The Application of Modernisation Theory to Phases in Maori Development Since 1800

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Maori Development at Te Ara Poutama, Faculty of Maori Development, Auckland University of Technology

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between certain descriptive and prescriptive elements in Modernisation theory, and selected phases in Maori development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This analysis also extends to consideration of the significance of intentional development, as defined by Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton (Cowen & Shenton, 1996), as the emerging basis for such development.

The particular focus within the theoretical framework is on the characteristics and implications of social transformation that are said to accompany rapid economic development – particularly for non-Western peoples living within an emerging Western economic environment. As a corollary of this, consideration is given to the evident conversion from such transitions being unplanned consequences of the forces of economic development, to the increasingly conscious, planned bases for the processes of modernisation being applied to Maori development.

This thesis concludes that there has been a discernable intensification in the forces of modernisation impacting on Maori, and that this has been complemented by more deliberate efforts – at a governmental level – to advance this process. One consequence of this trend has been that the alternative models for Maori development have been virtually excluded, even from consideration by successive Governments, and that a singular theoretical model has become the near-universal standard for governmental discourse about this area of indigenous development in New Zealand.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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<thead>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIML</td>
<td>Auckland Institute and Museum Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>APL</td>
<td>Auckland Public Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>Alexander Turnbull Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Church Missionary Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBPP</td>
<td>Great Britain Parliamentary Papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>HL</td>
<td>Hocken Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Manuscript</td>
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<td>MSS</td>
<td>Manuscripts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Translation</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ariki</td>
<td>paramount chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atua</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hapu</td>
<td>sub-tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hui</td>
<td>meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iwi</td>
<td>tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kai</td>
<td>food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kainga</td>
<td>home, village, place where fires are burned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaitiakitanga</td>
<td>guardianship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaumatua</td>
<td>elder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaupapa</td>
<td>philosophy; mission; purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kawanatanga</td>
<td>governorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kotahitanga</td>
<td>unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mahinga kai</td>
<td>traditional food sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana</td>
<td>respect; honour; dignity; sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana moana</td>
<td>title/sovereignty over the sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marae</td>
<td>meeting house; courtyard in front of meeting house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mauri</td>
<td>life-force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moana</td>
<td>sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moko</td>
<td>facial tattoo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakeha</td>
<td>European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rangatira</td>
<td>chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rangatiratanga</td>
<td>chieftainship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rohe</td>
<td>region, district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taiapure</td>
<td>control but not exclusive use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangata whenua</td>
<td>people of the land; the indigenous people; Maori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taonga</td>
<td>treasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tapu</td>
<td>sacred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tika</td>
<td>correct; fair; right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tikanga</td>
<td>the correct way of doing things; culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tiriti</td>
<td>treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utu</td>
<td>revenge; justice; compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wahi tapu</td>
<td>sacred sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wairua</td>
<td>spirit; spirituality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wero</td>
<td>spear; challenge; pierce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whaijorero</td>
<td>speech; exchanges of speeches, usually at a marae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whanau</td>
<td>extended family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whenua</td>
<td>land; soil; country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAORI TRIBAL MAP (Oliver and Williams, 1981).

MAORI TRIBAL LOCATIONS, c. 1870
Major tribes are indicated and some
locations reflect movements which
took place between 1830 and 1850.
Source: Oxford History of New
Zealand, ed. W.H. Oliver with E.R.
Williams (OUP, 1981). The map is
derived largely from AJHR, 1870,
D-23.

1. Te Aupouri
2. Te Rarawa
3. Nga Puhi
4. Ngati Whatua
5. Ngati Paoa
6. Ngati Maru, Ngati
Tama-Te-Ra
7. Ngati Haua
8. Waikato
9. Ngati Toa
10. Ngati Maniapoto
11. Ngati Raukawa
12. Ngai Te Rangi
13. Te Arawa
14. Ngati Awa
15. Te Whakatohea
16. Te Whanau-a-Apanui
17. Ngati Porou
18. Rongowhakaata
19. Tuhoe
20. Ngati Kahungunu
21. Ngati Tuwharetoa
22. Ngati Tama
23. Te Ati Awa
24. Taranaki
25. Ngati Ruamti
26. Nga Rauru
27. Te Ati Haunui-a-Paparangi
28. Muaupoko, Ngati Raukawa,
Ngati Apa, Rangitane
29. Ngati Toi, Te Ati Awa,
Ngati Ira
30. Ngati Kuia
31. Ngai Tahu, Ngati Mamoe
32. Foutini Ngai Tahu
1. INTRODUCTION

Until its reincarnation in the form of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, the edifice of Modernisation theory had been undermined by almost three decades of vigorous assaults from Dependency theorists in particular, most of whom were intent on recasting notions of development in Marxist or neo-Marxist forms. Ultimately however, this encounter between the two opposing development paradigms did not have the effect of rendering Modernisation theory redundant. On the contrary, it remains a valid construct through which a variety of development-related events can be understood. This thesis utilises Modernisation theory as a device for interpreting episodes of Maori development in New Zealand in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the process, the selected events are given new significance through the manner in which the theory is applied to them.

In addition, the recently-formulated distinction between immanent and intentional development is given consideration because of its capacity to contextualise the forces behind the processes of modernisation. This is useful because it enhances the perspective that Modernisation theory offers on issues of development.

(a) Structure of the Thesis

Chapter Two of this thesis reviews the elements of Modernisation theory that will be employed throughout the remainder of the work. It focuses on the descriptive elements of Modernisation theory, commencing with an analysis of the position Modernisation theorists assume on the definition of a traditional society, and then moving on to consider the nature and consequences of the process of transition to a modernised society. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the principles of immanent and intentional development and their association with the role of order. In particular, connections are made between immanent and intentional forms of development, and the nature of Maori development, particularly following the conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi.
The third chapter introduces the first case study: that of the Nga Puhi religious sect, Te Nakahi, or simply Nakahi. This sect emerged prior to the establishment of British rule in the country, and demonstrates many of the early traits and tensions of the transition of a traditional society to a modernised one. It also serves as an example of immanent Maori development which occurred after British intervention.

Chapter Four examines one of the first and most significant state-sponsored attempts to modernise Maori: the formation of the Office of Protector of Aborigines. This was an unashamed endeavour to ‘civilise’ Maori as part of the express process of incorporating them into the modern industrialised European realm that was beginning to establish itself in New Zealand in the early 1840s. It is an example of intentional development, and perhaps one of the more blatant efforts to achieve modernisation as part of the state’s policy.

Chapter Five surveys the role of the Kotahitanga movement at the close of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Superficially, the movement could be interpreted as a challenge to the forces of modernisation at work in the country, but what is revealed is that not only did the Government of the day eventually defeat the original objects and purposes of the movement, but the movement itself was a heavily-modernised political institution, which perhaps paradoxically, attempted to achieve greater Maori independence from British rule while simultaneously creating an entity which mimicked British institutions in order to achieve this.

The next chapter examines one of the most important areas affecting Maori development in the twentieth century: the Treaty settlement regimes introduced by the Crown from 1975. These are state-sponsored measures designed to investigate and partially compensate for earlier breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi which were perpetrated by successive governments as part of the modernisation process. The Waitangi
Tribunal, which is the main focus of this chapter, represents the nexus of Maori aspirations for redress from some of the adverse consequences of the modernisation process, and the state, which sets the parameters for this redress in specifically modernised terms. The existence of the Tribunal, and policies such as the Fiscal Envelope, are also both symbolic and representative of the intentional development which accompanies the practice of modernisation.

Chapter Seven investigates the policy which was introduced by the Government under the title of ‘Closing the Gaps’. This is the most recent of the case studies in this thesis, and is also one of the most evident in terms of its compliance with the main elements of Modernisation theory. Notwithstanding its relatively small scale, the closing the gaps policy is an explicit example of an attempt to foster modernisation in Maori society in the late twentieth century.

This thesis concludes with a review of some of the trends that are apparent in the application of Modernisation theory to Maori development in the period from the 1830s to the end of the twentieth century. What emerges is a clear picture of a shift to ordered, intentional development following the conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi, a consistent programme of modernisation being implemented by successive governments since that time, and a trend over the period of the state gradually guiding Maori development so that the preconditions for economic take-off are met. Moreover, considered cumulatively, the case studies in this thesis, and many others which could be added to them, suggest that the type of modernisation that was enacted in New Zealand from 1840, and which seems to have become an ideological keystone of state policy since the 1950s, has dramatically influenced the shape and character of Maori development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and continues to do so into the present century.

A further aspect considered in the conclusion is the usefulness of applying Modernisation theory as a device to analyse and interpret not only
individual episodes but also patterns of Maori development. This highlights the usefulness of the theory in a descriptive context, and in the case of the chapters on the Waitangi Tribunal and the ‘Closing the Gaps’ policy, its value in a prescriptive capacity.

(b) Research Methodology

The basic approach of this thesis – the application of a development theory to actual examples – has been determined to a considerable extent the nature of the methodology employed.

The first of the two main components of this thesis surveys the literature pertaining to the theoretical aspects of the study. Following on from this, specific bodies of data are referred to for the subsequent chapters. In Chapter Three for example, material on the formation of the Nakahi sect is sourced from interviews and from mainly missionary records of the 1830s and retrospective accounts in the 1840s and 1850s. In contrast, the following chapter – on the Office of Protector of Aborigines – relies substantially on the collection known as the Great Britain Parliamentary Papers. These are arranged in several volumes, and contain virtually all of the official and much of the unofficial documentation relating to the operation of the Office.

Material on the Kotahitanga movement at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century is derived from a more varied set of sources, ranging from the translated minutes of the meetings of the Kotahitanga parliaments, through to incidental references to the movement in other published texts.

Information on the Waitangi Tribunal – which came into being in 1975 – is more detailed and voluminous, reflecting its closer proximity to the present day. In addition to the published works of the Tribunal itself, there is a small collection of published materials on its activities, and more numerous commentaries which exist in a variety of formats.
The final chapter, on the ‘Closing the Gaps’ policy, takes advantage of Government policy statements, documentation on the policy generated by Government departments, particularly Te Puni Kokiri, and commentaries on the policy which appeared in the media for the duration of the policy’s existence.

(c) **Significance**

This thesis is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, it offers an original and innovative matching of Modernisation theory with the principle of separating immanent and intentional forms of development. The coupling of these two elements is unprecedented, and offers a new theoretical perspective to analyse and contextualise aspects of development generally, and in this case, Maori development in the period under review. This thesis therefore offers both a new means of analysis of Maori development, and an application of Modernisation theory to an area that it has previously not been linked with in this manner.

Secondly, virtually all of the events being surveyed through this lens have never previously been explored in this fashion. What is especially revealing about this approach is the extent to which ostensibly disparate events – dispersed over two centuries – share practically identical theoretical characteristics. There is a common seam of development which is only revealed when the particular theoretical framework is applied to these phases of development.

Another substantial area of significance in this thesis is the uncovering of new historical data. This applies particularly to the chapters dealing with the Nakahi religion, and the Kotahitanga movement at the close of the nineteenth century. Much of the material on which the historical basis of these chapters is constructed has not previously been used in any published material.
Finally, one of the most significant aspects of this thesis in the context of Maori development is that it offers a means of understanding past patterns of Maori development, and therefore makes explicable connections to what might otherwise seem as unrelated events. As a follow-on from this, the modernised constructs of development, that are evident in all the case studies in this thesis, suggest a reason for the present state of Maori development and can therefore serve as a starting point for the consideration of alternative models of development for the future.

(d) Notes on Terminology

The terms ‘colonialism’, ‘colonisation’, and ‘imperialism’, are used interchangeably in this thesis unless they appear in reference to certain writings where a specific meaning is attached to them. In such cases, the given meaning is made clear and is distinguished from its general usage. Although specific definitions for these terms do exist, the considerable variation in their employment during the nineteenth century (and more so in the twentieth century) could lead to confusion if single definition was unilaterally applied in this thesis.

Aristocratic, honorary, and academic titles are omitted from the references and the bibliography. Thus, for example, Lord Normanby would appear as Normanby, Sir George Gipps as G. Gipps, and Dr. Keith Sinclair as K. Sinclair. The only exception to this is the title of King or Queen, which are maintained because of their political and constitutional significance.

The convention in this thesis is not to italicise Maori words. Italicising Maori words risks marginalising the language, and serves to segregate Maori from its inclusion in English. As an official language of New Zealand, legally speaking, Maori has equal status with English, and this equality is reflected in its treatment in the text of this thesis.
The name of a prominent Maori politician in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century – Wi Pere – is always used with the first as well as surname. In Tairawhiti, Wi Pere was always referred to by both names, and this convention has been maintained here.

(e) Maori Society
Throughout this thesis, reference is made to ‘Maori’ as the indigenous people of New Zealand. Maori are a Polynesian people who migrated to New Zealand around 800 AD (Campbell, 1989). By the time of the first European arrivals in New Zealand, in the late eighteenth century, the Maori population was estimated to have been around 100,000 (Ward, 1973), with most of their number living in the North Island (Sinclair, 1988).

Maori society was made up of tribes (iwi) and sub-tribes (hapu). These were economic as well as political units of organisation (Davidson, 1981). Each iwi was based around common ancestry, and the land that iwi occupied since their arrival in the country (Davidson, 1981). A map of tribal locations appears on page 7 of this thesis.
2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The material in this chapter falls into two broad categories – representing the two main theoretical elements being reviewed. The first, and major section, surveys those components of Modernisation theory which will be applied to specific case studies in the succeeding chapters. The second section in this chapter examines the notion of intentional development, and explores how this offers a particular context for considering both the prescriptive and descriptive aspects of Modernisation theory when applied to examples in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Maori development.

What is Modernisation Theory?

Modernisation theory emerged in the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It is distinctive in the corpus of development theory in that it came into being as part of the broader ideological conflict of the Cold War, and that it was rapidly embraced by most Western governments as the basis for planning for development – particularly in the area of the development of non-Western communities. Hoebink (1997) suggests that the paternity of Modernisation theory can be traced back to President Harry Truman’s inaugural address of January 1949 (Ruttan, 1996), in which as part of the emerging Truman Doctrine, the American President outlined ‘…a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’ (quoted in: Hoebink, 1997, p. 1).

The proponents of Modernisation theory assume that the processes of industrialisation, which affected Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which have continued to affect other countries since, are both a liberating and progressive force, to the extent that they provide the ideal model for all other countries and societies to imitate (Giddens, 1988; Bentley, 1997; Cronin, 2000). If some traditional elements of a society linger, and prove obstacles to that society’s development, then, in the analysis of Frank, a ‘gap’ emerges which Modernisation theorists argue needs to be reduced or closed altogether (Frank, 1971). This theme is
considered in Chapter Seven of this thesis, which examines the similarly-named ‘Closing the Gaps’ policy. It is the culmination of the process of achieving a modernised society, and heralds perhaps the final stage in social transformation that lies at the heart of Modernisation theory and practice.

Modernisation theory can be delineated into two general constituent parts. The first is the descriptive aspect, which is most obvious in Rostow’s theory of economic take-off (1956). Indeed, the entire basis of his theory rests with a substantial analysis of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century patterns of development in Europe, centred around the Industrial Revolution. In developing this approach, Rostow and his successors formulated a specific way of looking at historical episodes, and casting them in the perspective of the processes of modernisation which will be examined throughout this chapter.

The other constituent part of Modernisation theory to be considered in this thesis is its prescriptive dimension. Essentially, this involves transporting the lessons derived from the descriptive analyses, and applying them to existing cases of what Modernisation theorists would perceive as underdevelopment (Rostow, 1956; Smelser, 1966; Hoselitz, 1960; Nash, 1963). It is the principles and themes of development accompanying these two dimensions of Modernisation theory which give the theory its distinctive characteristics. The following sections in this chapter detail these relevant principles and themes. These elements will form the theoretical framework that will be applied to the various case studies on Maori development in the subsequent chapters.

**The Traditional Society**

The point of departure for Modernisation theory are the characteristics of what its adherents label the traditional society (Rostow, 1956; Smelser, 1966). This definition of a traditional society is loaded with presumptions (to the point where Frank – a leading Dependency theorist – describes them as being unsatisfactory, parting from reality, and impossible of
finding in the world today (Frank, 1971)), but it is this understanding of what constitutes a traditional, non-Western, underdeveloped society that informs all subsequent aspects of Modernisation theory.

Images of the Traditional Society

One of the main areas of exploration by Modernisation theorists in the area of traditional societies relates to the roles presumably fulfilled by members of those societies. Hoselitz claims that roles in underdeveloped, traditional societies tend to be functionally diffuse rather than specific (Hoselitz, 1964a). That is, workers in traditional societies are more likely to fulfil a variety of occupations at the same time – including ‘earning’ roles such as farmer, labourer, builder, fisherman, and so forth, and ‘non-earning’ roles, such as carer of and provider for the elderly and the very young (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, 1963). This absence of sufficiently specific roles – or specialisation – appears as a barrier to economic development. Accordingly, Smelser laments the connection between a society’s economic activity and its ‘traditional setting’ as a reason for lingering underdevelopment in traditional societies (Smelser, 1966). In the early 1960s, former United States Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau also identified traditional communities as possessing traits that led to their economic stagnation (Hoebink, 1997). He proposed that limitations to economic growth lay in the natural habitat of such societies (and thus may be unavoidable) or were encountered on the cultural front (Hoebink, 1997) and therefore could be subject to manipulation and modification.

Smelser (1966) goes on to catalogue the characteristics he sees constituting the ‘typical’ traditional society: ‘…production is typically located in kinship units. Subsistence farming predominates….community and associational life is closely knit with the ascribed bases of social existence: kinship and clanship, and tribal and caste affiliations’ (pp. 121 & 127). In addition, he describes traditional societies as possessing technologically simple and traditionalised techniques, the predominant use of human and animal power in industry, the predominance of farms and
villages in ecological arrangements (as opposed to urban concentrations in developed societies), the dependence on simple tribal or village political structures, high or total levels of illiteracy, and comparatively fixed social hierarchical systems, with little opportunity for social mobility (Smelser, 1966).

Rostow’s description of traditional societies relies on a similar understanding of their functions and purpose. He sees the traditional society ‘…containing an economy mainly agricultural, using more or less unchanging production methods, saving and investing productively little more than is required to meet depreciation’ (Rostow, 1956, p. 27).

In a more extreme case, Talcott Parsons’ analysis of traditional societies relies on an abstracted notion of the structure and functions of such societies with no fixed point of reference to actual examples, particularly of the character of traditional communities in a dual society (Parsons, 1960). Instead, the traditional society is practically a hypothetical concept, containing all the anti-modernised elements which must be isolated and subsequently eliminated (Parsons, 1960).

*The Theme of Isolation*

One of the persistent underlying themes of the Modernisation theorists’ construction of traditional societies is that of isolation. To start off with, traditional societies are deemed to have had little if any contact with advanced Western societies. This accounts not only for their socio-economic predicament, but also their inability to achieve development under their own guidance – there are no models of success to emulate. There is thus an implicit isolation from the activities of developed societies (Rostow, 1956; Nash, 1963).

According to Modernisation theorists, underdevelopment in traditional societies is not connected to development elsewhere. Rather, it is portrayed as a consequence of the lack of an awareness of an ideal type of society on which attempts at development must ultimately be modelled.
and the ensuing result that the advanced Western societies have not had the opportunity to diffuse their ‘...knowledge, skills, organization, values, technology, and capital to a poor nation’ (Nash, 1963, p. 5).

Smelser, Rostow, and Nash all couch their descriptions of traditional societies in a way that suggests such societies are fully self-contained, socially, economically, and politically (Nash, 1963; Rostow, 1961; Smelser, 1966). Indeed, this isolation is necessary from an ideological perspective. It is at the core of the reason why non-Western societies are underdeveloped in the view of Modernisation theorists. It is only once exposure to the Western notions of development and success takes place that non-Western countries can even consider undertaking their own paths towards such development – paths set down by the developed nations.

David McClelland’s socio-psychological approach to examining development from a broadly Modernisation perspective succumbed to the same approach when considering the isolation of underdeveloped societies (McClelland, 1970). McClelland adopted the more cautious name of ‘pre-literate societies’ to describe traditional societies, but still saw them as being isolated from the Western bench-marks of development (McClelland, 1970).

The principle of the isolation of traditional societies from developed Western models is emphasised by Parsons in his rejection of the Marxist analysis in which every society is linked through a common system of exploitation (McLellan, 1980). Once the Marxist construct in relation to issues of underdevelopment has been dismantled, Parsons proceeds to fill the void with an explanation grounded in Modernisation theory:

Marx...tended to treat the socio-economic structure of capitalist enterprise as a single indivisible entity rather than breaking it down analytically into a set of the distinct variables involved in it. It is this analytical breakdown which is for present purposes the most distinctive feature of the modern sociological analysis....It results in a modification of the
Such a perspective extends the concept of isolation by denying underdeveloped, traditional societies the sort of history and social evolution which is implicitly ascribed to Western, developed societies. This is also evident for the way in which the concept of underdeveloped, traditional societies are spoken of in generic terms, as though the notion can be interchanged from one such society to another, with no evident consideration given to the distinctive characteristics of each of these particular societies.

The assumption of indistinct, isolated traditional societies is a necessary one for Modernisation theorists, because it creates a common starting point from which the processes of modernisation can commence. At the same time, it removes the requirement to assess in any depth the distinct or unique characteristics of whichever traditional society is being considered.

At an ideological level, this approach serves to confirm for Modernisation theorists the relative lack of importance of traditional societies in their own right. They appear to exist merely as development ‘problems’, for which a solution needs to be applied. The emphasis is clearly weighed in favour of the solution, with relatively little consideration given to the problem, its history, its culture, and even its validity.

The Nature of Transition to a Modernised Society

One of the most relevant aspects of Modernisation theory, with respect to the themes in this thesis, is the actual process of modernisation itself. This involves a specific type of transition which traditional societies are expected to undertake, from their existing state to that of a modernised society. This transition can occur in a variety of forms, and within the orthodox framework of Modernisation theory, can be in an immanent or
intentional form, especially in its early stages. This theme is explored in the following chapter with the examination of the emergence of the Nakahi sect, which was essentially a response to the entrance of members of a modernised society into the country, rather than being directed or ordered in any way by that new society. Conversely, the establishment of the Office of Protector of Aborigines, which is investigated in Chapter Four, represents a phase of transition which was deliberately ordered and imposed by the modernised society.

Another aspect of this transitional phase tends to be the product of a combination of interrelated processes, rather than following a unitary course (Smelser, 1966). Various preconditions have been proposed by Modernisation theorists as being necessary, or at least helpful, in allowing such transitions to occur. There is general accord, however, on what initiates the process.

The Root Cause of Modernisation
According to a consensus of Modernisation theorists, the element that underlies the commencement of all transitions towards a modernised state is that of deviance – which can emerge in both immanent and intentional forms (the characteristics of which are detailed later in this chapter). The principle of deviance asserts that there is some degree of non-conformity in a society that eventually acquires sufficient acceptance in that society to induce social change. The French philosopher Durkheim suggested that deviance was an important element in bringing about social transformation or adjustment. He based this assertion on the belief that society was bound by moral rules which perpetuated social solidarity, and therefore acted as a barrier to development (Durkheim, 1933).

As a consequence of the growing acceptance of deviancy, often, those activities that were once seen as being deviant are re-evaluated and seen as part of a new set of norms, solely on the basis that they receive popular support in the society concerned. In this setting, deviance was portrayed as a device of fostering positive change (Durkheim, 1933). Indeed, early
ideas about deviance promoted the notion that it was an integral part of all societies because it affirmed cultural values and norms, albeit sometimes radically modified values and norms (Hendershott, 2002).

Modernisation theorists re-worked this principle, and gave it greater prominence in their prescriptions for economic development. In Rostow’s analysis of the ‘take-off’, the deviance principle was described as acting as a sharp stimulus which could manifest itself in various ways:

The stimulus may take the form of a political revolution which affects directly the balance of social power and effective values, the character of economic institutions, the distribution of income, the pattern of investment outlays and the proportion of potential innovations actually applied; that is, it operates through these propensities. It may come about through a technological (including transport) innovation, which sets a motion a chain of secondary expansion in modern sectors and has powerful potential external economy effects which the society exploits. It may take the form of a newly favourable international environment….but it may also come as a challenge posed by an unfavourable shift in the international environment...(Rostow, 1956, p. 29).

However, what was more important, from Rostow’s perspective, was not so much the form of the stimulus, but the prior development of the traditional society, which had oriented itself not only to take advantage of the stimulus, but also to do so in a self-reinforcing and self-sustaining manner (Rostow, 1956). One of the themes that emerges in the subsequent chapters is the way in which, from the early nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century, Maori society was increasingly being guided by state policy so that the preconditions for its take-off were slowly being met, and the foundation of its traditional status was constantly eroded to a corresponding extent.

Rostow (1956) concedes that the impetus for economic development may come from within a traditional society as well as externally, and therefore is vague on the extent to which the initial impetus for the commencement of the modernisation process is either immanent or intentional in form:
Usually from outside the society, but sometimes out of its own dynamics, come the idea that economic development is possible; and this idea spreads within the established elite or, more usually, in some disadvantaged group whose lack of status does not prevent the exercise of some economic initiative (Rostow, 1956. p. 27).

Smelser mirrored the rejection of traditional societies that Rostow championed (Smelser, 1966). He summarised this position in a single sentence: ‘Economic development means, above all, the segregation of economic activities from…[the] traditional setting’ (p. 121). Included in the list of discontinuities between the traditional and modern sectors was a need for the reallocation of productive time of labour, the alteration of the very definition of economic security, the encountering of continually changing standards of goods and services in the market, and a general adjustment in the perceptions held by those in the traditional sector (Smelser, 1966).

McClelland (1970) was just as enthusiastic about the need for the break with the past. In exploring the causes of high levels of achievement in particular societies, one of the components he isolated was what he termed ‘…other-directedness…’ in societies (p. 186). This was an idea he borrowed and developed from David Riesman (Riesman, 1961). It involved ‘…reliance on the opinion of particular others, rather than on tradition, for guidance in social behaviour’ (McClelland, 1970, p. 186). McClelland identified those countries that had developed mass-media, and other means which allowed for the rapid development of public opinion, as achieving much faster rates of economic development (McClelland, 1970). He went on to offer his personal assessment of this deviant force as one of the means not only of initiating development, but also of overcoming the stagnation of tradition:

I think that “other-directedness” helped these countries to develop more rapidly because public opinion is basically more flexible than institutionalised moral or social traditions. Authorities can utilise it to inform people widely about the need for new ways of doing things. However, traditional institutionalised values may insist that people go on behaving
in ways that are no longer adaptive to a changed social and economic order (p. 186).

One point of difference in McClelland’s (1970) interpretation of the trigger for the modernisation process to commence was the source of the change:

Usually, rapid economic growth has been explained in terms of “external” factors – favourable opportunities for trade, unusual natura; resources, or conquests that have opened up new markets or produced internal political stability. But I am interested in the internal factors – in the values and motives of men have that lead them to exploit opportunities…in short, to shape their own destiny (p. 178).

While possibly less abrasive than Rostow’s or Smelser’s dismissal of traditional societies, the essence of McClelland’s argument was virtually identical. In the course of the processes of modernisation which bore down on Maori in the nineteenth century, it was a combination of internal and external forces which gave specific definition to the type of modernisation and discontinuities that Maori society experienced. This, in turn, generated a legacy that was to continue to affect Maori development even at the very end of the twentieth century.

Other Modernisation theorists concurred in varying degrees with this need for an abrupt separation from the traditional society as a prerequisite for economic development (Hoselitz, 1960; Moore, 1963). All that distinguished these theorists was simply the issue – identified by Smelser – of the extent of these differences and discontinuities (Smelser, 1966).

Following on from the requisite break with tradition, modernised development can be achieved, and most of the traits of underdevelopment can be eliminated, by changing the particular variables, roles, or parts of the social system (Frank, 1971). Armer and Katsillis (1992) specified the overall trend away from social collectivism towards more individualistic patterns of development as being characteristic of the modernisation process. Also in this model, institutional structures and individual
activities become more highly specialized, differentiated, and integrated into social, political, and economic forms characteristic of advanced Western societies (Armer and Katsillis, 1992).

The jolt from traditional society to an emerging modernised society is seen in this thesis in a microcosm in the emergence of the Nakahi faith. It most certainly represents a departure from traditional Maori religious beliefs, yet still bears a partial complexion of what could be termed Maori religion – particularly in the fact that the language of the sect, its founder, and all its adherents, were Maori. This is dealt with more fully in Chapter Three. Likewise, some of the tensions evident in the work of the Office of Protector of Aborigines – which explored in Chapter Four – reveal a similar discontinuity between traditional and modernising societies. However, what is also disclosed in these processes of attempts to modernise traditional societies is that by the beginning of the twentieth century, this phase – of wrenching Maori from the full embrace of their traditional society – had been largely completed. Admittedly, strong vestiges of that traditional world endured, but the essential separation had been complete, and the next phases in the modernisation process were beginning to come into effect.

The Modernisation of Social Relations
The title for this section is taken from Smelser’s 1966 paper in which he detailed both the influence of modernisation on social relations, and the ‘other side of the coin’: the need for social relations to be adjusted before modernisation could take place (Smelser, 1966). Indeed, when he considered the overall notion of economic development, he placed it firmly in the context of substantial modifications in social relations and the very make-up of a society. The modernisation process was seemingly all-embracing:

…in the political sphere, as simple tribal or village authority systems give way to systems of suffrage, political parties, representation, and civil service bureaucracies;…in the education sphere, as the society strives to reduce illiteracy and
increase economically productive skills;…in the religious sphere, as secularised belief systems begin to replace traditionalistic religions;…in the familial sphere, as extensive kinship units lose their pervasiveness;…in the stratificational sphere, as geographical and social mobility tend to loosen fixed, ascriptive hierarchical systems (p. 120).

The extent of this anticipated form of modernisation is evident in the work of Cyril Black (1966). Black extended the concept of structural change to incorporate ‘…psychological transformation encouraged by an ethic of individualism, competition, and self-development rather than a conservative conformity to traditionally assigned roles’ (quoted in Bentley, 1997, p. 8). The psychological dimension of modernisation is important in the context of this thesis, because it is so frequently reflected in the character of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Maori development. Yet, towards the end of the twentieth century, the evidence of ongoing psychological transformation as part of the modernisation process leaves almost no trace whatsoever, suggesting that that particular aspect of the process had completed its course by that stage.

Transition, when it did occur, would not be steady or even. Smelser predicted that in each sphere, change would take place at different rates, and with differing levels of intensity (Smelser, 1966) irrespective of attempts to order this change: ‘…no matter how carefully social change is planned, some institutional changes will always lead the way, and others will always lag behind’ (p. 120). However, the overriding consideration was that the momentum of the change was maintained, in spite of the upheaval in social relations. This point was emphasised by Halpern (1965): ‘Modernisation demands of all systems of society…the ability to persist continuously in the enterprise of responding to the challenge of new questions, new facts, and inadequate solutions’ (p.21).

Rostow’s construction of this modernisation of social relations was possessed of a more economic tilt. Changes in education, for example, were couched in terms of providing for the needs of modern activity, while developments in public health lead to increasing populations and
ensuing modernisation in agricultural activities (Rostow, 1956). All transitions and evolutions in social relations in the society being modernised were dependent on a particular element in what Rostow termed the ‘take-off’: ‘…the existence or quick emergence of a political, social and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external economy effects of the take-off and gives to growth an ongoing character’ (p. 32). In this brief statement, all social development was made subservient to the needs to achieving economic take-off for an underdeveloped society.

Nash (1963) positioned the modernisation of social relations more firmly in the context of imitating the Western ideals of social development. He labelled this the acculturation view of the process of development. In this view, the West, which was described as ‘…the Atlantic community of developed nations and their overseas outliers’ (p. 5) had the role of diffusing ‘…knowledge, skills, organisation, values, technology and capital to a poor nation until over time, its society, culture, and personnel become variants of that which made the Atlantic community economically successful’ (p. 5). Scant deliberation was afforded the upheaval that would inevitably accompany such monumental transitions.

In a comparable vein, McClelland wrote of the requirement for greater flexibility to be exercised in moral or social traditions in order to foster an environment of achievement in a society. A changed social order was a vital prerequisite to this particular model of modernisation (McClelland, 1970). Moreover, McClelland subtly excluded the continuity of social norms as a viable model for economic development by asserting that the Achievement motive (McClelland used a capital ‘A’ for this term, 1970) was not hereditary, and in fact, could almost be counter culture if it emerged in societies with a more traditional orientation. Similarly, the spacial separation of work from the family – which is more prominent in modernised societies – was another factor McClelland ascribed as a cause for a rise in levels of Achievement in societies (1970).
Social Unrest

The corollary to the modernisation of social relations in the setting of Modernisation theory is social unrest. Despite the obvious implications of rebellion or revolutionary sentiments that the term carries, the character of social unrest is more subtle when portrayed by Modernisation theorists. In addition, it is seen as a temporary feature of the modernisation process, and one that ought not to outweigh the perceived benefits of that process.

Smelser (1966) identified what he called discontinuities in modernisation as being at the heart of this particular strain of social unrest. Moreover, he unashamedly acknowledged that the economic and social changes that modernisation would bring about were the cause of this unrest. Of particular relevance to this thesis is Smelser’s analysis of uneven structural change that would occur in colonial societies. In such societies, he claimed that ‘European powers frequently revolutionised the economic and political framework by exploiting economic resources and establishing colonial administrations, but at the same time encouraged or imposed a conservatism in traditional religious, class, and family systems’ (p. 128). Smelser goes on to observe that similar discontinuities occur in post colonial societies (1966).

This brief statement has enormous implications if applied to an analysis of Maori development. It would suggest that at least part of the reason for the social unrest generated during the course of modernisation in colonial societies is the product of a tension manufactured by the colonising powers. In New Zealand’s case, radical social change was promoted by the British administration in the nineteenth century, while simultaneously and seemingly paradoxically, a new model of conservatism was applied. This analysis fits closely with the workings of the Office of Protector of Aborigines, which is detailed in Chapter Four. The new conservatism also has a resonance in the workings of the Kotahitanga movement, which is dealt with in Chapter Five, in which an organisation which aimed at the radical goal of a separate Maori legislative authority for the country,
conducted its affairs using an extremely conservative organisational (and colonised) model.

Rostow implied that the new conservatism that could accompany social unrest was sometimes the consequence of an acknowledgement by traditional societies that parts of their traditional values are inappropriate to economic development – this is a point of acquiescence which could mitigate some of the potentially more excessive points of social unrest (Rostow, 1956). Rostow summed up his thoughts on this issue fairly dispassionately: ‘The society makes such terms as it will with the requirements for maximising modern and efficient production, balancing off, as it will, the new values against those retarding values which persist with deeper roots, or adapting the latter in such ways as to support rather than retard the growth process’ (p. 30).

Possibly what is most remarkable about Rostow’s exploration of the theme of social unrest is the brevity with which it is treated. It is as though he is either hinting of its relative insignificance to the overall processes of modernisation, or perhaps he is concealing its possible consequences through minimising the attention he devotes to it, and delivering his explanation in relatively vague terms.

However, it is the unrest dimension of the discontinuities of modernisation which is the main focus in this section. This unrest is certainly widespread during this phase of modernisation: new educational institutions challenge traditional methods of learning; new kinds of social and economic activities create conflict with traditional ways of life; and attempts by governments to contain unrest can actually become a force for creating further unrest (Smelser, 1966).

Overcoming this Unrest
As though it would somehow be irresponsible to forewarn of social unrest with no proposed solution, some Modernisation theorists have attempted to offer a means of overcoming this most troublesome aspect of the
theory. However, what is significant about this approach is the underlying view that social unrest is not only acceptable, but might also even be necessary. Both Rostow and Smelser (Rostow, 1956; Smelser, 1966) include unrest as one of several stages of modernisation. Consequently, the main ‘solution’ to social unrest in this theoretical framework is to simply let it run its course. Such a position is justifiable, in large part, because of the pervasive sentiment that runs through so much of Modernisation theory that the ends justify the means. Some disruption, and defiance of the new order may occur, but the triumph of the new order is both desirable and practically inevitable. The dramatic collapse of Kotahitanga movement by 1905 – detailed in Chapter Five – vividly demonstrates how the ‘solution’ to social unrest and rebellion succumbed to the more powerful forces of modernisation.

Another consideration in overcoming social unrest was the possibility that it could assume a form that would prove counter-productive to the longer-term goals of modernisation. Mill (1861) eloquently identified this concern a century earlier, and the warning still had currency in the post-World War Two period:

Human improvement is a product of many factors, and no power ever yet constituted among mankind includes them all: even the most beneficial power only contains in itself some of the requisites of good, and the remainder, if progress is to continue, must be derived from some other source. No community has ever long continued progressive, but while as conflict was going on between the strongest power in the community and some rival power; between the spiritual and temporal authorities…the king and the people; the orthodox and religious reformers (p. 459).

By the time Modernisation theorists began to tackle the issue of social unrest, the safest course, it seems, was to reduce (not necessarily minimise) consideration of its character, and look forward to a time when the forces contributing to the unrest had dissipated.
Features of a Modernised Society

The fundamental elements of the modernised society, as constructed by Modernisation theorists, are essentially replicas of those elements that have been determined to be the cause of (particularly economic) success in advanced Western societies (Smelser, 1966). McClelland (1970) positioned the notion of Achievement firmly in Western mould. Citing an array of historical examples, he compared rates and types of achievement, but never deviated from the Westernised, capitalist concept contained within his employment of the notion of Achievement.

Various other Modernisation theorists and their ideological adherents have tended to focus on particular aspects of the modernised state as being the most important (Thurman, 2001). These include state-building (Tilly, 1975; Hall & Ikenberry, 1989), the emergence of modern capitalism (Nairn, 1977; Rostow, 1956), industrialisation (Gellner, 1983), print capitalism (Anderson, 1991), Westernisation (Kedourie, 1960), and advances in technology (Deutsch, 1953).

It was Rostow (1956), however, who offered one of the most detailed description of what a modernised society would appear like. Like virtually all Modernisation theorists who followed him, Rostow used an index of Western standards against which the successful attainment of a modernised state would be measured. He described the overall goal of modernisation as ‘…the long, fluctuating story of sustained economic development’ (p. 30). This was followed by a list of features that would be found in this modernised state, including increases in capital per head, diminishing returns in the industrial sectors that led the take-off and the counterbalance occasioned by the emergence of new leading sectors, the supplantation of entrepreneurs by industrial leaders and professional managers, declining rural employment opportunities, more efficient methods of production, and alterations in the values of the society (Rostow, 1956).
The value of Rostow’s more detailed analysis in the context of this thesis is that it can be employed, as it is in the case studies in Chapters Six and Seven, to reveal the extent to which the final state of modernisation remained beyond the grasp of Maori society almost two centuries after the first stages of Modernisation became evident in the country. This raises critical questions about the empirical validity of Modernisation theory, and suspending that issue momentarily, the specific placement of Maori within the overall framework of the modernisation process.

Ultimately, the measure of achievement of the modernisation ideal is twofold. The first indicator is the successful emergence of a modernised society, possessing all the prescribed traits discussed by Modernisation theorists. The second indicator is a corollary of the first: the disappearance of a substantial portion of the essential characteristics that constituted the traditional society that the modernisation process has been applied to.

The Realignment of National Identity

One of the end-products of the Modernisation process which has tended to be more implicit than explicit in the work of earlier Modernisation theorists in particular is that of alterations and realignments in national identities – particularly of indigenous, traditional societies. Thurman contextualised accounts of national identity in Modernisation theory as forms of communication theory (Thurman, 2001). In the case of the economic or more specifically capitalist components of Modernisation theory, one of the consequences of the processes was greater levels of social intercommunication (Thurman, 2001): ‘The effect is to change the identity and frequency of social interaction which…leads to national identity….The economic variant of Modernisation theory claims that the unified state and national identity result from the needs of the growing economy. The argument is that sustained economic growth requires a centralised state to provide the collective goods necessary for its efficient operation’ (p. 3).
This facet of Modernisation theory has a substantial bearing on the latter chapters in this thesis. It will be argued that one of the reasons that the Waitangi Tribunal and the Closing the Gaps policy were possible in the first place was the realignment of Maori national identity. In the case studies used in this work, the realignment is first evident in the pan-tribal political structures of the Kotahitanga movement, and is perhaps as near to completion as it is possible to get by 1975, when Crown policy in relation to Maori was partly based on the generic concept of ‘Maori’, as was the Closing the Gaps policy, with no substantive regard for the pre-modernised elements of Maori society – namely, iwi and hapu. When its constituent parts are examined separately, Modernisation theory offers three causal relationships for the realignment of national identity:

First…that state-building and/or a growth-oriented economy caused increased levels of social intercommunication through the erection of various forms of transportation and communication structures. Second, increased levels of social intercommunication is said to have led to increased social integration. And third, social integration is presumed to have been national in form’ (Thurman, 2001, p. 8).

As with almost all the other aspects of Modernisation theory, the route along this path could be characterised as being uneven (Smelser, 1966). However, the overriding consideration is that the changes do eventually occur, and that society is practically irreversibly affected by them as it moves towards the modernised goal. It is both ironic and symptomatic of this realignment process that even self-identification as Maori in the setting of the last quarter of the twentieth century reflects as much the realignment of Maori national identity as it does the strains of the pre-realignment phase of Maori society.

**Immanent and Intentional Development**

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the descriptive and prescriptive elements of Modernisation theory, and their application to specific occurrences of Maori development. However, while this proves to be a useful device to analyse Maori development in the period under review, extra significance can be added, from a developmental
perspective, by the employment of the distinction between immanent and intentional development.

The ideas of immanent and intentional development in a development studies context were articulated by Cowen and Shenton (Cowen & Shenton, 1996). The period of pre-Treaty of Waitangi Maori modernisation – which is explored through the case of the Nakahi sect – reflects how this development was a natural, evolutionary, organic type of development which was almost automatically generated, with no conscious consideration given to issues of development for Matarahurahu, Nga Puhi or Maori society as a whole. According to Cowen and Shenton, such developments tended to occur as a result of internal pressures and external threats, and lacked conscious planning and any ordering of change (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Cox, 1993).

The alternative model of development that Cowen and Shenton describe is that of intentional development (Cowen & Shenton, 1996). As the name suggests, this requires a deliberate attempt to develop, usually coordinated by the state. As a corollary to this, the state engages in expanding its administrative powers in order to impose its order and its preferred models of development (Wright, 1999). The various case studies in this thesis, from Chapter Four onwards, reveal not only an evident seam of intentional development affecting Maori development in the country, but also an intensification of state direction of this development. Such development is depicted as ‘…planned interventions by the state (or other agencies) to shape and direct socio-economic change’ (Overton, 2000, p. 2), while also endeavouring to mitigate what are perceived to be the adverse effects of immanent development (Overton, 2000). According to Cowen and Shenton, intentional development is necessarily more invasive than its immanent counterpart, and justifies such an approach on the basis that the ends – a modernised society in this context – justify the means (Cowen & Shenton, 1996).
Intentional Modernised Development and the Role of Order

One of the motivations behind the imposition of intentional development is the need to prevail over the disorder that appears to be the product of immanent forms of development. The implicit assumption in this dimension of intentional development – and one that is shared by Modernisation theorists, but in a more explicit manner (Smelser, 1966; Rostow 1956) – is that non-Westernised societies are somehow incapable of bringing about their own development, and therefore require an external power to guide whatever forms of development were chosen (Cowen & Shenton, 1996). In the context of this thesis, following the conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Government fulfilled the role of a guiding power when it came to matters of Maori development. Moreover, even when attempts at Maori development took place seemingly independently of the Government – as with the case of the Kotahitanga movement – simply having to engage with the Government resulted in a situation where the independent force in the movement was sapped, and government-ordained order was eventually imposed.

In the nineteenth century in particular, order was seen as a device which could be used to achieve development, but was not perceived as a goal of development itself (Cowen & Shenton, 1996). It was an important component none-the-less. Auguste Comte described order as being at the foundation of any development, and the predominant force behind progress (Cowen & Shenton, 1996). This nineteenth-century residue of order as a key requirement for intentional development was adopted, perhaps unwittingly, by Modernisation theorists and portrayed as a vital ingredient in the development process.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this review of aspects of Modernisation theory has been to identify their constituent parts and defining characteristics, and in doing so, offer a theoretical framework for the analysis of Maori development in New Zealand in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is both a useful and valid process because it allows for a context to be
put around what might otherwise be seen as only loosely connected episodes of Maori development in the period under review. In addition, it affords an interpretation of the effects of colonisation in New Zealand which has not been explored in these case studies before this study.

Finally, the use of this theoretical framework is important from the perspective of the validity of the theory itself. If the forces of modernisation work as the theorists described and prescribed, then the development experience of Maori in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would be a good generic case study to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of the theory. This comparative element was conveniently summarised by Bendix (1969), in which the efforts of non-Western groups to develop ‘…may be compared with the nation-building of Western countries during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Ideally, we should be able to analyse both processes in the same terms…having confidence in the progress of mankind…’ (p. 6). This, then, is one of the principal measures that will be applied in the remainder of this work. The various case studies will be set against the theoretical benchmarks to examine how each matches up to the other.

The following chapter in this thesis explores the emergence of the Nakahi sect, and how, from a development perspective, it epitomised both an immanent form of development, and the modifications that occur in traditional societies as the first stages of the modernisation process commence.
3. TE NAKAHI

This chapter will survey some of the aspects of the emergence of the Nakahi sect in Northland from the 1830s and its doctrine. These two facets are considered in the light of certain elements of Modernisation theory, including deviance, immanent forms of development, acculturation, and social unrest. In the context of this setting, the emergence of the Nakahi sect can be seen as a part of the embryonic stages of the modernisation process – at a point where such processes tend to be characterised by immanent forms of development. What also becomes evident as the course of the Nakahi sect is charted through its first half-century is that its initial form – particularly its anti-European orientation – subsided against the weight of the diffusion of Western (specifically British) values in the colony. The emergence of the sect, in this context, was a response to something much more than the importation of a ‘foreign’ religion. It was indicative of broader sentiments, including the need to reorient traditional social, religious and economic thinking, and was symptomatic of the confusion that can surround cultural interaction (Smelser, 1966).

The first aspect of the Nakahi sect considered in this chapter is its relationship to the concept of isolation. Following this, elements of deviance and the immanent development which characterised the growth of the sect are explored, and the theme of acculturation and its relevance to the sect is assessed.

The Emergence and Doctrine of the Nakahi Sect and the End of Isolation

Of all the various Maori ‘fusion’ religions that flowered in the nineteenth century (possibly in excess of fifty) (Belich, 1996) – faiths that combined elements of the teachings of the missionaries with traditional Maori beliefs – Ringatu assumed the position of the most senior. Binney, for example, cites Ringatu as ‘…the oldest of the surviving, scripturally based
religions in Aotearoa’ (Binney 1995, p. 1). The evidence to support such assertions were based on factors such as the geographical spread of the religions, their success in breaching the divides between iwi, the existence of written elements of the faith, and observations made by outsiders of their doctrines and practices (Binney, 1995).

The religion of some members of the Matarahurahu hapu of Nga Puhi – based in Kaikohe – and that of some of their ancestors going back at least to the early nineteenth century, shared comparatively few of the attributes of these other sects. This religion was known by its followers as Nakahi – meaning literally ‘the snake’. The choice of a name that was borrowed from an external culture is itself significant in that it hints at least at a nominal departure from traditional, homogenous Maori religion.

After a brief flourish in the mid-1840s, it was eventually confined to a few pockets in and around Kaikohe. It never spread outside the iwi, left virtually no written trace of its existence, and its services were conducted in secret on selected Saturdays, at night-time, in complete darkness. By the end of the nineteenth century, its services were regularised, with adherents meeting on the third Saturday of every month. With its emphasis on secrecy, it is not surprising, then, that Nakahi has been practically invisible since its inception, and has attracted considerably less academic attention than its southern successors. However, its importance in the context of this thesis is, to a considerable extent, its early origins – predating the onset of formal colonisation and intentional forms of modernised development that occurred after the conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. This is significant because, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the Treaty can be interpreted as an axiomatic event in Maori development in that it heralded the commencement of intentional Maori development, as opposed to the immanent forms of development that pre-dated the Treaty. Nakahi emerged in the pre-Treaty era, but survived well after the agreement was concluded – thus offering a valuable case study on the adaptation to modernisation from its immanent forms through to its intentional patterns.
Exactly when Nakahi emerged, and in the form it did, is disputable. Generally, explanations for the proliferation of Maori religions in the mid-nineteenth century account for them as being a reaction to the overbearing forces of rapid European colonisation (Binney, 1995; Belich, 1996). However, these explanations ignore the durability of many of these faiths long after the colonisation process had been sapped of its initial vigour. Moreover, in the case of Nakahi, its roots already appeared to have been established well before the rush of European peoples and culture flowed into New Zealand from the 1840s onwards – something that is contrary to the assertions of subsequent analysts (Bennett, 2000; Binney, 1995a). The missionary Richard Davis recorded in July 1833 that he was made aware of the teachings of one of the leaders of this little-known sect (Davis, 1833). Indeed, Nakahi’s earliest prophets – as far back as the 1800s – anticipated the onset of European colonisation as much as it reacted to it, as the following prophesy from the early nineteenth century suggests:

> It will not be very long before I die, nor very long after I am dead, that a god will come on the crest of a wave, and ghosts (kehua) will be on his back. That god will be like the canoes in appearance, but he will be much larger, and he will sail over all the ocean. He will never be mistaken in his course over the ocean; he will sail away, and will not be seen by the people. After a long disappearance another god will appear, who will be like the former one. The first god will come by the aid of sails, but the latter by the aid of fire (Smith, 1910).

This prophesy vividly conveys the sense that the socially, culturally, and economically self-contained, traditional form of Maori society – which Modernisation theorists described simply as being traditional (Nash 1963; Rostow, 1961; Smelser, 1966) – was about to be removed from its isolation. The precise character of this form of traditional society is immaterial in the context of the theoretical perspective of this thesis. Modernisation theorists were content to assume that a generic, indistinct construct known as traditional societies existed, without examining their history or points of difference (Nash, 1963; Parsons, 1960; Frank, 1971). What is significant is the approaching intervention of a modernising force,
and the fact that at least one sector of this traditional society had a premonition that the status it experienced as a consequence of its isolation was about to end.

_Nakahi’s Doctrine_

As for Nakahi’s code of beliefs, it was deliberately simple, and dependent on a small cluster of provocative images which served to fortify and even invigorate its adherents. Its main tenets were founded on vague notions of Maori religion, which were combined with fragments primarily from the Old Testament of the Bible, which had filtered through to many Nga Puhi in the early nineteenth century as a result of substantial missionary activity in the region. This was the sort of ‘halfway arrangement’ Smelser (1966, p. 123) described as occurring in the early stages of the modernisation process. The salient features of such arrangements were that they were essentially compromises emerging from a process of adjustment to a new culture (Smelser, 1966). There are no defined boundaries for the emergence of such compromises, and partly because of this, they are prone to further evolution and mutation as the balance of the forces that brought them into being in the first place alters.

At the core of this sect was the symbol of the snake, taken from the book of Numbers (Numbers 21, 4-9, see following page). The relevant passage resonates with the power of the relationship Moses had with God during a period when he was struggling to lead the Israelites in the desert. The imagery of ordinary people doubting their leader, and the need for that leader to reassert his power through symbols imbued with metaphysical significance had an obvious appeal to many Nakahi followers (Rankin, 2001).

This emphasis on re-enforcing leadership in the traditional society can also be explained in terms of Modernisation theory. The growth of a new, colonising sector, which is present in the society, forces the indigenous group to re-evaluate the basis of its power structures, and to re-assert what might be perceived as waning traditional authority. Indeed, the traditional
society may become ambivalent, and possibly even hostile to invasive power structures (Smelser, 1966). Referring to the Jewish experience in the Old Testament ironically gave some bolstering to the concept of traditional Maori leadership, especially when combined with the image of Te Nakahi. The extract from Numbers vividly portrayed the relationship between the snake, and a people looking for leadership:

They travelled from Mount Hor along the route to the Red Sea, to go around Edom. But the people grew impatient along the way; they spoke against God and against Moses, and said, “Why have you brought us up out of Egypt to die in the desert? There is no bread! There is no water! And we detest this miserable food!” Then the Lord sent venomous snakes among them; they bit the people and many Israelites died. The people came to Moses and said, “We sinned when we spoke against the Lord and against you. Pray that the Lord will take the snakes away from us”. So Moses prayed for the people. The Lord said to Moses, “Make a snake and put it up on a pole; anyone who is bitten can look at it and live”. So Moses made a bronze snake and put it up on a pole. Then when anyone was bitten by a snake and looked at the bronze snake he lived. (Numbers 21, 4-9)

The image of the snake in the Garden of Eden also featured repeatedly in Nakahi doctrine – admired because it was “…more crafty than any of the wild animals the Lord God had made” (Genesis 3:1). Ironically, the counterpoint of this verse in the New Testament foretold of the fate of the snake: ‘The great dragon was hurled down – that ancient serpent called the devil, or Satan, who leads the whole world astray. He was hurled to the earth, and his angels with him’ (Revelations 12:9). The apparent selectivity of quoting from the Bible by Nakahi leaders probably accounts for this singular emphasis on the image of the snake as something desirable.

The final biblical reference to the snake which Nakahi tohunga employed (Rankin 2001) features in Exodus. In a similar vein to the Numbers extract, Moses was experiencing doubts over the power of his leadership, and the fact that some of the Israelites were disputing his ability to
communicate with God. The subsequent exchange between God and Moses used the image of a snake to reaffirm the power God had vested in Moses:

The Lord said to him [Moses], “What is that in your hand?”
“A staff”, he replied.
The Lord said, “Throw it on the ground”.
Moses threw it on the ground and it became a snake, and he ran from it. The Lord said to him, “Reach out your hand and take it by the tail”. So Moses reached out and took hold of the snake and it turned back into a staff in his hand. “This”, said the Lord, “…is so that they may believe that the Lord…has appeared to you”. (Exodus 4:2-5).

Nakahí was not exclusively a sect which sourced its doctrine from the Old Testament however. Use was made of Christ’s words in John – again referring to the image of a snake: ‘Just as Moses lifted up the snake in the desert, so the Son of Man must be lifted up, that everyone who believes in him may have eternal life’ (John 3:14-15).

According to the late Matarahurahu leader Graham Rankin, Nakahi’s appropriation of such texts made it a sect tailored specifically for a political and military leadership class within Nga Puhi (Rankin 2001). This was based on a requirement for a new type of leadership that was perceived – in the early nineteenth century – would be necessary to counter the emerging influence and impending dominance of the European arrivals to New Zealand. Indeed, the sect’s character was as much temporal in this respect as it was spiritual, with a significant stress maintained on the importance of power, effective rule, and the requirement that people have absolute faith in their leaders (Rankin 2001). This raises a vital question about the apparent deficiency in traditional Maori social and cultural norms that warranted a new approach to developing leaders in the face of the first stages of European colonisation. In the context of Modernisation theory, such deficiencies are accounted for as being the product of both tendencies to ‘Balkanisation’ in indigenous political structures (Smelser, 1966, p. 129) as a consequence of colonisation, and the ensuing unrest and conflict within existing
authority systems (Smelser, 1966). An alternative interpretation, though, could be that Te Nakahi was a ‘bridging’ device – a means of coming to terms with the gradual arrival of a new order. Maori culture at this time still retained its traditions of autocratic leadership (Walker, 1990), but the creation of a new religion – with obvious Christian points of reference – was a means of accommodating the changes that were taking place with the onset of European colonisation.

In the case of the Nakahi sect, the product of this tension was the emergence of a new type of leader. In the 1830s, Nakahi found its Mohammed – the prophet leader who would take aspects of the old order and re-shape it into a new religion. This person was the Nga Puhi tohunga Papahurihia (who later renamed himself Te Atua Wera – the fire god). Probably born in the first decade of the nineteenth century, he initially rose to prominence and built a committed following through affiliating himself with the matakite tohunga: those who could prophesise, communicate with the dead, or act as mouthpieces for the dead. The senior Church Missionary Society missionary in the country during the 1830s, Henry Williams, mistakenly believed that Papahurihia was the founder of Nakahi, as opposed to its chief exponent (Rogers, 1961).

Papahurihia commenced his vocation in the early or mid-1830s in Te Puna, which was also the site of a Church Missionary Society station around this time. The close proximity to pioneering missionaries (Elsmore, 1989) provided Papahurihia with an additional, Christian, dimension to the traditional tohunga role he had been exercising up until that time. Papahurihia stood out among other tohunga, however, because he was intent on reconstructing his traditional beliefs in a manner that accommodated European Christian elements (Rankin 2001).

By the 1840s, the basic tenets of the Nakahi sect seemed to have settled, with the reward-heaven and punishment-hell principles being transposed from Christianity: ‘Believers in Te Nakahi were assured of a place in heaven – seen as a paradise of material pleasures – while unbelievers were
assigned to hell...From the introduced religion, the...[sect] took the new notions of the raising of the dead, the existence of Satan...the practice of baptism as symbolising membership in the new society, and the holding of regular services of worship’ (Elsmore, 1989, pp. 37-8). Moreover, the creators of the sect found ways of fusing pre-European Maori concepts with those of the European-introduced religion: ‘Satan was a figure who, while he did not have an exact equivalent in Maori tradition, had similarities to Whiro the cosmological representation of darkness and evil who dwelt in the underworld. He could therefore easily be assimilated into the pantheon of deities – and could even be seen as instrumental in the working of makutu…. Similarly, even though Maori [traditionally] believed there was only one realm of the dead, it was not a difficult step to divide this domain into two...particularly when the doctrine of Satan was already or concurrently accepted’ (Elsmore, 1989, p. 38).

Here, then, was the critical shift from the Modernisation definition of isolation (Smelser, 1966; Hoebink, 1997; Nash, 1963; Parson, 1960). This particular sect, although exclusively Maori in its language, locations, and membership, and possessing some elements of traditional Maori religious beliefs, it had clearly had moved from the isolated, traditional Maori religious realm, and had awkwardly embraced some elements of the modernising group present in the country.

The Elements of Deviance and Immanent Development in the Sect

The deviance that encapsulated the temperament of the Nakahi sect, from its inception in the beginning of the nineteenth century until about the 1850s, was characterised by a lack of direction in its path of development – something that is normally symptomatic of immanent forms of development (Cowen and Shenton, 1996).

By the close of the 1830s, Papahurihia’s reputation was widespread in Northland, and was most pronounced in the Bay of Islands. However, the doctrine he was developing for the Nakahi sect began to mutate around
this time and acquire more of the features representative of a deviant movement (Durkheim, 1933). In the preceding decade, Nakahi had taken on the form almost of a Maori variant of Christianity. It was no more extreme than some of the Puritan sects that flourished in the Interregnum in England (Wrightson, 1986). However, by the early 1840s, one of the identifying features of this revised form of Nakahi was its distinctly anti-Christian orientation. Membership of Nakahi in this time was also an act of protest, not so much at the missionaries or even Christianity per se, but more at what they stood for, and the visible signs of encroachment into Maori culture, politics and society that the European presence generally represented. The fact that Nakahi was practiced in secrecy allowed the protest to persist without the direct chastisement or even awareness of those at whom the protest was directed (Rankin 2001). Indeed, even the choice of Saturday as the day of worship was made because it was at odds with the Christian Sabbath being on Sunday (Wilson, 1965).

By the mid 1840s, particular contempt was being directed at the Protestant missionaries by Papahurihia and some of his senior followers. While the Protestants would burn in the fire with Satan, Papahurihia’s followers – he triumphantly asserted – would go to a place where they would ‘…enjoy unending light’. Everything would be ‘…found in plenty, flour, sugar, guns, ships; there too murder and sensual pleasure reign’ (Servant, in Binney, 1990, p. 1).

There was also a prophetic side to Papahurihia’s mission which gave a metaphysical dimension to his anti-Christian (and perhaps implicitly and selectively anti-European) pronouncements. He employed a Biblical extract to suggest that his presence and purpose had been foretold. This gave him an extra veneer of religious authenticity and authority among his disciples. The relevant section from the book of Exodus stated:

See, I am sending an angel ahead of you to guard you along the way and to bring you to the place I have prepared. Pay attention to him and listen to what he says. Do not rebel
against him; he will not forgive your rebellion, since my Name is in him.
If you listen carefully to what he says and do all that I say, I will be an enemy to your enemies and will oppose those who oppose you.
My angel will go ahead of you and bring you into the land of the Amorites…and I will wipe them out.
Do not bow down before their gods or worship them or follow their practices. You must demolish them and break their sacred stones to pieces. (Exodus 23:20-24).

The rhetoric of defiance and destruction encouraged the Nakahi congregations and emboldened their commitment to defend their political and cultural rights against whatever threats they saw.

The height of Papahurihia’s influence and fame occurred in 1845, when the Nga Puhi warrior and rangatira, Hone Heke, took him on as his personal tohunga. Heke, who was also a follower of Nakahi, put great faith in Papahurihia’s pronouncements, particularly on the progress of Heke’s war against the British in the mid-1840s (Maning 1887; Rankin 2001). It was during this period that Nakahi followers developed an almost pathological hatred of Christianity. The phase of protest against Christianity in the early 1840s – on the basis that it was a manifestation of European colonisation – had transformed into a doctrinal hatred in which the teachings of Christ were vilified solely because they were the teachings of Christ. Yet, in the maelstrom of this contempt for the faith of the New Testament, Papahurihia was still unable to completely separate himself from Christianity. To those of Heke’s troops who had converted to Christianity, he counselled: ‘You who pray to the god of the missionaries, continue to do so, and in your praying see you make no mistakes. Fight and pray…abstain from human flesh, lest the European god should be angry’ (Maning 1887:95).

The defiance exhibited by Heke and his allies to British rule can be partly traced back to Nakahi’s repeated emphasis on powerful demonstrations of leadership as a means of maintaining the allegiance of followers, and its deliberately provocative rejection of Christianity, in which vivid and
sometimes vile denunciations of the religion and the Bible were made right in front of missionaries who were frequently regarded as (feeble) opponents. The most famous of these denunciations was made by Papahurihia following the Battle of Ohaeawai in 1845 when the British troops were retreating from a failed attempt to storm the pa:

Ka whawhai, ka whawhai, e Ka whawhai, ki roto ki te awa, e Puare katoa ake ilei, e Ka whawhai. Kihai koe i mau atu, ki to kainga. Ki Oropi, e. I te ainga mai a wharewhare. Ki a lhu Karaiti, Me te pukapuka, Ki taka ki tua, Ki taekaukau o tako kumu kei raro. - i, i’, which translates as ‘Fight, fight! Fight in the valley, They are all exposed there, Fight. You will not return to your village, To Europe. Because of the driving force of the fighters. To Jesus Christ, And the Book, I will turn my back, And empty my bowels upon them!’ (Rankin 2001).

The deviant aspect to Nakahi from roughly the late 1830s until the mid to late 1840s epitomised the unguided, immanent form of deviance that seems to be a feature of the modernisation process only at its very beginnings. Nakahi was undoubtedly a deviant of traditional Maori beliefs – being infused, as it was, with such a strong component of Christian doctrine. Yet, the sect was simultaneously a strongly deviant form of Christianity – to the point of being (paradoxically) expressly anti-Christian. Thus, while being representative of the embryonic stages of the modernisation process in which some form of social deviance is needed to trigger a continuation of the process (Rostow, 1956; Smelser, 1966), the erratic and rebellious character of the sect, and its apparent inability to articulate a direction for the long-term development of its followers, serves to demonstrate the needs for the subsequent stages of the development process to be intentional, as Modernisation theorists suggest (Rostow, 1956, 1961). This is not to say that the deviance needs to be removed altogether, but that it needs to be guided in a way that leads on to the next stages in the modernisation process.
The Further Modernisation and Acculturation of the Nakahi Sect

One of the final stages in the preconditioning of a society for modernisation is the overcoming of social unrest. Modernisation theory is deliberately vague on how this is achieved. It seems that a consensus of Modernisation theorists (Rostow, 1956; Smelser, 1966; Parsons, 1960; Nash, 1963) have been content to assume that the strength of the momentum supporting the process of modernisation will overcome the social unrest which tends to appear towards the beginning of the process. The approach of letting social unrest run its course until it breaks down from exhaustion also seems to fit closely with the development of the Nakahi sect, particularly after 1845.

Following the inconclusive outcome of Heke’s war against the Crown, Papahurihia entered a quieter phase of his career, and for someone who professed severe contempt for Christianity, was regularly contact with several missionaries who visited him at his base at Omanaia, including John Webster, John Warren, Thomas Buddle, and the Catholic Maxime Petit. The work of the Protestant missionaries in particular in this part of Northland was under way with real vigour, and conversions of Maori to Christianity were occurring at a steady rate. Yet, following the conclusion of Heke’s war with the British in early 1846, Papahurihia did not denounce the efforts of the missionaries as he previously might have. The Reverend John Warren reported that Papahurihia had actually approved of the baptism of some Maori into Christianity, and hoped that it would make them less quarrelsome and make them show greater respect to him as their chief (Warren, 1853).

Nakah appeared to be undergoing another transformation. The critical turning point came in 1856, when Papahurihia himself was converted to Christianity by Aperahama Taonui, and took on the name Penetana (Elsmore, 1989). The baptism was conducted by the Wesleyan missionary Thomas Biddle (Binney 1990) with whom Papahurihia had been in frequent contact.
Still though, a slender seam of dissent occasionally ran through Papahurihia’s thoughts. In 1869, he baptised Hone Heke Ngapua (Hone Heke’s grand-nephew and a future Member of Parliament) into the Christian faith, although utilising the outward vestiges of the Nakahi religion. He offered intermittent prophesies on certain major issues of the day, such as the wars of the 1860s, and following his burial in November 1875, a memorial stone placed on his grave on behalf of the Government (Binney 1990) was reported to have turned by itself to face north, where Nga Puhi tradition claimed the spirits of the dead departed to the afterlife (Rankin 2001).

As a political or even religious force, Nakahi seems to have exhausted its energies by the late 1860s. Writing on another Maori sect – the Hauhau movement – E. M. Williams, who was the Resident Magistrate at Waimate, described the situation as he saw it in 1868:

Ngapuhi ridicule the very name, and declare they will never tolerate the system within their district. They compare it to one of a similar character called the “Karakia Ngakahi” (serpent worship) introduced some years ago by Papahurihia, and which for a time engrossed the attention of many among themselves, but which gradually died out, although Papahurihia continues to be respected as a high authority, and his “Atua” often consulted. The man is a ventriloquist, and by throwing his voice induces the belief that their questions are answered by the god they invoke (Smithyman 1997: p. 188).

This was probably too harsh a judgement. Even prior to Papahurihia’s conversion to Christianity, there were signs that the Nakahi sect was succumbing to the forces of acculturation that accompanied the modernisation process. This specific reaction is described by Modernisation theorists (Nash, 1963; Halpern, 1965). It is part of the momentum of change (Halpern, 1965) in which, in the case of Te Nakahi, the sect was forced to continually respond to the challenge of what Halpern (1965) described as ‘…new questions, new facts, and inadequate solutions’ (p. 21). Nash (1963) determined that as part of this progression, key aspects of the traditional society – in this case, a religious
component – would eventually become variants of the modernising power, and that the extent of differentiation would reduce as the process of acculturation continued to affect the formerly traditional community. McClelland’s (1970) recommendation that considerable flexibility be exercised in the traditions of a group in order to foster Achievement applied equally in the practice of acculturation that shaped the Nakahi sect in the nineteenth century.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Nakahi no longer was mentioned in European literature of the period as a current sect. However, although its membership crumbled away to just on fifty followers by the 1880s (Rankin, 2001) – perhaps mirroring the demise of Maori as a political force in the country – its surviving devotees clung tenaciously to its doctrine and practices, but more so out of respect for the early adherents of the sect, than for the ‘usefulness’ which the sect had long since ceased to offer.

**Conclusion**

From the 1830s to the 1860s, the Nakahi sect underwent a metamorphosis which was broadly consistent with the types of immanent forms of modernisation described by the relevant Modernisation theorists referred to in this chapter. The impetus for the development was both internal and external, and a strong impulse of deviance was evident in its doctrine and in the actions of some of its most prominent protagonists. Moreover, although influenced by a Western religion, the Nakahi sect was exclusively comprised of Maori, held services solely in Maori, and employed aspects of pre-European traditional Maori religion in its belief system. As Elsmore (1989) notes:

> It was a movement of adjustment between the two religious views of two very different cultures and, as such, there had to be some adaptation of each position. While the teachings of the missionaries could not remain intact totally, neither could those of the Maori. The irony from the indigenous point of
view is that the New Zealanders [Maori], in an effort to protect their own beliefs, had to adapt them to a significant degree in order to do so’ (p. 46).

Its contribution in terms of its deviance is probably more significant in the framework of Modernisation theory than any other aspect of its doctrine, structure, or leadership. Its ‘dual deviance’ – against both traditional, orthodox Maori religious beliefs as well as against the religion of the missionaries – demonstrated a symptom of the initial stages of modernisation, but also revealed the need for this process to be undertaken in an intentional form, rather than being left to the relatively directionless whims of immanent forms of development. This was more than an irony though. It was a paradox – one that was representative of the tension brought on by the earliest stages of modernisation, and which could ultimately only be resolved, according to Modernisation theory, with the increased diffusion of European values and the associated acculturation of the religious beliefs of this sector of Maori society.

One irony that remains, however, is that Nakahi’s stubborn continuance after the 1850s was partly responsible for nurturing a new generation of leaders who would challenge the modernisation processes of the British Crown. In 1869, Papahurihia baptised Hone Heke Ngapua. Ngapua was brought up in the Nakahi faith, and became a pivotal player in the Kotahitanga movement in the 1890s, about which more is examined in Chapter Five.

The following chapter explores the inception of the office of Protector of Aborigines, which serves as a thematic counter-balance to the immanent form of development that characterised the emergence of the Nakahi sect. The activities of this Government department allow another descriptive dimension of Modernisation theory to be juxtaposed with a particular episode in Maori development.
4. THE PROTECTOR OF ABORIGINES

The inception and early operation of the Office of Protector of Aborigines provides a vivid case of an attempt by the British to promote the modernisation of Maori society through a policy of intentional development. This chapter examines how the creation of the Office marked an important stage in the modernisation process being implemented in New Zealand, and explores the role of the colonising country in directing this development.

The Origins of the Office of the Protector of Aborigines
The Protector of Aborigines was an office Governor William Hobson (1840-2) formed based on the instructions he received from the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Normanby in August 1839 (Normanby, 14-15 August 1839). The instructions were ideologically driven, in part, by the desire of the British Government to act in what it believed was a more humanitarian way when engaging in colonial expansion. Indigenous peoples in the colonies needed protection from the adverse consequences of colonisation, and the best solution – as far as the British Colonial Office was concerned – was to modernise these people so that they could better adjust to ‘civilised’ life. A contemporary social philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, argued that indigenous peoples were basically incapable of directing their own development, and so needed the guidance of a developed country to direct this development on their behalf (Bentham, c. 1775).

The closeness to Modernisation theory is unmistakable here. Smelser (1966) and Hoebink (1997) similarly argued that traditional societies were their own greatest barrier to development, and that modified social norms were required in order for development to progress (Henderschott, 2002). The intervention of a ‘developed’ power would provide a model for the underdeveloped society to model itself on (Giddens, 1988; Bentley, 1987;
Cronin, 2000; Nash, 1963) and would also serve as a stimulus for development to commence (Rostow, 1956). Moreover, Black’s assessment that a break from traditional values and a transformation to a more individualistic, Western type of development was necessary (Bentley, 1997) ties in directly with the sort of modernising enterprise the Office of Protector of Aborigines was about to engage in.

Official Attitudes Towards Maori

Hobson was aware of the need for some sort of effort to be made, by the British Government, to manage the relations between Maori and European, provided that the relationship involved remodelling Maori society so that it took on a more European form. Within eight months of his Governorship commencing, Hobson wrote to his superiors in London acknowledging that although there were relatively few problems with relations between Maori and European at that time, the alleged lack of Maori development would be a major difficulty in the foreseeable future. Hobson’s personal attitude towards traditional Maori society suggests that the impetus from the Governor to modernise Maori society would be substantial: ‘...the native population offer us but trifling interruptions; yet their habits are so inveterately opposed to those of civilised life, and their practices so repugnant to the customs of Englishmen, that we can scarcely hope to preserve such harmony when the settlers become more numerous’ (Hobson, 15 October 1840).

Hobson’s successor, Robert FitzRoy, took what, on the surface appears as an almost contrary view. Yet, his position still accommodates the modernisation view, with more of an emphasis on the development that stems from trade:

There are some - perhaps many persons - who look on the New Zealanders [Maori] themselves as impediments to the prosperity of British settlers in that country. To such a person I would say: the best customers of the settlers in New Zealand are the natives. They are the purchasers of a large amount of blankets, clothing, hardware...and other articles for which they pay in ready money, in native produce...in land, or by their
own labour. The amount of native produce consumed by the settlers is really surprising; and a similar practice will continue, while peace prevails...’ (FitzRoy, 1846).

FitzRoy’s emphasis on commercial engagement as the ‘solution’ to any possible tensions arising from the colonisation of the country is reflected in Halpern’s (1965) assessment of trade as a medium of interaction between a developed and underdeveloped society, in which an almost self-perpetuating momentum of development is generated as a response to the challenges and questions arising from the colonisation process. FitzRoy’s statement can also be seen as fitting into the matrix of development described by Rostow (1956, 1961) in which the adjustment by a traditional society to new modes of economic activity becomes a prerequisite for the subsequent economic and social take-off of that society.

However, despite some optimism for the future of relations between the two societies, the invisible hand guiding commercial exchange was insufficient in itself to guarantee that these relations would either remain beneficial, or that they would necessarily bring about the anticipated ‘improvement’ of Maori. One settler in the colony at this time argued effectively that the unguided, immanent form of development that might be expected to flow from interaction between a Western and non-Western society was inadequate to serve the purpose of modernising Maori: ‘A feeling of regret is, I believe, very generally excited among thinking men, when they observe how little benefit has resulted to barbarous tribes from their intercourse with the people of civilised nations....’(Dieffenbach, 1843, pp. 136-7). The solution proposed by Dieffenbach was for the colonial Government to offer more legislation that covered Maori:

I see no difficulty in legislating for the different people amongst whom colonies have been established, although the minutiae of a legislative design must always be modified according to the different races. I think there can be little difference of opinion as to the general principles....(Dieffenbach, 1843, pp. 136-8).
In the first months of Hobson’s rule in New Zealand, he had relied on his officials, and the network of Protestant missionaries in the country to encourage Maori to adapt to English ways, but with no evident success. It was also inadequate to depend on individuals – such as missionaries – who were not directly under the authority of the colonial Government, and who were therefore not bound to execute Government policy. The informal channels of authority still undoubtedly remained important for the Governor to enact his rule, but a more formal, and hopefully more lasting alternative was necessary (Moon, 1998) in order to enact the policy which would bring about the desired change in Maori society.

The Creation and Purpose of the Office

There is no doubt that the creation of the Office of Protector of Aborigines was an ambitious, even idealistic aspiration. Certainly, from a practical point of view, its intended scope and goals were always far greater than its capacity to meet them, as one settler in New Zealand observed at the time: “‘Protector of Aborigines’ is the official person by whom these duties are professed to be performed; but it is perfectly impracticable, that the various numerous duties of such an office, over such an extent of country, and so great a number of natives, can be performed by one person, with satisfaction to the Government, or with justice to the Aborigines’ (Terry, 1842, p. 218).

Before he arrived in New Zealand, Hobson was unclear precisely how the Office would function, even though it had been referred to in Normanby’s instructions to Hobson in August 1839. Hobson wrote to Normanby a few days later to clarify the type of role the Office was expected to fulfil, and highlighting the vagueness of the initial instructions:

...allusion is made to the Protector of Aborigines. Were the functions of this officer confined to the protection of the natives from physical injury or injustice there could not be two opinions on the subject of his duty; but in matters which relate to their general welfare he and I, with equal zeal in their cause, may entertain very different ideas. I sincerely hope that the duties of this officer may be exactly defined, and that the
Government may be secured from the effect of captious opposition (Hobson, 15 August 1839, p. 43).

Normanby’s reply focussed on the fact that the Office of Protector of Aborigines would be totally under the control of the Governor. This is an important aspect of the Office in the context of this thesis because it manifests a desire, on behalf of the British Government, to actively direct the modernisation of Maori:

The Protector of Aborigines cannot be brought into any relation to you which would throw any doubt on the respective limits of your authority and is, because he would be in the fullest sense of the term your subordinate officer, yielding implicit obedience to all your lawful instructions, and reporting to you all his proceedings Normanby, 15 August 1839, p. 45).

Not only does this represent a clear case of intentional development, it also serves as an example of an external stimulus about to affect the development of a traditional society (Rostow, 1956). However, Rostow’s observation of stimuli asserted that they were most appropriately applied at the point where the traditional society had already undergone some prior development in the direction of a modernised state, and that the traditional society had shown signs of orienting itself to take advantage of the stimulus (Rostow, 1956). The inception of the Office of Protector of Aborigines – within a few months of the establishment of nominal British rule in New Zealand, was certainly a gesture that was done without any previous deliberate orientation of Maori society. This could be one of the reasons, according to the analysis of Modernisation theory, why the Office never achieved what its creators had intended.

Normanby’s successor as Colonial Secretary – Lord Russell – issued further instructions to Hobson in January 1841 (Moon, 1998). These provided additional details on the role of the Office of Protector of Aborigines, and introduced a new consideration into the Office’s functions: a link between the modernisation of social and cultural aspects of Maori society, and the modernisation of perceptions of land holdings –
something that was more akin to the stages of economic development analysed by Rostow (1956) and the changing perceptions among members of the traditional society of what constituted integration in the new economy (Smelser, 1966):

As often as any sale shall hereafter be effected in the Colony, of the lands acquired by purchase from the Aborigines, there must be carried to the credit of the department of the Protector of Aborigines, a sum amounting to, not less than fifteen, nor more than twenty per cent. in the purchase money, which sum will constitute a fund, for defraying the charge of the Protector’s establishment, and for defraying all other charges, which on recommendation of the Protector, the Governor and Executive Council, may have authorised, for promoting the health, civilisation, education and spiritual care of the natives. Such sums, when not immediately required, must be invested in the best securities in New Zealand, or in New South Wales, in the name of the Governor. If, at any future time, the fund should be found to exceed every reasonable demand for this service, any ulterior augmentation of it may be suspended, until the want of additional funds, shall become apparent, or shall be reasonably anticipated. But generally speaking, the proceeds will probably be expended within the year (Russell, 28 January 1841, p. 52).

The accelerated process of modernisation is evident in the way in which various aspects of the process were combined in the workings of the Office. For example, the process of modernising Maori social traits was inextricably linked with the redefinition of Maori land tenure from a traditional, communal model to a Western, private-ownership form. Indeed, the Office of Protector of Aborigines was to be funded primarily from the sale of Maori land. Herein lies one of the important paradoxes with the application of Modernisation theory in this context: the depletion of communally-owned Maori land. This was just as likely to usher in a period of severe economic dislocation as it was to bring about economic development for Maori. This was particularly so when it is considered that the depravation of land both economically and spiritually was one of the features most likely to retard Maori development. It is at this point that serious consideration needs to be given to the extent of social and economic unrest that can be tolerated as part of the broader processes of
modernisation. For most Modernisation theorists (Thurman, 2001; Tilly, 1975; Rostow, 1953, 1956, 1961; Smelser, 1966) the goal of development predominates the route to that end. However, as the course of Maori economic development – right up to the present time – has failed to match that of European development in the country, there is a point here where the precept of social and economic unrest in Modernisation theory seems to have been underestimated. Rostow’s confident assertion that the ultimate success modernisation process would eventually remove the initial causes of social unrest (1956) are not necessarily borne out in the Maori experience in New Zealand. It is therefore possible to view the establishment of the Office of Protector of Aborigines not only as an intentional endeavour to modernise Maori – which it manifestly was – but also as one of the early factors, albeit a small one, contributing to long-term Maori underdevelopment.

In 1840 though, such considerations were simply not present. The drive to modernise Maori was relentless. From the British perspective, the possession by Maori of the traits of modern, Western, civilised people, rather than the continued possession of their ancestral land, took priority. Any faint anxiety over the possible adverse effects of alienating Maori from their land was not evident, and certainly show no trace of having affected either the ideology or the operation of the Office of Protector of Aborigines.

Another element that is important to consider in the establishment of the Office of Protector of Aborigines is the religious dimension. The Protector Hobson appointed was George Clarke snr., who had formerly been secretary of the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) in New Zealand. Prior to making the appointment, Hobson undertook consultations with local missionaries from the CMS, and it was that body which had recommended that Clarke was the most suitable for the position. The missionary involvement is significant from a Modernisation perspective. Firstly, it was the CMS that had recommended to the British Colonial Office that the post of Protector of
Aborigines be created in the first place (Report of the House of Commons Committee on Aborigines in British Settlements, June 1837). The energetic missionary movement in the colony had an approach to civilising Maori (initially in some cases as a prerequisite to conversion to Christianity) that neatly coincided with official British policy. This demonstrates that room existed (and exists) for intentional state policy to work in conjunction with private organisations in order to achieve the goals of modernisation. In the process, though, the room for corruption was significant. One missionary complained around this time of the propensity for missionaries to personally benefit from cheap land purchases from Maori:

I was credibly informed on the island that there is scarcely one of them who has not managed in this way to secure for himself or his children in perpetuity a large extent of valuable territory....the case of these missionaries is in this respect the most monstrous that has occurred in the whole history of missions since the reformations (Lang, 1839, pp. 34 & 37).

The colony’s Attorney-General, William Swainson, similarly noted this tendency for missionaries to combine their spiritual work with temporal motives:

...some of the Missionaries...stationed in the country availed themselves of the permission given by the Church Missionary Society to purchase land from the natives for the use and benefit of their families: but these missionary claims eventually proved to the parent society a source of painful interest. Even in a merely financial point of view, it is a short-sighted economy to expose a Christian Missionary to the temptation of eking out a provision for his family by trafficking with an ignorant people for the purchase of their lands. For, to be efficient, the Missionary must be altogether beyond even the suspicion of self-seeking objects....The [CMS] Missionaries had taken advantage of their position to secure their own aggrandizement....(Swainson, 1859, p. 92).

This was crucial from an administrative perspective because the regime being constructed to achieve modernisation in the colony was dependent on a manifestly corrupt element to assist it. Again, it was an instance of
the sheer haste to accelerate the processes of modernisation which would ultimately undermine the efforts in this direction – in this case through the corruption of the process.

The impact of this corruption (or at least, conflict of interests) was so substantial because the CMS was used, almost from the beginning of 1840, as a de facto bureaucracy for the colonial Government. As Cowen and Shenton (1996) have observed, this type of corruption or conflict or interests has the potential to be a terminal flaw in plans to develop a society. These conflicting positions, which became an inherent feature of the post of Protector of Aborigines ultimately proved to be the undoing of the Office, and were a major factor in it being disbanded in 1846 by Governor George Grey (Grey, 3 June 1846).

The Work of the Office

The modernising efforts of the Office of Protector of Aborigines increasingly came to represent some of the tensions inherent in the monumental and almost unrealistic process of attempting to alter the entire basis of a society, and re-fashion it into a new form. The overt requirement to act to improve the welfare of Maori was the first consideration for the Protector. Of course, welfare in this context had an indisputably European complexion, as the Modernisation theorists in the second half of the twentieth century would have recommended (Nash, 1963; Halpern, 1965; Smelser, 1966; Nairn, 1977). However, the balance of striving for this European and nominally Christian construct of improvement, while also managing aspects of the sale of Maori land on behalf of the colonial Government was never likely to be an easily manageable task – especially in the hands of a person of Clarke’s modest abilities (Moon, 1998). This, in turn, produced a fundamental problem in the execution of the social modernisation of Maori.

The intentional development of Maori planned by the British required an invasive policy approach to Maori society. However, the vague goal of
‘civilisation’ was difficult to measure, and virtually impossible to engineer in a country of 66 million acres, with a Maori population of up to 150,000 (Sinclair, 1988), and with the Office’s staff comprising of just three people. The logistical challenges were undoubtedly overwhelming, to the extent that the highly formal, regimented approach to modernising Maori through an under-resourced Government department either proved to be non-productive or counter-productive.

Yet, from the perspective of the British administration in the country in the early 1840s, the accelerating alienation of Maori land was in no way seen as being linked to a possible stagnation, let alone regression of Maori development. On the contrary, in a parallel of the dismissal of social unrest by Modernisation theorists (Rostow, 1956; Smelser, 1966), the loss of Maori land was simply not considered, because there was no conscious connection made between this facet, and the more positivist goal of the Crown’s intent to recreate Maori society in a more European model.

The proximity of the work of the Office of the Protector of Aborigines to the functions of the colonial Government smudged the idealistic goals of modernisation, with which the Office was charged, with the more mundane or everyday political functions carried out by the Governor. By 1841, the distinction between the work of the Office, and the activities of the colonial Government (which was practically subject to the will of the Governor) was reducing considerably. However, the former was not automatically subservient to the latter. One of the sources of power for the Office was its ability to offer advice to the Governor. In this context, the Office began to emerge as a bridge between the two cultures. An example of this can be seen in 1841, when Clarke provided advice to Hobson about growing Maori discontent over land alienation – especially the emerging realisation among some Maori that they had lost their land through European trickery (Moon, 1998). Clarke had been close enough to both Government activities and some Maori communities to see evidence of how a shortage of Government funds had forced Hobson, in effect, to abuse the Crown’s monopoly right contained in Article the
Second the Treaty of Waitangi to purchase Maori land by paying less than what the market would have dictated to have been a fair price. The Crown’s subsequent flagrant profiteering by on-selling misappropriated Maori land to settlers did little to make Hobson’s administration seem a legitimate government to Maori (Moon, 1998). Certainly, the Office of Protector of Aborigines was contaminated by its close association with the colonial Government, and this unavoidably corrupted its efforts to bring about Maori development. The basic goals set down for the Office of Protector of Aborigines, focussing on the ‘…health, civilisation, education and spiritual care of the natives’ (Russell, 28 January 1841, p. 52), was handicapped by a shortage of funds to enable the Office to function effectively. Moreover, the temptation by the Crown to abuse the frail trust between many iwi and the Crown borne out of the relationship that had been consummated by the Treaty of Waitangi and its emerging power over Maori for immediate financial gain was strengthening over time.

Clarke remained at least outwardly confident, though, that his work was achieving some results as far as the modernisation of Maori was concerned. In January 1841, less than a year after the Office of Protector of Aborigines had been formed, Clarke recommended that the Office’s scope and resources be expanded to achieve the dual role of protecting Maori rights (rights defined in a European context), and shielding the colonial Government for the possible adverse consequences of being seen to abuse those rights. Although laudable intentions for the time as far as the British Government was concerned, the subtext of the language of indigenous rights and development was evidently set in European understandings of these concepts:

...his Excellency will at once perceive the necessity of approved officers being stationed so as to visit the natives, to correct evil disseminations and misapprehensions arising therefrom....The New Zealanders [[Maori] are jealous of their liberty, as well as of their lands; they see them as intimately connected, and they are carefully watching and comparing every public act, deducing from thence positive conclusions as
to the conduct that will be pursued towards themselves....One rash, injudicious step, and the whole country is involved in trouble and ruin; conciliatory measures, such as have happily marked the first year of his Excellency’s government, and a lasting friendship ensues...though it cannot be hid from his Excellency that the seeds of discord have and are being sown among the natives (Clarke, 1903, pp. 99-100).

There were aspects of the Office’s work, however, that can be seen as instructive in terms of how to implement programmes of modernisation. One of these was the approach of avoiding using coercion in order to get Maori to comply with British law. Clarke had very little in the way of actual, direct power, and so was obliged to seek as much consent from Maori as possible for some of his decisions in order to bring them into effect. This bears a relationship with the issue of social unrest that features in Modernisation theory. By the Office of Protector of Aborigines being forced to fall back on cooperation and consent in the absence of any effective powers to enforce its policies, it mitigated some of the potential unrest that could have erupted had it attempted to arbitrarily impose its will on Maori. This may explain to some small extent why the major social unrest in nineteenth-century New Zealand – the land wars of the 1860s – occurred long after the Office of Protector of Aborigines was disbanded, and roughly two decades after the establishment of formal British rule in the colony. It could be argued that the work of the Office helped to delay the onset of social unrest in New Zealand, and in the period of the Office’s operation, managed to reduce the some of the tensions that would lead to such unrest.

The Overall Effectiveness of the Office

The capabilities of the Protector of Aborigines himself figure prominently in any assessment of the value and effectiveness of the Office. Clarke tended to be inconsistent at times, and maybe was not possessed of the type of broad perspective of race relations in the colony that was perhaps required for the post.
This inconsistency is evident in the way Clarke dealt with two issues which arose in 1842. In the winter of that year, Taraia, a Ngati Tamatera chief from the Thames region, began to finalise his plans to attack tribes in the Tauranga area over a disputed pa that had been captured, and over other issues associated with land encroachment (Clarke, in Wards, 1968). Taraia launched his attack, with one result being the death of several Tauranga Maori, and two instances of cannibalism. Clarke decided to involve himself in this dispute, but his clumsy efforts to engineer a peace were rejected by the parties in the conflict on the basis that he had no place involving himself or the colonial administration in matters that were strictly Maori (Moon, 1998).

When appeasement failed, Clarke turned to a completely opposite approach to deal with the situation. At a meeting of the colony’s Executive Council on 17 June 1842, he recommended that the Government make a display of its military force in order to show the conflicting parties that British law could be imposed if it was not obeyed. Here, Clarke not only rejected the idea that a peaceful, negotiated settlement could be reached, but went as far as to reject the idea of a summons being issued to Taraia, arguing that the chief had no respect for British rule. As a result of Clarke’s recommendations, orders were issued for soldiers to arrest Taraia (Moon, 1998). If British rule would not be respected by Maori, then they would be forced to obey it.

Yet, within a week, Clarke had again changed his position (possibly because the British administration in the colony had insufficient resources to mount the show of force he had insisted on) and returned to his initial theme of conciliation (Wards, 1968) arguing that the use or display of any military force could adversely affect the goodwill he claimed to have build up between many Maori communities and the Crown (Clarke, 30 June 1842).
This oscillation in responses by the Protector to the issue of Maori order, and the inclusion of Maori under the umbrella of British law, demonstrates the sort of compromise in which the Protector of Aborigines had to engage in order to pursue the longer term of modernising Maori. This has a connection with the issue of social unrest in the modernisation process. Clarke’s substantial flexibility in his approach to dealing with Maori communities indicates a conscious awareness of trying to balance two essentially conflicting forces: the need to modernise with the need to avoid as much as possible the sort of social unrest that would obstruct this development.

There is also another dimension of the modernising work of the Office of Protector of Aborigines that deserves consideration. That is, the almost absolute requirement of the Office to acquire Maori consent for virtually any decisions it made. Although it is impossible to measure, it is certain that the ability of the Office to impose policies of modernisation was severely compromised by the need for Maori consent. However, what makes this such a significant feature is that the fact of requiring Maori consent meant that the rate of progress of modernisation would only occur at a pace that was acceptable to at least some Maori communities. This has implications right through to the present time, when attempts by state institutions to seek and obtain Maori consent to policies can, in the longer term, contribute to modernisation forces affecting Maori society. Thus can indigenous consent work against the indigenous elements of that society, as long as the modernisation policies demand alterations in the characteristics of the indigenous or traditional society.

**The Success of the Office**

When measured against the lofty ambitions that the British Government had held for the Office of Protector of Aborigines, its success, by contrast, could best be described as very limited. Ultimately, it succumbed to petty bureaucratic machinations in the absence of any capacity to exert its influence in a noticeable way on Maori society. In 1846, when Governor
Grey disestablished the Office, he described it as a failure, and made no mention of it having influenced the course of Maori development in the colony: ‘The business of this office was conducted by the late Protector of Aborigines in so unusual a manner that it is almost impossible to obtain any information upon subjects with which that office was connected, as they were shrouded with studious mystery’ (Grey, 3 June 1846, p. 5).

Another of Hobson’s successors, Governor Gore Browne, was similarly critical of the work of the Office:

...in other colonies where the Europeans have assumed the duties connected with the government of partially civilised tribes, it has been found necessary to have officers regularly trained and educated for those duties....In New Zealand the Government is, and always has been, unable to perform its duty, for want of a sufficient number of agents so trained and qualified for the service required of them (Browne, 25 May 1861, in Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives, E-3A).

Another deficiency affecting the Office was a continual shortage of funds. In 1841, the Office was allocated £2,000 for the ‘protection’ of Maori (Sinclair, 1957) but this was far too little to allow for the sort of Maori development the British Government had envisaged the Office would bring about.

There is an important issue associated with this relative failure of the Office’s intentions from a Modernisation perspective. The inability of the Office to substantially effect Maori modernisation – principally because of the small scale of its operations – suggested that if future efforts at Maori modernisation were to be attempted, they would require much greater financial and logistical support by the state. Rostow (1956) makes a similar essential point when he refers to the scale of investment that is required in order to bring about the development of a society. If the threshold of investment is not reached, then the anticipated modernisation will simply not occur.
A Lack of Understanding of Maori Society

There was also another noteworthy reason why the official approach to the modernisation of Maori society failed under the auspices of the Protector of Aborigines. This reason was connected with the lack of knowledge British officials in general, and Hobson in particular had about Maori society (Moon, 1998). Swainson – probably the most enlightened of Hobson’s officials – made this point very clearly:

...the Governor of New Zealand...is in an unenviable and anomalous position. In the various forms of books, pamphlets, and Parliamentary Reports...very little is generally known of the real condition, social and political, of its aboriginal Native race - of their power and influence - and of the qualified character of their submission to British rule. No special provision was made for their government; and...they take no part in the exercise of the ...Government of the country....(Swainson, pp. 367-8).

The issue of coming to terms with the characteristics of this traditional society was also touched on by a later nineteenth-century politician, William Gisborne. When reflecting on Hobson’s difficulties in this area, Gisborne revealed something of his own misunderstanding of the nature of Maori society:

His [Hobson’s] first duty was to negotiate with uncivilised tribes for the country which he was commissioned to govern. Then he was called on to substitute peace, order, and good government for absolute anarchy; and to do this under different and dangerous conditions. On the one hand, an aboriginal race, armed, warlike, jealous of its own position, suspicious of interference, and ignorant of English law, language, and habits, occupied the country...(Gisborne, 1886, pp. 8-9).

Yet, according to a consensus of Modernisation theorists, this lack of understanding of Maori society ought not to have been a problem. Traditional societies have tended to be lumped together by these theorists (Parsons, 1960; Nash, 1963; Hoselitz, 1964a; Smelser, 1966; Hoebink,1997), with practically no consideration given to the distinctive aspects each society possesses. Smelser's (1966) generalisations in
particular caste the impression that there is a unitary form of traditional society, and with a small amount of latitude, will react in roughly predictable ways when confronted with attempts to modernise them. One of the lessons that is clear from the experience of the work of the Office of Protector of Aborigines in New Zealand in the first half of the 1840s is that this blanket classification of traditional, non-European societies by Modernisation theorists does not match reality, as Frank drew attention to in his critique of Modernisation theory (1971).

Further evidence of the lack of British understanding of Maori society is found in the approach of British officials at this time. The fact that the Colonial Office was prepared to invest its faith in the tiny Office of Protector of Aborigines in order to bring about drastic modifications in Maori society reveals something of the miscomprehension, at the very least, of the scale of the challenge. However, the other side to this issue lay in the bleak outlook of the Permanent Undersecretary of the Colonial Office, Sir James Stephen. Stephen’s view was that indigenous groups often faced imminent extinction in the face of colonisation by a European power (Marais, 1927), and so was resigned to allowing what he saw would be sufficient expenditure for what might ultimately prove to be a doomed cause. Ironically though, Stephen was one of the loudest humanitarian voices in the Colonial Office (and possibly the entire British Government as well (Moon, 2002)). Thus, he was prepared to offer the opportunity for Maori to modernise, knowing that their fate would be almost certainly doomed if they chose to decline the offer. From the British Government’s perspective, the Office of Protector of Aborigines would be a point of recourse for Maori wishing to avoid their own terminal decline, as much as it would be an instrument for imposing modernisation on Maori. Outwardly, this could be seen as a weakness of the Office, yet it was also a strength in that it encouraged a dependence on Maori consent to elements of the modernisation process. This was a far slower and more challenging process, but it also had the effect of mitigating some of the potential unrest that could result from more forceful attempts at modernisation.
Conclusion
The modernisation of Maori society was a plank in British Government policy on New Zealand from 1839, and had its antecedents in British policy extending back – at an ideological level – for almost a decade prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi. However, budgetary constraints, poor leadership, less-than-able staff, and a deficit in the understanding of Maori society, all contributed to the eventual failure of the Office. However, despite this failure, there are important perspectives that the experience of the operation of the Office contributes both to the understanding of Modernisation theory, and to the subsequent course of Maori development.

First, its failure revealed that in the future, a clearer picture of the goal of Maori development, and the nature of the transition towards that goal, would have to be articulated. Black (1966) observed that the details of how structural change would transpire was crucial to the Modernisation process. Such details were lacking on the work of the Office of Protector of Aborigines. Instead, the Office deferred to a virtually formless construct of civilisation as its distant goal for Maori society.

Another lesson that the colonial Government seemed to have learned from the failure of the Office of Protector of Aborigines was that if intentional development was to occur, then it would have to be on a scale that would allow the policy to achieve what it set out to do. Goals as ambitious as redefining and restructuring the entire basis of a society could not be met without substantial expense.

Finally, there was the dilemma that cut through the heart of the Office’s activities, and which has remained, in various forms, up to the present time. This was the contradiction of the state endeavouring to ‘protect’ Maori on the one hand, while simultaneously trying to undermine their society as part of the process of assimilating them into European society. The two positions were not necessarily mutually exclusive, and room for some degree of integration existed, but to achieve full assimilation
necessarily meant removing those aspects of the traditional society that were seen as barriers to modernisation. This predominance of assimilation was emphasised in Thurman’s (2001) suggestions for the realignment of national identity, in which old national identities would be replaced with new forms. Similarly, Smelser (1966), and Rostow (1956) justified the dislocation of modernisation, and the monumental changes it would foist on traditional societies as being an important step along the path to a modernised state.

What imposed modernisation onto Maori society more than any of the efforts of the Office of Protector of Aborigines was the immanent process of British immigration. FitzRoy observed at first hand this transition, in which there was an evident impatience by some settlers with the traditional Maori belief-system, at the same time as the colonial administration was attempting to extend its legal system over Maori communities:

...in 1842 the tide began to turn. More settlers arrived in every ship. The natives were not only treated with less caution and less kindness than previously, but they were threatened, even on trifling occasions, with the punishments of English law (to them unintelligible); and they were told by ill-disposed or unreflecting white men that their country was taken from them, that they were now Queen Victoria’s slaves, and that they could not even sell their own property - their land - as they pleased. These taunts were felt deeply....the chiefs began to feel that they were no longer the principal persons; but that their influence and power were diminishing rapidly...(FitzRoy, 1846, pp. 11-12).

Finally, Hobson hoped that Maori would adjust their society to accommodate the demands of the British regime in the colony (Williams, 1847), but the lack of time and money he could devote to this task meant that it performed according to the relatively low priority it was given by the Government.

In future attempts by the Government to modernise Maori, more comprehensive, well-funded, and well-conceived efforts would be made.
Yet, despite successive Maori policies implemented by the Government, by the end of the nineteenth century, enough Maori were sufficiently dissatisfied to be at the receiving end of the Government’s modernisation policies that they decided to devise an institution and accompanying systems which would allow them to govern their own development. This institution – the Kotaitanga movement – is the subject of the following chapter, and simultaneously demonstrates a Maori reaction to the modernisation policies of the Government, and ironically, a modernised Maori response to these policies.
The Kotahitanga movement, which emerged from the late 1870s, throws up some important issues relating to Maori development and the impact of the forces of modernisation on Maori society from the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first five years of the twentieth century. The initial theme that is evident is of Maori resisting the political power of the colonising Governments of this period. Maori political power had been largely usurped since the 1840s (Cox, 1993), and the Kotahitanga movement can be seen as a challenge to that fact. However, there is also a paradox running through the movement because the form of its resistance was fashioned on European models – specifically, a European parliament. Furthermore, its emphasis on pan-tribalism, and a new classification of Maori leader (not necessarily hereditary chiefs) was also symptomatic of Maori society at this time being strongly affected by the processes of modernisation. Thus, the Kotahitanga movement demonstrates traits of social unrest, resistance to the forces of modernisation, and at the same time, characteristics of imitation of the modern regime it was outwardly resisting – all features closely linked to aspects of Modernisation theory.

Another aspect of the Kotahitanga movement that relates to the development context is that it appears as an example of intentional development undertaken by Maori society. This put it on a collision course with the Government's planned development for Maori, and demonstrates the inclination for there to be only one form of intentional development applied to a society at any given time.

**The Roots of Kotahitanga**

Although the exact origins of the Kotahitanga movement are unclear – principally because it seemed to have emerged simultaneously in several parts of the country – its beginnings can be traced back in part to Northland, where several prominent Nga Puhi began to promote the idea of Maori unity in the second half of the nineteenth century (Cox, 1993). At the same time, there was a specific element of rejection of various
previous attempts at forging some form of definite Maori resistance to the adverse consequences of European colonisation. This is made clear in a speech given by Hone Mohi Tawhai to the Council of Paramount Chiefs of the Kotahitanga movement at Waipatu in April 1893:

…let us persevere in planning our Kotahitanga and let us persevere with the organisation of the inheritance from our parents and ancestors. Let us be wise and let us be tolerant….I will not look to the way of Te Whiti because he proceeds according to the Maori custom, and does not move towards the practice of the Pakeha. This is why I say that this is within the unity of the Maori people. Concerning Tawhiao’s course, my thoughts are not for his way for he worked through the Maori way, and what I intend is that this is within the unity of the Maori people (Tawhai, 21 April 1893).

The notion of ‘kotahitanga’ – a political movement of unity among hapu and iwi seeking some form of emancipation from years of plainly injurious British rule – was propelled in the 1860s and 1870s on one hand by mounting concerns over breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi: breaches that the Crown appeared to be executing with no consideration to the effects on Maori or to the status of the Treaty. The other catalyst for its emergence was the political disempowerment, coupled with the rapid alienation of land that had left practically no Maori community in the country unaffected.

Kotahitanga challenged the European system of rule in the country. Many Europeans viewed it as a disruptive element in a landscape otherwise characterised by increasing European-based order (Cox, 1993). In such an environment, the only solution to the Kotahitanga ‘problem’ was either for it to be uprooted, or to let it wither away to a natural death.

The impetus for the Kotahitanga movement was ostensibly a popular frustration among Maori at being shunted to the social, economic, and political periphery of the country. However, the movement was not the first manifestation of this anxiety and disquiet. Its precedents extended
back for decades. Maori sovereignty, in the face of interaction with Tauitiwi (external peoples) was given a definite form in 1835 when James Busby, the highly ineffective British Resident in New Zealand, hastily assembled the Declaration of Independence with the immediate intent of hampering the intentions of the eccentric Baron Charles De Thierry. De Thierry had announced his intention to establish his own sovereign rule in Hokianga – something which Busby mistook as a sign of an imminent French manoeuvre to seize the colony (Moon, 2002).

Under the terms of the Declaration, (which crumbled within a few years of its signing) (Moon, 2002), Maori chiefs would exercise exclusive collective sovereign authority over the country. The language used was unambiguous, and although fatally weakened by being deprived of a means of enforcement, the pronouncement of Maori sovereign independence awoke in many minds a new sense of pan-tribal political consciousness (Cox, 1993).

A much more comprehensive expression of pan-tribal sovereignty occurred in 1840, when the Crown concluded the Treaty of Waitangi with over five hundred Maori chiefs. Article two of the Maori text of the agreement guaranteed that the Crown would protect the chiefs in the exercise of their sovereign rights – tino rangatiratanga (although conversely, the English version ceded all Maori sovereignty to the Crown) (Orange, 1987). Such written confirmations of sovereignty were less significant in the 1840s than they would be a few decades later, when the ratio of Maori to Europeans in the country was reversed (Sinclair, 1988). It was when the clumsy attempts by colonial rulers at wielding power over Maori began to be felt in various parts of the country that a reaction was produced. From the mid-1850s, Maori would never again be in the position to rely on their numerical superiority as the basis for their political power. Henceforth, those groups of Maori who sought to protect their sovereignty would have to engage in innovative and numerous rearguard actions to do so.
What is clear from this review of the background to the Kotahitanga movement is that it was propped up by popular Maori dissatisfaction at the rule imposed on them by the British colonial administration in New Zealand. This is precisely the sort of social unrest Smelser (1966) anticipated. Smelser’s reference to revolutionised political frameworks being introduced by European powers, and the subsequent reaction by the indigenous society to this closely fits the Maori experience in New Zealand for the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet, the Kotahitanga movement was never itself a completely revolutionary organisation, in the sense that it never sought to overthrow British rule. Instead, its leaders proposed a separate system of government for Maori.

The structure of the Kotahitanga movement, with its executive, regional representatives, budgets, committees and so forth, closely mirrored the structure of its European counterpart. This, too, was anticipated by Modernisation theorists (Rostow, 1956; Thurman, 2001), in which a new conservatism (in this case, conservative European political structures) became the basis of what outwardly may have been perceived by some Europeans as a rebellious movement. Moreover, the sense of Maori national identity was cultivated by the Kotahitanga movement, as opposed to most previous Maori political movements which still constructed their power bases along hapu or iwi lines. This realignment of national identity, albeit primarily in a political context, was ironically the only realistic means of Maori mustering enough political power to mount a serious challenge to the European Government – even if it meant dispensing with some of the cultural strengths that hapu or iwi-based organisations possessed. This, according to Thurman (2001), is a critical stage in the modernisation of any traditional society. Indeed, the sorts of intensified social interaction between hapu and iwi that took place as a result of organisation of the Kotahitanga movement led to the type of increasingly unified state and national identity that Thurman analysed was necessary in order for further modernisation to take place (2001).
Despite its name, the emergent Kotahitanga movement in Northland in the 1870s, like Hone Heke’s rebellion against the Crown a generation beforehand, did not unite Maori, or even all of the Nga Puhi iwi, under a single cause. Just as Tamati Waka Nene and Heke represented collaborators and loyalists respectively to Maori in the 1840s, so too did a similar divide open up among those Nga Puhi who, from the 1870s, allied themselves politically either with the Crown, or with this new unity and independence movement. It was partly Northland’s geography, the meagre presence of Government bureaucracy, and a numerically dominant Maori population, that enabled a resilient spirit of defiance of European rule to persist. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, many Nga Puhi communities were comfortably beyond the grip of British rule (Lee, 1987).

Kotahitanga was hardly exclusively a Nga Puhi sentiment though. Clusters of similarly-minded Maori in other hapu and iwi around the country were giving voice to their wishes for more political unity and influence. The King Movement survived the wars of the 1860s, and although battered by the conflict, clung obstinately to its main aspiration for greater Maori self-rule. However, the movement was still operating in fundamental opposition to the Crown, and never really escaped from its regional constraints. Like the confluence of two great oceans, the King movement and the Kotahitanga movement shared many similar elements, but tended to repel each other at contact.

Another group confined to a particular geographical region was the resistance movement led by the prophet Te Whiti, in Taranaki. Like the Maori King, Te Whiti and his followers laboured in a largely rear-guard action to preserve Maori land tenure (Williams, 1969). Both of these pulses of resistance were weakening though by the end of the nineteenth century. The King Movement conceded its diminishing control over its own members when it was forced to ask for the Crown’s assistance in restricting the sale of alcohol in areas that were supposedly under its
jurisdiction, and in 1884 went as far as petitioning Queen Victoria directly for the right to self-govern (Williams, 1969). When John Ballance’s Government passed the West Coast Settlement Reserves Act in 1892, 200,000 acres of Taranaki land was brought under the control of the Public Trustee (Parliamentary Debates, 8 July 1892). Te Whiti’s previous resistance to the Crown’s encroachment over Maori land seemed to have achieved very little. Ironically, it was the King movement and the followers of Te Whiti who opted to remain outside the orbit of the Kotahitanga movement in the 1890s. While Thurman’s suggestion of greater indigenous unity and solidarity (2001) was not absolutely manifested in the early phases of the Kotahitanga movement’s existence, this can be attributed to the unevenness of the process, which Smelser (1966) repeatedly emphasised, and the fact that the concept of pan-tribal unity was a mutation of traditional Maori political thinking which was predominately iwi-based.

One of the other aspects of the rise of Kotahitanga was that it potentially overrode old animosities with other iwi. This residue of intertribal tensions had extended back most recently to Hongi’s devastating attacks through many parts of the North Island in the beginning of the century (Williams and Oliver, 1981). The lingering mutual suspicion and contempt between some iwi proved to be an obstacle to substantial pan-Maori unity even well into the twentieth century (Cox, 1993), yet in the 1880s and early 1890s, the emerging Kotahitanga movement helped to galvanise iwi to develop a distinct political personality at a pan-tribal level. Such would be the strength of this evolving political movement that it soon began to draw in the support of other iwi in the North and South Islands. In 1881 for example, Te Tiriti o Waitangi Marae was constructed specifically with the purpose of accommodating hui where it was hoped that southern iwi and hapu would attend and join the Kotahitanga movement (Ward, 1973), and by the mid-1890s, most iwi in the country had representatives in the Kotahitanga movement (Fourth Sitting of the Kotahitanga Parliament, 1895).
Early Developments and Setbacks

Two considerations guided the early development of the Kotahitanga movement. The first was the persistent need that was expressed to achieve pan-tribal unity, even if it required some of the existing acrimony between certain iwi to be buried (Cox, 1993). As an extension of this was the firm realisation that even if this unity was achieved, it would be pointless without accompanying political influence. The failure of previous efforts to deliver substantial political power to Maori had taught the supporters of Kotahitanga that this would be a central requirement of the movement.

In 1889, many of the tribal leaders in Northland were becoming increasingly invigorated by the proposal of finally achieving unity and political power for Maoridom within the modern, European political realm of the country. The fruit of this enthusiasm was a flurry of hui which resolved, in an agreement signed by five hundred representatives, that the new unity movement be based on solid adherence to the Treaty of Waitangi (New Zealand Herald, 28 March 1889, and 29 March 1889). However, the nagging issue of a lack of credible political power, especially in Parliament, prevented Kotahitanga from flourishing. A final flicker of this ‘old’ Kotahitanga movement was witnessed at Omanaia in May 1890, where yet another petition calling for the Treaty to be honoured was put together and despatched to the Crown (Cox, 1993). A dead-end seemed to have been reached, and some time in mid-1891, the movement abruptly shifted its position. There could be no question that petitions, signed statements, letters and assemblies had utterly failed to penetrate the attitudes of any of the European politicians on the central issue of extensive Maori self-rule (Williams, 1969).

The Invigorated Kotahitanga

Now, following a winter of frustration, a mass and almost spontaneous consensus began to swell in many Maori communities. Government sanction for true Maori self-determination was more remote than ever, and so the only alternative that could be seen was to achieve independence
irrespective of where Government sentiments on the issue lay. The sense of urgency around this issue was becoming more robust. One Maori observer at a meeting organised to discuss an alternative parliament argued that ‘It is no use as of old putting our words on paper and sending that to the government…as we would be replied to by deceit, and by words intended to make us believe one thing, when the contrary is meant’ (Major Kemp, in Pharazyn, 1892, p. 3). It was Wi Parata, a former Member of the House of Representatives for Western Maori, who got to the root of the impetus behind this rising movement: ‘If all feel pain, then all will unite in seeking a remedy’ Wi Parata, in Pharazyn, 1892, p. 4).

In December 1891, a major gathering of mainly Nga Puhi chiefs took place at Waima, a small settlement around ten kilometres from the Hokianga Harbour. The purpose of this meeting was to agree on an agenda for a much grander pan-tribal hui to be convened at Waitangi in a few months (Williams, 1969). Under the principal direction of the Nga Puhi chief Heta Te Haara, the assembly of chiefs from almost all parts of the country gathered at Waitangi on 14 April 1892. The Proceedings of the Meeting (Translation of the proceedings of Maori meetings in the Maori language, J. McRae (trans.) 14 April, 1892), published shortly afterwards, do little to portray the enthusiasm that had captured the imagination and hopes of the participants. However, the scale of the event, and the status and integrity of the iwi representatives who had descended on Northland from throughout New Zealand, suggest that the crusade to restore rangatiratanga was being armed for a final victory:

The assembly of the chiefs of the two islands of Aotearoa and Te Waipounamu, the islands which have been called New Zealand, sat on the 14th day of April, 1892. The people who gathered at that meeting for unity had been carefully chosen by the tribes of their home territories. The tribes of those men who had come there had also written letters of authorization for them to be shown to the assembly of New Zealand chiefs so that they would know for certain that they had been authorized by their own people, and that their proposals effected in that meeting had authority. Those chiefs who came together in “The Treaty of Waitangi” were from each
Of the 1342 Maori in attendance, the list of chiefs who committed their mana to the Kotahitanga movement produced a mandate that was without precedent for any Maori political initiative. The list of those chiefs, in the original orthography, is worth reproducing here in full as a demonstration of the political force that was behind Kotahitanga:

Wihape Pakau, younger brother of Wikato, Ngati Awa, Poneke;
Wiparata Te Kakakura, Ngati Toa, Te Atiawa, Taranaki;
Ngati Ruanui, Waikena;
Tamihana Te Hoia, Ngati Raukawa, Otaki;
Meiha Kepa, Te Rangihiwinui, Whanganui, Ngarauru, Rangitane, Muaupoko;
Te Mana o Tawhaki, Ngwairiki, Ngati Apa, Turakina;
Te Maraku, Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati Te Kohera, Taupo;
Hoani Nahe, Ngati Maru, Ngati Tamatera, Ngati Pukenga,
Ngati Paoa, Hauraki;
Hamiora Mangakahia, Moehau, Whangapoua Whitianga,
Harataunga;
Akapita Tetewe, Ngati Terangi, Tauranga;
Eru Teuremutu, Matenga Taiwhanga, Hori Taiawhio, all from Te Arawa;
Te Ramaapakura, Ngati Awa, Whakatane, Te Teko;
Paora Taia, Te Whakatohea and Whanau-a-Apanui, Opotoki;
Tuta Nihoniho Apiata Te Hame, Ngati Porou, from Tikirau to Tokaatiau;
Wi Pere, Timi Kara, of Tauranga and Urewera;
Hoani Kehua, Te Mahia, Nuhaka, Whakaki, Kahungunu;
Tamihana Huata, Kerei Teota, Kahungunu, Wairoa, Waiau,
Whakapunake, Waikare, Mohaka;
Hekengarangi, Pene Te Ua, Mohi Teatahikoia, Wi Rangirangi,
Peni Tepuna, Kahungunu, Waikari, Whanganui-a-rotu,
Ahuriri, and all its regions, Patea, Hineuru;
Tunuiaranga, Kahungunu, Wairarapa, Heretaunga.
Timoti Te Whiua, Hoana Maaka, Ngaitahu and Ngati Mamoe,
Te Waipounamu.
Heta Paika, Hauraki, Ngati Whatua, Kaipara;
Taurau Kukupa, Mari Te Hautakiri, Wiremu Pomare, Pomare
Kingi, Tito, Pouaka Parere, Netana Patuawa Rikihana, Te
Parawhau, Te Rarawa, Tekoroa, Ngati Whatua, Whangarei,
Mangakahia, Wairoa, Opunake;
Hapakuku Moetara, Wiki Te Pa, Toi, Ngati Korokoro,
Waimamaku;
The impulses of anticipation and excitement at such a gathering offered those present the fortitude that would be needed to deliver Maori political independence. Even the cautious James Carroll, who was a Member of the House of Representatives and would soon become the first Maori Cabinet Minister – when witnessing the rate at which support for this new movement was growing – had cause to utter a vague statement in general support, provided that, as he carefully worded his thoughts, the movement would act ‘…within the limits of practicability’ (Carroll in New Zealand Herald, 28 April 1892).

**Modernised Maori Opposition**

Carroll’s commentary on some of these early meetings is significant. Ultimately, he proved to be an opponent of full Maori self-rule, and was unashamedly acting in his capacity as a Member of the House of Representatives when visiting the Kotahitanga meetings. Part of the importance of Carroll’s presence is that he can be seen as representing the more modernised state of Maori development, as opposed to the Kotahitanga movement, which were still ostensibly at the state of social unrest, and was resisting the new political order in the country. This
dynamic is so important because it transcends the racial divisions of the earlier phase of modernisation (best seen in the work of the Office of Protector of Aborigines) in which the modernised state of development was represented solely by Europeans, and the underdeveloped state was entirely characterised as Maori. By the 1890s, some Maori, such as Carroll, were already existing in a modernised and overwhelming European environment, and were actually instrumental in forcing the process of modernisation onto other members of their society. In the language of Nash (1963), Carroll could be described as having succumbed to the acculturation process, whereas those in the Kotahitanga movement had been less exposed to this same process, and therefore had the latitude to believe in the possibility of an alternative governmental regime. However, the very notion of a pan-Maori government could also be seen as evidence of Nash’s acculturation process impacting on the Kotahitanga movement, but in perhaps a less immediate way.

What is also important about this developmental division in Maori society in the 1890s is that it suggests that the followers of the Kotahitanga had yet to advance themselves along the modernisation path as far as Carroll had. If this was the case then the outlook for the Kotahitanga movement was bleak, because it could be categorised in the modernisation context as a transitory phase which would eventually pass away as the overall process of modernisation advanced (Smelser, 1966). This analysis is borne out in the subsequent history of the Kotahitanga movement.

Another, even more pronounced example of the gap between the various stages of modernisation within Maori society came with an attack from a nineteen-year-old Maori university student who would later join the House of Representatives. The student concerned, Apirana Ngata, described the workings of the Kotahitanga Parliament as ‘…crude and almost ridiculous…’, and suggested that its supporters, including some of the most senior rangatira in the country, suffered from ‘…a plentiful lack of wisdom, discernment and foresight (Ngata, 1893, p. 6)’. This was more than just youthful indiscretion. Ngata remained an opponent of the
Kotahitanga movement, and in 1905, successfully dislodged Wi Pere, the incumbent Eastern Maori Member of the House of Representatives and a long-standing advocate of the Kotahitanga movement. At the turn of the century Ngata could be identified, in the context of Modernisation theory, as part of the advance guard of the modernisation process affecting the indigenous culture in New Zealand.

In another realm, the sense that some of those Maori who had entered the House of Representatives had failed to serve what were seen as the more important political needs of Maori society is indicative precisely of the gulf that had opened up between different groups of Maori who were at various stages of development along the Modernisation continuum. For the leaders of the Kotahitanga movement, the need for a unified Maori position on issues affecting their society was a goal that ought to be aspired to. Indeed, the name ‘Kotahitanga’ was not just a symbolic title for the alternative Maori parliament. The importance of Maori unity, even in the European House of Representatives, had been emphasised on the opening day of proceedings of the first formal meeting to re-establish the Kotahitanga movement. On the afternoon of 19 April 1892, the Ngati Whanaunga leader, Hamiora Mangakahia, stood before the assembled chiefs and issued this summary of the significance of the work that was about to be undertaken, starting with the situation as he saw it prevailing:

Because all the Maori tribes of these two islands have felt the pain and burden of the jurisdiction of the laws formed by the Parliament of the Government of New Zealand in the many years now gone by, because of this the Maori tribes of these islands have sought ways to retain the remainder of their lands for themselves now…(Translation of the proceedings of Maori meetings in the Maori language, J. McRae (trans.). 14 April, 1892).

Then came the pointed attack on the performance of some of the current Members of the House of Representatives – a comment which produced some of endorsement from the audience:
It was also said [at previous hui] that the [Maori] members must unite when they stood in Parliament, and that they must support each other’s speeches as they had agreed. [For] when they reached Parliament, those members broke apart; they did not stand together and nothing resulted according to the wishes of the Maori people (Translation of the proceedings of Maori meetings in the Maori language, J. McRae (trans.). 14 April, 1892).

At this stage, some of the leaders of the Kotahitanga movement obviously saw the presence of some of its members in the House of Representatives as a means of furthering their aims. However, there were divisions that had fractured the Maori voice among their European parliamentary colleagues. To emphasise the importance of acting in unity in the European Parliament, Mangakahia continued his address by exploring the basis of this theme from the perspective of a rangatira:

The meaning of this word unity is an agreement by man, woman and child for there to be one rule for them. If their leader says: ‘The rule for us all is like this’, the man, woman and child will all consent. If their leader says: ‘This is the path for us to travel on’, they will all agree. This is the real meaning of this word, that not one of that gathering of people moves out on to another different path. They are as one in all matters. Thus this topic was put in the notice to be dealt with by this meeting of chiefs so that all the Maori tribes of these two islands will agree that there be one rule; some of the tribes in these two islands are not to remain outside the unity. If the tribes of these islands unite permanently, then that unity of these Maori tribes can set to work to select carefully the conditions for [its agenda] (Translation of the proceedings of Maori meetings in the Maori language, J. McRae (trans.). 14 April, 1892).

Uncompromising and simple this message may have been, but it was delivered with an anxious sense that the opportunity for rescuing Maori from a fatal future needed to be grasped quickly. With just four Maori in the House of Representatives – facing the daily onslaught of hostile or indifferent European legislation – unity was all-important to advance the causes that the Kotahitanga Parliament was about to articulate in some detail.
Internal Division as a Component of Social Unrest

One of the contentions here – that the Kotahitanga was fundamentally a manifestation of the sort of social unrest that is brought about by the processes of modernisation – is borne out in the character and experiences of the movement. Smelser, (1966) attributed such unrest to the dislocation that occurs as modernisations sets in on communities. However, there appears to be another layer to social unrest which is seen in the work of the Kotahitanga: internal division. This can be the result of uncertainty or confusion over the nature of political reality during times of social unrest, or the various rates at which members participating in a form of social unrest accommodate the sort of developments that are happening around then, and their place in this course of development.

The Native Rights Bill

A vivid example of this was the Native Rights Bill introduced into the House of Representatives in 1894 by Hone Heke Ngapua. Earlier that year, the Kotahitanga Parliament met in Pakirikiri, north of Gisborne on the East Coast of the North Island, and drafted a version of the Bill. This draft did not go as far as to demand a separate Maori state within New Zealand, but did propose provisions for extensive Maori autonomy and self-government. This signified an important innovation in the Maori Parliament, as though it had already acknowledged its own ineffectiveness, and was now positioning itself as a provider of legislation which could subsequently be introduced into the House of Representatives by sympathetic Maori Members of the House. This is indicative of the phase of social unrest – characterised by the very existence of the Kotahitanga movement – nearing the completion of its progression. Complete independence from the modernising power was not possible, so the best that could be hoped for was some sort of accommodation with that power.

Choosing Between Separate or Co-operative Development

The Bill’s architect, Hone Heke Ngapua, actively lobbied the Kotahitanga movement for its support, and overall, he received strong endorsement.
Some of the comments made by members of the movement when discussing the Bill give a sense of the constitutional issues that had to be tackled:

Tamahau: “Heke stood again and said that we would succeed in our demand for separatism. Now this was a new word to me. It would be a good thing to ask him to come here again and speak on this matter. This lies heavy in my heart, he said that by the taking of the authority we would achieve our work (Tamahau, May 1893)”.

H. K. Taiaroa: “We request this authority from whom? – the Queen. Who is now the mouthpiece for the Queen? – the Governor. Heke’s Bill will not stand. And the thing which they will strike out will be this question – Who will sign for the Maoris when the authority of the Queen has ceased? Well, it would never be approved to….However, I, I am working on the means to bring about well-being for us all. It should not be the case that that statement be carefully put aside, but that it be abandoned…. (Taiaroa, May 1893)”.

Mangakahia: “This work proceeds under the Treaty, if it is like that, then I am quite happy for it to stand (Mangakahia, May 1893)”.

The role of separate development was one of the salient features of these exchanges. From a developmental perspective, this was a critical issue. At the heart of the matter was whether Maori development would be autonomously directed, or guided (to whatever extent) by a modernising power. The former option would fit in with the prescriptive elements of Dependency theory (Frank, 1971), whereas the latter model, in which a modernising power fulfils a paternalistic, trusteeship role, is more consistent with Modernisation theory and its precursors (Mill, 1861; Nash, 1963). Ultimately, the fact that the Bill was being promoted through the House of Representatives indicates that the latter path (perhaps unwittingly) was being followed by the Kotahitanga movement.

Ngapua, as one of the leaders of the Kotahitanga movement, responded to the discussions about his Bill. He was clearly tilting towards a type of development that was separate from anything guided by the colonial
Government. He could therefore be positioned, in the Modernisation spectrum, as further away from the modernised ideal than Carroll:

I am sure of my words. Yesterday morning, I was taken by J. Taiaroa to his office to select the Bills. Because of his difficulty, I knew that he had come to my question about the authority. I was asked who should pass the acts, and I said the Council [of Paramount Chiefs – the Kotahitanga Parliament’s upper house]. I gave him the texts of the books I had looked at, and later when asked who should sign the thing passed by this House, he said to me the Governor. I said to him – let’s take it before the majority for them to consider (Ngapua, May 1893).

Thus did Ngapua place a challenge before the feet of the members of the Kotahitanga Parliament – a challenge on which its entire future role would undoubtedly hinge. The reaction to Ngapua’s proposal indicates that there was a sense of commitment to the cause of separate development that outweighed the niggling opposition of a small number of individuals:

Paraone: “I agree that we ourselves should sign our proposals….(Paraone, May 1893)”.

Speaker: :For these Bills, the refusal to sign cannot be allowed (Speaker, May 1893)”.

H. K. Taiaroa: “Well, I say that we should do as the Pakeha, that is, persist in making laws for ourselves….I suggest that my motion be withdrawn and Heke’s be put in…This is my thinking on the discussion. Heke’s Bill was passed and so I took out my Bill. One of my ideas was this, that Heke’s Bill was just the same as mine, so I said to withdraw my motion (Taiaroa, May 1893)”.

Ngapua’s was one of several Bills that had been drafted and circulated for discussion, and through the debate, it emerged as being the favoured one, and agreement was reached for Ngapua’s Bill to be printed and copies distributed to members of the Kotahitanga Parliament. On the evening of Monday 15 May 1893, Ngapua was invited to formally present his bill to the Members of the Kotahitanga Parliament:
Leader and Honourable Members, you have heard the Leader read my Bill; I have nothing else to add to it. However, what I do have to say to you concerns the work planned in this Bill, that is, with regard to the administration of your lands. For this reason it is the authority to control your lands which is called for, along with other things which have come up between you and the Pakeha. You have seen the ways of requesting power, suggestions in support of this are not in here, but you have heard what my ideas are. The second clause suggests for you to arrange a place to establish your own power. Don’t leave it for them to give it to us (Ngapua, May 1893).

Ngapua then sat down to await the responses. First to reply was Mangakahia, who was enthusiastic about Ngapua’s Bill:

Let us persevere, so that we can be successful. There is no other way in which our work can be carried out. If we are unified in our work, it will go well. This was something which was presented earlier to be done. We are not able to branch off in another direction in our work because we have signed for it, that is, to go along according to Taiaroa’s Bill, but rather with Heke’s, for it would not be good to give away the power to other people as Taiaroa’s does….Heke’s Bill is above that of Taiaroa’s because his asks for separate power, while Taiaroa’s asks for power of assembly (Mangakahia, May 1893). eke’s

Mangakahia neatly summarised the strength of Ngapua’s Bill. It was indeed built on the need for the Kotahitanga Parliament to have the sort of power which would give force to its resolutions and legislation. Ngapua was aware that this was a critical requirement, and that if he was unsuccessful, the Kotahitanga movement as a whole, and certainly its Parliament, would struggle to maintain the popular Maori support it had garnered during the previous two years. Others clearly lacked this insight though, and straight after Mangakahia sat down, speeches opposed to Ngapua’s initiative were heard:

R. Aperahama: “The proposals in both Heke and Taiaroa’s Bills are all possible, but I suggest that Taiaroa’s be put
through. Taiaroa is an important man and he knows about the working of his Bill, while Heke does not. He is like us…(Aperahama, May 1893).

H. K. Taiaroa: “I went to work on the right thing. There is not one word about separate power in Heke’s Bill discussed here by you, but there is in mine. These two Bills are pretty much alike, but the words on Heke’s have something behind them and for that the Pakehas will be rather suspicious and they will respond like this: ‘There is something devious behind all this’ (Taiaroa, May 1893).

There were then a series of ad hoc statements given by some members indicating their position on Ngapua’s Bill. The opponents to it who spoke at this time were H. Ropiha, N. Patuawa, W. Kupa, A. Kume, and H. Niania. Those who supported Ngapua’s Bill included W. Kawatupu, N. Haari, Karena Kiwa, Kiriwehi, H. Paea and R. Huru (Minutes, May 1893). The fact that there was a lack of unanimity is very revealing. This was more than a manifestation of a pluralistic people at work. The division hinged on the issue of separate development. Despite the fact that Ngapua supported the separatist model, ultimately, the Kotahitanga movement was to drift increasingly closer to a cooperative model with the colonial Government.

Although the fate of the Kotahitanga movement was destined to follow that of other Maori separatist movements in the nineteenth century and eventually dissolve into complete powerlessness, there was one significant difference. Kotahitanga had supporters in the House of Representatives by the mid-1890s. Maori members such as Wi Pere, Hone Heke Ngapua, and Ropata Te Ao were all affiliated with the movement, and sporadically disclosed their loyalty and commitment to Kotahitanga during their tenure in Parliament (New Zealand Herald, 6 February 1895).

Carroll was almost certainly conscious of the ultimate probable fate of the movement, and attempted to steer this embryonic institution to a position where it would operate as little more than an advisory body to the ‘real’ Parliament in Wellington. This was to ensure that the work of the Maori
Members of the House of Representatives was not hijacked by the Kotahitanga movement. Carroll had spoken to the assembly of chiefs in Waipatu in 1892, gently encouraging them to act in what was essentially an advisory capacity: ‘…this [Kotahitanga] government should present their opinions which they have considered as appropriate, to be sent to the main Parliament which takes place at Poneke [Wellington]’ (Carroll, 21 June 1892). He went as far as to try to guide the Kotahitanga Parliament to reverse its position against the despised Native Land Court: ‘In my opinion, the Maori Land Court should not be completely done away with because we know we could not accomplish the work of that Court’ (Carroll, 21 June 1892).

Carroll’s efforts at subtle diplomatic manoeuvring did nothing to budge the Kotahitanga Parliament at this sitting. It eventually endorsed the proposals against the Native Land Court and against Carroll’s suggestion that the Kotahitanga Parliament serve merely as a body to make recommendations to the Parliament in Wellington (Ngapua, 17 June 1892).

The Failure to Overcome State-Sponsored Maori Development

As with the King Movement a few decades earlier, many of the adherents of the Kotahitanga movement had experienced some of the social and economic the ruptures caused by involuntary land alienation. Herein lay the crux of the problem. Huge numbers of Maori (over half of all adult Maori in the early 1890s) (Translation of the proceedings of Maori meetings in the Maori language, J. McRae (trans.). 14 April, 1892) had committed themselves, in writing, to the opponents of the Government’s Maori land policies, yet they continued to lack the means to forestall the ongoing loss of their lands.

The Nexus of Kotahitanga and the European Parliament

In 1893, Richard Seddon took on the mantle of Native Minister, convinced that he had somehow acquired an insight into Maori issues that
had escaped other Europeans in the Government (Burdon, 1955). His assumption of this role followed the passage of the 1893 Native Land Purchase and Acquisition Act, which had been ostensibly designed to protect Maori land through an ad hoc resumption of the principle of pre-emption as it appeared in the Treaty of Waitangi. However, the reception the statute received among many Maori was unfavourable (Cox, 1993). Misunderstanding, suspicion of the Government’s motives, and the often painful experiences of previous Government measures to ‘protect’ Maori land worked together in roughly equal measure to harden Maori attitudes against the legislation. The need to explain the Act, and to allay Maori concerns about it, was one of the catalysts behind Seddon’s tour of the North Island which he commenced towards the end of the summer of 1894 (Costall, 1895). The other influence behind Seddon’s decision to visit Maori communities was to strike a counter-punch against the expansion of the Kotahitanga movement, and its separatist programme for Maori development.

It is unlikely that Seddon fully understood the sentiments which propped up the Kotahitanga movement, and even less probable that he would have sympathised with them. In his crude vision of the Maori world, the Kotahitanga movement was simply a self-interested challenge to the supremacy of Parliament, and its advocates in the House of Representatives were, by definition, duplicitous in their attempts to serve two masters (Burdon, 1955). At one of the meetings in Northland, Carroll made clear the modernising attitude of the Government. He advised Maori to: ‘…divorce themselves from the past…’, and to enter the modern, European world ‘…unimpeded by the traditions and prejudices of old times’ (Carroll in Costall, 1895, p. 24). This sort of language fits perfectly into the mould of Modernisation theory (Smelser, 1966, 1959, Rostow, 1953, 1956, Moore, 1963) with its emphasis of discarding the traditional in favour of the modern.

By 1895, the Kotahitanga movement was beginning to splinter. The previous three years had seen the evolution of factions in the Kotahitanga
Parliament that were loosely modelled on the political parties that existed in the European Parliament. One difference, though, was that the emerging parties in the Maori institution tended to group themselves more around divisions based on personal loyalties and antagonisms. Purely political tactics were also starting to poison the movement, and although the momentum of normal business was maintained, three years of hectic activity without any substantial power to implement Maori self-government was slowly starting to paralyse the entire notion of the Maori Parliament and its broad aspirations for separate development.

In April 1895, a motion had been put to the Kotahitanga Parliament that Ngapua, accompanied by Wi Pere (the Maori member of the House of Representatives for Eastern Maori), would go to Maketu to somehow shut down the Native Land Court that was in operation there. Ngapua’s response to this motion gives an indication of the weakening confidence some Kotahitanga leaders had in their movement:

Wi Pere and I are not able to go because of other kinds of duties. The job which we should be doing is in Poneke. My opinion is that it should be done by the people who have cases there; they themselves should withdraw them. That Court has greater authority than ours but the law itself says that people have the right to withdraw their cases over those days’ (Ngapua, in Fourth Sitting of the Kotahitanga Parliament, 1895).

The statement – implying that the European Parliament in Wellington was where the real power lay – was certainly true, but throwing this fact right in the face of the Kotahitanga Parliament was a damning gesture. Ngapua must have known that it would be an iconoclastic position to assume, but perhaps, to some small degree, this was his intention. Brushing aside his refusal, another plea was put to Ngapua to assist Te Arawa in their dispute with the Native Land Court, but his reply reveals that he would not be budged: ‘I know of no free time for me to do this but it would be appropriate for some of Te Arawa present here to explain all these things
Divisions in the Kotahitanga movement thereafter began to become more pronounced. On 11 April 1895, a petition was presented to the Parliament which called for those members of the Kotahitanga movement who were also Members of the House of Representatives to withdraw from that European institution ‘…to see if there is not sort of advantage that could be produced for us’ (Karorotipihau petition, 1895). Taiaroa had suggested the previous month that if the Maori Members of the House of Representatives in Wellington resigned, then Maori rights would somehow improve. There could be at least three motives behind this initiative. The first would be the belief, held probably only by a few less-realistic Kotahitanga Members, that the withdrawal of Maori from the European Parliament would improve the standing of Maori in the country. The second motive would be that of frustration of seeing the treasured Native Rights Bill defeated in the House of Representatives. If the European Parliament was manifestly unsympathetic to the Kotahitanga movement, why should any Kotahitanga representatives be involved with it? Finally, it is difficult to ignore the personal motives that preyed on this motion. Some Members were cynical of the successes of those Maori who were in the House of Representatives, and were intent on drawing them away from their involvement in the European Parliament. To save these sources of opposition from continuing to aggravate the workings of the Kotahitanga Parliament, Ngapua made his position on the motion clear to all the Members:

I have said a lot over the last days to the tribes of this island regarding the fact that if it was decided now or over the next days that I should leave the parliament in Poneke [the House of Representatives], then I would agree. What E. H. Karaka said was quite right because while we were in Parliament the premier said in his speech from a statement I had made, that Hone Heke had been saying that the Government intended to stop the Maori Members participating in this Parliament and that our speeches and duties would end.
While we were sitting here last week, I went to Auckland and I heard there that the Government might present a Bill like this Parliament’s here. So, Members of the House, at the time the word comes from you, from the Kotahitanga, to withdraw the Maori Members in Parliament at Poneke, that will be the time I will leave that house (Ngapua, in Fourth Sitting of the Kotahitanga Parliament, 1895).

Yet, while the Kotahitanga Parliament finally acknowledged the importance of the presence of Ngapua and Wi Pere in the House of Representatives, Ngapua’s confidence in the role of the Kotahitanga movement as a force for achieving Maori self-determination had plainly withered. The only resort left to the Kotahitanga members who were also Members of the House of Representatives was to plunge their energies into working in the House of Representatives for the sort of changes he desired. They therefore had to take the position that Carroll seems to have adopted several years earlier: that Maori development, if it was to be directed, needed to be done so through the European Parliament. The phase of Maori unrest seemed to be fading.

The demise of the Kotahitanga was in large part due to the management of Seddon. If the Kotahitanga movement is considered as a case of social unrest, then Seddon’s more active role in managing Maori development from the end of the nineteenth century can be interpreted as the state’s successful response to this unrest.

Seddon was victorious in the 1899 general election, and rewarded Carroll for his long-standing support (Costall, 1885) by appointing him Minister for Native Affairs. Such was Seddon’s popularity that his re-election bordered on being a formality. Like the colonial monarch the affectionate title of ‘King Dick’ suggested, Seddon’s power was considerable. Sinclair describes the elections from the mid-1890s until the end of Seddon’s tenure as being ‘…little more than plebiscites which registered the overwhelming public approval of the leader’ (Sinclair, 1988, p. 189). He goes on to give a sense of how Seddon was reaching out to embrace absolutism in his political leadership:
...[Seddon] rid himself of Reeves in 1896; by 1899 McKenzie was too ill to take part in politics; Stout was promoted to the political silence of the Supreme Court. Neither in the cabinet, where he surrounded himself with men who, with the exception of Ward, were nonentities, nor in the House was there anyone to rival Seddon’s pre-eminence (Sinclair, 1988, p. 189).

This shrewd, inelegant, and highly pragmatic despot had also shaped distinct ideas in his thoughts about the role of Maori in the country. He shared the popular view that the demise of the Maori race was now irreversible (Burden, 1955; Newman, 1881), and that the Government’s policies should – in the haunting words of another contemporary New Zealander – ‘…smooth the pillow of a dying race’ (Millar, 1958, p. 104).

On the issue of Maori land, Seddon’s views were a logical projection of his perception of the fate of the race. Certainly, the interests of Europeans were paramount, as he later vociferously argued:

‘They [Maori] must realize…from what has appeared in the press of the Colony, and from what has been stated time after time in this house, that where native lands are suitable for settlement and are doing no good for the Natives themselves, but are retarding the progress of European settlement – they must realize that every year that condition of things continues to obtain the greater is the likelihood of a remedy being applied by Parliament that may not be in the interests of the native race. I do not say this as a threat – I say this in all kindness’ (Seddon, in Burdon, 1955, p. 187).

Carroll’s support of Seddon seems incongruous, but he had several possible motives. As the first ever Maori to become a Minister of the Crown, there would be a panoply of attendant opportunities spread out before him, should he be politically astute enough to manage the conflicting pressures of the post. He also appears to have looked to a time beyond the Seddon regime, when a more assertive Maori presence in Parliament might materialise. More immediately, though, Carroll used his ascent to bridge the chasm that had existed – admittedly in a diminished form in the previous three years – between the more strident supporters of
the Kotahitanga movement, and those Maori who favoured achieving their goals through the European Parliament. The social unrest of the Kotahitanga movement was being sapped, but the edifice of the organisation could be converted into a more modernised institution, working much more closely with the European Government.

The Involvement of Apirana Ngata

With the imminent election to Parliament of the brilliant young Ngati Porou lawyer, Apirana Ngata, Carroll identified another potential ally to his modernising cause. Seven years earlier Ngata had criticised the Kotahitanga movement, dismissing it as being ‘ridiculous’ and ‘crude’ (Ngata, 1896). Yet, he now saw some political mileage to be gained from calculated participation in its workings, particularly as it lumbered through its death throes. From Ngata’s perspective, it appears as though he identified an opportunity to capture a portion of the political mandate that was lying dormant around the crumbling Kotahitanga political structure. Indeed, his biographer has noted that by the time of the meeting of the Kotahitanga Parliament at Ohinemutu in March 1900, Ngata’s attendance ‘…was so much taken for granted…that he was appointed to a sub-committee of the hui to prepare a bill to submit to Parliament’ (Walker, 2001, p. 88). Either Ngata’s earlier position on the Kotahitanga movement had been buried, or more probably, he wished to ensure some sort of transition could be engineered, whereby instead of the movement collapsing to the point where it generated a political vacuum, the members of the Kotahitanga Parliament as well as the loose collection of its supporters could be steered to eventually endorsing his political programme. As Ranginui Walker correctly concedes, ‘Kotahitanga was ripe for a takeover bid and it was not long in coming’ (Walker, 2001, p. 98).

At a very practical level, Ngata was aware that his programme for the modernisation of his people needed to have broad support from Europeans, and consequently, he fashioned his policies in part with a European audience in mind. The final drive towards Ngata’s entry into
Parliament in 1905 – which spearheaded the triumph of the Young Maori Party – led him into a subdued conflict with the old supporter for the Kotahitanga movement, and fellow member of his Ngati Porou iwi, Wi Pere. This seemingly minor political fray was a metaphor for a tectonic shift in the type of Maori representation in Parliament, and the aspirations for all Maori that this presence symbolised. Wi Pere represented the old order, and was resistant to the sort of modernised world Ngata and Carroll were advocating.

Like Ngata, Wi Pere was a devout Anglican, and in addition to being popularly identified by Maori as the Ngati Porou face in Parliament, had had links with the Ringatu movement (Walker, 2001), and, of course, had been one of the pillars of the Kotahitanga movement in the 1890s, when its ambitions came tantalisingly close to being realised. In addition, Wi Pere had opposed the treatment of the Ringatu founder – Te Kooti – at the hands of the Crown. For all these reasons, Wi Pere enjoyed a depth of popular support in the electorate that would be hard for any challenger to undermine or otherwise overtake.

Yet, Wi Pere’s apparent domination in his electorate was predicated on a construction of the Maori world that was evidently under threat from the more modernising view, as embodied by the Young Maori Party. The factors working against Wi Pere were more pronounced by the opening of the twentieth century, and in some instances reflected the encroaching European influence on national Maori politics. For a start, there was the issue of Wi Pere’s age. He was in his sixty-eighth year, and probably lacked the verve that some of the members of the Young Maori Party clearly paraded. Four decades later, Buck wrote in a relaxed manner of the gulf that had opened up between Wi Pere and Ngata at the beginning of the century: ‘The incumbent of the Eastern Maori electorate was the old-fashioned Wi Pere who, like the other old-timers, required an official interpreter to translate English speeches into Maori and his own speeches into English’ (Buck, 1950, p. 24).
Moreover, as has been diplomatically remarked, Wi Pere ‘…lacked command of legal and administrative detail and political subtlety.…The times required trained and subtle minds as well as strong personalities, and the Maori electorate recognised this’ (Ward, 1994, p. 1). Ngata and Ngapua – both young, expertly bi-lingual, with legal backgrounds, and committed to achieving farsighted improvement for their people, were naturally more likely to be inclined to cooperation with each other. A wedge would inevitably be driven between Ngata and Wi Pere at some point in the near future, and this would oblige Ngapua to determine which man he would lend his backing to. Ironically, it was Wi Pere’s well-intentioned attempt to move with the political currents of the time that had unfavourable consequences for his career. Seeing the futility of the original goals of the Kotahitanga movement, Wi Pere put his support behind Carroll’s Maori Councils Bill and Maori Lands Administration Bill. To his intransigent Kotahitanga supporters, this seemed like nothing short of capitulation, and with the passage of further legislation that eroded Maori land-holdings in 1905, Wi Pere’s downward slide became irreversible (Walker, 2001). He became a victim of the unrest phase of this period of Maori modernisation.

Having suggested that Wi Pere was a largely irrelevant presence in Parliament, Buck described how Ngata replaced him: ‘The time had come for Ngata to enter Parliament. Wi Pere had half-promised to stand down and “allow a new net to go a-fishing.” However, he stalled and Ngata had to oppose him in the general election of 1905. Wi Pere was defeated and Ngata, the crusader, entered Parliament’ (Buck, 1950, p. 24). There was no lasting animosity between Wi Pere and Ngata, but none-the-less, a new phase of Maori political representation had arrived. The final demise of the Kotahitanga movement had been effected as a consequence of the forces of modernisation gaining greater currency especially among a younger generation of Maori leaders.
Conclusion

There are several important development themes that are evident in the brief history of the Kotahitanga movement. These themes are of critical importance because they demonstrate some of the central tenets of Modernisation theory, and also because they allow the experiences and workings of the Kotahitanga movement to be contextualised as part of a broader process of Maori development.

The first of these themes is that of social unrest. What is clear from the analysis of the movement is that social unrest is much more than simply the sort of instinctive, unplanned, almost chaotic resistance that Smelser (1966) anticipated. Instead, the Kotahitanga movement was highly organised, and ironically, took on many of the traits of the system it was attempting to partially subvert. This is particularly the case in its attempts to build up a national political mandate (thus overriding the traditional hapu- and iwi-based political systems) and its adoption of the structures and formalities of European political organisations. This compromised form of social unrest adds a new dimension to the principle espoused by earlier Modernisation theorists. The unrest, in this example, was planned, generally unemotional, rational, and orderly. This demonstrates that the character of such unrest does not have to be as negative as previous theorists have described or implied it as being (Smelser, 1966; Nash 1963; Moore, 1963).

As part of the overall process of modernisation, the Kotahitanga can be seen as a stage in the pre-conditioning process (Rostow, 1956). According to the broad historical perspective employed by Modernisation theorists, movements such as Kotahitanga are part of the inevitable process of the preconditioning of a traditional society before it is in a position to fully assimilate into a modernised society. This is an important consideration, because if such an assumption is correct, then there is an implication that initiatives such as the Kotahitanga movement are almost automatically doomed to failure because they are permitted only a temporary tenure as the process of development runs its course. A
similar fate would be prescribed under the regime Smelser (1966) proposed as the traditional society in a country lurched forward awkwardly to the modernised ideal.

In addition to the sophisticated sort of social unrest that the Kotahitanga movement represented, there is also another important aspect to its existence from a development perspective. This is the evident impossibility of having two streams of intentional development existing at the same time in the same field. From the 1890s, the European administration in the country was taking a far more active and intentional role in shaping Maori development. Seddon, assisted by Carroll, and then later, the activities of Ngata during the early years of the 1900s, all formed part of a compelling programme to transform Maori society. The intentional development ambitions of the Kotahitanga movement, which centred around establishing separate political and social development, could manifestly not function in the same arena as that of its ‘competition’. The main conclusion that can be drawn from all these factors is that in the spectrum of modernised development, the inception of the Kotahitanga movement, at the time it occurred, and with the goals it strived for, was only ever likely to be a temporary initiative. It can be located easily in this setting as a movement of social unrest, and as an interim (albeit intentional) initiative in the preconditioning phase of a traditional society.

Following the demise of the Kotahitanga movement as a force in national politics by 1905, there were several decades where the collective Maori voice in the European political realm appeared to have been silenced. However, the emergence of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, following a short but forceful period of Maori lobbying, commenced a more advanced stage in the modernisation process for the indigenous people of the country. This theme is examined in the following chapter.
6. TREATY SETTLEMENTS

Following a comparatively brief but none-the-less concentrated period of protest in the early 1970s against the Crown’s continued refusal to systematically acknowledge or deal with Maori grievances arising from its breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oliver, 1991), Maori succeeded in 1975 in securing the passage of the Treaty of Waitangi Act through Parliament. Over the next quarter of a century, the Tribunal became one of the main state institutions at the forefront of shaping Maori development in the country (Oliver, 1991) in what turned out to be a specifically modernised form of development.

This chapter examines the significance of various approaches by the Crown to dealing with its breaches of the Treaty. It focuses mainly on the contribution of the Waitangi Tribunal – which the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act established – to Maori development in the late twentieth century. Consideration is given to how these efforts have been instrumental in introducing the more advanced stages of the modernisation process to Maori society. The initial section of this chapter deals with the history, structure, and workings of the Tribunal. This is followed by an exploration of three thematic elements that connect the Tribunal and Crown settlements with Modernisation theory: the diffusion of Western, capitalist modes of organisation to traditional socio-economic structures; the realignment of national identity; and the application of the Tribunal’s Development principle which fostered a modernised approach to the interpretation of the Treaty and the ensuing grievances relating to its breaches by the Crown. What is evident in the analysis of all of these themes is that the Crown’s Treaty settlement policies have been significant devices in advancing the process of modernisation in Maori society.
The History and Workings of the Tribunal

After years of growing unrest among some Maori groups over the Crown’s failure to address its breaches of the Treaty, the Crown, the third Labour Government decided in the early 1970s that some formal and systematic process was needed to investigate Treaty breaches (Oliver, 1991). The response was the formation of the Waitangi Tribunal. This section considers the workings of the Tribunal and its role in the modernisation process affecting Maori in the late twentieth century.

From the point of its inception in the 1974 Treaty of Waitangi Bill, the Tribunal heralded a major shift in the way the state dealt with Maori, and the implications of this altered mode of treatment on subsequent Maori development. Speaking at the introduction of the Bill in November 1974, its main proponent, Labour MP Matiu Rata, argued that the intended purpose of the Tribunal was as much about the principles of the Treaty, and the way these affected relations between Maori and non-Maori in the country, as it was about the resolution of grievances:

While the Treaty can be regarded as the possession by the whole of our nation of an instrument of mutuality that has endured for the past 134 years, to the Maori people it is a charter that should protect their rights. The Bill is primarily aimed at satisfying honour. It will also give physical and lawful sustenance to the long-held view that the spirit of the Treaty more than warrants our country's continued support (Waitangi Tribunal, 2003, p. 1).

The Tribunal emerged not as a court, although it was a branch of the Ministry of Justice, but more as a permanent commission of inquiry. Its jurisdiction was initially limited to grievances arising from breaches of the Treaty occurring since the formation of the Tribunal (Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975) and was empowered only to make recommendations on claims it received. The right to decide on these claims, based on the subsequent recommendations produced by the Tribunal, rested with the Crown.
The exception to its recommendatory status is the right the Tribunal has, in limited situations to make binding decisions. These are known – somewhat paradoxically – as binding recommendations (Waitangi Tribunal, 2003). These relate to the return of Maori land, and affect: Crown forest land that is subject to a Crown forestry licence; ‘memorialised lands’, which are lands owned, or formerly owned, by a state-owned enterprise (Treaty of Waitangi State-Owned Enterprises Act, 1987), or a tertiary institution; and former New Zealand Railways lands, that have a memorial (or notation) on their certificate of title advising that the Waitangi Tribunal may recommend that the land be returned to Maori ownership (Waitangi Tribunal, 2003). However, to date, this provision has only been used on one occasion, and is in no way indicative of the normal type of recommendation issued by the Tribunal.

The legislation that created the Tribunal was explicit that claims could only be made by Maori against the Crown, and not against private individuals or private property (Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975). Moreover, the Tribunal has the right to refuse inquiry into a claim if it finds it too trivial, or if more effective means of resolving a grievance exists (Waitangi Tribunal, 2003).

Despite the fact that the work of the Tribunal was restricted in the first decade of its existence as a consequence of its limited jurisdiction, it made some significant advances in the way in which it saw its role as contributing to Maori development. The following extract from a 1983 Tribunal report is worth quoting in some length because it gives a sense of the urge for Maori development among Tribunal members that accompanied the processes of grievance resolution, and suggests the foundation upon which the Tribunal’s recommendations were crafted:

The Treaty was an acknowledgement of Maori existence, of their prior occupation of the land and of an intent that the Maori presence would remain and be respected. It made us one country, but acknowledged that we are two people. It established the regime not for uni-culturalism, but for bi-
culturalism. We do not consider that we need feel threatened by that, but rather that we should be proud of it, and learn to capitalise on this diversity as a positive way of improving our individual and collective performance.

The Treaty was also more than an affirmation of existing rights. It was not intended to merely fossilise a status quo, but to provide a direction for future growth and development. The broad and general nature of its words indicates that it was not intended as a finite contract but as the foundation for a developing social contract (Motunui-Waitara Report, 1983, s. 10.3).

This is such a significant statement because it couches the relationship between Maori and non-Maori – as described in the Treaty – as being as much about furthering Maori development than as simply investigating breaches of the agreement. This explicit statement of intent by the Tribunal to become involved in guiding Maori development explains why the Tribunal and its work must be seriously considered from a developmental perspective.

*Extending the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction*

Ten years after the Tribunal had come into being, an amendment to the legislation governing its existence had a striking impact on the future of the institution. The fourth Labour Government altered the Treaty of Waitangi Act to enable the Tribunal to consider grievances extending back to 1840, rather than 1975 as had previously been the case (Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985).

The effect of this amendment was to open the floodgates to a deluge of claims that had the potential to dramatically influence ideas about Maori development (Oliver, 1991). This was particularly so because of the hundreds of millions of dollars that it was anticipated would be returned to hapu and iwi as compensation for losses. Certainly, the ensuing history of the Tribunal revealed a huge increase in claims and payments to iwi (Office of Treaty Settlements, 2003).
As at June 2003, fourteen historical claims had been settled by the Tribunal, with a combined value of just over $582 million (Office of Treaty Settlements, 2003). The break-down of iwi and settlement amounts is as follows: Ngati Ruanui, $41,000,000; Te Uri o Hau, $15,600,000; Pouakani, $2,650,000; Ngati Turangitukua, $5,000,000; Ngai Tahu, $170,000,000; Te Maunga, $129,032; Rotoma, $43,931; Waimakuku, $375,000; Waikato/Tainui raupatu, $170,000,000; Ngati Whakaue, $5,210,000; Haui, $715,682; Commercial Fisheries, $170,000,000; Ngati Rangiteaorere, $760,000; Waitomo, the Crown transferred land at the Waitomo Caves to the claimant group, subject to a lease, and provided a loan $1,000,000 (Office of Treaty Settlements, 2003).

The Tribunal and the Fiscal Envelope

The Fiscal Envelope policy emerged in 1995 partly as a response to the slow progress being made by the Tribunal in settling claims, the increasing number of claimants joining the queue waiting for their grievances to be heard, and the perceived need by the National Government of the day to limit the overall fiscal liability of the Crown for settling these grievances (Victoria University Political Studies Department, 2000). The initial limit set for the resolution of all Treaty claims was $1 billion, compared with the estimated value of claims to the Tribunal – as assessed by Professor Margaret Mutu – as being literally thousands of times as much (New Zealand Herald, 26 July 2003).

However, there were other criticisms of the policy, focussing on the questionable principles that it was founded on, as economist Gareth Morgan observed:

While politically pragmatic perhaps, in the sense that should Maori swallow it, it would “get rid” of the problem, the envelope idea is an arbitrary and gross approach to arriving at, or even approximating any modicum of justice. Its appeal is its finite and expeditious solution to the claim issue, but this is outweighed by the lottery aspect such a rationing process involves. For example, if the envelope essentially covers four
claims say, and three claimants agree with government their “deals”, then the fourth’s compensation is essentially determined. (Morgan, 1995, p. 1).

In addition, the Fiscal Envelope policy allowed tribes to bypass the Tribunal process and negotiate a settlement directly with the Crown. The role of the Tribunal therefore became less certain than it had been prior to this policy being introduced. The Government was clearly eager to hasten the settlement process.

Because of claimants’ concerns over the size of the Fiscal Envelope, the Labour Government revised the policy in 2000. The billion-dollar cap was removed, but the policy on subsequent Treaty settlements would require the use of existing settlements as benchmarks. Thus, while there was technically no expressed limit on the amount of money the Crown would be prepared to pay to resolve a claim, the fact that major settlements, such as those with Ngai Tahu and Tainui, had already been reached meant that the benchmark could approximate the initial size of the fiscal envelope – with perhaps slightly greater latitude in spending by the Crown (New Zealand Herald, 21 July 2000; Office of Treaty Settlements, 2003). Since 2000, the Tribunal has continued to operate, but is still facing hundreds of claims which have yet to be heard (Office of Treaty Settlements, 2003).

The preceding material indicates the present status of the Tribunal, and some of the issues that have impacted on its operations. In the context of the themes being explored in this thesis, however, there are other dimensions to the operation of the Tribunal that are of great significance in the overall course of Maori modernisation in the country.

The Diffusion of Capitalism

In the context of Modernisation theory, the diffusion of elements of capitalism has broader connotations than merely the spreading of a particular system of economic organisation to other societies. It is laden
with the notions of improvement and transformation of traditional societies to modern Western modes of economic organisation (Rostow, 1956; Smelser, 1966; McClelland, 1971; Moore, 1963; Nash 1963). Moreover, it requires a corresponding process of transmission of Western values to traditional societies as much as the realignment of traditional economies to more modern capitalism models.

The Context of Western Values

From the 1960s onwards, various Dependency theorists (Frank, 1971; Limqueco and McFarlane, 1983; Seers, 1981) inflamed by the rhetoric of Marxism, believed that the diffusion of capitalism in non-Western societies was part of a process of imposing specifically Western values on those communities – to the detriment of their own cultures and values (Frank, 1971; Limqueco and McFarlane, 1983). However, such a position misrepresents not only the process of modernisation but also its intent. Many of the values that are diffused by the modernisation process – such as individualism, liberty, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of Church and State, and so forth (Huntington, 1993) – are not necessarily Western values per se. Rather, they tend to be a reflection of the values of societies that have undergone modernisation. Their Western appearance is attributable predominantly because it is Europe where some of these processes and attributes first manifested themselves on a large scale. In this sense, they are as much a product of the modernisation process as they are preconditions (Rostow, 1956). If they are diffused to other cultures and societies, it is only because they have already demonstrated some success in certain national economies.

The Principle of Diffusion

The principle of diffusion – as opposed to its execution – is comparatively straightforward. It is based on the assumption that successful economies and societies will tend, either by design or through an immanent process
of development, spread the values that made them successful to less developed societies. This is one of the core tenets of Modernisation theory. In Frank’s (1971) critique of Modernisation theory and in Nash’s (1963) earlier assessment of the means of attacking the problem of inadequate economic development, the diffusion principle features as one of the prominent elements of the theory. The essential premise behind diffusion is that developed knowledge skills, economic arrangements, structures, values, technology, and capital will be transmitted to underdeveloped communities or societies until such time as those communities or societies become little more than variants of the developed societies which were responsible for the diffusion in the first place (Nash, 1963).

Nash (1963) and Parsons (1960) introduced the principle of diffusion as a process, which was a necessary part of a larger course of action that aimed at modernising communities or societies. Its significance is considerable because although economic development is the stated outcome of diffusion, achieving that singular outcome involves making alterations or modifications to almost all aspects of the society or community which is the recipient of the diffusion. Thus, while the end result may be an improved level of economic performance, the community or society subject to this diffusion may need to realign a range of social cultural, historical and other values in the process.

How diffusion occurs in practice is usually best explored by examining specific cases. In this instance, an exploration of the work of the Waitangi Tribunal reveals a particularly salient examples of the practice of diffusion.

The Tribunal and the Practice of Diffusion
The activity of the Tribunal is typically cast as focussing on resolving grievances arising from breaches of the Treaty by the Crown. However, its diffusionist functions have thus far not been considered. In this area,
Modernisation theory provides a theoretical approach that allows for a different interpretation of the Tribunal’s functions to be applied. Using Nash’s (1963) diffusionist argument as a commencement point for an analysis of this aspect of the Tribunal’s activity, there are some parts of the diffusionist model which seem to bear down heavily on the work of the Tribunal. These revolve around the transmission of structures, values, and capital.

These three elements require some clarification in terms of the way they relate to this case study. The diffusion of structures involves the reorganisation of Maori communities – based on hapu and iwi models – along more Westernised, modern lines. The diffusion of values is more nebulous, but is tied in with other aspects of modernisation promoted by the Tribunal – particularly with reference to the types of values that underpin Maori communities. Finally, the notion of capital in this context can be seen in the transferral of settlement monies as part of the claims resolution process for which the Tribunal is involved.

The scale of some settlements made between the Crown and various claimants as a result of Waitangi Tribunal recommendations has had the effect of altering the structures under which hapu and iwi organise themselves, sometimes in direct response to the settlements engineered by the Tribunal. An example of this is the evolution of the structure of Ngai Tahu following the successful progression of its claims through the Tribunal. Ngai Tahu’s claim fell under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after the passage of the 1985 amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act. In late 1986, Ngai Tahu lodged a claim, alleging that the Treaty had been ‘…breached by the Crown in respect of all ten official purchases of Ngai Tahu land, - from the Otago purchase of 1844 to the Stewart Island purchase of 1864, - and in respect of Ngai Tahu’s fishing rights under the Treaty, and alleging that Ngai Tahu suffered thereby’ (Evison, 1993, p. 487; also see Ngai Tahu Report, 1991; Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report, 1992).
When the Tribunal reported on the initial claim in 1991, the issue of capital being injected into the iwi (albeit capital that effectively had once been Ngai Tahu’s until the Crown misappropriated it) and the implicit requirement for the iwi to restructure in order to take advantage of the potential for development that could flow from the settlement, was referred to in the report (Ngai Tahu Report, 1991). The initial part of this statement identified the issue of economic deprivation as a matter that was material to the settlement: ‘It cannot be disputed that, as a result of the Crown’s numerous Treaty breaches, Ngai Tahu has suffered grievous economic loss. Moreover, much of this loss has persisted for a century or more’ (Ngai Tahu Report, 1991, p. 1056). The report’s authors then established the significance of development to Ngai Tahu, and made connections with that theme and the diffusion of capital (reconfigured by the use of the term ‘compensation’) that the settlement would bring about:

Ngai Tahu is plainly entitled to very substantial compensation….Such compensation would necessarily have to be financial. It would need to be sufficiently substantial to enable Ngai Tahu, now a numerous tribe, to be able significantly to enhance the social, educational and economic well-being of its people’ (Ngai Tahu Report, 1991, p. 1056).

In addition to the strongly modernising tone of this statement, the specific theme of diffusion is not difficult to detect. As Nash (1963) and Rostow (1956) suggested, the transfer of capital is a critical stage in the modernisation process. Rostow (1956) emphasised the need for a sufficient scale of investment in a society or community (along with technical and other forms of diffusion) as one of the principal stimuli that could trigger substantial and rapid economic growth and ensuing long-term self-sustained economic growth (1956).

The other consideration which is relevant to this example is that of the diffusion of structures and values. As a consequence of receiving a substantial settlement – $170 million in capital and assets – Ngai Tahu was forced to reorganise its structures and to some extent, its values, in order to accommodate the diffusion of capital. Prior to the claims being
submitted by Ngai Tahu in the 1980s, the scale of the iwi’s commercial operations was ‘…much smaller…’ and ‘…relatively…unsophisticated’ (Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu, 2003). However, once the settlement was concluded, a new structure was created within Ngai Tahu, know as Ngai Tahu Holdings Corporation. It was the commercial arm of Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu, and established a specific purpose that hitherto had not been part of the Runagna’s operation. The Corporation’s self-stated function is:

… to grow the economic base for the benefit of future generations and to generate sufficient cash flow on an ongoing basis to fund the tribe's development and administration activities. Tribal development activities are quite separately managed in Ngai Tahu Development Corporation with overall direction and allocation of resources being the responsibility of Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu (Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu, 2003).

In addition to the new management structures and accountability regimes that were introduced into Ngai Tahu, modified values also seeped into the activities of the iwi to accompany these developments. Even the language used by Ngai Tahu to describe these new values was resonant not so much of an iwi, but of a modern commercial enterprise, which the iwi had, in part, evolved into:

Ngai Tahu Holdings Corporation’s role is primarily focused on leadership, strategic direction and performance enhancement. There is a strong focus on the quality of current and future investment. Ngai Tahu Holdings is determined not to put itself under undue pressure to generate activity at the expense of quality. There is also a strong focus on partnership with existing industry participants where the ingredients for successful joint ventures can be established. Ngai Tahu Holdings has deliberately adopted a relatively conservative approach to investment…(Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu, 2003).

It is important to note that such modification of values does not necessarily require a sacrifice of existing values. However, Smelser (1966) argues in some detail that eventually, the diffusion of values is likely to permeate other aspects of the community’s life, to the extent that the character of the community as a whole – in areas as diverse as family structures, geographical location, community relations, and so forth – is likely to alter. The only concession he makes to the maintenance of
traditional values in the face of the processes of diffusion is the possibility of ‘…compromise arrangements…’ (Smelser, 1966, p. 123) in which remnants of traditional values are maintained, but are adjusted to suit modern circumstances. The incorporation into Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu of a corporate arm can be interpreted in this context as one such interim arrangement, with the implication that in the longer term, commercial activities or interests will dominate the organisational structure of the iwi.

**Realigning National Identity**

The notion that modernisation requires some form of realignment of national identity is a common theme in the works of several Modernisation theorists (Smelser, 1966; Hoselitz, 1964a; Moore, 1963; Nash, 1963; Parsons, 1960; Rostow, 1953). It is important at this juncture, however, to define national identity in the context of this thesis.

Specifically, national identity, as has been mentioned in Chapter Four on the Kotahitanga movement, is a potentially contentious issue when considering Maori society as a homogenous unit. This is because to do so would be to deny the significance of iwi and hapu units of organisation, many of which could be described – at various stages in their history – as largely autonomous political and social entities. The argument presented in this chapter is that the work of the Waitangi Tribunal and the Crown’s other means of endeavouring to reach Treaty settlements has superficially fortified the strength of iwi identity as opposed to pan-tribal ‘Maori’ identity in most cases, but that to compensate for this, the strength of hapu identity has been correspondingly eroded, and that this entire process is part of the realignment of Maori national identity. This is most evident in the settlement stages of the Tribunal’s activities. There are two case studies that reveal the forces for the realignment of Maori identity in action. These are the Fisheries Settlement and the Tainui Raupatu settlement, the former of which the Tribunal investigated and issued a report on (Fisheries Settlement Report, 1992), and the latter, which the Crown was directly involved with in securing a settlement.
The 1992 Fisheries Settlement, popularly know as the Sealord Deal, was the Crown’s attempt to resolve in a single stroke numerous grievances stemming from several Maori claimant communities around the country for commercial fishing rights (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Claims Settlement Act 1992). The key aspect of the Settlement was that it was pan-tribal in its basis. A commission would be formed (The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission) which would be responsible for managing the combined resources that comprised the settlement on behalf of all Maori, with an allocation model to be determined at a later date (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Claims Settlement Act, 1992). Any future right of Maori to claim for commercial fisheries through the Waitangi Tribunal was also extinguished by the terms of the Settlement (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Claims Settlement Act, 1992).

The salient feature of the Fisheries Settlement was that it was one settlement which completely bypassed the specific grievances of each hapu and iwi, and instead amalgamated all their claims into one. Consequently, the significance of belonging to a particular hapu or iwi was minimised – particularly in the legislation, where no iwi or hapu was even mentioned (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Claims Settlement Act, 1992) – and Maori were categorised by the Crown as a single group possessed of no significant distinguishing social, political, or economic units. Ironically, even the Tribunal was partially complicit in this process of realigning Maori identity in order that all Maori irrespective of hapu or iwi affiliation could thereafter be perceived as a single entity (Fisheries Settlement Report, 1992). The Tribunal, somewhat paradoxically, recommended that ‘…hapu generally have the main interest in the fisheries. However, it is not inconsistent that a national settlement on fisheries should be ratified at no less than an iwi level’, and ‘…the Deal…should bind all, including dissidents’ (Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Claims Settlement Act, 1992, pp. 22-3). Individual hapu or even iwi objections thereafter could have no bearing on the outcome of the Deal, or indeed, even its philosophical validity in the eyes of the Tribunal.
This imposed realignment of Maori national identity – involving the relegation of hapu and iwi status in favour of a single, national entity – is a definite milestone in the path to a modernised society. It is consistent with Moore’s theory on the need for transformation in social organisation (Moore, 1963) which he argued was critical for the society to take advantage of new economic opportunities.

The centralising aspect of the settlement is another dimension which is consistent with the realignment of national identity, in which fragmentary socio-political entities (whanau, hapu, or iwi) are bound together by a centralised body (in this case the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission) for the purposes of economic development. Eisenstadt (1966) stressed the importance of the intensification of centralisation to a society establishing the preconditions for economic development.

The other example that demonstrates the realignment of national identity is seen in the case of the Tainui Raupatu settlement (Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995). The Tainui settlement has added significance because it is broadly representative of the entire settlement process, in which trust boards that purportedly represent an iwi not only manage negotiations, but subsequently assume sole responsibility for managing the settlement moneys. In Tainui’s case, this took place at a confederated iwi level, with hapu effectively excluded from direct control of the allocation of benefits derived from the settlement (Waitangi Tribunal, 2000). As a consequence of this, financial decisions affecting all the hapu in the Tainui rohe were to be determined by the Tainui Trust Board, rather than being devolved to individual hapu. Even the language of status was altered. Hapu were no longer fundamental components of the iwi. Indeed, they barely received any mention in the settlement. Instead, the ubiquitous and demeaning term ‘beneficiaries’ was employed (New Zealand Herald, 19 July 2001) to denote those who might be eligible to receive some form of share of the settlement. The response by some of these so-called beneficiaries was to challenge the entire regime.
that denied the role of whanau and hapu within the iwi. One vocal opponent of the settlement being made and controlled at an iwi level was Huntly General Practitioner, David Gilgen. In 2001, he issued a statement which drew attention to the sort of opposition that existed to the sole jurisdiction of settlements being managed by the iwi: ‘Beneficiaries are planning to intercept or legally challenge any decision to pay funds to the ‘iwi authority’ and I intend filing a claim on mine and my family’s behalf’ (New Zealand Herald, 19 July 2001).

The failure to allow devolution of control over settlement monies to a hapu or even whanau level could also be responsible, in part, for the years of severe dissent that boiled over in the Tainui Trust Board as various factions challenged each other in such a manner that it provoked Maori academic Professor Ranginui Walker to state the nature of the dispute, involving the Maori Queen and the Trust Board – centred on control of the Board and the assets it held – was ‘undermining the last bastion of chieftainship’ (New Zealand Herald, 16 August 2000).

This sort of experience, while possibly on a larger scale in Tainui’s case, was certainly not limited to that iwi confederation. Yet, the Tribunal has continued to negotiate with, and recommend settlements be made to Maori at iwi, or even pan-tribal levels (Office of Treaty Settlements, 2003) to the detriment of hapu and whänau groups in some instances.

Although almost certainly an unintended result of the settlements process, the Tribunal is partially responsible for the realignment of Maori identity into a single entity, devoid of its whanau or even hapu political nuances. This represents an advanced stage in the modernisation process. The insistence on negotiating and settling predominantly at iwi rather than hapu level, as in the case of the Tainui Raupatu claim, and the emergence of pan-tribal settlements, such as the Fisheries Settlement, are evidence of modernising diffusionist forces at work in the Tribunal’s activities.
The Development Principle
In addition to resolving grievances arising from the Crown’s breaches of the Treaty, the Waitangi Tribunal has also been charged with determining the meaning of the Treaty, and with developing principles which capture the essence of that meaning. One of the most significant principles established by the Tribunal has been the Development principle. This right to develop has been divided by the Tribunal into three levels:

1. A right to develop resources that Maori used in a traditional manner in 1840 (‘the first level’);
2. A right to develop resources not known in 1840 (when the Treaty was signed) under the partnership principle of the Treaty (‘the second level’); and
3. A right of Maori to develop as a people (‘the third level’) (Gibbs, 2002, p. 1).

The thinking that underlined such a position rested with the need for the Treaty to be able to accommodate changes in technology, society, values, and so forth which could not have been anticipated at the time of the Treaty’s signing in 1840. The reasoning behind this was to ensure that the Treaty could continue to be used as a basis for resolving tensions between the Crown and Maori over matters which could be linked to the spirit of the Treaty, but were not necessarily explicit in its text.

The Emergence of the Development Principle
The origins of the Development principle lie in the work of the Tribunal in the late 1980s. The Report on the Motunui-Waitara claim (Motunui-Waitara Report, 1989) stated that the Treaty was a document that had the capacity to be adapted to meet changing circumstances. The report’s authors described the Treaty as being ‘…more than an affirmation of existing rights’, and was ‘…not intended to fossilise the status quo, but to provide direction for future growth and development’ (Motunui-Waitara Report, 1989, p. 52; Gibbs, 2002). This sentiment was consistent with the comments of the judge in New Zealand Maori Council vs. Attorney-General in 1987, in which he argued that the spirit of the Treaty was as
important as the text, and that the Treaty had to be seen ‘…as an embryo rather than a fully developed and interpreted set of ideas’ (cited in Gibbs, 2002, p. 6).

One of the clearest statements emanating from the Tribunal on this issue came in the Muriwhenua Fishing Report (Muriwhenua Fishing Report, 1988), in which it was asserted that there was ‘…an inherent right of all indigenous people to develop and progress in all areas’, and that a treaty ‘…that denied a development right to Maori would not be signed’ (Muriwhenua Fishing Report, p. 116). However, the extent of the Development principle was subtly limited in the Radio Spectrum Report (Radio Spectrum Final Report, 1999). The Tribunal made the following comment in the report which was suggestive of possible barriers being erected to the application of the Development principle to its fullest extent:

While it has been generally accepted that there is a development right (which includes the use of technology unknown in 1840) for properties specified in the Treaty, such as land, forest, and fisheries, there has been little agreement over the unspecified ‘other properties’ or taonga. The Crown accepts the development right for specified properties, such as fisheries, and some taonga, such as language and culture (Radio Spectrum Final Report, 1999, p. 41).

One of the significant features of this statement from a Modernisation standpoint is that the Tribunal was directing (or limiting) the extent of development that could be diffused to Maori – confirming that the diffusion relationship is generally an unequal one.

Encouraging Modernisation Through the Development Principle

While there is considerable scope for examining and testing the degree to which the Tribunal would accept the implementation of the Development principle, what has not received attention is the manner in which some of the elements of Modernisation theory have a direct application to the Development principle, and therefore, have flow-on effects on the
character of that Maori development that is either directly or indirectly affected by the decisions of the Tribunal.

This is predominantly a matter that stems from the more philosophical aspects of Modernisation theory. As the name itself suggests, modernisation requires a change to bring nominally underdeveloped groups into a modern state. In the case of the Treaty, because it was concluded in 1840, the risk could be that it could act as an obstacle to development in that it could restrict the right of redress solely to circumstances that prevailed at the time of the Treaty’s signing. In order to facilitate the Modernisation process, it was therefore crucial that the Treaty be re-cast in the light of a document that accommodates and even encourages a modernised approach to claims, rather than the potentially restrictive role which the literal text of the agreement could provide for.

In this context, the Development principle becomes axiomatic in the course of the type of Maori development that is directed by the Tribunal. It is the principle that enables the Tribunal to be part of the modernisation process, and that fosters modernisation as an implicit philosophical approach to development among at least some of the claimants.

**Conclusion**

It was anticipated by the Crown that the Waitangi Tribunal’s formation would lead to some form of resolution of grievances arising from breaches of the agreement extending back to 1840. However, notwithstanding the separate debate on the merits or otherwise of the settlements reached thus far, the Tribunal has also unwittingly been responsible for the promotion of the processes of Modernisation in many Maori communities – with the effects of this modernisation going beyond the immediate claimant groups. This has been achieved in a number of ways. The same can be said for the other means employed by the Crown in an attempt to resolve Treaty grievances.
First, the nature of the settlement process has required some form of diffusion to take place, as prescribed by Modernisation theorists. Specifically, diffusion involves the spreading of the values of successful economic groups to less successful groups. A broader part of this process is the overall modernising of communities or societies on the basis that such modernisation is at least a co-requisite, if not a pre-requisite, for economic development. In the case of the Tribunal’s work, it has assisted in the diffusion of structures designed to modernise the way in which iwi manage their settlement moneys, it has recommended for the transfer of what can be termed ‘capital’ from the Crown to some claimants, and embracing all of this has been the diffusion of modernised values – something that is not possible to articulate directly, but is none-the-less evident in the statements of iwi such as Ngai Tahu, which emphasise modern, Western, corporate values (Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu, 2003). These are effectively imported values that have been grafted on to traditional values in part because of the settlements engineered by the Tribunal and Office of Treaty Settlements.

Another modernising function of the Tribunal and the Fiscal Envelope settlements has been their role in re-shaping some of the notions of Maori national identity. This is most evident in the tribal and pan-tribal settlements, such as those on the 1992 Fisheries Settlement (Fisheries Settlement Report, 1992) and the Tainui settlement (Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995). In these and other similar cases, settlements were made in which hapu and whanau rights were subsumed by iwi or even pan-tribal bodies. This has important implications when it comes to matters of control of resources that are returned to claimant groups. The Tribunal appears to have favoured an approach whereby iwi-based trust boards become the beneficiaries of the settlements (Office of Treaty Settlements, 2003), obliging these entities to make decisions on behalf of their various hapu, and not necessarily in consultation with them (New Zealand Herald, 16 August 2000).
Finally, the Tribunal’s utilisation of the Development principle has been critical in allowing a broader scope of claims to be submitted, but at the same time, it has been a device for facilitating or even imposing the modernisation of some Maori claimant communities.

Overall, it would be fair to assert that the actions of the Tribunal with respect to its modernising influence has been incidental and therefore an example of immanent development along a modernised pathway. The same cannot be said for one of the most audacious examples of deliberate modernisation to have been adopted by the New Zealand Government in the twentieth century: the ‘Closing the Gaps’ policy. This policy is the focus of the next chapter.
7. ‘CLOSING THE GAPS’

In the 2000 Budget (Budget, 2000), the Labour Government introduced a new policy to deal with Maori development issues, and labelled it ‘Closing the Gaps’. Essentially, this policy encapsulated the essence of Modernisation theory, and represents one of the most undiluted and explicit attempts to achieve the Modernisation ideal that had been devised by a twentieth-century New Zealand Government.

The Policy

The Closing the Gaps policy was founded on the awareness by the Government that there were substantial gaps in development between Maori and non-Maori. The core statistics on this issue were published in the National Business Review in June 2000 (National Business Review, 16 June 2000, p. 3), revealing serious disparities in all the indicators listed:

\[\text{Figure 1.} \]

**The Gaps: Socio-Economic Indicators of Maori and non-Maori**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Maori</th>
<th>Non-Maori</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early childhood education participation</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School leavers with Sixth Form Certificate or more</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School leavers entering formal tertiary education</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment among working age population</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment among youth population</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median income of employed population per week</td>
<td>$485</td>
<td>$536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households earning less than $400 per week</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprehension rates per 1000 of 14+ population</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conviction rates per 1000 of 14+ population</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household crowding index (1.0+ is overcrowding)</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy for females (years)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rates per 1000 births</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These ‘gaps’ were not a surprise to anyone as they were consistent with longer periods of poorer performance in the listed areas (Walker, 1990). However, in 2000 the Government made an overt commitment to reduce these disparities. In its budget of that year, it made the following expenditure commitments to ‘close the gaps’ between Maori and non-Maori development:

- $20.8 million (over four years) for Maori economic and organisational development ‘to improve the capacity and capability of Maori organisations, assist with Maori land development and develop local partnerships that will create local employment opportunities’.
- $14.1 million (over four years) for Maori women's development ‘to assist Maori women to enter into, remain in or expand their businesses, and to promote the development of Maori women leaders in their community and provide enterprise and leadership training’.
- $3 million (over three years) for investing in Maori communities ‘to assist whanau, hapu, iwi and Maori communities to identify their needs and support their development’.
- $14 million (over four years) for Iwi/Maori Provider and Workforce Development (including iwi social services) ‘to further develop the capability of iwi social service providers, so increasing the numbers of Maori children and young people cared for by their iwi, hapu or whanau’.
- $10 million (over four years) for a Maori Youth Contestable Fund ‘to fund initiatives developed by Maori communities which aim to reduce Maori youth offending’.
- $19.9 million (over four years) to strengthen the quality of Maori language education.
- $12.9 million (over four years) to improve Maori teacher supply both in mainstream and kura kaupapa schools.
- $11.2 million (over four years) on programmes like mentoring schemes to help young Maori participate more fully in the school system.
- $10.4 million (over four years) for ‘Maori responsiveness initiatives’ including expanding the number of iwi education schooling improvement projects and piloting new approaches for professional development for teachers working with Maori students (Budget, 2000).
When the policy was announced, the Prime Minister, Helen Clark, issued a press release, in which she explained the rationale behind the policy:

In our country growth in inequality has had a unique and unfortunate dimension. There has been a growing disparity between the life chances of Maori and other New Zealanders, and Pacific peoples and other New Zealanders. It is simply not tolerable to this government to see tangata whenua consigned permanently to the status of disadvantaged citizens in their own land. It is not acceptable’ (Clark, 2000).

Here, the Prime Minister linked the difference in economic performance with disadvantage, and couched the concept of rates of economic development with the creation of opportunity. Social Welfare and Employment Minister, Steve Maharey, was more detailed in 2000 in his assessment of the need for this policy:

The Government's commitment to Closing the Gaps responds directly to the widespread call we heard all over New Zealand during the election campaign: that the continued growth of social disparity in our society must be stopped….Our future prosperity will depend on our ability to ensure Māori and Pacific children grow into the highly skilled individuals a dynamic modern economy and society needs. Economic and social disadvantage amongst Māori and Pacific peoples is well documented. Quite simply, all New Zealanders have an interest in seeing the gaps closed. No country can prosper when almost half of its children – New Zealand's future – do not enjoy the opportunities they should. The challenge for Pakeha New Zealand is to get behind the Government as we close the gaps in our society (Maharey, 2000).

In a speech to the Maori Development Conference in Hamilton in August 2000, the Minister of Maori Affairs, Parekura Horomia, offered his assessment of the need for the policy, and the potential benefits he suggested would flow from it:

Closing the gaps is about focusing the collective resources and harnessing the energy of the Government and Māori to improve Māori economic and social results. It is not about capping your aspirations to those of non-Māori. You will find
that the policy is about working from a Māori base to exceed your own expectations and exceed the achievements of others. In doing so, the Government has a very focused role in supporting you in this aim through its closing the gaps strategy....I want to draw your attention to a number of recent initiatives which underpin the Government's commitment to closing the gaps, and promoting Māori economic development. Firstly, the Government has set-up a high powered committee chaired by the Prime Minister called the Cabinet Committee on Closing the Gaps. The main objective of this committee is to provide Māori communities the opportunity to control their own development and achieve their own objectives. The Government's policy for closing the gaps between Māori and non-Māori includes: increasing accountability for Government performance in closing the gaps; improving the effectiveness of Government spending on Māori; and building the capacity of Māori communities to determine their objectives and achieve their own goals. The Government has devised new policies that will make government agencies more accountable for spending on improving outcomes for Māori and closing the gaps (Horomia, 2000).

It was on Budget night, though, that the Finance Minister, Michael Cullen, summarised the approach to implementing the policy, which indicated the extent to which the Government was committed to ensuring the success of Closing the Gaps:

A key task the Government has set for itself is closing the divisive and debilitating gaps that have opened up throughout New Zealand society. There are gaps between the skilled and the unskilled, between employment-rich and employment-poor communities, and between the cities and the provinces. But the most urgent and visible gaps exist between Māori and Pacific communities and others. A lot of effort to close the gaps is going through traditional delivery channels: schools, polytechnics, universities, housing agencies and hospitals. A lot is also going through Māori and Pacific controlled and managed organisations. We need to know whether that effort is achieving the intended results. We are making a significant investment in improving the information base and our monitoring capability. Te Puni Kokiri will receive an extra $12 million over the next four years to monitor the effectiveness of social policy programmes for Māori. We are also making government departments more accountable for
their delivery to Maori and Pacific peoples. From this year, departmental chief executives will be required to disclose in their annual reports what steps they are taking to close the gaps, and will be held accountable for their effectiveness. And we are building the ability of Maori and Pacific communities to realise their own aspirations. The Budget dedicates $114 million over the next four years to build the capacity of Maori and Pacific peoples to design and deliver their own initiatives (Cullen, 2000, pp. 14-15).

Although easily able to be dismissed as little more than political rhetoric, as will be explored in this chapter, these statements reflect some of the core traits of Modernisation theory. There is a philosophical substance to the policy and the statements surrounding its introduction which betrays a specific approach to achieving Maori development.

**Contemporary Reaction**

The significance of contemporary reaction to the Closing the Gaps policy is that it reveals how attempts at modernisation can be perceived in a community or country, and how these can influence the course of the modernisation process.

Generally, reaction to the policy outside the Government was unfavourable. The National Business Review (16 June 2000), was particularly scathing of the policy and the principles that apparently lay behind it:

For the first time this year's Budget has clearly defined poverty on an ethnic basis. The Budget also points the way to a radical shake-up of the methods the welfare state is delivered to Maori and Pacific Islanders as it makes a significant nod in the direction of Tino Rangatiratanga with its emphasis on Maori delivery of services to Maori. This offers up the irony of a Labour-Alliance coalition generally opposing the outsourcing of social services and privatisation within the welfare sector ... while it devolves social services delivery to Maori (National Business Review, 16 June 2000).
An editorial in the New Zealand Herald, which appeared the same day, was similarly dismissive of the chances of success for the Closing the Gaps policy:

In the end the gaps will be closed most emphatically by Maori or Pacific Island parents making determined efforts to lift their lot and that of their children. Some of that resolve would flow from a prosperous economy, and the jobs provided by it. The $20 million to be given to iwi groups over the next four years to create employment opportunities is no substitute for the bigger economic picture... (New Zealand Herald, 16 June 2000).

By the end of the year, scarcely six months after the Closing the Gaps policy had been announced in the Budget, the Government began to react to some of the adverse comments that were being aimed at the policy. In October 2000, Helen Clark diplomatically suggested that there was a need to ‘correct misperceptions’ about the policy (New Zealand Herald, 14 December 2000), and two months later, the phrase ‘Closing the Gaps’ was no longer appearing in documents on the topic issued by the Prime Minister’s office (New Zealand Herald, 14 December 2000).

Clark blamed the National Party Opposition for playing ‘dirty little race politics’ (New Zealand Herald, 14 December 2000), but the issue was far wider, with even the Race Relations Conciliator, Dr. Rajen Prasad, mentioning in his annual report for the year that the perceptions of the Closing the Gaps policy had been ‘damaging’ (New Zealand Herald, 14 December 2000).

The Closing the Gaps policy had lost its title by 2001, and had mutated into more politically-palatable policies such as Capacity Building. It had also by this stage lost some of the philosophical impetus which connected it to Modernisation theory. The connections with certain aspects of the theory were more explicit in the early months of the Closing the Gaps policy’s existence, and included links with the need for intentional
development imposed by a modernising body, and implementing an index-linked method of defining and achieving development.

**Intentional Development and Closing the Gaps**

Intentional development requires a conscious effort by the state to coordinate development for those groups within the state that are perceived as being in need of such development (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). Moreover, there is a requirement that there is substantial state involvement in the entire process, leaving little control over the direction of development to the group subject to the development programme (Wright, 1999). In the words of Overton (2000), such development is deliberately interventionist, and aims to ‘…shape and direct socio-economic change’ (Overton, 2000, p. 2). There is also the inherent presumption permeating the entire process of intentional development that the group being subjected to such development is incapable of directing their own development – an idea more explicit in the writings of earlier Modernisation theorists (Smelser, 1966; Rostow, 1953, 1956; Moore 1963). The Closing the Gaps policy certainly fits into this construct of intentional development in virtually every aspect.

Overton’s assertion that intentional development includes more than just economic changes (2000) is borne out in a speech Parekura Horomia made to a Development Studies Conference in November 2000 (Horomia, 2000a) in relation to the Closing the Gaps policy. In Horomia’s explanation of the policy, he noted that in the definition of development that the policy was based on, consideration was given to ‘…health, education, social, cultural, environmental, and political outcomes for our society’ (Horomia, 2000a, p. 1). And in this process, it would be the Government that would direct the ensuing development – or ‘re-engage with communities’ as Horomia euphemistically put it (2000a, p. 2).

The basis on which this approach is founded lies with the assumption that societies in need of such development are incapable of achieving it
without state assistance or involvement. This is an integral element of intentional development (Cowen and Shenton, 1996), and was evident in the entire philosophical approach of the Closing the Gaps policy. In this policy, Maori development was neither initiated, controlled, managed nor measured by Maori communities. Instead, it would be the state, and its various agencies, that would impose this development on the communities in question. Another implicit assumption visible in this case was that the state’s definition of what constituted development would automatically have to apply to the Maori communities who would become recipients of the policy’s plans for them. There is practically no evidence to even hint that Maori communities were directly responsible for creating the Closing the Gaps policy. This too is evidence of the intentional aspect of this development, as defined by Cowen and Shenton (1996). The fact that the Government has the capacity to order this development is also significant in this context. Order, as a prerequisite of development, is a necessary part of intentional development (Cowen and Shenton, 1996), and is apparent in the structured and controlled manner in which a policy such as this is created and put into operation. It formed part of the Government’s budget (Budget, 2000, 2000a) and was implemented through a range of Government agencies (Cullen, 2000).

**Index-Linked Modernisation**

One of the most significant aspects of the Closing the Gaps policy in relation to its links with Modernisation theory was the manner in which it overtly stated what were the indices that were deemed to be developed – or at least possessing the characteristics of a developed community. Moreover, it went to the next stage by directly stating that Maori – because they were deficient in these areas – needed modification to their communities in order to meet the prescribed indices of success. A more detailed examination of this reveals compelling connections between the policy and Modernisation theory.
There are various indices of Modernisation that have been identified by Modernisation theorists over the last four decades. For Smelser (1966), it was primarily the modernisation of social relations. Rostow (1956) emphasised the need for economic modernisation, and the importance of establishing the appropriate pre-conditions to achieve this. Kedourie (1960) stressed the more generic concept of Westernisation, as being vital, while Nairn (1977) building on Rostow’s work (1956) reiterated the important role of modern capitalism as a means of achieving development. Even areas such as advances in technology (Deutsch, 1953) have received attention as constituent parts of the Modernisation process. Certainly, these ideas can be detected as influences (conscious or otherwise) on the Closing the Gaps policy. The following chart shows how aspects of the Closing the Gaps policy can be connected with themes in Modernisation theory:

**Figure 2.**

**Links Between Closing the Gaps Policy and Modernisation Theory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Component</th>
<th>Related Aspect of Modernisation Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$14.1 million ‘…to assist Maori women…to expand their businesses…and provide enterprise and leadership’.</td>
<td>Modernisation of social relations (Smelser, 1966). Westernisation (Kedourie, 1960).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **$14 million for... Workforce Development.** | Introducing modern capitalism (Rostow, 1956; Nairn, 1977).  
Diffusing Western knowledge and skills (Nash, 1963).  
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992).  
Westernisation (Kedourie, 1960).  
Introducing modern capitalism (Rostow, 1956; Nairn, 1977).  
Diffusing Western knowledge and skills (Nash, 1963).  
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992). |
| **$10 million for Maori youth.** | Modernisation of social relations (Smelser, 1966).  
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992).  
Improving education (McClelland, 1970).  
Encouraging an ethic of self-development and improvement (Bentley, 1997).  
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992).  
Encouraging an ethic of self-development and improvement (Bentley, 1997).  
Introducing economically relevant skills to a community (Hoselitz, 1964a).  
Diffusing Western knowledge and skills (Nash, 1963).  
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992). |
| **$19.9 million to strengthen the quality of Maori language education.** |  
Encouraging an ethic of self-development and improvement (Bentley, 1997).  
Introducing economically relevant skills to a community (Hoselitz, 1964a).  
Diffusing Western knowledge and skills (Nash, 1963).  
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992). |
| **$3 million for investing in Maori communities to “...identify their needs and support their development”** |  
Encouraging an ethic of self-development and improvement (Bentley, 1997).  
Introducing economically relevant skills to a community (Hoselitz, 1964a).  
Diffusing Western knowledge and skills (Nash, 1963).  
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992). |
### $12.9 million to improve Maori teacher supply.

Diffusing Western knowledge and skills (Nash, 1963).
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992).
Improving education (McClelland, 1970).
Encouraging an ethic of self-development and improvement (Bentley, 1997).
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992).

### $11.2 million...to help young Maori participate more fully in the school system.

Reducing a ‘gap’ (Frank, 1971).
Introducing economically relevant skills to a community (Hoselitz, 1964a).
Diffusing Western knowledge and skills (Nash, 1963).
Improving education (McClelland, 1970).
Encouraging an ethic of self-development and improvement (Bentley, 1997).
Integration into Western patterns of development (Armer and Katsillsi, 1992).

Source (Clarke, 2000).

As is plainly evident in this table, the connections between Modernisation theory and the various elements that went to make up the Closing the Gaps policy are substantial. Whether this was by specific design, or part of a broader and unwitting approach to economic development is uncertain, and in this context is less important than the fact of these links existing and being so strong.

*Analysis of the Index Method*
The index method of economic development was strongly criticised by Frank (1971). These criticisms, although general in nature, can be transposed to the Closing the Gaps policy as a means of identifying potential weaknesses in the application of Modernisation theory to Maori development.

The first point to acknowledge in beginning a critique on the index method is that it identifies two distinct types of ‘gap’. The first is the historical gap, most closely associated with Rostow (1956) in which the underdevelopment of a community or society is the consequence of the particular stage of historical evolution that it finds itself in. The second type of gap is the pattern variable approach, which was proposed by Hoselitz (1960, 1964b). This focuses on differences in economic development in a country where there has been a shared history of development over time. Both of these types of gaps appeared to be part of the rationale for the Closing the Gaps policy of mid-2000 (Horomia, 2000, 2000a).

The basis of Frank’s criticism of the gaps approach to tackling underdevelopment hinges on the debilitating effect it has on the make-up of societies. Frank observed that both variants of the index method were based on the:

…assumption that underdevelopment is an original state which may be characterised by the indices of traditionality, and that, therefore, development consists of abandoning these characteristics and adopting those of the developed countries (Frank, 1971, p. 5).

The Closing the Gaps policy navigated around the more severe implications of Frank’s prognosis, to some extent, by emphasising the fact that Maori would somehow be involved in determining the shape of their own development under the policy (Clark). However, this was in contrast to the fact of the policy, in which the state made all the primary decisions.
about the nature, implementation, and extent of the development that the
policy would aim to achieve (Budget, 2000, 2000a; Cullen, 2000).

Frank (1971) was even more scathing of the empirical validity of the
index method – in particular, the presumption it held that the developed
communities or countries were more achievement-oriented than
underdeveloped ones. Such an assertion (Hoselitz, 1960, 1964b) rests on
assumptions about the supposed incapacity of underdeveloped
communities to be able to direct their own development (this is echoed in
Smelser, 1966). Putting aside the overtly Western definition of
development that Modernisation theorists implicitly assume is
universalist, Frank identifies the fact that even in the most advanced
Western societies, there is ample evidence for the fact that
underdevelopment is not only present, but is actually expanding (Frank,
1971).

Although there could have been some possible use in exploring some of
these criticisms of the index-linked method in the case of the Closing the
Gaps policy, there was apparently no such consideration given by those
who devised the policy. Consequently, the policy reflected a strictly
modernised approach to achieving economic development, with little
evident consideration given to the potential difficulties such a programme
could encounter.

**Conclusion**
The Closing the Gaps policy was relatively short-lived. From its public
announcement in the June 2000 Budget (Budget, 2000, 2000a), the phrase
‘Closing the Gaps’ ceased to be used by Government politicians from
December that year. However, despite its short tenure, the policy
represented a robust effort at achieving modernisation in Maori
communities, and operated on several levels in order to do this.
Firstly, it was a clear example of intentional development. The policy specifically aimed at achieving much more than just economic growth for the Maori sector of the country’s population. Such a broad approach is characteristic of intentional development policies (Overton, 2000), and is based on the belief that assistance in several categories of development is required because the subject group is incapable of achieving its own development independently of such guidance (Cowen and Shenton, 1996).

The Closing the Gaps policy was also highly significant from a developmental perspective because it so closely mirrored the index-linked aspect of Modernisation theory. The table (Fig.2) demonstrates the connection between the elements of the Closing the Gaps policy and various indices of modernisation which have been proposed by a range of Modernisation theorists.

One of the observations made on these close connections is the fact that there was effectively no consideration given to some of the critiques of such an approach. Frank’s (1971) criticism of the index-linked method raises concerns about cultural assimilation, the ability for underdeveloped communities to be given responsibility for their own development, and the general implicit assumptions of Modernisation theorists about the type of history underdeveloped communities have had. That these issues were not really addressed in the closing the Gaps policy reveals the extent to which it was a product of a Modernisation approach to socio-economic development.
8. CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the relationship between certain descriptive and prescriptive elements in Modernisation theory, and various episodes in Maori development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It has also considered how the notion of intentional development features as an additional device for examining the modernisation of Maori society over the past two centuries. After establishing the theoretical framework for such development, the remainder of the thesis has explored the application of the theory to actual events along the path of Maori development since the early nineteenth century.

The Theoretical Basis

Chapter Two examined a range of the main components that constitute Modernisation theory. The overarching theme in this chapter was the exploration of the characteristics and implications of social transformation that are said to accompany rapid economic development – particularly for non-Western peoples living within an emerging Western economic environment. This sort of transformation was further defined by dividing the possible types of development into either immanent or intentional forms.

A broad scope of Modernisation theorists was considered to give a fuller representation of the main tenets of the theory. Rostow (1953,1956,1961) was selected for his work on the economic dimension of development. This was complemented by Smelser’s (1959,1966) analysis of the social implications and prerequisites for development to take place: a theme that was also examined by McClelland (1970), Hoselitz (1960), and Nash (1963). The importance of the character of a society to its potential for development was examined at this juncture (Hoebink, 1997), as was the distinction between traditional and modern societies (Frank, 12971; Parsons, 1960; Smelser, 1966).
Another consideration was that of the isolation of an underdeveloped society (Smelser, 1966; Rostow, 1956; Nash, 1963; Parsons, 1960; McClelland, 1970), and the role of deviance in triggering development and bringing about the necessary social change that Modernisation theorists argue is necessary for such development to be sustained (Durkheim, 1933, Henderschott, 2002, Riesman, 1961; Armer and Katsallis, 1992). A particular area of focus at this point was the modernisation of social relations, which was surveyed by Smelser (1966), and also assessed by other Modernisation theorists to be a central aspect of the development process (Black, 1966; Bentley, 1997; Nash, 1963; McClelland; 1970).

One of the potential by-products of the Modernisation process is social unrest. This was drawn attention to by Smelser (1966), Rostow (1956), and had its thematic precedents in the work of Mill (1861). The consensus of these analysts was that social unrest was usually unavoidable, and nearly always necessary as part of the transition a society was required to undergo in order to achieve a developed state. Once the process of Modernisation had been complete, there were an array of elements that potentially characterised its new position. These included state-building (Tilly, 1975; Hall & Ikenberry, 1989), the emergence of modern capitalism (Nairn, 1977; Rostow, 1956), industrialisation (Gellner, 1983), print capitalism (Anderson, 1991), Westernisation (Kedourie, 1960), advances in technology (Deutsch, 1953), the realignment of national identity (Thurman, 2001), and Rostow’s (1956) goal for a developed state, which he described as ‘…the long, fluctuating story of sustained economic development’ (p. 30).

The final aspect considered as part of the theoretical framework for this thesis was the role of immanent and intentional development. This distinction was first argued by Cowen and Shenton (1996), and offers a means of contextualising the processes of Modernisation from the perspective of state involvement in attempting to bring about
development. Thus, it also allows the trend of the Modernisation of Maori society in New Zealand in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to be seen in relation to the growing role of the state in the ordering of this development.

The Application of the Theory to Case Studies
The first case study considered in this thesis – in Chapter Three – was that of Te Nakahi. This sect appeared before the establishment of formal British rule in New Zealand in 1840, and is important because it revealed traces of both internal and external forces affecting the shape of Maori development in this period. Its emergence was also significant because it demonstrated how embryonic moves towards a modernised society can be represented by an immanent form of development, and contained elements of deviance in its doctrine. The type of deviance identified in this case was a ‘dual deviance’ in that it was a counter to both traditional, orthodox Maori religious beliefs as well as against the religion of the missionaries. In this dual deviance, Te Nakahi demonstrated a symptom of the initial stages of modernisation.

Also evident in the case of Te Nakahi was a suggestion of social unrest. In the decades following the establishment of British rule in Nineteenth-century New Zealand, Nakahi members such as Hone Heke, Hone Heke Ngapua, and Hone Toia, used their adherence to Te Nakahi as a point of resistance to British rule.

Chapter Four considered the activities of the Office of Protector of Aborigines, which was conceived in 1839 and effected in 1840. Despite practical obstacles, such as poor quality staff and inadequate budgets, the Office none-the-less represented an overt attempt by the British Government to impose a specific type of development on Maori. This was the first major example of intentional development being applied to Maori society by the British, and had a definite modernizing intent in its policies. Its aims included structural change in Maori society, and the
eventual assimilation of Maori into the growing European society in the country. However, the Office was beset by a dilemma in its modernizing programme. One the one hand, it wished to bring about a transformation of Maori society, while on the other hand, it had an expressed interest in ‘protecting’ Maori from some of the adverse effects of British colonisation.

The following chapter examined a Maori response to British rule which manifested itself by the end of the nineteenth century in the form of the Kotahitanga movement. This encapsulated the type of social unrest Smelser 1966) anticipated, but assumed a far more advanced and sophisticated form that Smelser’s (1966) description allowed for. The pan-tribal aspect of the Kotahitanga movement was also a sign of the forces of Modernisation affecting Maori society, as was the principle of voting in leaders, rather than relying on hereditary lines to determine leadership, as had traditionally been the case. The Kotahitanga movement can also be seen as part of the pre-conditioning process of Modernisation, in which societies must reorganise their social, economic and political structures to allow transformation to occur.

Another important aspect of the Kotahitanga movement was that it demonstrated the difficulty, and eventually the impossibility, of having two institutions competing to effect the intentional development of a group. Eventually, the Kotahitanga movement had to defer to the greater authority of the Crown in this area, and by 1905, the Crown reassumed its role as the primary organization responsible for planning Maori development.

Chapter Six focused on the work of the Waitangi Tribunal and other initiatives by the Crown at resolving grievances arising from breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. What’s evident in this case study is the manner in which these efforts, orchestrated by the Crown, assisted in the process of the Modernisation of Maori society. Themes raised in this chapter include
the diffusion of modernised values and practices, and the re-shaping of Maori identity into more of a pan-tribal notion.

The final case study considered in this thesis is that of the Government’s Closing the Gaps policy. This was a solid example of intentional development, and resembled Modernisation theory in its insistence on development extending beyond merely economic development. Also implicit in this policy was the presumption that Maori society was incapable of engineering its own development to the extent that the Crown deemed it necessary to direct this development through this policy. This too was another significant resemblance of the tenets of Modernisation theory. The Closing the Gaps policy was also noteworthy from a Modernisation theory perspective because it utilized the index-linked element of the theory. This was demonstrated in the table which appears in the chapter as Figure 2.

**Conclusion**

This thesis concludes that there has been a discernable intensification in the forces of modernisation impacting on Maori, and that this has been complemented by more deliberate efforts – at a governmental level – to advance this process. One consequence of this conversion has been that the alternative models for Maori development have been virtually excluded, even from consideration, and that a singular theoretical model has become the near-universal standard for governmental discourse about this area of indigenous development in New Zealand.

**Significance**

This thesis is significant in a number of areas. It is the first time Modernisation theory has been applied to the case studies under consideration, and also the first time the model of Modernisation theory has been used as a means of assessing changes in the state’s approach to Maori policy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Another area of significance, related to the theoretical framework employed in this thesis, is the application of the principles of immanent and intentional development. These too have not previously been used to apply to the case studies utilised in this thesis, and are important because they provide a setting for the application of Modernisation theory. The delineation of immanent and intentional development, and more specifically, the extent of intentional development ordered by the state, is vital because the inherent presupposition behind its use is that the extent to which a policy of intentional development is applied is commensurate with the extent to which the subject group of the policy is supposed to be unable to exercise their own development.

The other key area of significance in this thesis relates to the material that has been brought to light in the course of researching for some of the case studies. This is particularly so in the chapters on Te Nakahi and the Kotahitanga movement, in which previously unused data, including interview material and unpublished documentation from private collections, has been used for the first time for the purposes of research.

Areas for Further Research

One of the benefits of the model this thesis uses is that it can be applied to any of the numerous other cases of Maori development in the last two centuries. This transportability is important because it allows single episodes of Maori development, or a set of events to be considered from a specific developmental perspective, and be linked in a way that would not otherwise be possible.

There are various other avenues for research. The first involves utilising other case studies, of which there are potentially thousands, to see how they fit into the broader matrix of Modernisation. The second takes the opposite approach, in which one case study could be explored in
considerable depth to examine the extent to which the various facets of Modernisation theory apply to it.

Another area for further research would involve an evaluation of the extent to which Government policy since the beginning of the twentieth century has veered closer towards the Modernisation model. This could be traced by examining the aims of policy over a given time, in a particular policy field, and determining the similarities with the prescriptive and descriptive aspects of Modernisation theory.
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