it would be useful to understand the size of the property, including their staff strength.
i. How often do you get VIP guests staying here?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>We have senior judges staying with us, Ministry of Justice personnel about once or twice a week. Obviously it depends on the needs of their business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Every week. I think from memory the [XXX] has been here for meals at least 3 times in the last 3 months and I have just received a note – they would like me to meet [XXX] again at the door next week. So as part of the protocol of the hotel, usually a senior manager on duty meets [XXX]. So here is an example of [XXX] being here regularly. [XXX] has also been here March, April, May and June. Think [XXX] also had meetings to discuss. We have people from overseas country stay at the hotel. They’re high ranking government officials and then we have, if you like, VIPs – be they book authors or TV celebrities. That sort of thing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>Not too often. If you say VIP meaning celebrities or sort of ministerial people – we don’t have that. CEO’s of companies – quite often.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>We have different categories of VIP guests. A VIP 1 is somebody that is maybe a CEO of a company or a dignitary or a government official – fairly rarely. We are more likely to have VIPs who are well known celebrities. They are more local. Maybe they are on TV doing the weather or something.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>No VIP guest. Actually we had someone from Shortland Street in our $18.00 dorm recently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>Quite often I would say. We had the [XXX] about a month ago. We have had the [XXX]. On a monthly basis – about 4 or 5 times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>Very often. On a weekly basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>No. That is not our market.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are various categories of VIPs that the participating properties have hosted. The [XXX] signifies a Minister, the Prime Minister, Governor-general or a visiting dignitary of a similar standing. These VIPs would be accorded a very high level of security during their visit. From the interviews it was noted that P2, P6 and P7 hosted this level of VIPs on a regular basis. It is possible that properties that regularly hosted VIPs treated the security for the RWC similarly or their considerable experience in handling VIPs made them more security conscious during the RWC. P5 and P8 however, had not previously had the opportunity to host VIPs. Their lack of experience may have affected their security preparation for RWC. Properties that hosted VIPs regularly seemed more confident and at ease throughout the session. For example, when discussing the lack of assistance and guidance from the police, P7 who hosted VIPs on a regular basis said ‘There is a general understanding of how we
handle these people (VIP guests) anyway. We'll just be adhering to that. We know the process'.

ii. **How many times have you been involved with events of this size and nature?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Formula One in Melbourne. That will be the biggest one but then in Melbourne every year there are big events going on – V8 Super cars, rock concerts, Grand Finals, sporting events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>I was in Sydney for the lead up to the 2000 Olympic Games and I was in Melbourne in the lead up to the 2006 Commonwealth Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>The last big one was the Lions tour of NZ. It was a massive amount of guest from Europe that stayed here. We had all the spectators staying here. We didn’t have any teams staying here. However if you look at the sporting teams – we have had the All Blacks stay here in 2005. And they stayed with us for almost 2 weeks. We have had the Tall Blacks stay here. We have had the Australian women’s basketball team stay here. Touch NZ – they always stay here. On and off, in the last 10 years we have accommodated some of the prominent teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>I think the only other event that would be comparable would be the Lions tour. It went very well. So the people that were staying here were staying for 5 or 6 days, so we consider that quite a long stay and they were most Welsh and English. No problem at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>No. Never been involved in any events this size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>I was working, not at the management level, at the Sheraton in Sydney during the Olympics and since then the Lions Tour or the Americas Cup would be on the same league. I have been involved in those events as well. And Rugby 7s – we host all teams on a yearly basis over here, so we are every involved with that as well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>RWC. Well the only comparable event to that would be the Lions Tour 2005 and this is bigger again by all accounts but we have yet to feel that. May not be. Would seem bigger for the country but whether it is big for us, I am not sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>This is going to be the biggest event. The Lions Tour was pretty big and of course we have the annual Rugby 7s, which is the ultimate event. You have occasional test matches and big international concerts. I guess nothing of this [RWC] scale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most of the managers provided local events as examples of their involvement in major events such as the Rugby 7s and Lions Tour. Those that mentioned international experience only had experiences in Australia. Many respondents claimed that most of their staff would not have had much experience in hosting mega events. Some would have had experience with local events like the Lions Tour and the Rugby 7s. Therefore with some of the properties in this research, it seemed reasonable to conclude that the managers and their staff would have had very limited experience. To conclude, P1 said, “We have a young staff. This will be their first time that they have ever been involved in an event – a big event.” The lack of experience can evoke one of two responses – either they would be overly cautious because they do not know their priorities or they could perhaps take a very laid-back approach because they are not aware of the possible problem areas. Both responses have a certain amount of risk involved. Being overly cautious would mean that they would try to prepare for every eventuality which will be almost impossible and also expensive. The laissez-faire approach however is the other extreme, where no preparation is undertaken either because the task is too big or due to the lack of financial resources and expertise.

iii. Do you plan to carry out any trial-runs before the Rugby World Cup?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>We are going to have a test run with the Tri Nations game (All Blacks vs Springboks) at the end of this month on July 30th 2011. That has been interesting in terms of how they handle the bookings. At this stage we are very heavily booked which is code for over-booked. It will be interesting with how house-keeping is going to work with 38 arrivals, 42 departures, rolling over rooms – it is going to be interesting. I'll give them some guidelines but we'll see how they react.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>The [XXX] stay here every year that I have been here. The [XXX] have been in this hotel so this has been their tour group hotel, team hotel for the last 4 years. So, we, if you like, it is not necessary for us to try out. We just take it as part of our normal business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>We don’t seem to get that busy with the Tri-Nations anymore. We used to get extremely busy. I don’t think I feel the need to actually do any sort of trial run leading up to the RWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>We will definitely be having debriefings about different scenarios that may arise. We consider that we probably have in our health and safety procedures for things like bomb alert or some kind of threat. Debriefings will be from the...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trial runs were opportunities to test the system and identify possible areas that required more attention. Not carrying out a trial run meant that either one was over confident of their system or there was no system in place to test. Even the best systems must be periodically tested to ensure they work properly. One out of the eight participants stated that their property would conduct a trial run to test their system. The rest had no intention to do so with two participants stating categorically that they did not see the need for it. P2 had international sports teams stay with them regularly and they felt that they were already well rehearsed and P7, the property that had the most contact with government security departments claimed that they would depend on the various government agencies for instructions. Those that did not plan to test their system all claimed that they would focus on practicing their emergency fire procedures. Fire drills are not the solution for every emergency and certainly not for terrorist related events yet they all mentioned them at some point during the interview. Each emergency requires a specially designed response. It is possible that they only mentioned fire drills because they had not thought security through properly or because they genuinely believed that a fire drill would perhaps be a suitable response for all emergencies.
iv. What are you doing differently in terms of security, compared to when you have been involved with hosting other high profile events or guests?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>I have to be honest – New Zealand is ‘see what comes’ – they seem to be quite reactive. My experience in Australia, in Melbourne and Brisbane, Queensland – there’s always different government departments getting involved. There are off-site meeting being held by Victoria Tourism to tell you what’s going on. Here it seems – hey we’ve got the Rugby World Cup coming – aren’t we great – open the doors and don’t rip people off with $800 a night rooms. I believe there is meant to be security but we are not doing anything different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>There is nothing that we are doing here that is more than what was being done in those two cities [Sydney &amp; Melbourne].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>I make sure none of my staff tell or sort of make public the information about who is staying here. The other thing is we will be having a lot of people drinking at the bar – there will be extra security in the bar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>The only thing different will be we are having an outside security firm assist us during the peak periods. At present we still have a lot of rooms that are unsold. We are full on the key dates (quarter finals) but apart from that it is not like we are fully booked or anything. We do have an outside security firm that monitors us and we are getting them to have somebody in here. They will just have a presence around the place where people see them and they are dressed differently from the staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Yes. We use Recon Oncall and they came to us and asked whether we wanted somebody for the busy game period. We will have Recon do walk-throughs of the building probably 3 times a night on top the night manager here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>I believe there are people assigned to the teams, people assigned with the VIPs that are coming in, to be on the premises for several hotels from the RWC committee. Not from the hotel. But again that is [security] something we will discuss closer to the time. Next week will be having world cup specific meetings where security might be a point. We do have a really good security system here. We have proximity cards, so you cannot access a floor without it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>No. we are not going to have any guards at all. We are well aware of the fact that the Police and the other departments and agencies that are surrounding and covering off security for the city and delegates that are coming here are going to be dealing with that. We provide the features - like there are security on the floor, there are security in the lifts. They can’t gain access without authority and we’ll adhere to any requirements that we are required to adhere to within reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>Not really. The main thing is to only take in reservations that is confirmed. We are not taking any walk-ins. That is one part of the security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One main difference mentioned is the increase in security staff for some of the properties. This meant that the managers acknowledged that there would be a
higher risk during the event and that justified the need for extra security guards. They perceived their existing security arrangements as being insufficient for an event of that size. All except P7 would have some form of guards on site. P7 would depend on the police and other government agencies to provide it with the necessary protection and resources. This property would get special attention from the security agencies due to the dignitaries that were staying there. Those that had increased their number of guards, claimed that it was either because they were expecting a high occupancy rate or because their bar would be full and they wanted better crowd control. P8 planned to reject any last minute walk-in guests even if they had space available. P8 was willing to forego the possibility of earning extra revenue for the sake of security.

The perception was that having extra uniformed manpower, clearly visible to the public would act as a deterrent to any potential trouble makers. Johnson (2001) claimed that clothing had purpose and significance, and they ‘identify a person’s sex, status, group membership, legitimacy, authority, and occupation’ (p. 28).

v. Describe the training that your staff have undergone or will undergo in preparation for the Rugby World Cup?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>It is not RWC specific, its more just treating guests – we have gone back [to the basics]. This property has undergone a bit of a [change] – we are on a journey. So we’ve gone back to the basics. Just identifying the guests and confirming the guest’s details on arrival. The big thing we did last month was 90 days prior to the World Cup, we sent an email out to all our corporate saying we still have apartments available – our core market. Just thinking ahead – that’s what we’ve been training, Looking at the big picture. When I first got here they were looking at 1 or 2 days out – who is arriving tomorrow. You have to start looking a month out, maybe 3 months out for myself and the assistant property manager. So it is not RWC specific, it is more the business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>No [no specific training]. We’ve got nothing planned [training]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>We have on and off training regarding armed hold-up or terrorism. We have staff who have gone through that. Our manager who lives on site is actually quite vigilant on those areas so he is constantly feeding us information as to what to be aware of and how to act in such instances. Say for example somebody has popped in from outside and left a bag in the foyer and nobody knows whose it is so what to do in that situation. Whom to call. May not be just terrorism. Might be a fire in the area. What to do and who needs to be evacuated. We have a form at reception where we write down the name of any person who is disabled or who is deaf or blind and we make sure we attend to those people first. Make sure that they are safe and sound while the other staff are doing the other evacuation. So staff are aware of what to do and how to behave in such instances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We will be practising the drills before the games. Fire drills are ongoing all the time anyway.

No special training

Nothing at this stage

No. We'll probably have a debrief. Bear in mind we don't know who is coming yet and we won't know that till the very last minute. That is usually the way they run it. Our key management will be involved. We have the bookings but that is all they are. They are not named at this stage. We won't get that information particularly around the secure people till the very last minute if at all. What happens is that they usually use pseudonyms for obvious reasons.

Absolutely. We are actually doing a few trainings in the next few weeks. Security wise – more on what to do in an emergency. Like the actions that they need to take. So I guess a more general approach. What to do in a fire or earthquake

The responses covered both extremes. Either they were not planning to undertake any training or the training was to do with fire drills which they practised almost every month. One participant (P8) even mentioned earthquake evacuation and the reason for that could be because a few months prior to this interview, on 22\textsuperscript{nd} of February 2011, Christchurch, New Zealand experienced a 6.3 magnitude earthquake resulting in a total of 181 deaths (Flanagan, 2011). None of the participants had thought about how different each of these emergency situations were to each other. When the participants were asked to describe their standard operating procedures for an emergency, they only mentioned their fire drills. Upon close scrutiny, it was evident that each type of crisis was different requiring different responses. It is possible that fire drills were popular because of the high possibility of a fire as opposed to any other emergency.

vi. Describe your procedure for conducting security checks on all your staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>No Police checks – just the normal reference checks. Will only carry out checks if we have new staff members come on board. If we have the same team as now – No. We’ve vetted all our contactors. They work for the companies that are our preferred suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>We don’t do Police vetting for any staff so we are not doing Police vetting for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All the eight managers interviewed stated that they did not carry out security checks on their staff at the pre-employment stage. Only two of the participants claimed that security checks were being done for the RWC (P6 and P7). This was perhaps a rather disturbing finding. Even if it is not for terrorism, security checks could identify criminal elements so that they can be prevented from being employed or if employed, they can be monitored. For example it would not be wise to employ someone who had been convicted for theft as a chambermaid. The hotel in this case could perhaps be deemed as being negligent.

vii. Describe your procedure for vetting your suppliers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>We mainly use commercial suppliers – plumbing example – we use a commercial plumber – so it is not Joe Bloggs from Tawa who does residential. This is Plumber Supreme who are gas fitters. So they know the building. There is about 3 guys who come onsite and we know them. They have to sign in every time they take a key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>There's been no check done on suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>Well the people who supply the food over here are – we don’t change them every week. They are the same suppliers we have had for years. We actually trust them and we know who we are dealing with in the first place. Knowing whatever food or supplies they are providing us is actually in good order and good condition. However they all come down when they deliver – the things are checked and signed off. So we don’t just let them drop something off and go away. A thorough check is done to make sure there is nothing else in there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>They can’t get in to deliver unless there is someone and then it would be just standard. We will be just signing off dockets. In one respect we are trusting the supplier. We don’t do any checks on them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>[Opening a new bar] We’ll be using Toops and no ..... we won’t be vetting them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>No, but we are being audited by RWC and the person from the council that has been assigned to properties. We have constant audits regarding food quality. I am not 100% sure these suppliers are vetted. We did receive some information from MAF. It is sitting on my table for me to go through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>We have been requested to meet with and comply with Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and Police requirements over the food chain. They are coming in to audit that. [Received that notification] about 2 weeks ago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>Pretty much our major supplier is Bidvest. They are the biggest supplier and we get all of our supplies from them. We do not vet them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The purpose of this question was to explore the possibility that suppliers could provide terrorist elements a safe path into the hotel. A focus of this was food terrorism. However, all eight managers unanimously confirmed that they did not conduct any specific checks on their suppliers. P1 defended his method by stating that his property worked only with reputed suppliers and tradesmen, ‘not Joe Bloggs from Tawa’. While it was very important to scrutinise and select the right supplier, a more thorough check would have been safer. P3 claimed, referring to their suppliers, that that they did not ‘change them every week’. That was meant to be reassuring but in essence complacency could destroy all that they had built up. Terrorist elements could join the supplier’s company and have access to the hotel almost immediately. This could have been possible simply because the supplier is well known and had been around for a long time. P4, P6 and P7 alluded to the fact that while they did not normally conduct checks on their suppliers and their system, they had been directed to do so for the RWC. Such audits could perhaps be in place as a norm, not just for the RWC. Of the eight properties, only three mentioned this directive which was disseminated.
around the 25\textsuperscript{th} of July 2011 (refer to Appendix 2). This was 47 days before the start of the RWC.

eviii. \textbf{Describe the kinds of security requests that participating teams, supporters, media and officials have put to you as a condition of their using your facilities.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>No. I’ve looked at all their emails. The group that’s staying here just want the apartments confirmed. No mention of security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>No [no request with regards to security]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>No, they haven’t made any requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>No specific requests made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>No specific requests from guests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>No requests from teams or [other] guests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>No requests directly to us. They would go through security channels of their own and through our Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>No specific requests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the properties were emphatic that no specific security requests had been made to them by any potential guest. There could be an implied understanding that the hotel would have taken care of security arrangements without being prompted or it was also possible that the visitors deemed New Zealand as a safe destination which therefore did not warrant such heightened concerns.

This theme related to the political ideology of New Zealand which was politically neutral in many areas. For example New Zealand refused to participate in the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was well known for its nuclear free stance. This could perhaps be the reason why visitors to New Zealand did not perceive it to be a high risk terrorist target.

ix. \textbf{Do you plan to keep the property open to the general public during the Rugby World Cup?}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>If we have [rooms] available – yes, they can come in. We’ll take bookings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We will take walk-ins. We’ll do an ID check. The policy with walk-ins is that we take a photocopy of their photo ID and they pay upfront. Probably doesn’t help if they have ulterior motives on their mind but I’ve found it easier to fall in line or fall in step with the ‘she’ll be right’ attitude. If we did what we [did] in Melbourne, we’ll be closed off by now

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>[open - no restrictions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>We are a very public hotel. We rely on our public business for our restaurant and the bars. We are not going to stop any person from the public coming into the hotel and have a drink and watch the game on the big TV. We have a sports bar and to do that in that period would be unfair to the prolong business. Nobody would actually turn up after everybody is gone from here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>We are open all the time anyway but we lock up the building at 11.00pm. So you can’t just wander in unless you are a house guests. You would be screened at the door</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>The front door will be open. What we rely on is the night staff .... however he spends two hours out of reception doing cleaning duties. So he won’t always have sight of the door. But we also have cameras as well all throughout the building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>The restaurants and bars are open. No restrictions. For public areas like the bars and restaurants – anybody can go in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>No restriction. Again the security that is going to be here will be around the person involved and that would be dealt with by the Police. So we would be / may be required to secure the foyer at certain times depending on what they need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>Generally we are open 24/7 but after 11.00pm, only people who are staying in-house will have access. The pub will be open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was quite clear that trading was expected to be brisk during the RWC with the arrival of an estimated 95,000 visitors. All the participants were planning to keep their properties open throughout the RWC. Most expected their properties to be fully booked well before the RWC but in the event that they had space available, they would be cautious with whom they took in. P1 stated that they are following the New Zealand way of working and had adopted a ‘she’ll be right attitude. If we did what we [did] in Melbourne, we’ll be closed off by now’. This comment suggested that attitudes towards security may have been more serious in Australia compared to New Zealand. This could perhaps be because of their historical relationship with terrorism or their open support of the Americans and the American led invasion of Iraq. According to Suter (2003), ‘Australia is the only country to have fought alongside the US in every war in which the US fought in the twentieth century’ (p. 275).
New Zealand businesses viewed the RWC as a great opportunity to increase their revenue. A Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Tourism (2010) forecast prepared in March 2010 claimed that a large number of visitors were expected for the event. These visitors would require amongst other things, accommodation. The report stated that the number of visitors ‘will be lower than levels typically observed during peak visitor periods’ meaning that the available existing accommodation would be sufficient (p. 10). Evans (2011) claimed that Alan Bollard, New Zealand Reserve Bank Governor, predicted that the RWC event would introduce about ‘NZ$700 million’ into the economy (Evans, 2011).

It was not that hotel managers were unconcerned about security issues. It might perhaps have been a case of trying to increase their revenue during the off peak season. They may have decided on remaining open to the public after having assessed the risk and deciding that a terrorist attack was unlikely. Certainly, this would have been an opportunity to increase their revenue.

x. **Describe any structural changes (if any) that you had to make specially for the RWC.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>No structural changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>No [no structural changes]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>We haven’t had any reason to do that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>No ... there is probably not too much we can do around the hotel with that respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>No ... structural changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>Nothing at this stage because the way the hotel is built, I think it does secure things. We have lifts and doors that we can lock. Nothing structurally has been done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>No [plans to]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>No structural changes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None of the hotels in the study had to make any structural changes to their properties because of the RWC. The reason for this question is to ascertain whether the authorities had inspected their premises and insisted that they
needed to make the building safer in terms of security. There might have been a case for concrete barriers or bollards to be erected to protect from would-be car or truck bombs. All the participants appeared surprised that anyone would even consider erecting barriers to their property.

xi. Have the organisations appended below provided any advice/support with regards to security?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>P2</th>
<th>P3</th>
<th>P4</th>
<th>P5</th>
<th>P6</th>
<th>P7</th>
<th>P8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Police Force</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitality Association of New Zealand</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Councils</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private insurance companies</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other accommodation properties</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Y = Yes     N = No

The participants had not received much support with regards to security. They had been left on their own to decide how to proceed with their own security preparations. The smaller properties received less in terms of support. The focus, if any, had been on the larger properties that were hosting teams or VIPs. It was observed that they all would have liked more support from the relevant authorities.

New Zealand Police Force (NZPF)

Most participants claimed that they had not had any contact with the police with regards to preparation for RWC from a security perspective. Most of the comments were similar to those of P3, ‘Nobody from the police have approached us saying what we have to do and if anything happens over here this what we have to do’. No directives or emergency procedures had been provided. Only P6 and P7, the larger properties, had been in touch with the NZ Police directly. P6 commented, ‘Vetting has been done by them. They have been directly in touch. And basically providing instructions regarding VIPs and what the requirements are’. P7 who managed a property that hosted VIPs on a regular basis said ‘It is more about information from us than us requesting
information from them. There is a general understanding of how we handle these people anyway. We’ll just be adhering to that. We know the process’.

The focus for the police appeared to have been to service only those properties that were in direct contact with visiting teams and properties where VIPs were staying. The backpackers and smaller hotels, where most of the international supporters were staying had not received any support or guidance.

However, it is important to note that there seemed to be an implied expectation that the police would provide hotels with the required guidance. P2 said when asked about contact from the police ‘No, no instructions or extra leaflets or advertising material come through the mail. No offering of any courses or guidelines’. It seems that they were hoping for some information even if it was through leaflets and advertising materials. P3 added ‘nobody from the police have approached us saying what we have to do and if anything happens over here this what we have to do. At this point no contact’. The properties were not aware that the police had been in touch with a select few properties, mainly those that were hosting VIPs and teams. The managers may take the lack of contact from the police as a sign that everything has been taken care of and that there was nothing more for the properties to do. This may explain why the properties themselves are not doing very much in terms of security.

**Hospitality Association of New Zealand (HANZ)**

Participants confirmed that they had not received any direct help from the association with regards to security preparation at all. There was no mention about security or terrorism. The only contact that participants could recall was about street closures and alcohol sales. P3 said, ‘they have mentioned about how people should be drinking but nothing on security’. P1 have had, ‘no emails or discussions specifically about security’ with HANZ.

**Local councils**

The council’s only contact with the participants has been to do with alcohol sales, street closures, crowd control and food hygiene. No mention was made about security. P7 stated that they had contact with their council but it was not specific to their hotel – ‘we have done a little bit on security. Mainly precinct
based security not direct hotel stuff’. It would perhaps have been reasonable to have expected that councils would have made some preparations in the event of a major crisis and would have wanted to include all major buildings in their precinct including those hosting transient guests in their plans. In the preceding chapter (literature review) the attraction of accommodation properties with international guests as possible targets was extensively discussed. The reason for this was that targeting such an establishment would have a world-wide effect, which is the aim of the terrorist.

**Private insurance companies**

There was an expectation that private insurance companies would have been in contact with their clients to offer help and advice since they stood to lose as well if a catastrophe were to occur. None of the participants had any contact with their insurers about the RWC preparations. Properties had not been issued with any specific instructions or directives. The properties also confirmed that their insurance premiums had not been increased. It is possible that insurers did not consider this event to be a high risk. It could also be that their risks assessment showed that New Zealand was a low risk. P1 agreed – ‘I haven’t heard anything from our insurers. I don’t know whether it’s people thinking it’s New Zealand and it is too far away – we are not of strategic importance or .... I don’t know if everyone thinks we are one big happy family here’.

**Other accommodation properties**

Though the authorities were not in contact with all the properties, it was expected that properties would have organised their own support groups from their own network. Participants claimed that even though they meet other managers regularly, they did not discuss security issues. P2 summed it up quite well when they said,

hotels meet once a month informally just to discuss issues but there has been no concentrated subject about security preparations being discussed. If anything it has been [about] the bad media relating to room charges or its been the slowness of ticket sales or the effect of the Christchurch earthquake on RWC and logistics or it’s been about the shortage of skilled staff but nothing at all about security’.
P3 believed that everybody was working on their own – ‘I take it that everybody is just doing their own thing and organising their own details regarding RWC’.

xii. Explain your property’s policy (crisis management) with regards to terrorist threats / attacks. Describe your standard operating procedures for a terrorist event (if any).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>No – not specifically, more about the generic armed hold-up, bomb threat. About bomb threats – it is written – about half an A4 page – basically keep calm, try to get as much information from the person on the phone. I think it is the generic hotel template that has been around. Try to get as much detail as possible. Try to identify where the bomb is. What does the person sound like. 12 steps – 12 bullet points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>No [nothing specifically for terrorism]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>No – we don’t have a specific manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>We have a check list that actually HANZ put out which is one for a bomb threat, terrorism threat. So whoever is on duty will quickly try and get the gist – reminder that these are really quite critical. We will reinforce that before the games. It is part of our everyday - one respect they know that the information is there but I guess we do get into a - ‘it is not going to happen to us’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>We don’t have policies specific for terrorist threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>There is a manual on emergencies and bomb threats. Staff are all familiar with it [if there is a bomb threat] we immediately call the Police and get instructions from the Police. The Police will ask relevant questions and we will also evacuate the building or stop anybody from entering into the building. Regardless if even someone is calling sounding drunk, no matter what, the call immediately goes to the Police and basically the team has been told to try and understand the specifics of what the threat was about and names or anything – just so that we can give more information to the Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>No [specific policy]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>No specific policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a vast variation in the response for this question. Most said that they did not have any specific policy or procedure in place. P4 claimed that they had a checklist distributed by HANZ. The others seemed to omit this information even when prompted. P1 had a half page set of instructions that they used. They were unaware of its age or origins. When asked to describe the procedure, only P1, P4 and P6 volunteered information. There is no single standard operating procedure for all the properties regardless of their size or star ratings.
xiii. Do you feel you are sufficiently prepared to host the Rugby World Cup?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Yes – ask me afterwards. Yes, we are a small property. Hoping the security at the bigger properties will act as a deterrent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>In terms of guests staying in my hotel, I am confident. Nothing is going to happen specifically to my hotel. I am confident that the New Zealand government and the team organising the whole thing have done everything to make sure such act doesn’t occur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Yeah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>Operations point of view – yes definitely. We are pretty much ready. Security – the meetings I have had with the Police and the other security teams – I would say yes. We will just concentrate a wee bit more on the big event dates, especially the quarter finals. At the moment it is just day-to-day security issues rather than the terrorist side of things. Not to that extent but from operations point of view and basic security point of view – yes we are ready</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>Yes. I think so. We are getting there. It is all about making sure the staff know what to do</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the participants claimed they were prepared for the RWC. Some sounded convincing, others not so. P1 was ‘hoping the security at the bigger properties will act as a deterrent’. P3 was ‘confident that the New Zealand government and the team organising the whole thing have done everything to make sure such act doesn’t occur’. Hoping that other properties or the government will protect them is perhaps insufficient.

xiv. What are your thoughts about this interview and thesis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>I think it is useful. Anything that makes people think is good. A lot of people get caught up with the day-to-day running of their business. I keep going back to this ‘she’ll be right’. I think we take that a bit too far. Formula One in Melbourne – we had armed guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>I would be interested in the feedback. As you can see by my answers there is nothing there that indicates that we are treating these Games any differently than a normal business.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. I wouldn’t say it is a waste of time. I actually like to say that the world we live in now - thesis like that need to be conducted especially in tourism industry because it is such a big industry. Thesis like this is actually a good eye-opener. Make us think what to do if a terrorism act does occur. I am happy to do this interview with you, because it has given me some idea as to what might or might not happen. Also gives me ideas as to what I should be talking to my staff about.

I think it is fantastic. You have made me start to think about a few things

It has definitely made me think. I think it is going to be a shock for New Zealand to consider that [terrorism]. But it will be interesting to see what you find.

In today’s changing world I wouldn’t say it is a waste of time. I know that New Zealand is considered to be a pretty safe place and pretty far away from international politics but on the other hand it is very different at the moment and I don’t think there is anything that is safe from that aspect. The basic awareness of what could happen is important.

I would be interested to see the outcome and to read it. I don’t think it is a waste of time. It is people like you that reveal issues that some of us may not see.

I guess in New Zealand it is not – people don’t think that we will be targeted. That is not a concern I guess. Well, now that you have brought up a few things, It is very important [this research]. This is the time where everyone is in one location. There is more risk of things happening. I definitely see a good point why it should be done.

Two main reactions surfaced out of this question. One was that the study was a good idea and absolutely necessary but more importantly many claimed that it had made participants think about the way they were working. They realised that the system they had in place was not sufficiently robust. It was an interesting and an unexpected finding in that the two points mentioned here were not the objectives of this research. They took this opportunity to discuss security matters and it seemed like they appreciated that opportunity. Two properties even enquired whether it was possible for this researcher to address their staff and provide them with some security information. So it is evident that they were concerned to a certain degree and would have appreciated some guidance from the authorities.

4.6. Themes

Using an interpretivist paradigm, the dataset was interpreted and several themes and issues have emerged from this research. These themes and issues
were justified, presented and discussed in greater detail in the discussion chapter but a brief outline has been presented here.

1. What affects state of preparedness? Political ideology and awareness of international politics?
2. “She'll be right” attitude.
3. Vetting of staff and suppliers
4. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) food guidelines and checklist introduced in July 2011
5. Who is responsible for security?

4.6.1. Political ideology and awareness of international politics
This issue was selected for a more in-depth discussion because of the physical closeness but ideological distance between Australia and New Zealand. Participants cited Australia as their experience outside New Zealand but due to the difference in political outlook, their actions differed from those of Australia. For example, P1 said ‘my experience in Australia, in Melbourne and Brisbane, Queensland – there’s always different government departments getting involved. There are off-site meetings being held by Victoria Tourism to tell you what’s going on’. New Zealand’s security effort seems lesser in comparison to Australia. A country's ranking on the list of terrorist targets would affect their outlook and preparedness, but it is their political ideology and foreign policies that put them on the terrorist target list. For example, countries that invaded Iraq in 2003 would expect to be high on the terrorist target list. These countries would be expected to be more vigilant and have a higher standard of security arrangement.

4.6.2. ‘She'll be right’ attitude.
The ‘she'll be right’ attitude is a defining feature of the New Zealand character. New Zealand is thought to be relaxed and laid back. ‘She'll be right’ is an expression commonly used in Australia and New Zealand and it means that even if something is wrong, it will correct itself eventually. It is not that New Zealanders are thoughtless or careless; it is more that they are optimists, seeing the positive. It could perhaps have come from the agricultural background and having to rely heavily on having good weather. Unable to have
any control over nature, farmers had to be optimists, take the laissez-faire approach and hope that they got the weather they needed. A 1955 New Zealand folk song (Appendix 3) of the same name (She’ll be Right), by Peter Cape an Anglican priest, demonstrated New Zealand’s social attitude. It spoke about optimism in all aspects of life. One verse in the song was specifically about rugby, which demonstrated New Zealand’s love for the game.

An example of New Zealand’s ‘she’ll be right’ attitude is found in the story about Burt Munro and the film, The World’s Fastest Indian. Munro purchased a motorcycle, an Indian Scout in 1920, and worked on making it the fastest motorcycle in the world. He designed, modified and built his own parts. He did not give up, confident that his ideas would work out. His 1967 world record stands undefeated. He was described as ‘an extraordinary character embodying genuine, positive Kiwi attributes such as ingenuity, dogged determination, and a laid back and humorous demeanour’ (The Southland Times, 2011, p. 18). Munro’s willingness to test ride a motorcycle made from custom made parts that were previously untested, at very high speeds, perhaps demonstrated this ‘she’ll be right attitude’. The purpose of raising this example is to demonstrate New Zealanders’ relationship and attitude towards risk. While people would normally avoid risky activities, some New Zealanders deliberately seek them out. Other high risks activities available in New Zealand such as stock car racing, high speed jet boating and bungy jumping also demonstrated that New Zealanders may not be taking the issue of risk seriously or they may acknowledge the existence of risk but still want to test their luck. Besides their laissez-faire attitude towards risk, New Zealanders may genuinely believe that they were safe from harm and nothing negative could possibly happen to them.

Some of the responses expressed by the participants implied that this laissez-faire attitude could impede on security preparations. If the authorities did not believe that a terrorist threat existed, then they would adopt a relaxed attitude. P1 even used the phrases ‘see what comes’ (interview question iv) and ‘she’ll be right’ (interview question xiv) during the interview. And when asked whether his hotel would be conducting trial-runs to test their system, P2 said ‘it is not necessary for us to try out. We just take it as part of our normal business’. This
attitude, because it is part of the culture of the country and region, may perhaps have infiltrated the hospitality arena as well.

4.6.3. Vetting of staff and suppliers

All participants explained that they did not conduct any police checks on their staff or contractors. They did not believe that there was a need to. This theme is important because 100 per cent of the participants of this research were in agreement with each other and they claimed that they did not vet their staff or suppliers under normal circumstances. This demonstrated that criminal or terrorist groups would have had a safe and easy route into the industry. This puts the hotel in a vulnerable position. It is for that reason that this issue was considered important and one requiring more discussion. Hoteliers had a legal obligation to ensure the safety of their guests. Omitting to vet their staff and contractors could be in breach of that obligation.

4.6.4. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) food guidelines

The main issues that made this topic a concern were the timing of the release of the MAF guidelines and the properties that received them. The document was distributed to a select few. Only three participants claimed to have been aware of the existence of this guideline and checklist and all three received the document very close to the start of the RWC. This seemed to defeat the purpose of producing and implementing the guidelines. Due to lack of time, two of the three participants had not even read the document by the time they were interviewed for this research.

One of the suggested guidelines was to restrict entry to certain areas where food was stored or being prepared and vetting staff and contractors. P5 said ‘We’ll be using Toops and no ..... we won’t be vetting them’. Some of the other participants also had similar responses. Basic vetting of staff and contractors was not going to be conducted which in turn posed a danger. However, given the long list and late dissemination of the guidelines, it would have been difficult to have been able to read, understand and effectively implement them in a short time.

The MAF Food chain safety and security guidance material and checklist is attached in Appendix 2. The document implied that the reason for the
publication of the guidelines is the RWC and it highlights the fact that the presence of international media could be embarrassing for New Zealand should food contamination occur. The quote appended below shows their concerns about food contamination and the effect on New Zealand’s tourism.

‘With the Rugby World Cup 2011 being hosted by New Zealand and the expected arrival of an unprecedented number of international fans, 20 teams and their support personnel as well as visiting dignitaries, it is especially important that food businesses know how to prevent their products from being the target of intentional contamination.

Some 2500 international media are predicted to visit here for the event, so news of any incidents of tampering or contamination has the potential to make headlines around the world and have a negative impact on our future as a tourism destination’ (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2011, p. 1).

4.6.5. Who is responsible for security?

Some of the responses from participants that made this theme important for further discussion were:

1. P3 – ‘I take it that everybody is just doing their own thing and organising their own details regarding RWC’
2. P1 – ‘hoping the security at the bigger properties will act as a deterrent’

The two quotes above demonstrated that there did not seem to be a co-ordinated security effort and many of the participants felt that they were being left to fend for themselves. The question here is, were the police, central government, local government or the hotel owners themselves responsible for security. The discussion around this theme hoped to decipher who was responsible for each part of the security effort. It is a huge responsibility, one that has to be shared and properly coordinated.

4.7. Conclusion

These findings cannot be generalised as the data set is small. It is meant to be an exploratory piece of research. A larger sample with more in depth questions would be required to arrive at a conclusion that can be applied industry wide. These eight properties, which were convenience sample, provided a plausible explanation regarding the current situation but they did not imply that their
responses would be the same throughout the hospitality industry. This was an important event New Zealand was hosting, and the need to showcase itself as a possible serious contender for future events was big and understandable. One might therefore have expected more to have been done in the security area. Even if New Zealand was considered a safe destination, it could be argued that the tourists who come from areas that have been previously targeted by terrorism may need reassuring. They perhaps expected to see security in action. This study is not meant to be critical of the accommodation providers, police or any other specific group. It is meant to raise questions as to the level of preparedness and support properties were receiving. The study was merely questioning the industry’s preparedness. There is a saying that ‘justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done’. Perhaps it is the same with security. When security is obvious, it allays fear amongst the peace loving people and also acts as a strong deterrent to criminal and terrorist elements.
5. Chapter Five: Discussion

‘The terrible thing about terrorism is that ultimately it destroys those who practice it. Slowly but surely, as they try to extinguish life in others, the light within them dies’.

~ Terry Waite ~

5.1. Introduction

The purpose of this discussion chapter is to reason, justify and present some of the main themes and issues that have arisen from the preceding findings chapter. Five themes had been selected from the findings chapter for further discussion because they warranted a more in depth explanation to facilitate an understanding. Each theme would be addressed separately. The discussion for each topic may not arrive at any particular conclusion but may instead create more questions that would require further study. This discussion was grounded in an interpretivist viewpoint.

Greener-Barcham (2002) explained in her discourse about terrorism and New Zealand that New Zealand was better prepared than most other countries even though at that time it was an unlikely target. New Zealand, according to the paper, had plans, systems and counter-terrorism measures in place well before the events of 9/11 and even the attack on the Rainbow Warrior. According to Veitch (2010), the Rainbow Warrior was part of a fleet of five vessels operated by Greenpeace, and was bombed on July 10th 1985 by French agents who were operating under the instructions of the French Minister of Defence and the then French President, Francois Mitterand. David Lange, the New Zealand Prime Minister at that time called the act “a sordid act of international state backed terrorism” (Veitch, 2010, p. 6). Greenpeace was at that time protesting against the French conducting nuclear testing in the Pacific.

Having experienced the Rainbow Warrior incident, New Zealand understood the threats and possibilities of terrorism and was prepared to a certain degree but the findings from this study gave a different perspective. There was perhaps a possibility that New Zealand’s neutral political position had made them less of a risk or they had become complacent over the years believing that they were unlikely to be targeted by terrorism.
5.2. Political ideology and awareness of international politics

Several responses from participants created the need for this theme to be examined a little closer. A few sample responses have been appended below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>iv</th>
<th>What are you doing differently in terms of security, compared to when you have been involved with hosting other high profile events or guests?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>I have to be honest – New Zealand is ‘see what comes’ – they seem to be quite reactive. My experience in Australia, in Melbourne and Brisbane, Queensland – there’s always different government departments getting involved. There are off-site meetings being held by Victoria Tourism to tell you what’s going on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>xiv</th>
<th>What are your thoughts about this interview and thesis?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P6</td>
<td>I know that New Zealand is considered to be a pretty safe place and pretty far away from international politics but on the other hand it is very different at the moment and I don’t think there is anything that is safe from that aspect. The basic awareness of what could happen [is important]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P8</td>
<td>people don’t think that we will be targeted. That is not a concern I guess. Well, now that you have brought up a few things, It is very important [this research].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Savun and Phillips (2009) claim that ‘states that exhibit a certain type of foreign policy behaviour, regardless of their regime type, are likely to attract transnational terrorism’ (p. 878). New Zealand did not support the invasion of Iraq. Savun and Phillips believe that a country’s attraction as a terrorist target depended on their own foreign policies. As New Zealand was not supportive of the American led invasion of Iraq, it must place them at the lower end of the list of terrorist targets. This can be demonstrated by the fact that participants stated that they did not receive any specific security related requests from teams or fans staying at their properties. That would imply that guest were satisfied with the security provided and/or did not rate New Zealand as a high security risk.

A country’s collective political ideology or position could affect an individual’s personal position. New Zealand’s largely neutral stance could encourage its
citizens to believe that they were very low on the list of terrorist targets. That could be the reason participants seemed to claim that they had not given terrorism and security much thought. It was only because of this research that some claimed they were thinking about their situation and preparedness.

Pilat (2009) argues that countries should endeavour to study the ‘causes or roots’ of terrorism (p. 171). This will mean that they will have to look at their own policies and actions. Taking a purely reactionary stance would not be beneficial in the longer term. Understanding the cause could perhaps explain the reasons why only selected countries are targeted by terrorism.

Perception of ideology was also important as senior managers in hospitality needed to be aware of local and international developments that may place their guests at risk. Being aware of the international political situation could help them with their decision making process.

It is useful to note with regards to perception that the September 11th terrorist attack in the USA (9/11) occurred while the Labour government was the government in New Zealand. Soon after the attack, USA then under Republican President George W. Bush invaded Iraq with the help of UK and Australia claiming that the invasion was legal (BBC News, 2004b). The purpose of the mission was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and also to search for weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations strongly opposed the invasion as did many European countries (MacLeod & Wallace, 2003).

According to a report by Black and Watkins (2002) New Zealand’s Labour led government headed by the Right Honourable Helen Clark refused to participate in the invasion. There was international pressure for New Zealand to join the group but New Zealand refused stating that the reasons for invading Iraq were wrong (Houlahan, 2006). Any subsequent military involvement New Zealand had internationally was only as a peace keeping role.

A recent incident at Auckland Airport perhaps demonstrated how some New Zealanders perceived the serious issue of security. Reid (2011) reported that Benjamin Boyce, a New Zealand television presenter known for his comedy routines, dressed as an airline pilot to gain access to restricted areas of the
airport as a routine for a show they were filming. Aviation security around the world is generally taken very seriously and to attempt such a prank can be considered unwise. Prime Minister John key was apparently not amused. He said ‘It's irresponsible for a bunch of clowns who should know better. Quite frankly, we're in the middle of hosting a RWC and if these are people playing games, they need to grow up a bit’. Several people including Benjamin Boyce were charged for the prank. This incident demonstrated the relaxed attitude that some people in New Zealand had about security.

The American Marriott hotel brand, understanding their country’s political stand and the terrorists’ view of USA had become one of the most protected hotels in recent times. They had been attacked several times as noted in previous chapters. Marriott’s managers correctly assessed their risk and made decisions to act accordingly. They ensured that their property, staff and guest were protected at all times. A sizeable financial investment was required but they knew that they did not have any choice in the matter. Glynn (2005) argues that USA’s need for control makes them a target for terrorism. This confirmed that the political ideology affects every individual and business from that country.

There is a strong connection between the literature and findings. The findings show that the perception was that New Zealand was not at risk of a terrorist attack and the literature argued that a country’s foreign policy impacts on their exposure to terrorism. This perception that New Zealand was low risk for a terrorist target perhaps explained their laissez-faire attitude towards risk and security preparations.

5.3. ‘She’ll be right’ attitude.

A clear indication of a laissez-faire attitude towards security preparations is the reason why this theme is being explored. There is perhaps a possibility that this is part of New Zealand’s cultural identity. A sample of the participants’ comments has been listed to demonstrate their relaxed attitude.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>iv</th>
<th>What are you doing differently in terms of security, compared to when you have been involved with hosting other high profile events or guests?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>I have to be honest – New Zealand is ‘see what comes’ –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
they seem to be quite reactive. My experience in Australia, in Melbourne and Brisbane, Queensland – there’s always different government departments getting involved

I believe there is meant to be security but we are not doing anything different

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>xiv</th>
<th>What are your thoughts about this interview and thesis?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>I think it is useful, anything that makes people think is good. A lot of people get caught up with the day-to-day running of their business. I keep going back to this ‘she’ll be right’ I think we take that a bit too far. Formula One in Melbourne – we had armed guards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>iii</th>
<th>Do you plan to carry out any trial-runs?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>It is not necessary for us to try out. We just take it as part of our normal business</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Dann (2000) ‘the real reason for the poor performance of New Zealand companies is a culture of fear and a malaise of quality management’ (p. 3). In the article, he quoted risk management expert, Patrick Caragata who claimed that ‘too many companies still adopted the ‘she’ll be right’ attitude to problem solving’ (Dann, 2000, p. 3). This meant that companies and managers were not proactive, allowing issues to work out on their own. It is risky to have such attitudes in business but even more so when it comes to security issues. Most of the participants’ responses displayed the attitude that there was no need to over react and that everything would work out. P1 used the phrases ‘see what comes’ and ‘she’ll be right’ during the interview. P1, having worked for many years in Australia in a similar capacity felt that Australian security concerns seemed to be more serious possibly because Australia is reported to have terrorist sleeper cells in the thousands according to Kerbaj and Chulov (2007) who reported that Australia possesses ‘ideological sleeper cells’ (Kerbaj & Chulov, 2007). Sleeper cells are small groups of activists or terrorists working together as part of a larger political or resistance group. P1 felt that the security arrangement for the RWC was very different from the preparation for the
Formula One in Melbourne possibly for the same reasons mentioned by Kerbaj and Chulov (2007).

Some examples of a relaxed attitude are the fact that participants were not requesting for assistance from the relevant authorities when they could by right be demanding it. They did not even question the reasons behind being issued the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) guidelines only a few weeks prior to the beginning of the RWC. They would have realised that it was nearly impossible to adhere to the guidelines at short notice, yet they did not protest. They could perhaps also have tested their systems to identify any possible inadequacies where their security could be compromised, but they did not. Staff were likely to need prior training to ensure they would perform accordingly when required. These examples clearly demonstrate a very relaxed attitude towards security and terrorism in particular.

Insurance is also an issue. All participants claimed that their insurers had not increased their insurance, given them any special instructions pertaining to the RWC or denied them coverage due to the risk element. This was not the case in India. In the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi, India, insurance was a major issue. Lloyds of London refused to insure these Games according to Davies and Lamont (2010) stating the high risk factor. India had to eventually form a group of local Indian insurers to cover the Games. So, even the insurance providers did not believe that terrorists would target the RWC.

P2, when describing his property’s efforts to prepare for the RWC gave the impression that his property had been hosting VIPs for a long time, and he understood the security requirements. His response to whether he was carrying any trial-runs of his systems was, ‘it is not necessary for us to try out. We just take it as part of our normal business’. Clark (2004) warned that sporting events had been disrupted 168 times over a short 32 year period, yet despite this evidence, participants in this research stated that they did not intend to include any major security changes except to increase security guards during the RWC. Shellum (2003) claimed that terrorist groups have ‘switched its focus to soft targets such as hotel resort properties’ (p. 22). Therefore Shellum (2003) suggests that security be taken seriously. Cornwell and Roberts (2010) and Araña and León (2008) both claimed that there was a relationship between
terrorism and tourism and international travel had been severely impacted by terrorism.

Another example of the participants' relaxed attitude towards security would be their own vetting of staff and suppliers. If they took their responsibilities as innkeepers seriously, they would perhaps have taken the opportunity to protect their staff and guests.

Another example that supports the 'she'll be right attitude' is the plan to use the fire drill for all types of emergencies. This is worrying as different emergencies require different forms of actions or response.

For example in a fire, the alarm is raised and the relevant authorities would arrive within a few minutes and take control of the situation. Also the neighbouring properties and other witnesses / passers-by will assist in the interim. The situation is localised and the authorities will focus all their resources and effort on the affected property.

An earthquake usually involves more than just one building. In fact a large area will be affected and damaged. Therefore help from neighbours and witnesses may not be forthcoming immediately. Also the authorities will have to attend to several call outs, not just one. Therefore the property must be able to attend to their guests and their property on their own for the interim, until help arrives.

There are various forms of acts of terror that a hotel might encounter. Most involve an individual or group of attackers. With a bomb threat, an informant may contact the hotel by telephone to warn them that a bomb had been placed on their premises. A trained staff member would be able to handle the informant calmly, professionally and extract as much useful information from them as possible, while the hotel is being evacuated and the relevant authorities alerted. However, untrained staff members may treat the threat as a hoax and respond differently ending in a different outcome.

Another complex terrorist act would be a hostage situation where a single terrorist or a group of terrorist takes over a property as was the case in Mumbai in 2008; where terrorists took over the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi and
held the guests and staff hostage according to Magnier and Sharma (2008). The duration of this sort of situation is unknown. Staff would need to be trained so that they know what to expect and will be able to calm and guide their guests accordingly.

The *modus operandi* for a suicide bomber is to identify the location where they want to detonate their bomb; either the structurally weakest part of the building or the most crowded part, and detonate their bombs. They do not generally communicate or engage with anyone which means there is no warning before the event. With the case of the 2002 Bali bombings, Sheridan (2008) describes how the perpetrators detonated their bombs inside the crowded Paddy’s Pub. The first explosion forced the survivors to run onto the street outside the pub where a second bomb was detonated. While it is not easy to plan for suicide bombers, trained staff, that are vigilant may be able to identify them early and possibly take some evasive actions. Their training could also help them to manage the aftermath of the bombing, until the arrival of the relevant authorities.

Therefore, training just for one type of emergency is insufficient. Thinking that a fire drill can be applied to all types of crisis is flawed logic. While it is sensible to train for the most likely emergency, this type of training must not preclude other possible emergency situations including acts of terror. The frequency of acts of terrors could perhaps be used to encourage the industry to be better prepared for such crisis.

The literature confirmed a need to ensure that visitors would be convinced that the accommodation they were being provided was secure. It suggested that security was very important and had to be taken seriously. However, the responses from the participants seemed to suggest that they were not taking it very seriously. They do not deem security as important. The reason for this attitude could be that they did not believe that New Zealand was in danger of being attacked and they would rather take the risk and focus on their business. Being a sporting nation perhaps the adventurous, risk taking facet of the country was showing. As explained in section 4.6.2, in the Burt Munro (Fastest Indian) example, there was a clear laissez-faire attitude towards risk. The above
participants’ responses and hospitality examples demonstrated that risk was not a major factor in their decision making process.

It is clear that a relationship existed between the participant’s responses and the literature. There is a relaxed attitude in general and especially with regards to security. However, it must be noted that the laissez-faire attitude is not restricted to security alone. New Zealand businesses also experienced the same issues as described by Dann (2000).

5.4. Vetting of staff and suppliers

The reason for including the staff vetting process as one of the themes was because all the participants had similar responses. A sample of their responses is appended below. Managers were not conducting any vetting for their staff or suppliers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>vi</th>
<th>Describe your procedure for conducting security checks on all your staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>No Police checks – just the normal reference checks. Will only carry out checks if we have new staff members come on board. If we have the same team as now – No. We’ve vetted all our contactors. They work for the companies that are our preferred suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Not necessary for everybody. We do three reference checks on every person. With the police checks we may do but I can’t say we do for everybody. If they have filled in an application form and they indicate that they have got a criminal record – then that would lead us to think well maybe there is more to this</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>vii</th>
<th>Describe your procedure for vetting your suppliers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>We mainly use commercial suppliers – plumbing example – we use a commercial plumber – so it is not Joe Bloggs from Tawa who does residential. This is Plumber Supreme who are gas fitters. So they know the building. There is about 3 guys who come onsite and we know them. They have to sign in every time they take a key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>[Opening a new bar] We’ll be using Toops and no ..... we won’t be vetting them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P8</td>
<td>Pretty much our major supplier is Bidvest. They are the biggest supplier and we get all of our supplies from them. We do not vet them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cavanagh and Maila (2008), in their article ‘Doom service’ categorically stated the importance of vetting all staff and suppliers. Cetron (2006) agreed and declared that ‘by far the greatest risk of trouble comes from your staff and suppliers’ (Cetron, 2006, p. 33). Frewin (2004) described a case where proper security vetting of a staff was not carried out, which ended with the staff getting access to the House of Commons. The literature indicated support for security vetting of staff. Clement (2011) stated that the RWC required a large number of temporary staff.

However, almost all the participants in this research stated they did not vet their staff and suppliers. In contrast many other sectors, including volunteer roles in New Zealand require police checks to be carried out at the pre-employment or pre-engagement stage. The participants claimed that they conducted reference checks but the list of referees were provided by the candidates themselves. So the referees could be friends or family members who were willing to help the candidates. P4 said that they only carried out police checks when candidates, ‘filled in an application form and they indicate that they have got a criminal record’. People wanting a job may not be necessarily honest about their criminal history. P6 and P7 claimed that it was a requirement for the RWC and they were complying but they did not conduct police checks as a rule. The New Zealand Police Force website states that requests for vetting ‘are best made before the individual starts their employment, contract, or volunteer work with the organisation’ (New Zealand Police Force). Hotel staff come into direct contact with guests and their property so it is imperative that they are vetted and monitored. Hotel managers have an obligation towards their guests.

There could be several reasons for not vetting their staff:

1. High turnover in the industry
2. Lack of available skilled staff
3. Too time consuming
4. Cost of security vetting

According to Wiliams, Harris and Parker (2008), there is a high staff turnover and a shortage of skilled staff in the hospitality industry. Staff in the hospitality industry tend to move around frequently between jobs. Conducting the checks
could therefore end up being a costly waste of time. Managers may be afraid that they may lose skilled staff if they were to insist on police checks. Shortage of staff and the high turnover could be a major factor in their decision not to vet potential staff. The other issue could be the work involved with getting the vetting done, the time taken and the cost involved. All these could have been considerations that affected their decision not to vet their staff.

The President of the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (CTU), Helen Kelly, provided the following quote when approached about the Council’s position on vetting of staff.

'We don’t support the regular police checking of new employees. Employees can be asked on application about any specific criminal convictions if this is relevant to the position but the approach that employers could potentially have blanket access to any applicant’s records of any kind (medical, criminal, employment) is not necessary and oversteps the mark in regards to a person’s right to privacy. In regards to the RWC, the police approached us regarding a small group of hotel employees that would be working with VIPs visiting for the cup. It was agreed that a process of police checks would be undertaken that did not expose to the employer the information discovered. Police would check a group of staff and indicate a group that would be acceptable to work on VIP services. The group rejected would be much wider than any individual rejected on the basis of police concerns which would protect any person from identification. People could be able to move on from convictions and not have their economic futures continually blighted by them. Employers can have prejudices against convictions that may have little relevance to the type of employment and these should perhaps not be encouraged. Where a specific position requires a high level of responsibility for vulnerable people (e.g aged care, ECE etc) clearly police checks for relevance crimes are necessary’ (Kelly, 2011).

The Council’s position is based on the need for and importance of privacy and they agreed that checks could be conducted if it involved vulnerable people. Perhaps, hotels could also be considered under this category.

With the suppliers and contractors, the managers felt that they were dealing with reputable companies which would have vetted their staff. P1 summarised it well when he said that they did not hire ‘Joe Bloggs from Tawa who does residential’ when explaining his choice of plumbers. So the managers were assuming that their contractors and suppliers had done their work for them. P3 and P4 stated during their respective interviews that the suppliers would not be able to just drop off the goods and leave. One of the kitchen staff would have to
be present to check and receive the goods. The point is if the supplies had already been contaminated, it will not make any difference who received the goods. Most of the participants were making assumptions about the security vetting system employed by their suppliers and contractors. It is possible that these suppliers, like the hotels themselves, were not conducting any checks on their staff.

It becomes clear why there is a constant need to vet staff and suppliers when one considers the case of the 2009 Jakarta Mariott hotel bombing. The bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2009 according to Murdoch (2009b) was made possible because of extensive help from inside. While the person in that instance was not a hotel employee per se, he was a flower seller stationed in front of the hotel. He had been there for three years and knew the building and staff intimately. He was a contractor. He was able to advise and provide the bombers with absolutely accurate information.

There is a considerable difference in opinion between the literature, the CTU and the current vetting criteria. The literature suggests and supports security vetting for employees while the CTU is opposed to security vetting based on privacy and the participants in this research do not conduct any vetting unless required to. The fact remained that staff with crucial information about the hotel may be tempted to assist criminal or terrorists organisations. The fact that managers were not conducting security checks implied that they were either very trusting or had a laissez-faire attitude about the issue of security believing that terrorism would not affect New Zealand. This was in spite of the hotel managers having a legal and moral obligation to protect their guests.

5.5. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) food guidelines
While the study did not specifically set out to look for guidelines and checklists, one was noted. The reason for including it as an issue that required more in depth study was because only three of the eight participants discussed it. It is interesting that this checklist that was developed to protect against terrorism, especially food terrorism, was only being disseminated to selected properties. Three participants (P4, P6 and P7) commented about the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry’s (MAF) guidelines and checklist (Appendix 2). Two of the three (P6 and P7) said they had yet to read it. This topic is important to this
discussion of the New Zealand’s level of preparedness to host mega events and raises two questions:

- Why was it disseminated so late?
- Did all accommodation properties receive it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>vii</th>
<th>Describe your procedure for vetting your suppliers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P6</td>
<td>We have constant audits regarding food quality. I am not 100% sure these suppliers are vetted. We did receive some information from MAF. It is sitting on my table for me to go through.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P7</td>
<td>We have been requested to meet with and comply with Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and Police requirements over the food chain. They are coming in to audit that. [Received that notification] about 2 weeks ago</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yoon and Shanklin (2007) and Bruemmer (2003) explain the importance of preparing against food terrorism. Both papers describe the financial costs resulting from a food terrorist attack. Yoon and Shanklin also describe the steps taken in the USA to prevent food terrorism. The agencies involved in the USA are the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). They all have specific roles and the group devises strategies not just for one particular event but rather to be implemented as a standard to be used all year round.

The MAF food guidelines and checklist was a very useful, comprehensive and well thought out list of instructions for entities working with food. It would help to ensure food safety. The document was not about hygiene but instead about eliminating the possibility of food terrorism. One of the main roles of MAF was to oversee the biosecurity of the country according to the information on their website.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is charged with leadership of the New Zealand biosecurity system. This encompasses facilitating international trade, protecting the health of New Zealanders and ensuring the welfare of our environment, flora and fauna, marine life and Maori resources (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry).
That was the reason for MAF compiling the guidelines and checklist with input from the police and several other parties including the New Zealand Food Safety Authority (NZFSA).

The issue was not so much about who created the document (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2011) as opposed to the timing of the release. Bidding to host the RWC started in 2004 and on 18th November 2005, New Zealand was granted the privilege of hosting this mega event. The event was scheduled for 9th September 2011 to 23rd October 2011. New Zealand had between 18th November 2005 to 9th September 2011, a period of almost six years, to complete their planning and test the system. The guidelines and checklist by MAF was created in May 2011 and the first participants to mention it indicated that she only sighted it around 25th July 2011 which was about 47 days prior to the start of the RWC. The other two participants that mentioned the documents stated that they had received the checklist but had yet to read it due to time constraints. 47 days perhaps is insufficient to read and understand the document, appoint and train staff, implement, monitor and test the plan.

Perhaps a plausible explanation is that the authorities were unprepared. They had six years, yet they released the guidelines late. Perhaps the authorities did not believe that there was a real threat of food terrorism. Implementing the programme 12 months prior to the start of the RWC would have been more useful. The guidelines required suppliers, staff and supplies to be checked and monitored.

The government of the USA have its guidelines in place all year round because of their high terrorist threat level whereas in New Zealand they seem to be devised on an ad hoc basis since the threat is perceived to be much lower. Given that the literature about food terrorism support a more proactive stance, perhaps the New Zealand authorities could create a standard checklist for all food suppliers to adhere to all year round, instead of only at particular major events. That would make it a part of normal service just like food hygiene. It should to be a part of their food handling training.

The MAF guidelines require that staff and contractors be vetted and monitored but all eight participants claimed vetting was not a part of their normal process.
Participants made the following response when asked specifically about security checks for staff and contractors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Contractors</td>
<td>There’s been no check done on suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>When we hire them, we always call the references that they have provided. We don’t do police vetting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Contractors</td>
<td>We’ll be using Toops and no ..... we won’t be vetting them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>Contractors</td>
<td>Pretty much our major supplier is Bidvest. They are the biggest supplier and we get all of our supplies from them. We do not vet them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important issue relating to this guideline was that only three properties (P4, P6 and P7) made any mention about the guidelines and checklist. Even when they were specifically asked whether they received such a document, their responses were negative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Manager’s age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Management experience</th>
<th>Staff numbers</th>
<th>Rooms / Beds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>46 - 50</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18 years</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>176 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>31 - 35</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>&gt; 5 years</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>260 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>41 - 45</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>&gt; 6 years</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>140 rooms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Properties that received the MAF guidelines and checklist

While they had not read the MAF guidelines by the time they were interviewed for this research, it is understandable why P6 and P7 received them. They would be hosting teams and VIPs for the RWC. P4 however claimed that they would only be hosting supporters of various international teams. Table 6 lists properties that received the guidelines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Manager’s age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Management experience</th>
<th>Staff numbers</th>
<th>Rooms / Beds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>36 - 40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>55+</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>17 years</td>
<td>180 - 200</td>
<td>192 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>36 - 40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>20 - 25</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>8 months</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>220 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>26 - 30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>200 beds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Properties that did not discuss the MAF guidelines and checklist
Of the five properties that did not discuss the MAF guidelines (Table 7), two were hostels, one a service apartment, one a 3-star property and a large 192 room property that regularly hosts VIPs. It is possible that the four of the five (P1, P3, P5 and P8) were deemed as low risk. That still did not explain why P2 was omitted. Of the five, only P1 did not have a food and beverage outlet on site. All the others had restaurants and or pubs which were open to the public and in-house guests.

The guidelines were disseminated very late and only to a select few. The criterion for selection was unknown. There were no set patterns or easy explanations except that it was decided upon very late. It was also unknown why a standard set of guidelines that could be used all year round was not designed and disseminated to food suppliers and handlers. Perhaps the authorities do not want to appear as alarmist and cause unnecessary fear.

The literature highlighted the need to prepare against food terrorism and emphasised that the failure to do so could be detrimental. The financial costs would be considerable and the lack of preparation could damage the reputation of the country. It is perhaps likely that the delay in releasing the guidelines was due to the believe that terrorism was unlikely to affect New Zealand. Whereas, the level of preparedness in USA is very high due to their terrorism risk assessment.

5.6. Who is responsible for security?

A key part of this study is to discover who was responsible for security hence its inclusion for an in-depth discussion. There was reluctance by both - the government and individual hotels to accept responsibility probably due to the high costs and implications. A sample of the participant’s response is presented below in Table 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>xiii</th>
<th>Do you feel you are sufficiently prepared to host the Rugby World Cup?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Hoping the security at the bigger properties will act as a deterrent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>ix</th>
<th>Do you plan to keep the property open to the general public during the Rugby World Cup?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P7</td>
<td>No restriction. Again the security that is going to be here will be around the person involved and that would be dealt with by the Police. So we would be / may be required to secure the foyer at certain times depending on what they need</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>iv</th>
<th>What are you doing differently in terms of security, compared to when you have been involved with hosting other high profile events or guests?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>P7</td>
<td>No. we are not going to have any guards at all. We are well aware of the fact that the Police and the other departments and agencies that are surrounding and covering off security for the city and delegates that are coming here are going to be dealing with that. We provide the features - like there are security on the floor, there are security in the lifts. They can’t gain access without authority and we’ll adhere to any requirements that we are required to adhere to within reason</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Security responsibility

Most participants insist that they had not had much contact with the authorities regarding security issues. The interviews specifically asked them whether they had any advice or assistance from the Police, Hospitality Association of New Zealand (HANZ), their respective local councils, their insurers and even other accommodation properties. All except for P6 and P7 responded negatively. P6 and P7 have throughout their interviews mentioned their relationship with the Police. However, they also agreed that they did not have contact with HANZ, local councils, their insurers or other properties. P3 stated in the interview, ‘I take it that everybody is just doing their own thing and organising their own details regarding RWC’. While this may be true, what was the reason behind this behaviour? Or was it possible that they were all hoping that someone else was taking care of security and the hotel’s interests lay only on the business aspect. P1 supported this notion when he said, ‘hoping the security at the bigger properties will act as a deterrent’. Many had similar responses, hoping that someone else or the authorities would be taking care of security.

A possible explanation for this behaviour could be that again assumptions were being made that someone, quite possibly the authorities, would take the lead and oversee all security matters. Also properties seemed to be more engrossed with the business aspect of the RWC. It is a rare opportunity for some extra
earnings and they did not want to miss that opportunity. Another reason for the lack of interest was the cost factor. Security could cost a huge amount and the returns were not necessarily tangible so justifying it became quite difficult. The extra costs negatively affected profits. Another explanation for not providing more security was the lack of knowledge. Properties may not have known where to start.

Groenenboom and Jones (2003), Burton (2005), Kwai (2008) and Ronan (1993) argued that hotels must provide security and protect their guests. Groenenboom and Jones (2003) stated that, ‘security procedures have to be incorporated in the running of the hotel, and not developed after the hotel experienced problems’ (Groenenboom & Jones, 2003, p. 17). Burton (2005) claimed that ‘beyond the obvious necessity of protecting guests and employees, taking pre-emptive security measures is emerging as a corporate legal imperative, and failure to do so opens companies up to the possibility of damaging litigation’ (Burton, 2005, p. 28). That meant that hotels had to take the responsibility to ensure the safety of their guests and they had a legal obligation to do so. However properties such as P1 were ‘hoping the security at the bigger properties will act as a deterrent’ and P7 who stated that ‘the security that is going to be here will be around the person involved and that would be dealt with by the Police’ may perhaps have to consider providing some security arrangements themselves. In explaining the lawsuit brought against Hilton hotel by the victims’ families due to an attack on the hotel in Taba City, Egypt, Aronson (2006) demonstrated that the perception was that hotels were liable and responsible for their guest’s safety.

The authorities could perhaps take the lead in protecting the country’s borders and local environment, but they must also provide all necessary advice, assistance and incentives to individual properties. The responsibility could not be passed on. Studying the interview transcripts, P1 was largely hoping that the other bigger properties surrounding their property would have sufficient security that would deter any terrorist attack. P7, one of the properties that would host VIPs, was depending on the authorities to ensure that security was addressed. The police could very well only provide precinct level security and not at the individual property level. An analogy can be drawn between one’s own house
and a hotel. Even at the individual household level, each occupant had his or her own security arrangements, with an alarm, a guard dog, neighbourhood watch groups or by using the services of a security firm. The Police only patrol the streets; they do not get involved in the security arrangements of individual properties. It is no different for these accommodation properties. The responsibilities within the boundaries of the property belonged solely to the owners and operators and the literature clearly supports this position.

A hotel manager’s underlying belief in the importance of security is also critical. At the household level, if there had been a recent spate of burglaries in the neighbourhood, there was more likelihood that all of the houses in the area would increase or upgrade their security. If they deemed that their area was safe or if an embassy with high security was a few doors from their house, they were unlikely to spend too much on security. They would depend on or hope that the security overflow from the embassy would act as a deterrent. If hoteliers believed that terrorism were a possibility, they would make more of an effort to protect themselves.

This explanation is valid for properties as a whole, but the reasons for the inactions of HANZ, local councils and insurance companies are unknown. They were after all also major stakeholders. Possible explanations could be that they lacked funds, did not believe that a terrorism threat existed, believed that it was not their responsibility or that the responsibility should be borne solely by the central government or the property owners.

5.7. Conclusion

The attitudes towards terrorism vary considerably depending on the individual and the country’s previous experiences and the country’s political ideology. These few factors shape the thinking and behaviour of the population. In an article about security, Marshall (2004) concluded that ‘New Zealand and its neighbours are not immune from the new generation of security threats, including international terrorism’ (Marshall, 2004, p. 50). Businesses such as accommodation properties considered these factors when making risk assessments and decisions about their security levels.
The serious issues for consideration were the laissez-faire attitudes of the hotel managers who seemed to be more reactive than proactive, the late dissemination of the MAF guidelines seemed to be an afterthought and lack of security vetting for staff and suppliers was making the industry a soft target at a time when other sectors were tightening their security. The attractiveness of the industry as a terrorist target would not decrease so it is the responsibility of the industry to make efforts to deter possible threats. Owners could perhaps fortify their properties and engage and demand that the government provided all other necessary assistance and infrastructure to ensure the safety of the industry. Properties large or small must not be left to protect themselves. The industry must understand that security is everyone’s business and it cannot be left to one organisation alone to handle. All stakeholders had a role and they could perhaps engage with each other to ensure safety.

5.7.1. Key theme – laissez-faire

One of the key themes to emerge and underpin this study was the laissez-faire management style and attitude of New Zealanders. It was certainly not the fault of the individual managers since it was evident in all the participants’ responses and even with the other interacting parties such as the Police, MAF, HANZ and Councils. It was perhaps possible that this was more a cultural issue affecting New Zealanders as a whole.

Transferring the Hofstede cultural dimension model to the hospitality industry is straightforward except that the hotels were in one country, practising a certain kind of culture while the guests were from other countries practising a variety of different cultures. Therefore managing the guests’ expectations would be somewhat complex. For example, not all guests will be satisfied with sub-standard security arrangements. Therefore it was safe to conclude that the culture of any country has an impact on how the public and private sector organisations are managed.

The case of Burt Munro and the fastest Indian demonstrated perhaps the New Zealanders’ ingenious mentality, invincibility and belief that even if the odds were against them, everything would work out eventually. Perhaps some of New Zealand’s successes in various fields could be attributed to this laissez-

faire attitude that everything would work out in their favour. They did not place unnecessary pressure on themselves to perform. Munro’s love for racing and not being concerned about the risks explained the ‘it won’t happen to me’ attitude discussed by McKenna (1993). Racing a custom made motorcycle at high speeds was highly dangerous and Munro could have ended up hurt or even dead.

It is possible to conclude that the laissez-faire attitude and ‘it won’t happen to me’ belief could have perhaps influenced the hospitality industry and even the authorities with regards to the possibility of a terrorist attack.
6. Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendation

‘There is no substitute for face-to-face reporting and research’
~ Thomas Friedman ~

6.1. Terrorism

Terrorism is defined by the US Department of State (2011 sec. 2656f(d)2) as 'premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents'.

Non-combatants may expect a certain level of security where they could go about their daily lives without having to worry about being caught in the middle of a terrorist act and the primary purpose of this research was to find out whether the hospitality industry in New Zealand provided that sense of security.

The focus of this study was not so much whether a terrorist act was a possibility in New Zealand but that the country was prepared for any eventuality. To encourage tourism, the industry must assure visitors that they were doing everything possible to stave off terrorism. Acts of terror were very different from Acts of God. With terrorism, preparation was possible but an earthquake for example is unpredictable to a certain extent.

6.2. State of preparedness

This research raised several areas of concern which the industry as a whole may want to reflect on. They are:

6.2.1. Security vetting process

It is evident from the findings and discussion that security vetting was not part of the pre-employment process in New Zealand. Even the New Zealand Council of Trade Union argued against vetting for fear that those with a criminal past and who had been sufficiently punished, would be severely disadvantaged. However, the Union supported vetting for staff who were working with the vulnerable in society, referring to the elderly and the very young. Perhaps that list could be expanded to include visitors to New Zealand. They too are
vulnerable since some may perhaps did not know their way around the country or speak English.

6.2.2. Laissez-faire attitude towards security

A demonstration of this attitude was the display of ‘she’ll be right’ and the lack of support from the authorities. While efforts were made to prevent food terrorism, the guidelines were not created and disseminated far enough in advance. This affected the chances of properties properly implementing the guidelines. Some of the participants had not received the guidelines and while two said they received it, they did not have the time to read it through.

A large number of participants were not contacted by the police or any of the other authorities. Yet they did not try and contact the authorities themselves to request assistance and guidance. Perhaps they assumed that if security was a major issue, the authorities would have contacted them.

Some of the participants stated that they were hoping that security at the larger properties would act as a deterrent and protect them. Others were expecting the police to oversee their security arrangements. Either way, the security efforts did not seem properly coordinated. There seemed to be an over reliance on someone else handling security matters.

The literature suggested that hospitality owners took responsibility for their own security arrangements. They had a legal and moral obligation to serve and protect their guests. However, other stakeholders also had a role.

This laissez-faire attitude was according to Hofstede (1984) caused by one of the cultural dimensions of the country. Some countries accepted certain levels of risk.

6.3. Important lessons

The main points to take from this research are that better planning, communication and coordination are required. With regards to security, while individual property owners could be encouraged to take charge of their security arrangements, the authorities must supervise the process and offer all possible assistance, guidance and advice.
6.3.1. Management implications

From a management perspective, the laissez-faire attitude and ‘it won’t happen to me’ belief could create negative outcomes. Management would be forced to be constantly vigilant. Hotels must not expose their guests to unnecessary risks. They have to find a compromise where risks are routinely assessed and mitigated to an acceptable level and where managers would still be allowed to offer a genuine ‘Kiwi’ welcome.

6.4. Recommendation

It is important that in any research, that while the study provides some solutions to problems, it must more importantly create more questions. To that end, this research has achieved that.

It is recommended that since this was only an exploratory study, a larger, more comprehensive study be carried out to ascertain the level of security in the hospitality industry.

Some of the areas it could focus on are:

- attitudes towards security
- the need for security vetting
- role and responsibilities of government agencies
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Safety and security concerns
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Rugby World Cup (RWC) security
Chapman, 2010; Dudding, 2010; Marshall, 2010; McRoberts, 2010; Vass, 2010;

Political ideology
Glynn, 2005; Laqueur, 2004; Murdoch, 2009; Savun & Phillips, 2009;

Risk sensitivity
McKenna, 1993; Hofstede, 1984; White & Shullman, 2010

Appendix 1: Literature Guide
Disclaimer
While every effort has been made to ensure the information in this publication is accurate, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) does not accept any responsibility or liability for error of fact, omission, interpretation or opinion that may be present, nor for the consequences of any decisions based on this information. Any view or opinion expressed does not necessarily represent the view of MAF.

Acknowledgement
The information contained in this document draws inspiration from the work done by the World Health Organization and the United States Food and Drug Administration in the area of preventing intentional contamination of food. More information about this topic can be found on their websites:
World Health Organization http://www.who.int/fuodsafety
United States Food and Drug Administration http://www.fda.govlFoodlFoodDefense/default.htm


Emergency point of contact
If a retail food store or food service establishment operator suspects that any of their products have been subject to tampering or other malicious, criminally motivated action, they should notify their local police immediately. Ensure MAF is also updated by phoning the freephone on 0800 NZFSA1 (0800 693721 ).
Contents

MAF food chain safety and security guidance for retail and food service sector 1

Introduction 1

Background 1

Implementation 2
  A. Management 2
  B. Human element – staff 3
  C. Human element – public 5
  D. Facility 5
  E. Operations 6

Emergency point of contact 8

Appendix: Food Chain safety and security Self Assessment tool for food service establishment 9
MAF food chain safety and security guidance for retail and food service sector

INTRODUCTION

While it doesn't happen often in New Zealand, food is occasionally intentionally contaminated with the aim of harming the consumer, the company or drawing attention to a particular issue.

Although there is no indication the rate would increase Food businesses need to know how to prevent tampering with their products and how to stay vigilant for any signs of intentional contamination.

With the Rugby World Cup 2011 being hosted by New Zealand and the expected arrival of an unprecedented number of international fans, 20 teams and their support personnel as well as visiting dignitaries, it is especially important that food businesses know how to prevent their products from being the target of intentional contamination.

Some 2500 international media are predicted to visit here for the event, so news of any incidents of tampering or contamination has the potential to make headlines around the world and have a negative impact on our future as a tourism destination.

This guidance document identifies preventive measures which food service establishments can take to minimise the risk that food under their control is subject to tampering or other malicious or criminally motivated contamination.

It can be used by operators of a wide range of food service establishments, including hotels, caterers, bars, cafeterias, mobile food carts, and restaurants.

BACKGROUND

In New Zealand, businesses that sell food for human consumption are required to provide safe and suitable food under the Food Act 1981.

With a high-profile event such as the Rugby World Cup 2011 being held in New Zealand, Police and MAF are encouraging operators to review the systems they have in place to deter anyone from tampering with their food.

This guidance document is designed to focus operators' attention on each segment of the food delivery system that is within their control, in order to minimise the risk of tampering or other criminal action at each segment.

Both management and staff must be committed to implementing enhanced preventive measures in order to be successful. Accordingly, MAF recommends that both management and staff participate in the development and review of such measures.

Not all of the guidance contained in this document may be appropriate or practical for every food service establishment, particularly smaller facilities. MAF recommends that operators review the guidance in each section that relates to a component of their operation, and assess which preventive measures are suitable.

MAF also recommends the use of a relevant food safety programme to complement any food security arrangements. Such a programme ensures the basics of food safety are systematically
implemented. Further information on a Food Control Plan for food service operators is available online at www.foodsafety.govt.nz by searching for Food Control Plan in the e-library. You can also contact your local council Environmental Health Officer for more information.

It is important to note that this document does not establish legally enforceable responsibilities. Instead, it should be viewed as good practice recommendations, unless specific regulatory or statutory requirements are cited.

However, if a business adheres to these guidelines, it might be able to demonstrate that reasonable precautions have been taken to prevent intentional contamination. If food did become contaminated and harm customers, such measures may also offer the business some defence against allegations that they have acted less than responsibly.

IMPLEMENTATION

The information contained in this section is intended to get your business started on developing a food chain safety and security strategy. Depending on the scale and extent of your operation, not all that is outlined may apply to your business, but may still serve as suggestions to get you thinking about possible avenues where food could become intentionally contaminated.

A. Management

1. Preparing for the possibility of tampering or other malicious or criminal action that may involve food

   • Assign responsibility for security to knowledgeable individual(s).
   • Conduct an initial assessment of food security procedures and operations, and keep it confidential
   • Have a crisis management plan to prepare for and respond to tampering and other malicious or criminal actions, both threats and actual events, including identifying, segregating and securing affected product.
   • Plan for emergency evacuation, including how to prevent security breaches during evacuation.
   • Make management aware of 24-hour contact information for local police/fire/health.
   • Make staff aware of whom in management they should alert about potential security problems (24-hour contacts).
   • Promote food security awareness to encourage all staff to be alert to any signs of tampering or other malicious, criminally motivated actions or areas that may be vulnerable to such actions. Encourage them to report any findings to identified management (for example, providing training, instituting a system of rewards, building security into job performance standards).
   • Have an internal communication system to inform and update staff about relevant security issues.
   • Have a plan for communicating with the public (for example, identifying a media spokesperson, preparing generic press statements and background information, and co-ordinating press statements with appropriate authorities).
2. **Supervision**

- Provide an appropriate level of supervision to all staff, including cleaning and maintenance staff, contract workers, data entry and computer support staff, and especially - new staff. This could be aimed at the supervisor on duty, periodic unannounced visits by supervisor, daily visits by supervisor, two staff on duty at the same time, monitored video cameras, and off-line review of video tapes, one-way and two-way windows, and customer feedback to supervisor, of unusual or suspicious behaviour by staff.

- Conduct routine security checks (at a frequency appropriate to the operation) of the premises - including utilities and critical computer data - for signs of tampering or malicious, criminally motivated actions or areas that may be vulnerable to such actions.

3. **Investigation of suspicious activity**

- Investigate threats or information about signs of tampering or other malicious or criminal actions.

- Alert appropriate law enforcement and public health authorities about any threats of or suspected tampering or other malicious or criminal actions.

4. **Evaluation program**

- Evaluate the lessons learned from past tampering or other malicious, criminally motivated actions and threats.

- Review and verify, at least annually, the effectiveness of the security management program, for example, using knowledgeable in-house or third party staff to conduct tampering or other malicious or criminal action exercises and to challenge computer security systems. Revise the program accordingly and keep this information confidential.

- Perform random food security inspections of all appropriate areas of the facility (including receiving and warehousing, where applicable) using knowledgeable in-house or third party staff, and keep this information confidential.

- Verify that security contractors are doing an appropriate job, when applicable.

**B. Human element - staff**

1. **Screening (pre-hiring, at hiring, post-hiring)**

   - Examine the background of all staff (including seasonal, temporary, contract, and volunteer staff: whether hired directly or through a recruitment firm) as appropriate to their position, considering candidates’ access to sensitive areas of the facility and the degree to which they will be supervised and other relevant factors (for example, obtaining and verifying work references, addresses, and phone numbers).

2. **Daily work assignments**

   - Know who is and who should be on premises and where they should be located for each shift, and keep this information updated.

3. **Identification**

   - Establish a system of positive identification and recognition that is appropriate to the nature of the workforce (for example, issuing uniforms, name tags or photo identification)
badges with individual control numbers, colour coded by area of authorised access) when appropriate.

- Collect the uniforms, name tag, or identification badge when a staff member is no longer associated with the business.

4. Restricted access
- Identify staff requiring unlimited access to all areas of the facility.
- Reassess levels of access for all staff periodically.
- Limit staff access to non-public areas so staff enter only those areas necessary for their job functions and only during appropriate work hours (for example, using key cards or keyed or cipher locks for entry to sensitive areas).
- Change combinations, rekey locks and/or collect the retired key card when a staff member who is in possession of these is no longer associated with the business, and as needed to maintain security.

5. Personal items
- Restrict the type of personal items allowed in non-public areas of the establishment.
- Only allow staff to bring those personal use medicines that are necessary for the health of staff and ensure that these personal use medicines are properly labelled and stored away from stored food and food preparation areas.
- Prevent staff from bringing personal items (for example, lunch containers and bags) into non-public food preparation or storage areas.

6. Training in food security procedures
- Incorporate security awareness in the training programs for food staff including information on how to prevent, detect, and respond to tampering or other malicious, criminally motivated actions or threats. Ensure seasonal temporary, contract, and volunteer staff are also trained in these procedures.
- Provide periodic reminders of the importance of security procedures (for example, scheduling meetings and providing guidance material).
- Encourage staff support (for example, involving staff in food security planning and the food security awareness program, demonstrating the importance of security procedures to the staff).

7. Unusual behaviour
- Watch for unusual or suspicious behaviour by staff. This could be staff who, without an identifiable purpose, stay unusually late after the end of their shift, arrive unusually early, access files/information/areas of the facility outside of the areas of their responsibility, remove documents from the facility, ask questions on sensitive subjects, or bring cameras to work.

B. Staff health
- Be on alert for atypical staff health conditions that staff may voluntarily report and absences that could be an early indicator of tampering or other malicious, criminally motivated actions (for example, an unusual number of staff who work in the same part of
the facility reporting similar symptoms within a short time frame), and report such conditions to local health authorities.

C. Human element - public

1. Customers
   • Prevent access to food preparation, storage and dishwashing areas in the non-public areas of the establishment, including loading docks.
   • Monitor public areas, including entrances to public restrooms (for example, using security guards, monitored video cameras, placement of employee workstations for optimum visibility) for unusual or suspicious activity (for example, a customer returning a product to the shelf that he/she brought into the store or spending an unusual amount of time in one area of the store).
   • Monitor the serving or display of foods in self-service areas, such as salad bars, condiments, open bulk containers, produce and bread display areas.

2. Visitors, including contractors, sales representatives, delivery drivers, couriers, pest control representatives, third-party auditors, regulators, reporters, tours
   • Restrict entry to the non-public areas of the establishment (for example, checking visitors in and out before entering the non-public areas, requiring proof of identity, issuing visitors badges that are collected upon departure, accompanying visitors).
   • Ensure there is a valid reason for all visits to the non-public areas of the establishment before providing access to the facility, and beware of unsolicited visitors.
   • Verify the identity of unknown visitors to non-public areas of the establishment.
   • Inspect incoming and outgoing packages and briefcases in the non-public areas of the establishment for suspicious, inappropriate or unusual items to the extent practical.

D. Facility

1. Physical security
   • Protect non-public perimeter access with fencing or other deterrent when appropriate.
   • Secure doors to the extent possible, including freight loading doors (when not in use and not being monitored), emergency exits, windows, roof openings/hatches, vent openings, ventilation systems, utility rooms, ice manufacturing and storage rooms, and bulk storage tanks for liquids, solids, and compressed gases.
   • Minimise the number of entrances to non-public areas.
   • Account for all keys to the establishment (for example, assigning responsibility for issuing, tracking, and retrieving keys).
   • Monitor the security of the premises using appropriate methods (for example, using security patrols and monitored video surveillance).
   • Minimise, to the extent practical, places in public areas where an intruder could remain unseen after work hours.
   • Minimise, to the extent practical, places in non-public areas that can be used to temporarily hide intentional contaminants (for example, minimising nooks and crannies and false ceilings).
• Provide adequate interior and exterior lighting, including emergency lighting, where appropriate, to facilitate detection of suspicious or unusual activities.

• Implement a system of controlling vehicles authorised to park in the non-public parking areas (for example, using placards, decals, key cards, keyed or cipher locks, issuing passes for specific areas and times for visitors’ vehicles).

• Where practical, keep customer, employee, and visitor parking areas separated from entrances to non-public areas.

2. Storage and use of poisonous and toxic chemicals (such as cleaning and sanitising agents, and pesticides) in non-public areas

• Only store chemicals that are required for the operation and maintenance of the facility and those that are being stored or displayed for retail sale.

• Store chemicals as far away from food handling and storage areas as practical.

• Limit access to storage areas for chemicals that are not being held for retail sale (for example, using keyed or cipher locks, or key cards).

• Ensure that chemicals are properly labelled.

• Use appropriate pest management procedures (for example, maintaining rodent bait that is in use in covered, tamper-resistant bait stations).

• Know what chemicals should be on the premises and monitor use of them during routine stock takes.

• Investigate missing stock or other irregularities outside a normal range of variation and alert appropriate authorities about unresolved problems when appropriate.

E. Operations

1. Incoming products

• Use only known and appropriately licensed or registered suppliers for all incoming products.

• Inform suppliers, distributors, and transporters about food security procedures.

• Take steps to ensure that delivery vehicles are appropriately secured.

• Request that transporters have the capability to verify the location of the load at any time when practical.

• Establish delivery schedules, do not accept unexplained, unscheduled deliveries or drivers, and investigate delayed or missing shipments.

• Supervise off-loading of incoming materials, including off-hour deliveries.

• Reconcile the product and amount received, with the product and amount ordered. Check against product and amount listed on the invoice and shipping documents, taking into account any sampling performed prior to receipt.

• Inspect when appropriate, incoming products and product returns for signs of tampering, contamination, or damage (for example, abnormal powders, liquids, stains, or odours, evidence of resealing, compromised tamper-evident packaging) or "counterfeiting" (for example, inappropriate or mismatched product identity, labelling, product lot coding or
specifications, absence of tamper-evident packaging when the label contains a tamper evident notice).

• Reject suspect food.
• Alert appropriate authorities to evidence of tampering, counterfeiting, or other malicious, criminally motivated action.

3. Storage

• Have a system for receiving, storing, and handling distressed, damaged and returned products, and products left at checkout counters, which minimises their potential for being compromised (for example, obtaining the reason for return and requiring proof of identity of the individual returning the product, examining returned or abandoned items for signs of tampering, not reselling returned or abandoned products).
• Keep track of incoming products, materials in use, salvage products, and returned products.
• Investigate missing or extra stock and other irregularities outside a normal range of variability. Report unresolved problems to appropriate authorities when appropriate.
• Minimise reuse of containers, shipping packages and cartons where practical.

4. Food service and retail display

• Display products for retail sale in a location where they can be easily monitored (for example, visible by staff at their work stations, windows, video monitoring).
• Periodically check products displayed for retail sale, for evidence of tampering or other malicious, criminally motivated action to the extent practical (for example, checking for off-condition appearance).
• Monitor self-service areas (for example, salad bars, condiments, open bulk containers, produce and bread display areas) for evidence of tampering or other malicious, criminally motivated action.

5. Security of water and utilities

• Limit access to controls for airflow, water, electricity, and refrigeration, to the extent practical.
• Secure non-council water reservoirs, storage, and handling facilities.
• Ensure that water systems and trucks are equipped with backflow prevention.
• If using non-council sources, test for potability regularly, as well as randomly, and be alert to changes in the profile of the results.
• Chlorinate non-council water systems and monitor chlorination equipment and chlorine levels.
• Stay attentive to the potential for media alerts about public water provider problems when applicable.
• Identify alternate sources of potable water for use during emergency situations where normal water systems have been compromised (for example, trucking from an approved source, treating on-site or maintaining on-site storage).
6. Mail/packages

- Implement procedures to ensure the security of incoming mail and packages.

7. Access to computer systems

- Restrict access to critical computer data systems to those with appropriate clearance (for example, using passwords, firewalls).
- Eliminate computer access when a staff member is no longer associated with the establishment.
- Establish a system of traceability of computer transactions.
- Review the adequacy of virus protection systems and procedures for backing up critical computer-based data systems.
- Validate the computer security system.

EMERGENCY POINT OF CONTACT

If a retail food store or food service establishment operator suspects that any of their products have been subject to tampering or other malicious, criminally motivated action, they should notify their local police immediately. Ensure MAF is also updated by phoning the freephone on 0800 NZFSA1 (0800693721).
Appendix: Food Chain safety and security Self Assessment tool for food service establishments

The checklist below provides a guide for businesses to review their current systems. It may identify areas that need improvement or confirm that current systems are sufficient to mitigate any potential risk. Businesses should keep findings in perspective in relation to the potential threat opportunity and realistic intent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of business</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Yes / No / NA</th>
<th>Manager Signed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consider if there are any current factors that may increase the business risk of food tampering or malicious activity, e.g. hosting an international event or increase in local threat level, nature of clientele</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assign a responsible person to oversee this area of security, make them aware of who to contact</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct initial assessment of food security procedures across operations</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Have a plan in place if signs of breaches of food security are found</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Review emergency evacuation plan in relation to food security</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Make staff aware of the food security procedures</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigating suspicious activity</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Yes / No / NA</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigate threats or information relating to tampering or malicious activity</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<td>Notify the appropriate authority, e.g. Police, MAF</td>
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<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Yes / No / NA</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review procedures at least annually to check effectiveness of procedures</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perform random inspections periodically of all facilities</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Yes / No / NA</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Know which staff should be on duty and what areas they should be in for each shift you operate</td>
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<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keep information up to date</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have a system of identification for your staff. Make sure the system is not transferable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Make sure security passes and IDs are returned once a staff member has left. Change combinations, rekey locks, and delete computer access if required</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keep a record of who has access to what security codes, secured areas</td>
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<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<td>Reassess access periodically for all staff and limit access as necessary dependent on job functions</td>
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<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitor unusual or suspicious behaviour and report as necessary</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspect outgoing goods</td>
<td>☑/ ☑/ ☑</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Yes / No /NA</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Personal items</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Discourage staff from bringing personal items into the work area</td>
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<td>Keep a record of staff who are ill or on medication, and record type of medication and where it is kept</td>
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<td>Keep all areas tidy and only store items and equipment that you need</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporate food security awareness in staff training</td>
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<td>Provide periodic reminders of food security</td>
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<td>Encourage staff feedback of improvements to current procedures</td>
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<td><strong>Customers/visitors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevent public access to food preparation, storage and dishwashing areas including delivery areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verify the identity of unknown visitors in non-public areas</td>
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<td><strong>Security of premises</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimise entrances to non-public areas</td>
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<td>Monitor security of premises using appropriate methods</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide adequate interior and exterior lighting including emergency lighting to allow detection of suspicious or unusual activity</td>
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<td>Keep non-public parking separated from public and keep a record of what vehicles should be parked there</td>
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<td><strong>Incoming goods</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Use only approved suppliers to source all incoming goods</td>
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<td>Check that delivery vehicles have taken steps for appropriate security</td>
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<td>Establish delivery schedules. Do not accept unscheduled deliveries or suspect goods and investigate variation to schedule or delivery personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspect incoming goods and documentation; investigate any variations to schedules</td>
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<td><strong>Storage</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Have a robust stock control system, monitoring incoming goods, stock rotation, returned product</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keep chemicals separate from food and limit access to only appropriate staff</td>
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<td>Investigate missing or extra stock and report discrepancies as necessary</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Food service and retail display</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Check products on display for evidence of tampering or malicious activity</td>
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<td>Monitor public areas for unusual or suspicious activity including service or self-service areas</td>
<td>☐ / ☐ / ☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to computer systems</td>
<td>Yes / No /NA</td>
<td>Manager Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restrict access to computer systems and data to those with appropriate clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop and check systems for monitoring computer usage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Check systems for virus protection and backing up</td>
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Appendix 3: ‘She’ll be right’ lyrics

She'll Be Right

Peter Cape (1955)

When you're huntin' in the mountains and your dogs put up a chase,
And this porker's comin' at you and he doesn't like your face
And you're runnin', and he's runnin', and he's crowdin' on the pace,
Well don't worry mate, she'll be right,
She'll be right, mate, she'll be right.
Don't worry mate, she'll be right.
You c'n get y' feed of pork when he slows down to a walk,
So(And) don't worry mate, she'll be right.

Now you're loggin' on the saddle and you're drivin' down the bluff
With a thousand feet of timber bouncin' right behind your chuff,
And the clutch has started slippin', and the brakes are worse than rough,
Well don't worry mate, she'll be right. She'll be right mate...
Give 'er all you can give 'er, she'll just fly into the river,
So don't worry mate, she'll be right.

Well they've finished off yer forwards, and yer backs are wearin' thin,
And the second spell's half over and you've forty points to win,
And this hulkin' wing-three-quarter's got his teeth stuck in your shin,
Well don't worry mate, she'll be right. She'll be right mate...
You won't worry who's the loser when you meet down at the boozer,
So don't worry mate, she'll be right.

When you've had yer copper goin', and you've boiled a ton'a hops,
And you've brewed your brew and bottled 'er and hammered on the tops,
And your missus keeps on askin' where y' left your footie socks,
Well don't worry mate, she'll be right. She'll be right mate...
Shove a shot o' metho in and you'll swear you're drinkin' gin...
And don't worry mate, she'll be right.

Now you've slipped out on the missus, and you've gone to watch the race,
And you've spent her shoppin' money, and you didn't get a place,
And you're comin' home flat stoney, and she sees it on your face,
Well don't worry mate, she'll be right. She'll be right mate...
You can save a lot of trouble if you say you won the double,
So don't worry mate, she'll be right.
Appendix 4: Indicative questions

Introduction

Questions regarding the property
i. Describe this property (e.g. age of the property, number of rooms, etc)
ii. What is your staff strength?
iii. How often do you get VIP guests staying here?

Questions regarding the management and staff
i. How long have you worked at this hotel?
ii. How long have you worked as a senior manager in hospitality?
iii. How many times have you been involved with events of this size and nature?
iv. Have any of your staff been involved with events of this size and nature?

1. Security preparation

i. What are you doing differently in terms of security, compared to when you have been involved with hosting other high profile events or guests (e.g. conferences, providing accommodation for VIPs)?

ii. Describe the training that your staff have undergone in preparation for the RWC?

iii. If you have increased your security staff or are planning on using private security companies to assist you during the RWC, explain your reasoning.

iv. Describe your procedure for conducting security checks on all your staff (existing staff, part-time staff, contractors etc)?

v. If you have appointed a dedicated manager to oversee all the preparations for the RWC, what was your reasoning for this?

vi. Describe your procedure for vetting of all your suppliers (e.g. fresh food).

vii. Describe the kinds of security requests that participating teams have put to you as a condition of their team using your facilities.

viii. How do you plan to keep the property open to the general public while hosting participating teams.
ix. Describe your standard operating procedures for emergencies.
x. Describe any structural changes (if any) that you had to make specially for the RWC.

2. Guidance and support from the authorities / associations

Describe the nature of any support from the following organisations?

i. New Zealand Police Force
ii. Hospitality Association of New Zealand (HANZ)
iii. Local Councils
iv. Insurers
v. Other accommodation properties

3. Policy and manuals

i. Explain your property’s policy with regards to terrorist threats / attacks.

ii. Describe your standard operating procedures for a terrorist event. Who helped you put these procedures in place? Was it done specifically for the RWC?

4. Insurers

i. If you increased your insurance for this event, was it easy to get the extra insurance? Were your insurers willing to increase and how did it affect your premiums?

ii. What (if any) specific instructions did your insurers give you with regards to the RWC?

Conclusion

i. Do you feel you are sufficiently prepared to host the RWC?
ii. What are your thoughts about this interview and thesis?
iii. Do you have any more information to add?
Appendix 5: Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet

Date Information Sheet Produced:
1st May 2011

Project Title
Implications and impacts of terrorism on sporting events: Is the hospitality industry prepared and equipped to host mega events

An Invitation
My name is Cyril Peter and I am a Masters student at the School of Hospitality and Tourism, Auckland University of Technology (AUT). For my Masters thesis I am researching the implications and impacts of terrorism on sporting events to see whether the hospitality industry is prepared and equipped to host mega events. The literature that is currently available confirms the existence of a relationship between sporting events and terrorism. Based on that knowledge, I would like to explore the preparedness of the hospitality industry to host large sporting events. Your property has been identified as one that will be hosting Rugby World Cup (RWC) teams/supporters and/or officials and therefore you may be able to assist me with this study.

What will happen in this study?
If you agree to be interviewed, I will interview you at a time and place that suits you. I would like to ask you about the preparations that your hotel has made in light of a possible terrorist attack on your property. Our central focus is on the preparedness of your hotel and the precautionary measures taken. The interview will take around an hour and you will be asked some questions throughout the interview relating to the research. I will be seeking your opinion and views on the research topic.

You will also be given the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of all the information you have provided after the interview. This is merely to ensure that I have not misunderstood what you have said. Participation is purely voluntary and you may withdraw from the study prior to data collection being completed without any adverse consequences. You will also be able to request a copy of the thesis if required.

If you are agreeable to participating in this study, please complete the attached Consent Form.

How was I identified and why am I being invited to participate in this research?
I have identified your property, with the help of the information in media, as one where RWC teams or spectators are likely to be staying. For this study a total of six to ten accommodation properties will be approached based on their star rating and the probability that they will be hosting participating teams and spectators.
What are the discomforts and risks?
You may feel that you have not adequately prepared for a terrorist attack, or even thought about the possibility that this may occur. In this case, I can suggest some government agencies that will provide you with advice if you wish.

How will these discomforts and risks be alleviated?
Participants may choose to abstain from answering any question, without having to provide a reason, if the questions cause any discomfort. If participants have experienced any terrorist attacks previously and they do not wish to discuss it, they may prefer not to participate in this study.

How will my privacy be protected?
The amount and type of information that you wish to provide will be up to you. Your identity will not be divulged in any publications arising from this study, and because interviews are being conducted in more than one city, it is unlikely that anyone will be able to guess the name of your property.

What are the costs of participating in this research?
The major cost to you will be your valuable time. You will need to set aside approximately one hour for the interview and another to check the notes for the information that I have collected from you in order to check for accuracy. This will happen over two separate days.

What opportunity do I have to consider this invitation?
You have two weeks to consider this invitation.

How do I agree to participate in this research?
If you are agreeable to participate in this study, please complete the attached Consent Form and return it to me.

Will I receive feedback on the results of this research?
Participants will be provided with a summary of the research findings.

What do I do if I have concerns about this research?
Any concerns regarding the nature of this project should be notified in the first instance to the Project Supervisors.

Dr. Jill Poulston (Primary Supervisor)
Tel: 09 921 9999 EXT 8488
Email: jill.poulston@aut.ac.nz

Erwin Losekoot (Secondary Supervisor)
Tel: 09-921 9999 EXT 6347
Email: erwin.losekoot@aut.ac.nz

Concerns regarding the conduct of the research should be notified to the Executive Secretary, AUTEC, Madeline Banda, madeline.banda@aut.ac.nz, 921 9999 ext 8044.

Whom do I contact for further information about this research?

Researcher Contact Details:
Name: Cyril Peter
Email: cyrilpeter10@gmail.com
Project Supervisor Contact Details:

Dr. Jill Poulston (Primary Supervisor)
HOD Hospitality, School of Hospitality and Tourism
Auckland University of Technology
Tel: 09 921 9999 EXT 8488
Email: jill.poulston@aut.ac.nz

Erwin Losekoot (Secondary Supervisor)
Senior Lecturer (Hospitality)
Auckland University of Technology
Tel: 09-921 9999 EXT 6347
Email: erwin.losekoot@aut.ac.nz

Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on 8\textsuperscript{th} June 2011, AUTEC Reference number 11/96.